The Kargil War (new title, all aspects)

[blueblood]

As for the artillery.

As per the official list of Pakistani soldiers who have been killed during the war period, put up on its website by the Pakistani Army, about 190 of the over 400 dead were killed because of shelling by the Indian Army.

http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation...il_669140.html

The Indian artillery fired over 2,50,000 shells, bombs and rockets during the Kargil conflict. Approximately 5,000 artillery shells, mortar bombs and rockets were fired daily from 300 guns, mortars and MBRLs while 9,000 shells were fired the day Tiger Hill was regained. During the peak period of assaults, on an average, each artillery battery fired over one round per minute for 17 days continuously.

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/n...in-kargil-war/

The Gunners of the Indian Artillery fired their guns audaciously in the direct firing role, under the very nose of Pakistani artillery observation posts (OPs), without regard for personal safety.

http://mod.nic.in/samachar/jan15-02/html/ch3.htm

[Firn]

As usual it is helpful to think in a simple yet disciplined fashion trough METT-TC ( Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops and support available, Time available, and Civil considerations) keeping in mind that the missions were framed by the primacy of politics on both sides.

The papers and Ray, blueblodd and Gurkha have described aptly the impact of the specific endowment on the various factors and the adaption to it, especially from the Indian side. For example the time and human effort, mostly by porters, needed just to prepare the infantry part of the final assault was great indeed. According to an unidentified Indian Army major:

a single night-time operation may see as many as a thousand men moving against a single post occupied by only ten people.

From:145, HIGH ALTITUDE WARFARE: THE KARGIL CONFLICT AND THE FUTURE

Personally I wonder how to explain the relative lack of counter-battery fire by the Pakistani forces, especially considering the excellent OPs. Was it due to masked position of the relevant Indian batteries? Was it an insufficient political will (plausible? deniability, underestimation of Indians will) to muster enough ressources to muster enough artillery and supply?

[Ray]

Even though deployment space was minimal being mountainous. one could attribute it to the Bofors shoot and schoot!

The positions hugged the mountains.

While the road was visible, there were places that were masked.

One could not muster all the artillery available in the IA since other sectors had to be covered and there was no guarantee whether the other fronts will get activated by the Pakistanis or by the Indians.

[blueblood]

@ Brig Ray and Gurkha, which infantry units were first on the scene? I read somewhere that Kumaon, JAK LI and Laddakh Scouts took part in the earlier operations and paved way for less acclimatized units.

[Ray]

3 Inf Div was already deployed there. Ladhak Scouts was also there.

The first unit of 8 Mtn Div was 1 NAGA.

Later the Div built up in Dras and Matiyan.

[blueblood]

3 Inf Div was already deployed there. Ladhak Scouts was also there.

The first unit of 8 Mtn Div was 1 NAGA.

Later the Div built up in Dras and Matiyan.

Thanks a bunch sir. One more thing, what about the expulsion of Brig. Devinder Singh ? Was it merely a feud ?

[Ray]

He is my friend.

I know the Corps Cdr too.

Too much of pressure for instant victory from Delhi, as if it was so easy!

I would say it was all some misunderstanding.

[blueblood]

As usual it is helpful to think in a simple yet disciplined fashion trough METT-TC ( Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops and support available, Time available, and Civil considerations) keeping in mind that the missions were framed by the primacy of politics on both sides.

The papers and Ray, blueblodd and Gurkha have described aptly the impact of the specific endowment on the various factors and the adaption to it, especially from the Indian side. For example the time and human effort, mostly by porters, needed just to prepare the infantry part of the final assault was great indeed. According to an unidentified Indian Army major:

From:145, HIGH ALTITUDE WARFARE: THE KARGIL CONFLICT AND THE FUTURE

Personally I wonder how to explain the relative lack of counter-battery fire by the Pakistani forces, especially considering the excellent OPs. Was it due to masked position of the relevant Indian batteries? Was it an insufficient political will (plausible? deniability, underestimation of Indians will) to muster enough ressources to muster enough artillery and supply?

http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/ndt...ng-point/87144

This video though partly in Hindi should clear some of your doubts.

Some of the factors which might have contributed to the lax counter-battery fire by Pak could be

1) Lack of optimum resources i.e. 155 mm guns. PA had some 100 odd M198 guns which they kept for the plains in case war escalates.

2) Lack of aerial assets i.e. helicopters. Both PAF and PAA used light helicopters in limited numbers. Thus, had to dismantle and reassemble the 105mm guns unlike India which used Mi-8/17 to airlift the entire gun.

3) Since Indian troops didn't crossed the LOC, Pak arty couldn't have used their guns in direct fire mode.


Notwithstanding my assumptions Pak fielded significant arty formations.


Typical artillery support methods provide one artillery battalion (16 cannon) to support one brigade (approximately 4,000 troops). Due to the terrain, the artillery employed during the Kargil conflict far exceeded conventional support. Pakistan employed 18 artillery regiments, or more than 100 guns, in support of the 5,000 committed troops. To ease the limited space for the howitzers, Pakistani forces expanded firing positions by using dynamite to carve away parts of the mountain walls. Pakistani helicopters carried dismantled 105mm howitzers onto key outposts using the reverse slope of the mountains to cover their tight flight paths........

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art...illery-forward