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Thread: The Kargil War (new title, all aspects)

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  1. #1
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    Quote Originally Posted by Firn View Post
    As usual it is helpful to think in a simple yet disciplined fashion trough METT-TC ( Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops and support available, Time available, and Civil considerations) keeping in mind that the missions were framed by the primacy of politics on both sides.

    The papers and Ray, blueblodd and Gurkha have described aptly the impact of the specific endowment on the various factors and the adaption to it, especially from the Indian side. For example the time and human effort, mostly by porters, needed just to prepare the infantry part of the final assault was great indeed. According to an unidentified Indian Army major:

    From:145, HIGH ALTITUDE WARFARE: THE KARGIL CONFLICT AND THE FUTURE

    Personally I wonder how to explain the relative lack of counter-battery fire by the Pakistani forces, especially considering the excellent OPs. Was it due to masked position of the relevant Indian batteries? Was it an insufficient political will (plausible? deniability, underestimation of Indians will) to muster enough ressources to muster enough artillery and supply?
    http://www.ndtv.com/video/player/ndt...ng-point/87144

    This video though partly in Hindi should clear some of your doubts.

    Some of the factors which might have contributed to the lax counter-battery fire by Pak could be

    1) Lack of optimum resources i.e. 155 mm guns. PA had some 100 odd M198 guns which they kept for the plains in case war escalates.

    2) Lack of aerial assets i.e. helicopters. Both PAF and PAA used light helicopters in limited numbers. Thus, had to dismantle and reassemble the 105mm guns unlike India which used Mi-8/17 to airlift the entire gun.

    3) Since Indian troops didn't crossed the LOC, Pak arty couldn't have used their guns in direct fire mode.


    Notwithstanding my assumptions Pak fielded significant arty formations.


    Typical artillery support methods provide one artillery battalion (16 cannon) to support one brigade (approximately 4,000 troops). Due to the terrain, the artillery employed during the Kargil conflict far exceeded conventional support. Pakistan employed 18 artillery regiments, or more than 100 guns, in support of the 5,000 committed troops. To ease the limited space for the howitzers, Pakistani forces expanded firing positions by using dynamite to carve away parts of the mountain walls. Pakistani helicopters carried dismantled 105mm howitzers onto key outposts using the reverse slope of the mountains to cover their tight flight paths........

    http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art...illery-forward
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 10-03-2012 at 08:42 AM. Reason: Edited at authors request, wrong info inserted, was pt. 3 and awaiting update.

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