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Thread: Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

  1. #201
    Council Member carl's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    Madhu, you captured my point accurately. Carl I think you're perpetuating our COIN doctrine myth, and blaming the failure of it to work so far because we simply don't do it well. I admit the doctrine seems logical, but having participating in more than two of these conflicts as an advsior in multiple countries in Africa, East Asia, and the Middle East I know the logic of doctrinal assumptions tend to fall apart when it hits the reality of a complex convergence of psychological, social, and political influences. There are a few insurgencies around the world where the doctrine would work, but in most cases the conflict is much more complex than simply insurgents battling a so called illegimate government or in our case (when we do COIN) an occupying power.
    Well we'll have to disagree. We don't do it well, witness the command structure in Afghanistan. I actually don't know, but have we ever got around to doing a comprehensive census over there? I know we have done nothing about the external support and sanctuary provided by Pakistan.

    But come to think of it, what type of small wars fighting are you talking about, the type we did in the Philippines or the 'throw money and aerial bombs at them till they like us' type of career centric small war we do in Afghanistan?

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    Back to Syria, there have been some articles suggesting we should intervene in Syria and the authors imply we can use all the lessons learnt from our conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan to stabilize Syria. This implies our COIN doctrine actually worked in those cases, and therefore it would work in Syria. It implies that the population in Syria can be won? What segment is that? The Alawites? The Kurds? The AQ affiliates? I'm sure if we rebuild their schools and create petty jobs with our CERP money that they all forgive each other, Al-Qaeda will retreat, Iran and Hizbollah will withdraw, and we will have denied a future safe haven for terrorists at moderate cost. However, just in case this doesn't work out, what can we do?
    I think your problem is more with stupid authors and the 'throw money and aerial bombs at them till they like us' school of thought than anything else.

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    At best we can achieve limited military objectives of seizing and securing certain facilities to limit the distribution of weapons to the growing extremist network. We can assist the resistance movements by attacking the Syrian regime, but to what end? I hope we think this one through very carefully. We can shape this conflict, but we can't control it. We can achieve limited objectives if deemed necessary, we can't impose a legitimate government that all the people will embrace.
    I don't think there is anything we can do. We can't shape it at all. I can't for the life of me figure out how. I seriously doubt we have any good idea at all where the various weapons we fear are and if we did we won't risk the very real possibility of serious casualties to secure them. Everybody in that country is 10 times better at intrigue than almost any of us will ever be.

    I have always thought this about this conflict, but I think I was wrong to think that 1 or 2 years ago. Not now though. If we had had the nerve to pick a side and fully back it or kill Bashir ourselves back then, maybe. At least we would have had a chance of keeping the Jihadists from hijacking the rebellion. Not now though. Even if our political leaders had the nerve, I haven't a clue what we should do except hope for the best.

    The big problem is things might get to the point where we will be forced to do something if the scenario Tequila's articles mentions comes about.
    Last edited by carl; 05-21-2013 at 06:18 AM.
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  2. #202
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    Carl,

    Actually I don't disagree with your assertion that we don't do COIN, or more accurately small wars, well at the tactical level. My point is even if we did do it well in accordance with our COIN doctrine it wouldn't make a difference in the outcome if the strategy is flawed.

    I agree with your statements about the tactical essentials of denying safe haven, frequent patrolling, protecting the population, etc. Failure to be more aggressive in the initial years and excessive use of fire power was due to a risk adverse mentality that infected the force. None the less, the major cause of failure were our nave policy goals. Even with tactical excellence we wouldn't have achieved those ends, but we would have taken few casualties by being more aggressive towards the fighters and less aggressive towards the population (excessive aerial bombings, etc.).

    People will always question whether Syria would have turned out differently if we intervened in the early years. No one will know, but I suspect that is wishful thinking on our part. The same groups fighting now were always there. Al-Qaeda had a presence in Syria ever since they established a presence in Iraq to counter our occupation. The Iranians and Russians were supporting Bashir before we would have intervened and they would most likely increased their support if we supported the adversaries.

  3. #203
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    Smile "Who are you arguing with?" - Carl

    The voices in my head, apparently.

