Infantry Training: Philosophies, Tips, Tricks, and Gaps
I'd love to hear the council's thoughts on infantry training, particularly after the requirements of the PTP have led us to outsource so much of our training over the last ten years. I'm particularly interested in non-live fire training, as we're already heading into the "age of austerity" and the lower ammo and fuel allocations that will go with it.
My .02: I want my guys to be aggressive, very physically fit, know their weapons intimately, and understand the orders process. I want them to be very proficient in fire and movement, fire and maneuver, patrolling, reporting, call for fire, working with air, combat lifesaving, land navigation, communications, and reconnaissance. I want corporals who can lead squads and sergeants who can lead platoons in a pinch. I want to train for HIC and educate for COIN/LIC.
But that's all more endstate than method.
First of all learn who's smart and who's not, learn about their intrinsic motivation, learn about their character.
This can be done during the training of the basic stuff.
Once you know your people you can really work with them to exploit whatever time and hardware budget you have to the fullest.
Sacrifice holding on to your junior NCOs and send them to formal schools. And get your wingman to the Plt Sgt course or LAR Ldr Crse. You will have the tims now, so start using it wisely.
And get a copy of the Infantry T&R manual as soon as it is signed, and a copy of the draft LAR T&R Manual. Sit down with your Gunny, crack them open, and fill in the gaps with training that is nested in with the company's plan. Prioritize training based on resources and time available (you already know this stuff), but do it all in concert with the battalion's building block annual training plan. It will be there; you've just got to digest it and execute.
Give me a ring or drop me an email f you want to discuss further over lunch sometime in the next two weeks. I'm curious how your deploy went anyway.
ETA: Start by abolishing the phrase, "Well, the way we did it in Helmand," from use within the platoon, and revert back to your roots at Quantico. Look at what you were able to learn in just the six months of TBS alone. You can do a lot with a well-structured plan.
Last edited by jcustis; 08-11-2012 at 11:13 PM.
Agree with all of the above, sir, especially formal schools, that's one I think we did get right last go around, for the most part.Originally Posted by jcustis
"OEFisms" is another whole thread, and a favorite point of our old Gunner.
Ha. I call it Kandaharitis.
In my opinion, I think we have partially lost our way in terms of high intensity operations and what the newer generation of soldiers who have been brought up with OEF/OIF have come to know as infantry work. I am careful with how I say that, because I do not want to criticise what people have done in very dangerous environments. Really, I see it more as an adaptation and response to the threat and environment presented.
That's why I wrote a book about it. Problem: the book contains and is a result of a lot of experience that I personally gained in Iraq and Afghanistan! However, I also put in there what I consider to be the good tactics from my British Army experiences, and some from my US Army ones. As a fan of infantry work and small unit tactics, I have never allowed myself to forget how to do good basic infantry work.
The other side to that however is that there is a lot to be learned from tactics adapted for lower intensity counter insurgency, that can be "taken back up" to high intensity operations. An example is the technique of "satellite" patrolling, which is a term I made up to describe a technique adapted from "multiple" patrolling. This is a British Army technique originally developed for Northern Ireland. A "multiple" is a half platoon and the term "satelite" refers to the way the (usually) three teams within that element move around each other while patrolling. This can be very useful for, and has been adapted to, theaters such as Afghanistan and can be used for rural and urban settings, with perhaps an adaptation of team sizes depending on the environment.
A "feeling" that I have that is not backed up by any research or empirical evidence is that in the current/recent OEF/OIF theaters some (not all) coalition infantry would appear to have lost the ability to maneuver on the enemy. Many TICs will take the form of an exchange of small arms fire while the heavy assets (i.e. CAS, indirect fires etc) are called in. This is very sensible of course, if you can do it, do it - why risk taking casualties. However, the feeling remains, that some units see infantry work as simply firing at the enemy, rather than conducting maneuver, and in the absence of timely fires in support they seem unbale to prosecute an assault. It is almost as if, in some cases, insurgent vs coalition "man to man" yields no advantage to coalition troops. Of course, in many cases coalition troops are supremely able, so take that with a pinch of salt.
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