Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

[Dayuhan]

You insist on ignoring what I posted about Syrians and their POVs regarding whom would they like to support them (in struggle against Assadists and Iranians), who is actually supporting them, and what repercussions this has for their POV regarding the West.

I don't think any of us have reliable information on what Syrians think or want.

You insist on explaining me what would a 'post-Assad Syria' look like - and as next explain me I can't know what would happen?

I didn't "explain what a post Assad Syria would look like", I offered an opinion, which like all opinions on the future is speculation, not explanation. And no, you can't "know what would happen".

Given that there has never been a dominant leader or faction in the resistance to Assad, the resistance is highly fragmented, the disparate groups have widely divergent agendas, the Syrian military is Allawite-dominated and was never likely to turn against Assad in numbers, etc, ect... I see very little basis to assume that the resistance was ever likely to generate a clean win or a clear winner. That is speculative, but I've yet to see a credible argument to the contrary.

you come with an explanation that contains a description of what is ALREADY NOW going on in Syria (namely, 'external intervention by Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, and their proxies') - in a predominantly pro-West Arab country - as an argument 'against' US/Western attempts to meddle....

How is that an argument for intervention? Everybody;s in the mess, we have to be there too? Even if we don't have a clear national interest at stake, even if we don't have clear goals, even if there is close to zero support for intervention on the home front?

you serve the argument contra-US-interventions by citing a number of cases where the US either imposed a dictatorship (often after crumbling a nascent democracy), or (literally) went in, screwed up, and then run away.

Yes, US intervention has a poor track record. How is that an argument for intervention?

Considering how much money the US has burned for such - utterly failed - interventions, I'm really surprised you can't come to the idea that investing anything into Syrian insurgency might be a useful solution?

That would depend on what you plan to invest, in whom you plan to invest it, what specific goals you propose to achieve, etc. I have yet to see anybody lay out anything even vaguely resembling a coherent and plan for intervention.

Let me remind you first and foremost, that the situation in Syria right now is a direct result of the US decision (primarily US decision; French, for example, were just a step short of launching a direct military intervention), NOT to meddle, but to let the Arabs sort out the matters for themselves. Summarized, the US excuse was something like 'I don't want to fight for al-Qaida'.

No, the US reason was more like "we have no vital national interest at stake, no clear goal to achieve, no viable partner to work with, no plan that looks to have even a marginal chance of success, and zero political support for getting into another conflict in the Middle East.

What reason do we have to think that US intervention would have made the situation any better? Is it not just as likely that it would still be a mess, only it would be our mess? US intervention really does not have a stellar track record for making things better, why would you expect a positive outcome in this case?

1.) The fact that exactly the same would have happened in Libya - and that is 100% certain - if the US/West would have refused to 'meddle' there too.

And you are now... Nostradamus? There is not one person on this planet who can state with 100% certainty what would have happened in Libya if there had been no intervention. I do not think that Hezbollah and Iran would be involved in Libya to the extent that they are in Syria.

Because without Western intervention there (with support from specific Arab countries, of course), the Libyan regime would have managed to maintain itself in power for a while longer (because revolutionaries there were as disorganized as those in Syria), and in turn buy time for Islamist extremists to gain a foothold there too.

That's possible. It's also possible that the Libyan regime might have crushed the rebellion and stayed firmly in power. We don't know.

2.) The fact that the AQ in Syria is NOT representing even 10% of Syrian insurgency (whether qualitatively and especially not quantitatively); that the AQ in Syria is NOT fighting against the regime, but against insurgency (meanwhile I'm at least not alone with this standpoint, see here); and even of the fact that the AQ actually ordered the ISIS to dissolve and get to hell out of Syria, etc., etc., etc.

So what? How is that an argument for US intervention?

Finally, you're wondering, 'what should the US do'?

No, I'm wondering what you think the US should do. Different thing.