    There is more than one conversation going on:

    1. If we had intervened in Syria earlier could we have prevented a jihadist infiltration? I doubt it but here we can agree to disagree.

    2. The process of writing FM 3-24 and the political battles behind the scenes in the military is very interesting to me and has been documented now in books, some papers, certainly here at SWJ. The reflection and documentation will be argued forever, I suppose, given the nature of the subject.

    Yes, small was have certain practices that are generally accepted but if you look at the behind the scenes arguments different scholars and practitioners of small wars wanted to focus on different aspects and objected to the focus of Army counterinsurgency doctrine as it was being written (for instance Bing West).

    Reportedly, during the conference for that doctrinal manual he mentioned that what he was talking about in the Village was intrinsically different than population centric counterinsurgency, that his patrolling was at night killing insurgents. It wasn't focusing on building wells and schools as a first step to draw out insurgents. Those books that you talk about that detail small wars good practices? The practices were different, in, well, practice.

    That's the argument, that Army doctrine has made it a one size fits all situation. The counterargument is that people don't really follow doctrine but if that is the case, then the whole thing is messed up either way.

    It is the focus and emphasis of one tactical example over the other that is the argument, they are not all equally emphasized in the different COIN strategies. This is what I believe Colonel Gentile means when he says the enemy is absent in the current doctrine. You are saying the same thing too, actually.

    3. By evidence I mean historical evidence, intelligence, sociological evidence, psychological evidence, terrain as evidence, etc.

    For instance, on the art, there is good art and bad art. Good art realizes that a heavy logistical train through insurgent territory might be a bad idea; bad art thinks it can rescue this problem with better well and school building and patrolling. Good art vs. bad art.

    I need to do a better job referring to the different things I've read to make my points. Upon reflection, I can see how confusing my comments are because I'm thinking of specific papers and books and how can you know if I don't tell you? I will try and do better.

    The better part of valor is for me to track down those papers and perhaps discuss them on a thread here but I am shy to do this because I understand the tremendous pressure under which the papers are written. I also have no military experience. I do believe that they need to be discussed and "close read" carefully. The military folks can correct me if I'm wrong on certain things.

    I mentioned the novel because it was a formative experience for Petraeus and lead to an interest in small wars and an interest in Galula, apparently. I think there is a paper in Salon about this and the reissue of the novel.

    Douglas Porch is the scholar that has written on the French in Algeria and in his opinion Galula's impressions didn't match up with what actually happened when examining other sources.

    Remember, there are lots and lots of sources and some evidence was probably never collected right? This is the situation in India where my poorer illiterate ancestors never left any record of their experience under the Raj.

    By the way, the colonial government in India did do some good things (well, they were the government, they were supposed to do that) but the fantasy versions that are very popular in books and the historical reality based on historical evidence are different. I know that reality changes with interpretation but that evidence paints a very different picture than romanticized novels.

    For instance, people call the Indian Mutiny the First Indian War of Independence. They never thought they were pacified, carl. Some never thought they were pacified. How's that for a trip?

    Studying the diaries of, say, a British officer is great but to have a full picture you need to examine the stories of more than one person and try and match up the stories to evidence from the ground.

    No, it's not science as hard science is understood but Military Science exists or we wouldn't be having this conversation.

    This is what I meant by evidence. Artists, really good artists, research plenty.

    Aargh, you people always draw me in when I tell myself, "that's it, I'm not commenting here anymore!"

    I guess it's a compliment to all of you!
    Last edited by Madhu; 05-21-2013 at 01:25 PM. Reason: corrected scholar name

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    Default One more thing....

    I've worked or trained in a lot of different hospital environments but until now primarily with an academic and clinical tertiary care institutional focus. Now I see the effects of Iraq and Afghanistan with regularity. It may be that I am too emotional on the subject.

    On Syria, I rambled on here:

    http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2013/04/kow...#comment-22456

    The entire situation is messed up and has been from the beginning, the Syrian diaspora I know don't want outside involvement (many terrified of the opposition with or without jihadist infiltration) and some of the people writing pro intervention papers are journalists that wrote for Iraq intervention and were part of a particular type of British or American think tank world. The connections are curious and the track record of their prediction pretty dismal.

