Learning from Iraq: COIN in American Strategy

[RTK]

IA proximity to their places of dwelling is a crapshoot. The BDE I had in Ninevah Province had most of the leaders from the Kurdish North and most of the jundis from the Shia south. Hardly any of them were from Ninevah, which worked both ways, good and bad.

[Rob Thornton]

Although finding enough these individuals would be a challenge; not to mention pulling all the good leaders from their IA units would be disasterous; as in many cases, it's literally one or two leaders keeping the unit together.

When we first got here, we did not find many leaders in the BN. The BN CDR's understanding of running a BN was taking his rather large PSD out and kicking in doors. He was was an interesting sort of fellow - old regime IP type and a Zebari Kurd (not everyone understands that there were quite a few Kurds on the Saddam payroll). About 4 months into our tour the powers that be changed him out and put him in a position more suited to his talents - LNO with the IP - believe it or not - a good match. They brought in a new guy and he brought in several FGs with him.

The focus changed in the BN. This new CDR started developing his companies, and the staff. He and his FGs actively sought advice, and he has made some stand up decisions that could have significantly lined hs pockets, but instead improved the security situation and showed CF what is possible with an IA unit.

There are now quite a few leaders in the BN, so much so that its no longer a "Jenga" sort of eqaution. I talk to other TT types and they see similiar progress up here in Ninewa, but I don't think it goes below the 35th parallel - it starts to get muddy down there. I think a person's expectations about progress are an important part of the equation. If a person thinks they are going to going to radically improve a unit in 12 months, they may be setting themselves up for disappointment. It can happen, but you'll be more effective aiming for small dents in the problem that add up collectively vs. looking for the grail. BCTs and such tend to measure their success in what they accomplish in 12 months - that is just what we are geared to. I'd recommend a longer outlook, one that begins with understanding where the start points and end points are.

It may be similiar though (or it may be very different) in the very far South (say below the 32nd) -I just don't know anybody down there, nor do I hear much about it - this is also a big problem in that sharing what works and hearing about what doesn't is lethargic at best.

I would not expect too many things to be the same if I rotate back in a year -there seems to be too much politically (both in Baghdad & Washington) that could dramatically alter the equation.

I tell friends and family what I see here. Its my little patch. Everybody's frame of ref. is a little different either in time or geography.

[JKM4767]

Actually, directly east of Tikrit, sitting just west of the notional "green line". The BN was a unique mix of Sunni Arab, Shia Turkoman and Kurds.

[Shek]

I certainly agree that Mosul doesn't always follow the trends of the rest of the country. I left Mosul in Jan '04, during the infancy of the insurgency that would soon devastate the area. I attribute a lot of the problems to tactical failures on the part of the TF that replaced the 101st. Mosul in the spring and summer of '04 is a perfect example of what large FOBs do to a battlespace. I have also recently learned of the successes of ISF in the city and compared to what Mosul used to look like, I think CF have done a commendable job in the last year. After a year on a MiTT, I can understand the labors of getting Iraqis to 1. get along and 2. take ownership of their mission and AO.

JKM,
FYI - we were forced to consolidate into large FOBs. We fought to maintain many of the company FOBs that were used by you guys open only to be told no at the GO level. I was asked by a few of the Iraqis that "hosted" platoon FOBs if we could keep them open, but the same as above applied. Baghdad was pushing towards reducing the footprint.
Shek