Let's see: Tehran is maintaining the Assadist regime in place with help of about US$1 billion in cash a month, plus deliveries of fuel (partially from Venezuela via Egypt) worth another US$500 million, and about 15,000 fighters consisting of approx. 3,000 IRGC, 4,000 Hezbollah, and balance of various Iraqi, Azerbaijani and Shi'a from elsewhere. These forces have proved crucial for stabilizing regime's situation in 2013. Although the regime is claiming to have about 100,000 people under arms, the fact is a) that this is not truth (simply because there are no indications for presence of as many pro-regime combatants), and b) that the above-mentioned, Iranian-sponsored forces are meanwhile bearing the brunt of the fighting and have proved something like 15 times more effective than regime's Syrian forces.

Wow!

This makes the answer very hard to even think about...isn't it?

But, let me try: the insurgents have at least 35,000-40,000 organized within the IF; another 50,000 in various other groups. So, one needs no ground troops. Hunting all the various pro-regime groups with high-tech weapons is like shooting sparrows with guided missiles. So, there is no use of military intervention.

What's left....?

Hey, how about that with providing money for insurgents? [/QUOTE]

To whom do you propose sending money? "The insurgents"? Which ones?

Do you really believe that simply sending money would have significantly altered the course of events to date?

But right now Syrian insurgency is ending in 'right hands'?

As long as it's not in our hands...

I'm a bit disappointed in the advocates for intervention here. We've heard "support the moderates" and "send money to the insurgents". On another thread I saw "flood the place with small arms". If those are the best plans the advocates for intervention can come up with, is it really very surprising that there's not much enthusiasm for intervention?

[Bill Moore]

Dayuhan,

A well reasoned argument, which is something lacking from the advocates for intervention. Their argument is little more than we should just go, and Americans are rightfully leery of that approach. Seems we thought we could predict the future with a high degree of accuracy many times in the past only to be disappointed. Not too many American leaders would commit U.S. troops to a conflict they didn't think they could win in unless it was truly self-defense where they had no choice.

An excerpt from the following article hits home to me, most of our interventions have simply made the situation worse, regardless of whether the intervention was direct or indirect. I think we need to go back and review the few successes we did have in our history and focus on what we did right, instead of the endless focus of what we did wrong. It is too difficult to see what we'll do wrong in foresight, but if we can at least focus on the underlying principles that lead to success then maybe we can increase our odds of determining where our intervention would at least have a decent chance of making the situation better.

http://www.latimes.com/opinion/comme...#axzz2qBUvtx1q

The truth is something few people in the national security establishment are willing to confront: Confusing capability with utility, the United States knows how to start wars but has seemingly forgotten how to conclude them. Yet concluding war on favorable terms — a concept formerly known as victory — is the object of the exercise. For the United States, victory has become a lost art. This unhappy verdict applies whether U.S. forces operate conventionally (employing high-tech "shock and awe" tactics) or unconventionally ("winning hearts and minds").

As a consequence, instead of promoting stability — perhaps the paramount U.S. interest not only in the Islamic world but also globally — Washington's penchant for armed intervention since the end of the Cold War, and especially since 9/11, has tended to encourage just the opposite. In effect, despite spilling much blood and expending vast amounts of treasure, U.S. military exertions have played into the hands of our adversaries, misleadingly lumped together under the rubric of "terrorists."

Bold print is mine for emphasis

[CrowBat]

As said, it's getting boring, so this will be my last post in reply to you.

See here:

...
How is that an argument for intervention?...
...
How is that an argument for intervention?

Go back and read my post from September or October, when I told you that it's much too late for an 'US intervention' - i.e. an intervention through military means.

I'm not argumenting FOR any such intervention since long any more. Can you please finally realize that?

And you are now... Nostradamus? There is not one person on this planet who can state with 100% certainty...

But sure: turn off the logic and everything's 'crystal clear' about what would have happened there.

To whom do you propose sending money? "The insurgents"? Which ones?

