Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

[CrowBat]

The 'Syrian government' is supposedly advancing on Qunaitra, according to this report:

...The Syrian TV report, citing a military official, said troops and pro-government gunmen known as National Defense Forces captured the areas of Rasm al-Hour and Rasm al-Sad, south of the town of Quneitra. The Britain-based Syrian Observatory For Human Rights confirmed troops were on the offensive, adding that the air force was taking part in the attack.
...

Even the regime media is not talking about 'Army', but NDF now.

Meanwhile, Ahrar ash-Sham is assaulting the base of the former 61st (Independent) Brigade in Tel al-Jabiyeh, further south (this is the first time we've got to hear about this SyAA unit after nearly three years of that war; reason is that most of it defected in the meantime; indeed, a part of the 61st turned its weapons at elements of the 4th AD sent to crush its mutiny, in January 2012).

It's thus interesting to see that - concurrent with the 'regime offensives' into northern Aleppo and towards Qunaitra - a number of new entries for IRGC casualties in Syria can be found here (pages 119-122 of that thread).

BTW, the IDF is re-shuffling its units on cease-fire lines with Syria too. According to this report:

...The 36th Division had been stationed in the Golan Heights for 40 years, and its move away from the Syrian border is a historic military shift that will see it become an all-purpose wartime division, designed to be sent to any combat arena, such as Lebanon or Gaza, to support other divisions.

Replacing it will be the 210th Division, which since July has been training intensively to familiarize itself with the Syrian border, and mastering the IDF's intelligence and firepower capabilities that may be needed to deal with future threats from Syria.
...

While the 36th was stationed on the Golan for 40 years, it consisted of brigades and battalions drawn from other parts of Israel. On the contrary, the 210th is a reservist unit consisting of 'regional' brigades and battalions. Summary: contrary to rumours about the West, Israelis and Saudis planning to establish a NFZ over Syria, it seems the Israelis do not expect the civil war in Syria to spill over the cease-fire lines.

[JMA]

Came across this:

Analysis: Is Syria now a direct threat to the U.S.?

They're saying now that fighters are going to be trained in Syria and come back to the U.S.," he said. "We can't pretend that it doesn't have an impact on American national security interests."

[davidbfpo]

JMA,

The cited Reuters article brings nothing new on the issues around foreign fighters, although its American emphasis is different to what we see here.

There is a SWC thread 'Foreign fighters in Syria: a crime minus a motive?', where there are differences of opinion:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=19976

[CrowBat]

Few days ago 2-3 videos appeared on YouTube, showing British and French Jihadists (fighting in Aleppo for the JAN), stressing they'll not gonna go back.

So, some might go back, others not.

IMHO, it depends what faction in Syria they joined. If it's ISIS, then I wouldn't bet on them staying in Syria or not going to 'fight' somewhere else. If it's the JAN or Ahrar ash-Sham, they have no reason to go back, no matter what kind of links to AQ they might have.

Both of these organizations are run by native (Syrian) Salafists, not by Wahhabists. No matter how many are bunching them together or considering them 'the same', they are not the same. Although they're presently happily pocketing money from private sources in Saudi Arabia there remains plenty of antagonism between Syrian Salafists and Saudi Wahhabists. Of course, I've got no crystal ball or any sort of 'special abilities', but I expect sooner or later the relations between these two organizations and the AQ to end like those between the Libyan Salafists and AQ (concerns of that kind are probably the most likely reason for Zawahiri dropping the ISIS).

***********

BTW, the Saudi-supplied ATGMs are flooding the frontlines quite freely, and the last two days saw the NDF suffering heavy losses in armour (again). Here 'selected' examples...

In southern Syria, after capturing the base of the (former) 61st (Independent) Brigade, Ahrar ash-Sham should have overrun the base of the 90th (Independent) Brigade too, severing the Damascus-Quneitra road in the process. Here scenes from the base of the 61st:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hf6PTsF0z7A

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oPIiXHhyl4g

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Fciwecz90w Not working 10th March.