  5. #205
    Council Member carl's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    Carl,

    Actually I don't disagree with your assertion that we don't do COIN, or more accurately small wars, well at the tactical level. My point is even if we did do it well in accordance with our COIN doctrine it wouldn't make a difference in the outcome if the strategy is flawed.
    My turn to agree with you. The strategy was completely fouled up in Afghanistan at least. Part of strategy is figuring out who the prime enemy is, in my view the Pak Army/ISI. If you can't figure that out nothing at all is going to help. After you figure that part right, the next part of strategy is figuring what your biggest weakness is vis a vis the prime enemy and then do something about it. That would be the Karachi supply line and we could have just abandoned it and lightened up, which would have helped in a hundred different ways. But we didn't recognize those big picture realities and it was a forlorn hope.

    One of the big strategic realities we face is our senior leadership, political AND military, to put it bluntly, have no backbone at all. It seems that bluff is their primary weapon and if that doesn't work there is nothing else. The problem with that is once the enemy figures that out, it puts you in a position that there is no way out of.

    That is part of our problem in Syria (just part), at least as far as the Russkis and the Iranians go. Russia has nothing except nerve, which they got a lot of. If we were to really put the screws on them they would have to back off but they know we won't do anything but bleat so on they go. You don't impress Russians with earnest talk. They're Russians. For God's sake you don't let them snub your Sec of State by making him wait in the ante room for 3 hours. They'll walk all over you if you do that.

    The same with the Iranians. Those guys are tough guys. Words mean nothing to them. If one of their cargo flights went mysteriously missing over the Iraqi desert, that would mean something.

    The problem our leadership classes present us is insurmountable. The opportunities they give our enemies are vast.
    Last edited by carl; 05-21-2013 at 02:40 PM.
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  6. #206
    Council Member carl's Avatar
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    Madhu:

    I don't know where the 'give them money and they will love us enough risk getting their throats cut' idea came from. I always been amazed too when I've read about some armoured truck column going to a village once a week and asking what they need and where is the enemy and how is security and then they wonder why they aren't making any progress with that village. That has never worked. Heck I don't think anybody ever was stupid enough to think it would before the inside the beltway types twisted small war fighting into something Oprah would approve of. It always was about controlling the place first. I think West, Lt. Johnston, Galula and Lyautey would all agree with that. Most of our guys know that and can do it if we let them.

    I just finished Galula by Cohen and it was a very good book. He said that Galula didn't really know much about Lyautey and all those guys because of when they came into the army, just at the start of WWII. There wasn't time to teach them. Mr. Galula came up with his ideas mostly from watching the war in China. Cohen said that was a shame because many of his ideas were similar to those of the French who pacified North Africa way back when. Ours isn't the only army that forgets its past I guess.

    By Indian Army, I meant the army of the country of India, not the army of the Raj. The Indian Army of today has a huge amount of small war fighting experience.
    "We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene

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    http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/...al_imperialism

    Top 10 warning signs of 'liberal imperialism'

    The odd-bedfellow combination of their idealism with neocons' ideology has given us a lot of bad foreign policy over the past decade, especially the decisions to intervene militarily in Iraq or nation-build in Afghanistan, and today's drumbeat to do the same in Syria.

    It's not that the United States should never intervene in other countries or that its military should not undertake humanitarian missions (as it did in Indonesia following the Asian tsunami and in Haiti after a damaging earthquake). It should do so, however, only when there are vital national interests at stake or when sending U.S. troops or American arms is overwhelmingly likely to make things better. In short, decisions to intervene need to clear a very high bar and survive hardheaded questioning about what the use of force will actually accomplish.
    Lots of folks who visit SWJ need to start the 12 step program.

  8. #208
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    Default Hezbollah landnav fail.

    I don’t know how much, if any, of this is true, but the post is still pretty funny.

