Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

[Dayuhan]

I am not sure the tribes were sponsored or "effectively controlled" by anybody but themselves.

Very true, and Luttwak's demand that the US "lay some ground rules for the endgame" seems to me an exercise in fantasy. Various rebel groups will make whatever promises they think will get them equipped by the US. If they win, they will do what they want to do, not what they agreed to do. The idea that helping someone allows us to control that someone is utterly specious.

The Soviet Union was a great power. Russia is a demographic disaster ruled by a kleptocracy with an economy that is dependent, still, upon selling extracted resources. They are afflicted with a simmering insurgency (cies) in their south that they haven't been able to make go away in decades. Their military is not so hot. They may have been able to beat up on Georgia but that does not a 'great power' make them. In my view this statement by Mr. Luttwak ascribes power to a state that mostly is nervy.

True to some extent, but great or not, the Russians have sufficient leverage (nuclear and hydrocarbon) to be able to do as they please in the region without fear of direct repercussions. They don't have to be particularly great to provide the "equal and opposite reaction" that is feared. They can provide arms and assistance, and they can get away with it. Iran and Hezbollah aren't great powers either, but they can and will intervene, and the US capacity to control them is limited by domestic political imperatives. Deploying US forces against either is not something Americans are going to want to do, for excellent reasons.

The whole mess illustrates why drawing red lines is such a bad idea. When those lines get crossed, you have to act, or seem impotent. That puts you in a position where your action is purely a response, and you're acting without clear, practical and achievable goals and in circumstances where no compelling US interest is at stake.

J. Wolfsberger's central question remains rather conspicuously unanswered. Why intervene at all? What desirable and achievable end state are we pursuing here?

[carl]

Very true, and Luttwak's demand that the US "lay some ground rules for the endgame" seems to me an exercise in fantasy. Various rebel groups will make whatever promises they think will get them equipped by the US. If they win, they will do what they want to do, not what they agreed to do. The idea that helping someone allows us to control that someone is utterly specious.

The way we do it, yes. And that is probably true in some cases no matter what. But I still think that if we played the game hard enough, we could exercise much much more control than we think possible.

But that is really here nor there because we are so inept that we will be in effect slinging in weapons blindly. That isn't such a good thing.

True to some extent, but great or not, the Russians have sufficient leverage (nuclear and hydrocarbon) to be able to do as they please in the region without fear of direct repercussions. They don't have to be particularly great to provide the "equal and opposite reaction" that is feared. They can provide arms and assistance, and they can get away with it. Iran and Hezbollah aren't great powers either, but they can and will intervene, and the US capacity to control them is limited by domestic political imperatives. Deploying US forces against either is not something Americans are going to want to do, for excellent reasons.

Yes but what power they have I think is really a function of what we allow them to exercise, at least in Russia's case. That doesn't make it any less real on the ground in Syria, but it is what we allow.

There are a lot of things we could do that don't involve troops on the ground. One thing that comes to mind is approving multiple LNG export terminals here in the US. That would be very bad for Russia because a few years after that, no more blackmailing the Europeans.

Our Navy could be a bit of a lever too. There is lots of precedent for shoving people around, to be blunt about it, at sea without getting close to shooting.

The whole mess illustrates why drawing red lines is such a bad idea. When those lines get crossed, you have to act, or seem impotent. That puts you in a position where your action is purely a response, and you're acting without clear, practical and achievable goals and in circumstances where no compelling US interest is at stake.

Yep, to an extent. I fear ultimately our interests will be very much at stake, but I can't think of any good way, that the US leadership would actually do, to affect things.

J. Wolfsberger's central question remains rather conspicuously unanswered. Why intervene at all? What desirable and achievable end state are we pursuing here?

In an ideal world, turn Syria into Malaysia, but that ain't gonna happen. Or at least keep the thing from spreading too far, prevent an AQ emirate in east Syria and west Iraq and install a regime (not PC for sure) that wouldn't slaughter too many people and cause a lot of trouble. But we ain't capable of achieving that given our leadership. So it is a moot point.