RAK-12 crew in action against Tel Jabiya (61st's base):

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uqfKMH_w3B8

Regime launched a (supposedly) 'big' counteroffensive in direction of Qunaitra. Contrary to meanwhile standard practice from other parts of Syria, this was led by the conglomerate of native troops trained by the IRGC and coloquially designated the '4th Armoured Division' (read: NDF) and Iraqi Shi'a, and it run into major trouble when the Ahrar ash-Sham and SF began deploying Saudi-supplied ATGMs. This video is showing regime troops running away from Qunaitra area:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w8yYAdiVS8U

Counterattack by NDF failed:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1ycPpHSo8QU

2 BMPs and 1 MBT knocked out:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7qQfbydT1u4

HJ-8 vs ZSU-23-4:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UNxB46g75tc

**********

Dera'a:
Army base in Nawa overrun by SF, one T-72 knocked out in the process:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dq5k-Y10JPU

HJ-8 hit another MBT:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FqEzpGiy0tU

T-55 captured:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eskV8s9aoag

Hamza Asadullah Brigade (SF) attacking Inkhil, northern Dera'a:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dab-IpeMCNM

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MDi-H9zixAs

**************

Similar scenes from Qalamoun/Yabroud area, where Saudi-supplied ATGMs are used by the IF against NDF- ('4th AD' again) operated armour in support of Hezbollah offensive mentioned above:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXYtAFVThFQ

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vjd7R7NhCr8

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MNFcrVekbYk

On ACIG.info forum we have a lad cross-checking all such evidence and counting regime losses. His last count (covering period between 9 May 2012 and 23 February 2014), ended at:

- 276 BMP destroyed and 107 captured by rebels = 383 BMP lost
- 441 tanks destroyed and 223 captured by rebels = 664 tanks lost
- 19 ZSU-23-4 destroyed and 25 captured by rebels = 44 ZSU-23-4 lost
- 7 2S1 destroyed and 11 captured by rebels = 18 2S1 lost

Makes one wonder what's going to be the 'up-to-date' figure after this week.

[flagg]

Interesting ambush video by the Syrian regime.

They'd have to have had some pretty good Int by the looks of things:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=amD-CTwPVkI

[carl]

Interesting ambush video by the Syrian regime.

They'd have to have had some pretty good Int by the looks of things:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=amD-CTwPVkI

What kind of weapon hit those guys?

[Dayuhan]

What kind of weapon hit those guys?

And what were they doing lined up out in the open? I wonder if that was a refugee group; it's hard to imagine even the most confident insurgent unit exposing themselves like that.

[jcustis]

If you look carefully, the video is taken with a medium-quality thermal camera (FLIR). The personnel moving on the ground could have been moving single file for a number of reasons, such as through a breach in a minefield or similar obstacle, to avoid IEDs, or because they were trying to infiltrate to a specific point and then assault a fixed position.

They don't appear to be refugees because they seem to be of a uniform height, and all seem to be moving at the same rate of speed. That's not something you'd see with women, children, and old men shuffling along.

As for the ordnance? Anybody's guess. Could be simple HE from mortars or artillery. If it was, government forces had that pre-registered target laid in very well.

[CrowBat]

There is plenty of confusion and controversy over this entire issue, and there are several videos meanwhile, indicating the possiblity of there being two such ambushes: one in Qalamoun, and the other in Eastern Ghouta areas (geographically, both are in Rif Dimashq Province, but the Qalamoun range is stretching from 70km NE of Damascus towards north, while Eastern Ghouta is encirling southern and eastern suburbs of Damascus).

Anyway, in hope I might have more luck with posting videos than the last time (see above for a botch-up attempt), here some additional ones with scenes from that ambush and after (WARNING: most are GRAFFIC!!!):

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dF4qKxDSlhk

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r9FdlOXS1RA Requires sign in to confirm age.

Now, the pro-regime sources are claiming it was an IED set up by Hezbollah that, according to the SOHR, killed '152 rebels from Jabhat an-Nusra and other brigades', outside Otaiba (Eastern Ghouta). Seven injured insurgents should have been taken prisoners.