    Satellite Navigation Error Sends Hezbollah’s Men Fighting In The Wrong Place in Syria

    In an embarrassing admission for the Lebanese party, it emerged today that a satellite navigation error was responsible for Hezbollah’s men fighting in the wrong part of Syria. The Party of God’s fighters were on their way to participate in The Campaign To Defend The Shrine of Sayyidah Zaynab located just outside Damascus, but ended up by mistake in the town of al-Qusayr near the northern border between Syria and Lebanon, some 100 miles away from their intended destination. […] http://www.karlremarks.com/2013/05/s...ror-sends.html
    If you don’t read the newspaper, you are uninformed; if you do read the newspaper, you are misinformed. – Mark Twain (attributed)

  9. #209
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    http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/26/wo...anted=all&_r=0

    Hezbollah Commits to an All-Out Fight to Save Assad

    Mr. Nasrallah, a shrewd political operator, appears to be calculating that the West, thrown off balance by the rise of jihadist factions among the Syrian rebels, will not jump in on the rebel side.
    He evoked Hezbollah’s tenacity during its 2006 war with Israel, signaling that the organization considered the fight in Syria to preserve Mr. Assad and the crucial conduit he provides for weapons from Iran, as important as its founding mission, opposing Israel and driving it out of Lebanon.
    If you read the rest of the article you'll see Nasrallah is also concerned about the conflict in Syria creating renewed sectarian conflict in Lebanon, which I suspect is another key driver in his decision to take such a strong position on the conflict in Syria.

    1. His external support will be weakened (Iran, Syria)
    2. His safe haven and his status will be threatened by new civil strife w/in Lebanon.

    Suspect both of these could seriously degrade the image and status Hezbollah gained after their fight with Israel in 2006.

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    http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middle...843641150.html

    Rockets hit Beirut's southern suburbs

    At least five people injured as car dealership and residential building are hit in Lebanon's capital.

    In a televised address, Nasrallah pledged that Hezbollah would turn the tide of the conflict in Assad's favour, and stay as long as necessary to do so.

    "We will continue this road until the end, we will take the responsibility and we will make all the sacrifices," he said. "We will be victorious."

    The fighting in Syria has already spilled over into Lebanon's second city, the northern port of Tripoli, where 31 people have been killed and 212 wounded in a week of clashes between pro-Assad Alawites and pro-rebel Sunni Muslims.
    From:http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/...7c1_story.html

    He also said that if Hezbollah did not act preemptively, Lebanon would be put at further risk.

    “If Syria falls into the hands of America, Israel and the takfiris, the people of our region will enter a dark period,” he said, casting the opposition as followers of an extreme interpretation of Islam that condones aggression. “If we do not go there to fight them . . . they will come here.”

    Former Lebanese prime minister Saad Hariri, leader of the Sunni Future Movement, on Saturday described Hezbollah’s decision to fight in Syria as “political and military suicide.”
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 05-26-2013 at 06:12 PM.

  11. #211
    Council Member Red Rat's Avatar
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    This is probably the best analysis of the Syrian situation that I have read this year: Is this the end of Sykes-Picot?

    It ties in a number of threads that I have picked up from other informed commentators.

    I do wonder why we insist on trying to maintain the Sykes-Picot boundaries. Historically boundaries have shown a lot of flexibility.
    RR

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    Quote Originally Posted by Red Rat View Post
    This is probably the best analysis of the Syrian situation that I have read this year: Is this the end of Sykes-Picot?

    It ties in a number of threads that I have picked up from other informed commentators.

    I do wonder why we insist on trying to maintain the Sykes-Picot boundaries. Historically boundaries have shown a lot of flexibility.
    Thanks for posting, this is an excellent article. This could be the beginning of the end for Sykes-Picot boundaries, but I suspect there are a lot of powers that find these borders useful and will fight to maintain them. Cockburn captures it well with the following, which is why predictions in this situation are at best a wild guess.

    It’s hard to imagine a real agreement being reached when there are so many players with conflicting interests. Five distinct conflicts have become tangled together in Syria: a popular uprising against a dictatorship which is also a sectarian battle between Sunnis and the Alawite sect; a regional struggle between Shia and Sunni which is also a decades-old conflict between an Iranian-led grouping and Iran’s traditional enemies, notably the US and Saudi Arabia. Finally, at another level, there is a reborn Cold War confrontation: Russia and China v. the West. The conflict is full of unexpected and absurd contradictions, such as a purportedly democratic and secular Syrian opposition being funded by the absolute monarchies of the Gulf who are also fundamentalist Sunnis.
    Last edited by Bill Moore; 05-27-2013 at 08:50 AM.