[Dayuhan]

The way we do it, yes. And that is probably true in some cases no matter what. But I still think that if we played the game hard enough, we could exercise much much more control than we think possible.

There are real world limits to how "hard" we are able to play, especially if playing hard means significant commitment of military or other resources. I'd submit that "playing hard" is only sensible if you have a clear, practical, and achievable goal, and I'm not at all sure we have that. I'm sure that with sufficient application of resources we could force certain events (like the fall of Assad) to happen. The extent to which we could exercise meaningful "control" of that process or its aftermath without undertaking an unacceptable commitment (occupation) remains very doubtful.

Yes but what power they have I think is really a function of what we allow them to exercise, at least in Russia's case. That doesn't make it any less real on the ground in Syria, but it is what we allow.

Have we the capacity, realistically, to disallow any Russian action? We're not going to get into a shooting incident with the Russians over Syria, and they know it, which makes bluff a pretty pointless game. It's silly to issue ultimatums or draw lines in the sand if you don't have the means and will to take real meaningful steps to back them up and enough interest at stake to justify the costs and risks of backing them up.

There are a lot of things we could do that don't involve troops on the ground. One thing that comes to mind is approving multiple LNG export terminals here in the US. That would be very bad for Russia because a few years after that, no more blackmailing the Europeans.

I don't see the US exporting enough gas to Europe to significantly reduce dependence on Russia, and the Russians know that the current US gas glut will not last, given the overall US energy equation. I doubt they'd be deterred at all.

Our Navy could be a bit of a lever too. There is lots of precedent for shoving people around, to be blunt about it, at sea without getting close to shooting.

Only works if they believe you'd be willing to escalate. We aren't willing. They know it.

Yep, to an extent. I fear ultimately our interests will be very much at stake, but I can't think of any good way, that the US leadership would actually do, to affect things.

Interests will be affected no matter what the outcome, but I don't see how intervention will make that picture any better. It could make the picture a whole lot worse. Again, the first thing you need to justify intervention is a clear, practical, and achievable goal. Have we got one?

In an ideal world, turn Syria into Malaysia, but that ain't gonna happen. Or at least keep the thing from spreading too far, prevent an AQ emirate in east Syria and west Iraq and install a regime (not PC for sure) that wouldn't slaughter too many people and cause a lot of trouble. But we ain't capable of achieving that given our leadership. So it is a moot point.

I'm not sure those are achievable with any leadership. It's easy to complain about lack of political will, but lack of the will needed to stick your tender bits into a meatgrinder seems to me eminently logical. Even the most peripheral mention of "installing" regimes should throw up a whole forest of red flags. Us getting involved is as likely to cause spillover and escalation as it is to prevent it. It's not a question of leadership. We have neither the desire nor the capacity to govern Syria, directly or by proxy, nor is it in our interests to try to govern Syria.

[Madhu]

Luttwak states that he thinks the entire thing is a bad idea, but some military aid is now official policy.

I thought he was just talking about vetting groups, not literally trying to recreate Anbar.

It was for several good and solid reasons that U.S. President Barack Obama's administration long resisted pressures to intervene more forcefully in Syria's civil war. To start with, there is the sheer complexity of a conflict at the intersection of religious, ethnic, regional, and global politics, as illustrated by the plain fact that the most Westernized of Syrians (including its Christians) support the Assad government that the United States seeks to displace, while its enemies are certainly not America's friends and, indeed, include the most dangerous of Muslim extremists. But no matter: After two years of restraint, the administration -- having decided to send "direct military assistance" to the rebels -- has chosen sides and is now choosing sides within sides.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...g_rebels_syria

It is now argued most authoritatively that U.S. President Barack Obama's failure to act decisively to remove Bashar al-Assad's regime from power in Syria is explained by internal divisions within his administration, miscalculations about the balance of power on the ground, and the president's own irresolution. There is another explanation, however: that the Obama administration is showing calculated restraint induced by bitter experience and, even more, by the overriding strategic priority of disengaging from the Islamic arc of conflict to better engage with China.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...d_enough_alone

One comment I've read frequently is "if only we had intervened earlier, things would be different", the moderate opposition would be the main fighters and there would be no radicals involved.

