Humanitarian Aid: Winning the Terror War

[Rob Thornton]

I guess my gripe is that all too often the material solution becomes an end unto itself. I was talking with one of the instructors here at AWC who said that he was approached for a recommendation on what a good COIN A/C would look like - He responded with both a jet solution - the old A-4 and a prop job - the OV-10. The folks who asked him went away disappointed because he would not endorse the need for a new A/C. His recommendations were just not sexy enough.

Ex. 2 Look how long it took us to come off the dime and decide that the COTS solution for MRAP was good enough - even when we were already demonstrating their survivability with the route clearnace teams and EOD.

Ex. 3 While there are other issues in fielding a new rifle - if we want one the aquisition process will ensure its years off.

It just seems like its hard to get out in front when we continue to draw our material solutions from the board instead of the field. Right now is different then the 1990s, and we need to treat it differently in terms of how we resource our needs when we're talking zero sum gains.

I thought about it a little after I read LVs post and came up with a rough intro:

What to Do when You are out of Schlitz: A Concept for Outsourcing Large Scale Capabilities for SSTRO Missions

The United States is in a resource intense security environment and is unable to provide the scale of military means needed to meet all the demands. The question remains however that with its finite resources committed primarily to Iraq and Afghanistan, how does it shape other regions and environments in order to prevent destabilization? How does it create the conditions which in avoids a host of security problems in places we’ve identified as being in jeopardy, but are unable to affect? The answer may be in combining outsourcing with limited critical capabilities provided by the U.S. military and OGAs. The concept would not be a one size fits all, but a scaleable solution based on the local and regional security environment. It would involve PMCs, contract shipping and air (Contract LOG), NGOs and regional partners working within the confines of the mission as defined by the United States. These limited critical capabilities would almost always require US C2 (Command & Control), but depending on the level and type of threat, may for different lengths of time require other US capabilities not committed elsewhere.

TOPICS

Contract air, PMC security, US distribution, NGO medical, US C2, Contract engineering,

(I'm not sayng the US is unable to produce the means - but that is a choice, and the result is that the means by which the military can employ is limited by funding and policy - that is just the way it is)

I am not of the notion that it would be a good idea for example to hire a PMC to form a BDE. I am also not of the idea that asking them to take on a long term mission we have identified as something critical to our strategy - ex. the advisory mission. I believe those are better left to the uniformed services (or regional parnters) & will mean tough choices for us. However, if we are talking about helicopter pilots for supply runs, contract convoy escort and site security for NGOs which are of a limited contract and are re-evaluated every time, then I think it may fit.

I don't have too much spare time these days as I work my way through BSAP, but I'd be willing to work on it with somebody if they want to pursue it. This is one instance where I think we may have to resort to Contract and PMCs because we just can't spare the Schlitz. It may already be that we are doing allot of this (outside of OIF/OEF), but I have not seen it on a large scale. It would still be pricey but it would address a capability gap.