Sigh... explained this some 10-12 times so far, only. Seems the art of organizing such operations got lost in the USA of the last, say, 50 or so years?

OK: yup, to 'insurgents'. It doesn't matter which. Pick up a group, get them to a training camp, explain them what you expect from them in return for your aid, train them, arm them, etc., do the same that various Islamists from KSA, Qatar, UAE and (especially) Kuwait are doing: make them so powerful, disciplined, well-armed, -fed, and -led, that insurgents from other groups are defecting in order to join such groups.

It so obviously works with all the possible other insurgent organizations in Syria, just not with the one group _supposedly_ supported by the 'West': even a blind must see this.

So, where is your problem actually? You're argumenting for the sake of insisting on your POV?

Do you really believe that simply sending money would have significantly altered the course of events to date?

Didn't the Saudi, Kuwaiti, Qatari and Emirati money change anything?

If you think it didn't - or US or any sort of 'Western' money wouldn't - then you should explain me: where would the Syrian insurgency be by now without all the support it's receiving from different corners in the Arab world?

I'm a bit disappointed in the advocates for intervention here.

... Holy Mao Tse Tung... Again: I'm not advocating an 'intervention' in sense of 'military intervention', 'bombing' etc., but in terms of (literaly) buying one of parties between Syrian insurgent groups and then developing it into THE group that matters there, that's important on the battlefield, and thus gaining political influence (in the future).

Is that really that much 'impossible', 'out of mind', or do you simply prefer to wait until it's going to be too late even for that?

Or wait: perhaps you prefer a Syria that's under the control of whatever sort of extremists, so that Israel can continue declaring itself for 'under existential threat', and thus get more monetary and aid in terms of most modern technology and arms - and all of this because 'USA have no common history with Syria', 'they're no friends of us, but Israelis are'...?

If so, I could perfectly understand you advocating a hand-over of Syria to Iran and Hezbollah. Or the AQ. (As it there would be difference for Syrian population?). But then, the 'quality' of such behaviour is the same like when that duck with 'Iran buying 270 Su-27s' was launched, few years ago, just in order to find argumentation for selling F-35s to Israel and F-15s to Saudi Arabia.

[carl]

I don't think any of us have reliable information on what Syrians think or want.

That construction is meant to close off argument because there are three words in there that are by definition, in this context, indefinite: reliable, thing and want. They can never be definitely known. The way you arguing they must be definitely known in order for any conclusion to be drawn. It's circular. We must know for sure things that can't be known for sure before we can decide and we can't decide unless we know for sure things that can't be known for sure. Or at least that is how it seems to me.

Hey I got a question. Are you ever going to stop picking sentences apart and write some paragraphs with arguments that don't consist of open ended, rhetorical questions, or at least not so often?

[carl]

Bill Moore:

That article by Mr. Bacevich was good but he missed his own most important point. The point he missed is WE, the US, the Americans, the US military, the Army, the Air Force, the Marines, the Navy (I'll leave the puddle pirates out of it), the CIA, the NSA, the DIA, Specops, we don't know how to win. He states that most clearly in his analogy about the home improvement contractor that has all the best tools but can't do anything right. The point is about the contractor's incompetence, not that it isn't worthwhile to redo the kitchen or the bathroom or fix the rood when a tree falls on it, the point is this particular contractor can't do anything. Later on in the article he gets all metaphysical about how force isn't useful in today's world but that's nonsense. The people we are contesting, some of them seem to use it pretty good. WE, us, we don't seem to be able to do it anymore. He's right. We've forgotten how to win.

This has very great importance that bodes ill for the future, very ill for the future. We don't know how to fight and win. Any nation, great or small, that doesn't know how to fight and win is a victim in waiting. Mr. Bacevich's isn't a new observation. I remember years ago Abu Muqqwana said in response to something about how we can't do or didn't get small war or coin or whatever, he said maybe it isn't that, maybe what it is we don't get or can't do war at all anymore. That is what I am thinking too.