I don't see why people think that, earlier intervention doesn't preclude others arming competing groups. Once violence is unleashed, it's hard to predict the outcome.

Ken White (he hasn't posted in a while, hope he's well) used to get it just right: most of what we do overseas is almost reactionary and based on domestic politics.

[Madhu]

carl,

I'm not sure I follow your logic. I think intervention is a mistake on both humanitarian and realist grounds--I don't think I need to repeat my reasoning here--but what do you think the goal or goals should be? Proponents offer multiple and contradictory goals, at times. The things you mention have nothing to do with leadership, they are a contradictory and conflicting wish list. What is the ultimate goal, why is it the proper goal for the US, is it possible, what might be expected problems, and how much blood and treasure might be required to accomplish stated goal, it is even possible?

(I may be excessively influenced by friends from the region, many Syrian Christians.)

[carl]

carl,

I'm not sure I follow your logic. I think intervention is a mistake on both humanitarian and realist grounds--I don't think I need to repeat my reasoning here--but what do you think the goal or goals should be? Proponents offer multiple and contradictory goals, at times. The things you mention have nothing to do with leadership, they are a contradictory and conflicting wish list. What is the ultimate goal, why is it the proper goal for the US, is it possible, what might be expected problems, and how much blood and treasure might be required to accomplish stated goal, it is even possible?

(I may be excessively influenced by friends from the region, many Syrian Christians.)

Madhu: Read what I wrote again, carefully. Then read what you wrote above. They don't seem to be related.

[Dayuhan]

Madhu: Read what I wrote again, carefully. Then read what you wrote above. They don't seem to be related.

I see the relation, and I was about to ask a similar question. You repeatedly suggest that there are options that would be possible or practical without what you seem to suggest are leadership constraints:

The way we do it, yes.

I still think that if we played the game hard enough, we could exercise much much more control than we think possible.

I can't think of any good way, that the US leadership would actually do

Or at least keep the thing from spreading too far, prevent an AQ emirate in east Syria and west Iraq and install a regime (not PC for sure) that wouldn't slaughter too many people and cause a lot of trouble. But we ain't capable of achieving that given our leadership

If we were willing to tell the Russkis to go stuff it. If we told the Iranians they ain't seen nothing yet if they keep horsin' around. If we told Israel that the days of us dancing to their tune were over, they will survive as a state but we play the music. Same thing with the Gulf States, especially the Gulf states.

The problem is the inside the beltway elites won't do any of this stuff

All of this suggests a belief that viable options (hinted at, but never specified) exist that have a real chance of altering the state of affairs in a favorable manner, but that leaders are unwilling or unable to pursue them. I wonder what exactly those options are, and why you think they'd achieve anything.

I, and I believe Madhu, believe that the problem is not leadership, but rather the inherent undesirability of intervening in a situation where we have no realistically achievable goal and where applying force is likely to forcefully dig us into a very unpleasant hole.

[J Wolfsberger]

Luttwak states that he thinks the entire thing is a bad idea, but some military aid is now official policy.

After what you and wm wrote, I reread the article in (ahem) a less reactionary mode. You are both correct.

That said, in response to both of you, I'd suggest that the most we should or effectively can do is help provide humanitarian aide and security for safe zones where those who wish can escape the slaughter.

I think I'd also favor offering refuge to the Christian minority. No matter how this turns out, I don't foresee any future for Maronites or Chaldeans in the region.

[davidbfpo]

If there was ever a time for external US-led intervention in Syria that has passed; IIRC we discussed this two years ago, mainly in the context of imposing no-fly zones and internal safe havens.

J Wolfsberger posted just:

I'd suggest that the most we should or effectively can do is help provide humanitarian aide and security for safe zones where those who wish can escape the slaughter.

Yes we, the West, could help with humanitarian aid, although I do wonder why the rich Arab nations have not been able to sign all the cheques.

'Security for safe zones' is far more problematic. Safe zones outside Syria maybe easier, although both Jordan and Turkey have considerable numbers of refugees. Lebanon has fewer. Will 'security for safe zones' mean preventing their use as rear bases by the insurgents rather than guarding them against regime coercion?