  13. #213
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    Default Gas, gas

    A report in Le Monde, by two French journalists embedded with opposition fighters, which reports repeated use of chemical weapons by the Bashar al-Assad regime:http://mobile.lemonde.fr/proche-orie...7708_3218.html
    davidbfpo

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    The proxy war in Syria is expanding rapidly and it may have passed the point that the Syrian government or Free Syrian Army will determine the outcome of the conflict in Syria, but both sides will merely become pawns for other actors that include, but is not limited to: Iran, Russia, Lebanese Hezbollah, the EU, U.S., a number of Arab States and Al-Qaeda.

    http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22688894

    Russian arms 'to deter foreign intervention in Syria'

    Russia says it will go ahead with deliveries of S-300 anti-aircraft missiles to Syria, and that the arms will help deter foreign intervention.
    On Monday, the EU said member states would be able to decide their own policy on sending arms to Syria, after foreign ministers were unable to reach the unanimous decision required to extend the current arms embargo past Saturday.
    http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/...a47_story.html

    Syrian rebels threaten Hezbollah as sectarian conflict intensifies

    The shooting of three Lebanese soldiers Tuesday at a checkpoint near the Syrian border — decried by Lebanese President Michel Suleiman as an attempt to “stir up strife” — underscored the worsening instability in the fragile nation.

    Politically polarized, Lebanon has attempted to pursue a policy of “disassociation” with the two-year-old uprising against President Bashar al-Assad. But that facade is now in tatters: Ministers with alliances to Damascus have traveled to meet Assad, while others have publicly supported the opposition.

    When Hezbollah, which wields significant control over the country’s weak caretaker government, openly admitted sending fighters to Syria on Saturday and pledged to back Assad to the hilt, it marked the end of any pretense of neutrality.
    http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/...2a7_story.html

    Iraqi Shiites fight for Syrian government

    The Iraqi fighters in the video shoulder assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades as they walk down a highway lined with cypress trees. Grinning, some hold up cellphones and camcorders to capture the moment — the aftermath of a victorious battle to secure the Aleppo airport from Syrian rebels who had attempted to take it.
    The role of Iraqi Shiite fighters in Syria raises questions about the possible complicity of the Iraqi government, which U.S. officials have recently criticized for allowing Iran to use Iraqi airspace for flights that allegedly transport weapons, troops and supplies to the Assad government.
    But Iraqi officials have warned repeatedly that Assad’s fall would spell disaster for Iraq, and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki told the Associated Press in February that a rebel victory in Syria would revive Iraq’s sectarian war.
    http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affa...et-with-rebels

    McCain meets with rebel leaders in Syria

    According to the Daily Beast, which first reported the visit, McCain met with Gen. Salem Idris, the leader of the Supreme Military Council of the Free Syrian Army, and spent a few hours in the country after entering through Turkey.
    Last week, however, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved a bill to arm the Syrian opposition, a bipartisan rebuke to the White House
    Other reports of unknown credibility claimed Sen McCain promised to push for U.S. support for the rebels.

    This is already a quasi-World War, but with the potential to rapidly escalate into a regional World War involving a number of states and non-state actors. I don't know what good will become of U.S. intervention, but it appears we're on that road despite our regional ally(?) Iraq telling us a rebel victory would result in a new civil war in Iraq (as though that isn't materializing already).

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    Worth considering

    http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/19/opinion/skinner-syria

    Before taking on Syria, U.S. should heed lesson of the past

    But in Weinberger's view, Lebanon was the wrong fight for the United States. In a speech on November 28, 1984, he articulated his six principles for future U.S. military engagements:

    (1) There should be no commitment of U.S. forces abroad unless there is a clear and vital interest for the United States or its allies; (2) Combat, if agreed upon, should be undertaken with the intention of military victory, using whatever forces and resources are needed to achieve that goal; (3) Political and military objectives must be clearly defined before entering a conflict; (4) The relationship between military means and diplomatic, military, and political objectives "must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary," not just established at the beginning of the military engagement; (5) No battle is worth fighting or will be successful without "reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people" and Congress; and (6) The commitment of U.S. troops to a conflict should be an act of last resort.