The AJE Arabic-language service reported that it was actually a column of civilians escorted by 'FSyA fighters' underway to pick up food for besieged civilians:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R1dvvgsQK2U Requires sign in to confirm age.

Curiously, this is not what AJE English-language service is reporting, as can be read here.

Frankly, the JAN might be 'AQ-linked extremists', but for them to walk in the open like this... well, that would require an incredible dose of stupidity. Namely, car bombs and IEDs are a matter of everyday life in all of Syria since at least two years. But: artillery shellings and air strikes of any kind of concentrations of 'non-regime people' - even more so.

[CrowBat]

'In other news'...

As usually when it comes to Middle East affairs, one must all the time keep on 'connecting dots', and 'reading between the lines'. For example, few weeks ago we've seen those 'pro-regime demos' supposedly held in Dera'a (ho-hum), and Damascus (indeed). Subsequently it turned out these were staged to 'pre-empt' anti-regime demos by nobody else but Assad's 'very own' - Alawists, primarily held in Tartus (only to get quickly squashed by 'security services'). There is plenty of unrest between Alawists, because of their heavy casualties in this war so far.

That's making one curious about the actual reasons for the (completely regime-controlled) Syrian media, and then all the media of all of regime's allies so happily reporting about this 'ambush' now. Namely, when one considers some of things mentioned in report The Crucial Syria Battles You’re Not Hearing About (SPOILER: Assad seems in trouble) things are anything but 'developing ah so well' for the regime:

...Two weeks into a furious Syrian government assault on Yabroud, the largest remaining rebel-held town in the Qalamoun mountains, rebels are on a surprising offensive.
...
On Monday, the pro-opposition Qalamoun Media Foundation reported that, despite heavy shelling and the Syrian air force’s use of barrel bombs on rebel-held positions, Free Syrian Army-affiliated combatants and Islamist brigades, including Jabhat a-Nusra and the Islamic Front, had eliminated regime forces in the Rima farms, in eastern Yabroud.
...
The advance comes a day after the Islamic Front and others announced they had seized control of the village of a-Sahel, northeast of Yabroud, forcing a retreat of Syrian government troops and their Hezbollah reinforcements.
...

Let's go a step further, and check the report Regime forces inch closer to Aleppo, by Lebanese Daily Star (leaning 'pro-Regime').

Not only that 'Regime forces inch AROUND Aleppo' would be a better title, but this contains some interesting details too:

...In Aleppo, the Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights monitoring group said that government troops, backed by National Defense paramilitary forces and officers from Lebanon’s Hezbollah, advanced against rebel groups near Aleppo’s airport, and close to the Army’s 80th Division headquarters.

At least 17 rebels, including some non-Syrians, were killed in the fighting, the Observatory said.

It said that regime troops were now one kilometer away from the neighborhood of Tariq al-Bab, which has been targeted repeatedly by regime airstrikes and barrel bombs in recent weeks.

The Observatory said the government troops, backed by paramilitary forces, seized a factory in the Sheikh Said area of Aleppo while rebels, backed by the jihadist Nusra Front, disabled a regime vehicle in Sheikh Najjar, adding that the regime side sustained casualties in the clashes.
...

The NDF has certainly reached the area in question, as can be seen from this video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1oni5tm55nI

'But', the same report is also stating:

...The commander of an Islamist militia was killed in clashes outside Yabroud, the Observatory said, as government artillery struck targets around the town, along with the nearby region of the Rima Farms, and the nearby towns of Maaloula and Seidnaya.

...
The latest battles raged in the Rima Farms region, where the latest attempt by Hezbollah and the Syrian Army to achieve a breakthrough against rebel defenses failed, activists said.
...

etc.

This is imposing the quesiton: if the regime has claimed to have captured the Rima Farms already a week ago, why should it now have to shell that area, and fight for it?

The answer implies that the regime is - as usually - lying. Which then implies nothing good about regime's report about that 'ambush' either.