[JMA]

[snip]

I've yet to see any evidence of any of these in the arguments presented so far for intervention in Syria.

[snip]

I've yet to see anyone "cover the need" for intervention in Syria, or even make a credible argument that intervention in Syria is a "need". I understand that some people want to intervene, but want and need are two different things.

I am trying to understand why anyone needs to satisfy your demands in this regard. Who exactly are you to make such a demand?

[Bill Moore]

Bill Moore:

That article by Mr. Bacevich was good but he missed his own most important point. The point he missed is WE, the US, the Americans, the US military, the Army, the Air Force, the Marines, the Navy (I'll leave the puddle pirates out of it), the CIA, the NSA, the DIA, Specops, we don't know how to win. He states that most clearly in his analogy about the home improvement contractor that has all the best tools but can't do anything right. The point is about the contractor's incompetence, not that it isn't worthwhile to redo the kitchen or the bathroom or fix the rood when a tree falls on it, the. oint is this particular contractor can't do anything. Later on in the article he gets all metaphysical about how force isn't useful in today's world but that's nonsense. The people we are contesting, some of them seem to use it pretty good. WE, us, we don't seem to be able to do it anymore. He's right. We've forgotten how to win.

This has very great importance that bodes ill for the future, very ill for the future. We don't know how to fight and win. Any nation, great or small, that doesn't know how to fight and win is a victim in waiting. Mr. Bacevich's isn't a new observation. I remember years ago Abu Muqqwana said in response to something about how we can't do or didn't get small war or coin or whatever, he said maybe it isn't that, maybe what it is we don't get or can't do war at all anymore. That is what I am thinking too.

Carl

The military doesn't get a pass on this, yet on the other hand I am not aware of battles the military lost over the past 10 years. My point is what does winning look like? Some would argue a better peace is achieved, which I have little faith our government would achieve in Syria. Why would it turn out differently than Iraq? The military objective in Iraq was to remove Saddam. It was accomplished. Political objectives beyond that were not. Neither the military or political objectives were achieved in afghanistan as of now. I think you are too quick to point the finger at our military as the sole source of our failures, and give the
the policy makers and influencers like Wolfowtz a pass. Our military can accomplish most military tasks. If you want them to more give them the authority of State in the war zones, and fire all the stary eyed policy mskers who confuse dreams with reality.

[carl]

Bill:

The object is to win wars not battles. Who cares if you win every single battle? It is not Major League Baseball where you tote up the games won and lost to determine the champion. You got to win the war.

I haven't given the policy makers a pass. I said us, we, the Americans. But I should have been more clear and said more specifically the American leadership class, both civilian and military. They are the guys who give the big orders and they don't know how to win. Guys like you know how to win and guys like Col. McFarland, McMaster, Carter Malkasian, Carl Prine and thousands of others know how to win, but for some reason the guys at the top don't know and don't care that they don't know. That poses the most extreme danger to our country and to all the young men I know.

For the military to believe that its military task only extends to beating the opposing military is amateurish. It is like the Imperial Japanese Navy only thinking about big battles and forgetting about convoys and fighting submarines. It's a kids idea of what the role of the military is. Occupation and pacification is as much the role of the military as hitting the beach. There is nothing else that can do it. The military didn't whine after WWII about having to occupy all the countries that it occupied. That was a military task, as was the occupation of the South after the Civil War and the Philippines and Puerto Rico and on and on. A military that can't handle occupations or doesn't think it is a military task is just a bunch of well organized pirates.

My point isn't about Iraq or Afghanistan, it is about the Americans not knowing how to fight to win anymore. It is obvious that the civilian elites are feckless believers in magical thinking as witnessed by our relationship with the Pak Army/ISI over the years, but our multi-star officer corps should be a brake on that. Most all civilians think they are, but they are not. They may not believe the cant but they ain't got the nerve to tell the emperor why he is feeling so cold. This is a grave danger to our country.

