Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

[J Wolfsberger]

I suspect Mr. Luttwak fancies himself a 21st century Herman Kahn.

He's wrong.

The article did make some good points, but failed dismally by not even raising the central question: Why should we do anything?

We don't have any friends in this fight. I don't think there's any of them I'd WANT as a friend. At best, there are some innocent civilians caught in the crossfire. Fine, let's establish protected safe havens. But as for the rest, as far as I'm concerned they can slaughter each other to their bloodthirsty, savage little hearts' content and Shaitan can sort 'em out.

[wm]

I suspect Mr. Luttwak fancies himself a 21st century Herman Kahn.

I think the comparison to Herman Kahn may be a little overdrawn. As I am sure you are aware, Luttwak has written 2 books in which he tries to spell out the "Grand Strategy" of the later Roman and Byzantine Empires. Arguably, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the USA stands as a modern analog to the Roman and Byzantine empires of the 1st to the 6th centuries AD. One might consider Luttwak's recent effort as a stab at educating the latest American leadership on lessons to be learned from the failed strategies of those two former world powers. Whether Luttwak has correctly identified the strategies of the Romans and Byzantines and whether the lessons learned are really applicable to America and the world of the 21st century are probably much more fruitful ways to criticize him.

But, as pointed out, a cost benefit analysis ought to be the first order of business, with the bottom line being an answer to the question, "Does the US achieve a net gain by intervening?" I suspect a disinterested, rational calculation (one that avoids placing too much value on the need to demonstrate leadership's testosterone level) will identify a significant net loss to America.