**********

On the lighter side: fans of the regime shouldn't miss a visit to the FB page of nobody else but Brig Gen Essam Zaher ad-Deen (or 'Zahreddine'), a Druze and a former CO of the 104th Mechanized Brigade of the RGD, appointed the CO of Aleppo Garrison in late summer last year:
https://www.facebook.com/general.issam.zaheraldeen

This 'bad-ass' guy, who supposedly survived several assassination attempts by 'Jihadist rats', has appeared in Dayr az-Zawr, few days ago, where insurgents made some advances back towards the local air base. Here you can see him visiting the local 'Syrian Arab Army' units (read: NDF):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6u2dStG9Moc

Experiences from three years of this war are teaching us: if Zaher ad-Deen is appearing somewhere, the situation (from the regime's POV) is 'close to catastrophe'. But also: there is a high probability that the regime (read: IRGC, Hezbollah, Iraqi Shi'a, PFLP etc., etc., etc., followed by the NDF, BPM etc., etc., etc.) migh launch a major offensive operation in the given area, within 1-2 months.

[CrowBat]

Almost forgot to post this one:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vAopr8vIIIA

Excellent PBS Frontline documentary about the emergence of Ma'arouf's SRF in Idlib and Aleppo provinces (first half), and their assault on ISIS-held Atareb, in mid-January 2014, and then a report on 'every day life' of kids in insurgent-held parts of Aleppo.

[davidbfpo]

Note the number of enclaves still held by the regime, which I can only assume are airfields and rely on external supplies. They must be quite lonely outposts being far from the regime's heartland.



The large empty space is desert and virtually uninhabited. The few spots I assume are towns.

[flagg]

What kind of weapon hit those guys?

I would guess a daisy chained bank of claymore-type mines or IEDs.

[flagg]

And what were they doing lined up out in the open? I wonder if that was a refugee group; it's hard to imagine even the most confident insurgent unit exposing themselves like that.

Maybe it's a question of training/discipline amongst insurgents?

Trained soldiers in a military with decent discipline/leadership, TTPs, and equipment would ensure appropriate spacing between individuals and between subunits day or night.

But there's also the question of traveling at night.

The lower the ambient light, likely the shorter the distance between folks traveling in single file if they don't have individual issue NVE/NVG.

[jcustis]

They were traveling at night, hence the FLIR. Not at all unreasonable that they expected to be able to do so undetected if regime night vision/thermal capabilities are poor or unknown.

They just got sloppy either way and paid for it.

Remember that they were crossing open ground. Sometimes speed IS security, and the file is an appropriate to maintain speed...unless some knucklehead is watching and waiting.

[jcustis]

I watched several of the insurgent posted videos for the first time in a while last night.

Good lord what a largely undisciplined band of effing clownshoes. The one chubby guy who likes to step out and shoot RPGs without using the sights, and one-handed, might as well be throwing gang signs as he struts back behind cover. I want to punch him in the head everytime I see his goofy mug show up.

That they are holding their own at all is remarkable, but their donkey's rear end brethren in Iraq put up a similar fight and sometimes fared well too. A good all-out frontal assault by disciplined infantry might surprised the regime in terms of how effective it could be. But we've seen the quality they have as well.

Risk aversion prolongs things. Sometimes folks just need to tuck in the chin and get down to business. Syria is an existential threat for both parties involved, and they are fighting it like some sandlot game at times.

[carl]

I would guess a daisy chained bank of claymore-type mines or IEDs.

Thank you sir. That appears to make the most sense.

[JMA]

With Syria, Diplomacy Needs Force

"If the president already owns the deadly consequences of inaction, it is only prudent now to back diplomacy with force so that the consequences do not become deadlier still."

[CrowBat]

Note the number of enclaves still held by the regime, which I can only assume are airfields and rely on external supplies. They must be quite lonely outposts being far from the regime's heartland.

That map contains few mistakes.