[Dayuhan]

That construction is meant to close off argument because there are three words in there that are by definition, in this context, indefinite: reliable, thing and want. They can never be definitely known. The way you arguing they must be definitely known in order for any conclusion to be drawn. It's circular. We must know for sure things that can't be known for sure before we can decide and we can't decide unless we know for sure things that can't be known for sure. Or at least that is how it seems to me.

Exactly. Since we can't know for sure what "the Syrians" want, we can't use "the Syrians want us to intervene" as an argument for intervention. It would make a poor argument even if we could know, because the US government is supposed to do what the Americans want, not what the Syrians want.

Are you ever going to stop picking sentences apart and write some paragraphs with arguments that don't consist of open ended, rhetorical questions, or at least not so often?

If you really want me to explain why I think getting involved in the Syrian civil war would be a bad choice for the US, I'll do it... but it seems a bit repetitive.

Any nation, great or small, that doesn't know how to fight and win is a victim in waiting.

"Winning" is achieving your objective. Is it not possible that the American issues with "winning" could stem largely from the selection of objectives that are nebulous, ephemeral, and all but impossible to achieve with the tools we dispatch to pursue them? Asking an army to "do nation-building" makes as much sense as asking a demolition team to build a skyscraper.

If we aren't clear on what our goals are, if we shift our goals midstream, if we select unrealistic goals, and if we mismatch goals with the tools used to pursue them, we are going to have a hard time achieving our goals, and hence a hard time "winning". Is that a problem with not knowing how to win, or a problem with not knowing how to select goals, and with not knowing how to stay out of situations where goals are unclear or unrealistic.?

When the US military is assigned objectives that are clear, realistic, and compatible with what they are trained and equipped to do, they seem able to achieve the objectives quite expeditiously: e.g. "dismantle Saddam's military and remove him from power" or "remove the Taliban from power in Afghanistan". Our problem is that we insist on morphing those objectives into nebulous concepts like "nation-building" or "installing democracy", which are simply beyond our (or anyone's) capacity to achieve. That sets us up for losing, or at least for not winning.

[Dayuhan]

I am trying to understand why anyone needs to satisfy your demands in this regard. Who exactly are you to make such a demand?

Where did you see a demand?

Is it unreasonable for any participant here to request those who advocate US involvement is Syria to explain why they think involvement is necessary or appropriate, what the goals of the proposed involvement would be, how they propose to achieve those goals, and how they propose to avoid adverse unintended consequences? Is it unreasonable to expect more than a superficial answer to those questions?

If that's unreasonable, the discussion is not going to be much of a discussion.

[Dayuhan]

A well reasoned argument, which is something lacking from the advocates for intervention. Their argument is little more than we should just go, and Americans are rightfully leery of that approach. Seems we thought we could predict the future with a high degree of accuracy many times in the past only to be disappointed. Not too many American leaders would commit U.S. troops to a conflict they didn't think they could win in unless it was truly self-defense where they had no choice.

Thank you... I wish I could make the same point that concisely!

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Carl

For the military to believe that its military task only extends to beating the opposing military is amateurish. It is like the Imperial Japanese Navy only thinking about big battles and forgetting about convoys and fighting submarines. It's a kids idea of what the role of the military is. Occupation and pacification is as much the role of the military as hitting the beach. There is nothing else that can do it. The military didn't whine after WWII about having to occupy all the countries that it occupied. That was a military task, as was the occupation of the South after the Civil War and the Philippines and Puerto Rico and on and on. A military that can't handle occupations or doesn't think it is a military task is just a bunch of well organized pirates.

My point is I think many in the military are willing to step up to the plate, but leadership in the different agencies, principally CIA and Dept of State push back and protect their supposed lanes, even after repeatedly demonstrating they're inept in some areas. The CIA is occasionally held accountable, the State Department never seems to be held accountable for their errors, and it often their errors that lead to failures that is then seen as a military failure.