Personally I don't think the West should undertake such a 'security' role outside or inside Syria. A UN 'blue beret' presence I expect would be opposed by Russia and China; assuming Jordan and Turkey sought that.

The Western experience in the ill-fated MNF in the Lebanon, even before the attacks on French paras & US Marine bases, is a more likely template. Oddly at least one UK analyst ignores that:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22967636

[carl]

Have we the capacity, realistically, to disallow any Russian action? We're not going to get into a shooting incident with the Russians over Syria, and they know it, which makes bluff a pretty pointless game. It's silly to issue ultimatums or draw lines in the sand if you don't have the means and will to take real meaningful steps to back them up and enough interest at stake to justify the costs and risks of backing them up.

I don't see the US exporting enough gas to Europe to significantly reduce dependence on Russia, and the Russians know that the current US gas glut will not last, given the overall US energy equation. I doubt they'd be deterred at all.

Only works if they believe you'd be willing to escalate. We aren't willing. They know it.

My original narrow point regarding Russia was that Putinistan, a state with a lot of problems, punches above their weight because we ascribe to them power that they don't actually have. The above short list is a quite excellent illustration of the line of thinking that results in that.

[Dayuhan]

My original narrow point regarding Russia was that Putinistan, a state with a lot of problems, punches above their weight because we ascribe to them power that they don't actually have. The above short list is a quite excellent illustration of the line of thinking that results in that.

My original point was that the Russians don't need to punch very hard, or to have much power, to make life difficult for any intervening power in Syria. Neither does Iran. Neither does Hezbollah. None of them are great superpowers, none of them can fight the US and win, all of them can and will make life miserable for anyone foolish enough to get bogged down in that particular quagmire. Worth noting that while the Russians are more than willing to offer material and ideological support to Assad, they don't want to put people in there either: they know where that would go, and they know that once entrenched it would be easy for their rivals to make their lives miserable.

One of the realities of quagmires is that once you're in one, your antagonists don't have to be great powers or heavyweight punchers to make your life difficult.

It's normal enough to be frustrated by the realities of American governance (democracy can be such a pain but if you're going to suggest that effective action would be possible with better leadership, you might consider clarifying what action you think would be effective and what you think those actions might achieve.

The US operates under a real constraint in Syria, the constraint being that the US electorate is in no mood to countenance another military adventure in the Muslim world, especially with no clear and immediate threat to US interests and no clear and achievable objective. I have yet to see any coherent argument against that position, and I think the US electorate is showing a good deal of sense.

PS: The "inside the Beltway" crowd is not exactly unaware that Europe would benefit from diversifying its energy sources, as evidenced here:

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42405.pdf

Still, there's no reason to think that anything the US does on that score is going to change the Russian position on Syria, or act as an effective constraint on Russian action in Syria.

[JWing]

As the conflict in Syria has escalated, so has the involvement of foreign countries. Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and now the United States and England are all supporting one group or another in the war. Neighboring Iraq has also joined in the conflict. Every month there are reports about young Iraqis going to fight in Syria, usually organized by not only Shiite militant groups like the League of the Righteous or the Hezbollah Brigades, but also the country’s major political parties like the Sadrists and the Badr Organization. These organizations are now publicly acknowledging their losses in funerals and on the Internet. Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah are also recruiting, arming, and funding Iraqis. To help explain this growing flow of men and material to Syria from Iraq is Phillip Smyth. Smyth works for the University of Maryland’s Institute for Advanced Computer Studies’ Lab for Computational Cultural Dynamics. He also writes the Hizballah Cavalcade which focuses on militant Shia organizations operating in Syria, their members, ideologies, arms, funerals, and other related topics for the Jihadology website.

continued

[davidbfpo]

A report from The Guardian, citing an official Russian statement and that:

Russia has been evacuating its citizens from Syria for weeks.

With an important caveat:

...the decision to remove defence ministry personnel did not include technical experts employed by the Syrian government to train its army to use Russian-issued weapons.

Link:http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013...ersonnel-syria