For example: Idlib City is not really 'cut off and surrounded'. The regime is holding a corridor along the road from Idlib to Ariha (south of Idlib) and Jishr ash-Shughour (west of Ariha) towards Lattakia.

Further south (still inside Idlib Province), there is another pocket held by the regime, stretching from Camp Wadi ad-Dayf (SE of Ma'arat an-Numaan) to Khan Sheykhun.

Then, the ISIS pocket NW from Aleppo - the town of Azzaz - is not existing since few days: the ISIS withdrew from there towards the East. Here a relevant report:
ISIL jihadists retreat from parts of north Syria, says monitor

...The jihadist Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham has begun withdrawing from parts of northern Syria ahead of a deadline set by a rival group, a monitor said Thursday.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said the group was retreating east towards its stronghold in the city of Raqa.

The withdrawal comes four days after the Al-Qaeda affiliated Al-Nusra Front issued ISIS an ultimatum to go before an Islamic court for mediation or face being forced from Syria altogether.

The deadline expires on Saturday.

"ISIS has withdrawn from Aazaz, its most important bastion in Aleppo province, as well as the Minnigh military airport, the Mayer region and the villages of Deir Jamal and Kafin," the Observatory said.

"Aleppo region is their weakest link, so they fear being attacked there" by Al-Nusra and other rebels after the deadline expires, Observatory director Rami Abdel Rahman told AFP.

"ISIS is heading to areas that neighbor Raqa province where it has its main stronghold in the city of Raqa," he said.
...

Azzaz is now under combined, IF/SRF control.

Then, the insurgent-held pocket 'east of Homs' was recently overrun by the regime. The insurgents are still holding few neighbourhoods in the NE of that city, which are connected with the large pocket between Houla and Rastan.

The insurgent-held area in Qalamoun Range received a sizeable 'dent' on its northern side, since the start of SyAAF & NDF-supported Hezbollah offensive on that area, two weeks ago.

And finally (between others), the insurgent-controlled area along armistice lines with Israel is stretching all the way up to Qunaitra, i.e. much further north than marked on that map.

The large empty space is desert and virtually uninhabited.

'Sparselly populated' would be a better description. This is no 'sand sea' as often imagined by foreigners (and shown in various Hollywood movies), but an area characterized by low rolling hills, covered by gravel, lavender bush and actually quite a lot of grass (except in summer and autumn, of course). There are plenty of roads in that area too (two each connecting Damascus and Homs with Palmyra, for example), and all of these are effectivelly under regime control (indeed, the regime can still push entire supply convoys all the way from Damascus via Palmyra to Dayr az-Zawr).

[jmm99]

This story, Times of Israel, Syrian Christians sign treaty of submission to Islamists - Threatened by al-Qaeda-affiliated extremists, community in northern city of Raqqa chooses ‘dhimmitude’ over conversion or death (by Elhanan Miller, February 27, 2014); and Haaretz, Under threat, Syria's Christians sign accord with Islamists - While Christians opt for a medieval-style 'protection agreement' and tax over conversion or death, Assad bolsters standing as the preferred option in Syria (by Zvi Bar'el, 3 Mar 2014).

This undated file image posted on a militant website on Tuesday, Jan. 14, 2014 shows fighters from the al-Qaeda linked Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) marching in Raqqa [JMM: Raqqa Wiki], Syria (photo credit: AP).

has been gaining traction over the last week or so. That being said, my purpose here is not to launch into a discussion of Raqqa's military history (an interesting subject), dhimmitude under Sharia law (a subject of interest to comparative lawyers), or of the ISIS troopers' marching style.

Instead, I'd like to discuss one apparent legal implication of Raqqa to larger issues in US foreign policy (one global, one Syrian in scope), which arose out of the events briefly described in these snips from the "dhimmitude" articles:

Times: Earlier this month, al-Qaeda’s central command distanced itself from ISIS, saying it was “not a branch of al-Qaeda.”

Haaretz: The response from rival groups has not been long in coming. Al-Nusra Front, led by Abu Mohammed al-Joulani, issued an ultimatum to ISIS warning that if its people do not cease their attacks on the front, and if they don't sign a reconciliation agreement, they are in for “a dreadful battle.”