Do you think we got it right in Panama?

Some hold up El Salvador as an example of victory, but at most we held the communists from achieving a victory, they weren't defeated, and they didn't quit until the USSR collapsed.

Grenada? An overall success, but several serious tactical blunders that led to further reform acts.

Desert Storm? I think it was a complete success up to a point. President Bush appropriately scoped the mission into something that was doable, and sustainable politically. At the end he then encouraged the Shia and Kurds to rise up, and let them get slaughtered by the Iraqi security forces. Not sure what that accomplished except a bunch of hard feelings for the US.

Korea? Partial success, yet North Korea is still one the worst countries on the planet when it comes to human rights abuses. Amazingly we turn a blind eye to the atrocities their while the media continues to beat the drum about human rights issues and suffering in Sudan and Somalia (previously). Political correctness over the professional reporting, got it, but still sad.

Vietnam? Not touching it tonight.

Lebanon intervention in the early 80s?

Iran-Contra?

Shock and awe baby, the more I think about it the more in awe I am.

[Dayuhan]

Go back and read my post from September or October, when I told you that it's much too late for an 'US intervention' - i.e. an intervention through military means.

I'm not argumenting FOR any such intervention since long any more. Can you please finally realize that?

Neither are you explaining what you think could have been done, beyond a very generic "send money", and why you think that would have had a significant impact on the evolution of the civil war.

But sure: turn off the logic and everything's 'crystal clear' about what would have happened there.

I wouldn't know about that. Turning off logic and achieving crystal clarity on hypothetical events seems more your specialty.

Sigh... explained this some 10-12 times so far, only. Seems the art of organizing such operations got lost in the USA of the last, say, 50 or so years?

What got lost is the illusion that "the art of organizing such operations" ever existed.

It doesn't matter which. Pick up a group, get them to a training camp, explain them what you expect from them in return for your aid, train them, arm them, etc., do the same that various Islamists from KSA, Qatar, UAE and (especially) Kuwait are doing: make them so powerful, disciplined, well-armed, -fed, and -led, that insurgents from other groups are defecting in order to join such groups.

A training camp run by whom? Do you propose to send American trainers into Syria?

"...explain them what you expect from them" is almost mind-boggling. Do you really think they are going to simply submit before our overpowering Americanness and do our will like good subservient little non-Western folks? Holy Gunga Din, Batman, what century are you living in? More likely they will take our money and our stuff, tell us whatever they think we want to hear, and do whatever they want, not what we want. What on earth makes you believe that the US can simply select a group at random and transform them into instruments of our policy? If that's the plan, don't expect anyone to salute when you run it up the flagpole.

It so obviously works with all the possible other insurgent organizations in Syria, just not with the one group _supposedly_ supported by the 'West': even a blind must see this.

If the Saudis are doing it and it's working for them, why do we need to be involved? Because everybody else is? Do you seriously think the Saudis will be able to control their proxies?

So, where is your problem actually?

My problem is that... first, you're not explaining why you want all this done. You're not explaining what vital or even pressing American interest is served. Ypu're not explaining what you want or expect to achieve by picking and supporting a side in someone else's fight. Also, the plan seems, frankly, as full of holes as the aforementioned Gunga Din after his little bout of serving the western meddler.

Didn't the Saudi, Kuwaiti, Qatari and Emirati money change anything?

If you think it didn't - or US or any sort of 'Western' money wouldn't - then you should explain me: where would the Syrian insurgency be by now without all the support it's receiving from different corners in the Arab world?

We don't know where the Syrian insurgency would or wouldn't be in any hypothetical event. We also don't know why you think the US needs or would want to pick a side in that particular mess. What would you hope to achieve?

I'm not advocating an 'intervention' in sense of 'military intervention', 'bombing' etc., but in terms of (literaly) buying one of parties between Syrian insurgent groups and then developing it into THE group that matters there, that's important on the battlefield, and thus gaining political influence (in the future).

