Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

[Madhu]

Luttwak states that he thinks the entire thing is a bad idea, but some military aid is now official policy.

I thought he was just talking about vetting groups, not literally trying to recreate Anbar.

It was for several good and solid reasons that U.S. President Barack Obama's administration long resisted pressures to intervene more forcefully in Syria's civil war. To start with, there is the sheer complexity of a conflict at the intersection of religious, ethnic, regional, and global politics, as illustrated by the plain fact that the most Westernized of Syrians (including its Christians) support the Assad government that the United States seeks to displace, while its enemies are certainly not America's friends and, indeed, include the most dangerous of Muslim extremists. But no matter: After two years of restraint, the administration -- having decided to send "direct military assistance" to the rebels -- has chosen sides and is now choosing sides within sides.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...g_rebels_syria

It is now argued most authoritatively that U.S. President Barack Obama's failure to act decisively to remove Bashar al-Assad's regime from power in Syria is explained by internal divisions within his administration, miscalculations about the balance of power on the ground, and the president's own irresolution. There is another explanation, however: that the Obama administration is showing calculated restraint induced by bitter experience and, even more, by the overriding strategic priority of disengaging from the Islamic arc of conflict to better engage with China.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...d_enough_alone

One comment I've read frequently is "if only we had intervened earlier, things would be different", the moderate opposition would be the main fighters and there would be no radicals involved.

I don't see why people think that, earlier intervention doesn't preclude others arming competing groups. Once violence is unleashed, it's hard to predict the outcome.

Ken White (he hasn't posted in a while, hope he's well) used to get it just right: most of what we do overseas is almost reactionary and based on domestic politics.

[Madhu]

carl,

I'm not sure I follow your logic. I think intervention is a mistake on both humanitarian and realist grounds--I don't think I need to repeat my reasoning here--but what do you think the goal or goals should be? Proponents offer multiple and contradictory goals, at times. The things you mention have nothing to do with leadership, they are a contradictory and conflicting wish list. What is the ultimate goal, why is it the proper goal for the US, is it possible, what might be expected problems, and how much blood and treasure might be required to accomplish stated goal, it is even possible?

(I may be excessively influenced by friends from the region, many Syrian Christians.)

[carl]

carl,

I'm not sure I follow your logic. I think intervention is a mistake on both humanitarian and realist grounds--I don't think I need to repeat my reasoning here--but what do you think the goal or goals should be? Proponents offer multiple and contradictory goals, at times. The things you mention have nothing to do with leadership, they are a contradictory and conflicting wish list. What is the ultimate goal, why is it the proper goal for the US, is it possible, what might be expected problems, and how much blood and treasure might be required to accomplish stated goal, it is even possible?

(I may be excessively influenced by friends from the region, many Syrian Christians.)

Madhu: Read what I wrote again, carefully. Then read what you wrote above. They don't seem to be related.

[Dayuhan]

Madhu: Read what I wrote again, carefully. Then read what you wrote above. They don't seem to be related.

I see the relation, and I was about to ask a similar question. You repeatedly suggest that there are options that would be possible or practical without what you seem to suggest are leadership constraints:

The way we do it, yes.

I still think that if we played the game hard enough, we could exercise much much more control than we think possible.

I can't think of any good way, that the US leadership would actually do

Or at least keep the thing from spreading too far, prevent an AQ emirate in east Syria and west Iraq and install a regime (not PC for sure) that wouldn't slaughter too many people and cause a lot of trouble. But we ain't capable of achieving that given our leadership

If we were willing to tell the Russkis to go stuff it. If we told the Iranians they ain't seen nothing yet if they keep horsin' around. If we told Israel that the days of us dancing to their tune were over, they will survive as a state but we play the music. Same thing with the Gulf States, especially the Gulf states.

The problem is the inside the beltway elites won't do any of this stuff

All of this suggests a belief that viable options (hinted at, but never specified) exist that have a real chance of altering the state of affairs in a favorable manner, but that leaders are unwilling or unable to pursue them. I wonder what exactly those options are, and why you think they'd achieve anything.

I, and I believe Madhu, believe that the problem is not leadership, but rather the inherent undesirability of intervening in a situation where we have no realistically achievable goal and where applying force is likely to forcefully dig us into a very unpleasant hole.

[carl]

I see the relation, and I was about to ask a similar question. You repeatedly suggest that there are options that would be possible or practical without what you seem to suggest are leadership constraints:

All of this suggests a belief that viable options (hinted at, but never specified) exist that have a real chance of altering the state of affairs in a favorable manner, but that leaders are unwilling or unable to pursue them. I wonder what exactly those options are, and why you think they'd achieve anything.

I, and I believe Madhu, believe that the problem is not leadership, but rather the inherent undesirability of intervening in a situation where we have no realistically achievable goal and where applying force is likely to forcefully dig us into a very unpleasant hole.

You really think so? Well golly, who knew?

[J Wolfsberger]

Luttwak states that he thinks the entire thing is a bad idea, but some military aid is now official policy.

After what you and wm wrote, I reread the article in (ahem) a less reactionary mode. You are both correct.

That said, in response to both of you, I'd suggest that the most we should or effectively can do is help provide humanitarian aide and security for safe zones where those who wish can escape the slaughter.

I think I'd also favor offering refuge to the Christian minority. No matter how this turns out, I don't foresee any future for Maronites or Chaldeans in the region.

[davidbfpo]

If there was ever a time for external US-led intervention in Syria that has passed; IIRC we discussed this two years ago, mainly in the context of imposing no-fly zones and internal safe havens.

J Wolfsberger posted just:

I'd suggest that the most we should or effectively can do is help provide humanitarian aide and security for safe zones where those who wish can escape the slaughter.

Yes we, the West, could help with humanitarian aid, although I do wonder why the rich Arab nations have not been able to sign all the cheques.

'Security for safe zones' is far more problematic. Safe zones outside Syria maybe easier, although both Jordan and Turkey have considerable numbers of refugees. Lebanon has fewer. Will 'security for safe zones' mean preventing their use as rear bases by the insurgents rather than guarding them against regime coercion?

Personally I don't think the West should undertake such a 'security' role outside or inside Syria. A UN 'blue beret' presence I expect would be opposed by Russia and China; assuming Jordan and Turkey sought that.

The Western experience in the ill-fated MNF in the Lebanon, even before the attacks on French paras & US Marine bases, is a more likely template. Oddly at least one UK analyst ignores that:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22967636