Al-Nusra became Al-Qaida’s official representative in Syria after ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi defied an order by Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri to dismantle the front's forces in Syria and go back to fighting in Iraq. This blatant defiance led Al-Zawahiri to openly disavow ISIS, but this does not seem to have impressed the ISIS leader much, as he continues to spearhead an independent front within Syria.

It was Al-Bahgdadi's forces, in fact, who assassinated Abu Khalid al-Suri, a close friend of Osama bin Laden and a top Al-Qaida official, who worked alongside Al-Joulani. Friendship with Bin Laden is no longer a reliable insurance policy, apparently.

The power struggles between the two radical groups that have seized partial control of some Syrian towns and villages is forcing the Free Syrian Army to take a stand. The paradoxical result is that the Al-Qaida stand-in – Al-Nusra – is now considered a more desirable ally of the rebels than ISIS because it relies largely on Syrian support, while ISIS has recruited many volunteers from Arab and Western countries.

That story has also been discussed in posts above (primarily by Crowbat), which obviously have military and political implications.

Lawfare's Jack Goldsmith has been following the legal implications of the AQ-Base and ISIS rupture, in two pieces. The first, The ISIS Expulsion and the AUMF (by Jack Goldsmith, February 11, 2014), deals with the "reported fact" that the Obama administration considered the US to be at war with ISIS, and with al-Nusar in an earlier admission:

Karen DeYoung and Greg Miller report in the WP [Al-Qaeda’s expulsion of Islamist group in Syria prompts U.S. debate] that Al-Qaeda’s recent expulsion of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has raised questions about whether the AUMF “still applies” to ISIS. “According to some administration lawyers and intelligence officials,” they report, “the expulsion of ISIS removes the group from the short list of al-Qaeda ‘associates’ that the president has virtually unlimited powers to strike under a law passed days after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.”

These statements imply that the administration had determined, prior to the ISIS expulsion, that the AUMF authorized the President to use force against this group that operates in Syria. That is news to me, and it highlights the non-transparent method by which the Executive determines with whom we are at war.

Does Congress know that the Executive branch had determined that the AUMF authorized force against ISIS? Did the Senate Arms Services Committee know? (When DOD officials suggested at a SASC hearing last May that the AUMF authorized force against the Nusra Front in Syria, many Senators on the SASC expressed surprise.)

The WP article claims the WH's targeted group list is now down to four AQ "affiliates" (obviously not including Astan and Pstan):

The unofficial list of al-Qaeda affiliates is now down to four: the powerful offshoots in Yemen and North Africa, Somalia-based al-Shabab, and Jabhat al-Nusra, an ISIS rival within the Syrian opposition to President Bashar al#-Assad.

All of this goes to Jack's main point:

The main point of the story is the increasing fragility of the AUMF. Zawahiri’s expulsion of ISIS, by calling into question its status as an AQ associate, makes it more difficult as a legal matter for the USG to use force against ISIS. DeYoung and Miller report that some in the administration “think ISIS can still be targeted because of its long-standing al-Qaeda ties and parallel ambitions.”

But this would probably be stretching the AUMF too far, leaving the President either to act under Article II if ISIS presented a serious threat, or not act at all. In that connection, DeYoung and Miller also report that “Obama remains leery of justifying drone strikes and other types of military action with constitutional powers he accused his predecessor, George W. Bush, of overusing” – namely, inherent Article II powers.

It has always puzzled me why President Obama is leery of using Article II in counterterrorism operations where U.S. safety and security are at stake, but not in humanitarian operations as in Libya and the threatened action in Syria.

Actually, I doubt that Jack is puzzled; he is well aware of the forceful advocacy of Susan Rice and Samantha Power when it comes to liberal-progressive humanitarian interventions.

At the time Jack wrote this, his concerns about the AUMF and Article II powers were theoretical. But, within two weeks, we got what seems a real world example.

- to be cont.-