Taking sides is the first step toward direct intervention. What do you do when your side doesn't win? What do you do when you send more money and stuff and your side still doesn't win? All too often, the answer has been "send advisers and trainers"... and it doesn't stop there.

The idea that the US can simply pick a faction, any faction and, purely by an infusion of money and weapons, transform them into the dominant faction seems beyond speculative.

Or wait: perhaps you prefer a Syria that's under the control of whatever sort of extremists, so that Israel can continue declaring itself for 'under existential threat', and thus get more monetary and aid in terms of most modern technology and arms - and all of this because 'USA have no common history with Syria', 'they're no friends of us, but Israelis are'...?

US intervention would in no way assure that Syria stays out of the hands of extremists... and how the Israelis manage their relations with Syria is and should be their own affair.

If so, I could perfectly understand you advocating a hand-over of Syria to Iran and Hezbollah. Or the AQ. (As it there would be difference for Syrian population?). But then, the 'quality' of such behaviour is the same like when that duck with 'Iran buying 270 Su-27s' was launched, few years ago, just in order to find argumentation for selling F-35s to Israel and F-15s to Saudi Arabia.

Nobody needs a threat-based argument to sell F-15s to Saudi Arabia or F-35s to Israel. US factories make good money on the planes, and they need to generate volume on the F-35 to keep unit cost under control. They would sell them even if the greatest threat on the other side was a Sopwith Camel. Of course the Saudis and Israelis might not be as willing to buy them, but they don't need the US to tell them whether or not they are threatened.

The US is not in a position to "hand over" Syria to anyone. Possibly you hadn't noticed, but it's not ours to hand over. If a bunch of people who want to kill us are busy killing each other over the question of who gets to run the place, is that really something the US needs to get involved in?

[carl]

So I says to Dayuhan, I says "Are you ever going to stop picking apart sentences?" Nope I sees. Then I says, I says "Are you ever going to stop arguing via open ended rhetorical questions?" Nope I sees again. I should a said "Are you ever going to address the point at hand instead of ignoring it and bringing something completely different and pretending it addresses the original point?" Nope, I would a seen. Then I says, I says "That's a circular argument." And he says 'Yep it is, and it proves this.' Ain't that remarkable.

[carl]

My point is I think many in the military are willing to step up to the plate, but leadership in the different agencies, principally CIA and Dept of State push back and protect their supposed lanes, even after repeatedly demonstrating they're inept in some areas. The CIA is occasionally held accountable, the State Department never seems to be held accountable for their errors, and it often their errors that lead to failures that is then seen as a military failure.

Do you think we got it right in Panama?

Some hold up El Salvador as an example of victory, but at most we held the communists from achieving a victory, they weren't defeated, and they didn't quit until the USSR collapsed.

Grenada? An overall success, but several serious tactical blunders that led to further reform acts.

Desert Storm? I think it was a complete success up to a point. President Bush appropriately scoped the mission into something that was doable, and sustainable politically. At the end he then encouraged the Shia and Kurds to rise up, and let them get slaughtered by the Iraqi security forces. Not sure what that accomplished except a bunch of hard feelings for the US.

Korea? Partial success, yet North Korea is still one the worst countries on the planet when it comes to human rights abuses. Amazingly we turn a blind eye to the atrocities their while the media continues to beat the drum about human rights issues and suffering in Sudan and Somalia (previously). Political correctness over the professional reporting, got it, but still sad.

Vietnam? Not touching it tonight.

Lebanon intervention in the early 80s?

Iran-Contra?

Shock and awe baby, the more I think about it the more in awe I am.

My opinion differs from yours. Many in the military are willing to step up and do what it takes. The problem is the multi-stars aren't and they are the movers and shakers. If they don't or won't win, you and the others don't much matter. Those guys are infected with the same virus that afflicts State, the intel agencies and every other leprous collection of inside the beltway organizations.