    The Reagan administration had approved Israel's invasion of Lebanon, and although initially welcomed by many Muslims in Lebanon the United States came to be seen as too pro-Israel, pro-Christian, and anti-Muslim. U.S. forces' unintentional shelling of civilians did not help matters.

    Furthermore, the re-entry of the MFN was not accompanied by a serious understanding of strategy, objectives and the relationship between them. So President Reagan decided to withdraw U.S. forces from what would likely become a major military quagmire for the United States, instead of a multinational peacekeeping operation.

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    I find that list self serving, particularly the following:

    (2) Combat, if agreed upon, should be undertaken with the intention of military victory, using whatever forces and resources are needed to achieve that goal; (3) Political and military objectives must be clearly defined before entering a conflict; (4) The relationship between military means and diplomatic, military, and political objectives "must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary," not just established at the beginning of the military engagement
    (2) is in direct conflict with (3) and (4) and seems to stand in violation of the idea os using military force in a limited manner to deter further agression, a perfectly reasonable use of the military. Military victory may be independent of political objectives. In addition, if you begin a fight with the intent of finishing it that stands in contradition to the idea of reassessing the situation and adjusting the means you use to achieve your goal.

    While it seems like a platatude that you never start a military fight without the intent of military victory, I think it is better to say that you should never start a military action without the realization that you may have to take it to its natrual conclusion.
    "I can change almost anything ... but I can't change human nature."

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  17. #217
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    Default How We Lost The Syrian Revolution

    Patrick Cockburn's article, cited by 'Red Rat' is good, but I also found this anonymous article by a Syrian in Aleppo of value. It starts with:[QUOTE]So what went wrong? Or to be more accurate, where did we go wrong? How did a once inspirational and noble popular uprising calling for freedom and basic human rights degenerate into an orgy of bloodthirsty sectarian violence, with depravity unfit for even animals? Was it inevitable and wholly unavoidable, or did it not have to be this way?[/QUOTE

    Needless to say the answer is not optimistic.

    Link:http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/orig...ppo-assad.html
    davidbfpo

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    Quote Originally Posted by TheCurmudgeon View Post
    I find that list self serving, particularly the following:



    (2) is in direct conflict with (3) and (4) and seems to stand in violation of the idea os using military force in a limited manner to deter further agression, a perfectly reasonable use of the military. Military victory may be independent of political objectives. In addition, if you begin a fight with the intent of finishing it that stands in contradition to the idea of reassessing the situation and adjusting the means you use to achieve your goal.

    While it seems like a platatude that you never start a military fight without the intent of military victory, I think it is better to say that you should never start a military action without the realization that you may have to take it to its natrual conclusion.
    Are you implying our involvement would be part of its "natural" evolution and a foreign imposed solution is natural. The list reflect the wisdom of lessons observed repeatedly throughout history, but they are not lessons learned. What exactly do you think the military can accomplish there?

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    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    Are you implying our involvement would be part of its "natural" evolution and a foreign imposed solution is natural. The list reflect the wisdom of lessons observed repeatedly throughout history, but they are not lessons learned. What exactly do you think the military can accomplish there?
    I never said anything about anything being "natural." I only disliked the way the quote limited the idea of using military force as part of a collective group of way and means to pursue our national interests. Based on that quote we would never conduct a NEO action - we must be prepared to invade and control the entire country.
    "I can change almost anything ... but I can't change human nature."

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    Quote Originally Posted by TheCurmudgeon View Post
    I never said anything about anything being "natural." I only disliked the way the quote limited the idea of using military force as part of a collective group of way and means to pursue our national interests. Based on that quote we would never conduct a NEO action - we must be prepared to invade and control the entire country.
    I didn't read it that way, this is classical so-called Powell Doctrine and a NEO is a specific task that the military can accomplish. In Lebanon the military successfully evacuated the Palestinians, but when they went back to enforce a non-existent peace agreement between the fighting parties they failed. I'm for using the military, perhaps more than we do now to achieve certain objectives. I have grown to be pretty critical our occupation/transformation efforts.

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