You are at times confusing perfection with good enough. WWII was sure as hell not perfection but it was good enough. Heck, you even said the commies quit in El Salvador. That was good enough but you seem to think good enough wasn't good enough. A lot of South Koreans benefited hugely from a good enough, for them, outcome in the peninsula.

I don't think political correctness has anything to do with reporting or lack of it on North Korean barbarity. What limits exist exist because nobody can get in there and there isn't much prospect the situation is going to change.

Then there were the things that weren't even good enough. Two cases in point, Iraq 1991 and Vietnam. Both of those in my view exemplify our inability to win when winning was possible. We never tried to cut the Trail and we just sat on our hands while a thoroughly defeated Iraqi army slaughtered people. We don't do war well.

[JMA]

Excellent response Carl.

Saved me firing off a response to Bill's sad apology for political and - top level - military incompetence. (The grunts do the business and the generals screw it up.)

Bill:

The object is to win wars not battles. Who cares if you win every single battle? It is not Major League Baseball where you tote up the games won and lost to determine the champion. You got to win the war.

I haven't given the policy makers a pass. I said us, we, the Americans. But I should have been more clear and said more specifically the American leadership class, both civilian and military. They are the guys who give the big orders and they don't know how to win. Guys like you know how to win and guys like Col. McFarland, McMaster, Carter Malkasian, Carl Prine and thousands of others know how to win, but for some reason the guys at the top don't know and don't care that they don't know. That poses the most extreme danger to our country and to all the young men I know.

For the military to believe that its military task only extends to beating the opposing military is amateurish. It is like the Imperial Japanese Navy only thinking about big battles and forgetting about convoys and fighting submarines. It's a kids idea of what the role of the military is. Occupation and pacification is as much the role of the military as hitting the beach. There is nothing else that can do it. The military didn't whine after WWII about having to occupy all the countries that it occupied. That was a military task, as was the occupation of the South after the Civil War and the Philippines and Puerto Rico and on and on. A military that can't handle occupations or doesn't think it is a military task is just a bunch of well organized pirates.

My point isn't about Iraq or Afghanistan, it is about the Americans not knowing how to fight to win anymore. It is obvious that the civilian elites are feckless believers in magical thinking as witnessed by our relationship with the Pak Army/ISI over the years, but our multi-star officer corps should be a brake on that. Most all civilians think they are, but they are not. They may not believe the cant but they ain't got the nerve to tell the emperor why he is feeling so cold. This is a grave danger to our country.

[JMA]

Who said anything about US involvement? Not I.

With the Keystone Cops antics of the White House and the Pentagon it would just be another cock-up. The US military must not get within 1,000 miles of Syria.

I've said it before … use proxies.

Where did you see a demand?

Is it unreasonable for any participant here to request those who advocate US involvement is Syria to explain why they think involvement is necessary or appropriate, what the goals of the proposed involvement would be, how they propose to achieve those goals, and how they propose to avoid adverse unintended consequences? Is it unreasonable to expect more than a superficial answer to those questions?

If that's unreasonable, the discussion is not going to be much of a discussion.

[Dayuhan]

Who said anything about US involvement? Not I.

With the Keystone Cops antics of the White House and the Pentagon it would just be another cock-up. The US military must not get within 1,000 miles of Syria.

I've said it before … use proxies.

Involvement by proxy is still involvement.

Who would you suggest as an appropriate proxy?

[Firn]

It seems that there area certainly a lot of proxies involved in this very messy and foggy conflict. What surprised me after is the sheer amount of videos coming out of the war, some of it clearly recorded to show all the great things are done for the cause x. In some cases they even say thanks, for example to gracious donors around the Gulf. The vast spread of digital cameras and the increasing penetration of the Internet plus platforms like YT make it possible.

[JMA]

Involvement by proxy is still involvement.

Who would you suggest as an appropriate proxy?

Is this '20 Questions'?