The Kargil War (new title, all aspects)

**davidbfpo** · 09-21-2012

Thanks to a lurker's pointer to this Carnegie research paper on an intriguing issue in a delicate setting:http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/kargil.pdf

From the preface:

The role of airpower, however, was tinged with controversy from the very beginning. Both during and immediately after the conflict, it was not clear whether the Indian Air Force (IAF) leadership of the time advocated the commitment of Indian airpower and under what conditions, how the IAF actually performed at the operational level and with what effects, and whether the employment of airpower was satisfactorily coordinated with the Indian Army at either the strategic or the tactical levels of war. Whether airpower proved to be the decisive linchpin that hastened the successful conclusion of the conflict was also uncertain—but all these questions provided grist for considerable disputation in the aftermath of the war.

What the Kargil conflict demonstrated, however, was that airpower was relevant and could be potentially very effective even in the utterly demanding context of mountain warfare at high altitudes.

There is an earlier short thread on Kargil, although the word appears on twenty threads:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=5576

**Ray** · 09-21-2012

Airpower in Kargil was not really a coordinated effort as one would want.

There was much to be desired as far as a coordinated effort is concerned.

The IAF, in any case, was not trained for combat in support of High Altitude land operations.

**Ray** · 09-21-2012

Kargil conflict was a “poor test” of India's air warfare capability, a prominent US think-tank has said, warning that with threats of future wars with Pakistan and China persisting, Indian defence establishment has to prepare accordingly.

“Despite the happy ending of the Kargil experience for India, the IAF's fighter pilots were restricted in their operations due to myriad challenges specific to this campaign. They were thus consigned to do what they could rather than what they might have done if they had more room for maneuver,” said the think-tank in a report released on Thursday.

The Kargil war, in which India emerged victorious over Pakistan, the 70-page report titles 'Airpower At 18,000: the Indian Air Force in the Kargil War' further brought to light the initial near-total lack of transparency and open communication between Indian Army's top leaders and the IAF.

The report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace said the covert Pakistani intrusion into Jammu and Kashmir had exposed a gaping hole in India's nationwide real-time intelligence.

“On a strategic level, the Kargil War vividly demonstrated that a stable bilateral nuclear deterrence relationship can markedly inhibit such regional conflicts in intensity and scale -- if not preclude them altogether,” it said.

“In the absence of the nuclear stabilizing factor, those flash points could erupt into open-ended conventional showdowns for the highest stakes. But the Kargil War also demonstrated that nuclear deterrence is not a panacea,” the report said.

It said the possibility of future conventional wars of major consequence along India's borders with Pakistan and China persists, and the Indian defence establishment must plan and prepare accordingly.

According to the report, Pakistan's military leaders miscalculated badly in their apparent belief that the international community would press immediately for a cease-fire in Kashmir out of concern over a possible escalation of the fighting to the nuclear level, with the net result that Pakistan would be left with an easily acquired new slice of the terrain on the Indian side of the LoC.

Carnegie said the nuclear balance between the two countries did not deter a determined Indian conventional response, and the successful reaction that India ultimately mounted on the Kargil heights fell well short of being all out in scale.

“Furthermore, since the Vajpayee government scrupulously kept its combat operations confined to Indian-controlled Kashmir, the international community had no compelling reason to intervene,” it said.

As a result, a remote but high-intensity and high-stakes showdown was allowed to run on for more than two months, something the Pakistan Army's leaders all but certainly did not anticipate when they first conjured up their incursion plan.

The Kargil experience also suggested that if China and Pakistan came to appreciate that India possessed overwhelming conventional force preponderance in the region, that presence could act as a deterrent against such provocations in the future, it said.

According to the report, prudent Indian defence planners will likely find themselves shortchanged in their preparations for the full spectrum of possible challenges to their country's security in years to come if they draw undue comfort from the happy ending of the Kargil experience and accept that conflict as their only planning baseline for hedging against future contingencies along the Line of Control.

http://www.indianexpress.com/news/ka...tank/1005858/0

**Gurkha** · 09-30-2012

Misleading : what actually won the war were the Bofors, diplomatic pressure & the Pak army chickening out...and not necessarily in that order. Despite being an infantryman myself and notwithstanding the gallant but suicidal assaults by our light infantry at 18000 feet, it was firepower, information warfare & psychological pressure which won the day. The Air force now boasts about it, have few LGB videos to show about interdiction blah blah.. but as with the old axiom : "success has many fathers while defeat is always a bastard !!"

**Ray** · 09-30-2012

If one can lay his hands on the book "A Ridge Too Far" by Capt Amarinder Singh, who is ex Maharaja of Patiala, one would be able to get an idea of the Kargil War.

He was there after the war and interacted with the people and the units and with us at the Div and then wrote the book.

I would take the IAF doing a great job not very seriously, though the helicopters (Army and IAF) did much service.

Attack on objectives from the air which are narrow and just a spot on the ground by flying in laterally across the mountain ridges and narrow valleys with high performance jets is not an easy matter.

The IAF was new to this type of warfare is the best way to explain.

(courtesy Bharat Rakshak)

**omarali50** · 09-30-2012

Pakistan Air Force role in Kargil has been well covered by PAF officers (and seems like the truth to an outside observer): http://kaiser-aeronaut.blogspot.com/...air-force.html

**carl** · 09-30-2012

Originally Posted by Gurkha

...what actually won the war were the Bofors,...

That is an interesting comment. Could you expand on it a little so I can understand better?

**Ray** · 10-01-2012

Originally Posted by carl

That is an interesting comment. Could you expand on it a little so I can understand better?

Because of the dispersion of the artillery shells as is natural, there were too many 'overs' and 'unders', missing the objective on the narrow ridgeline. Such overs and unders would also affect the attacker since it (the attack) was on mountain slopes.

The Bofors were used in Direct Firing Role to achieve pin point accuracy with devastating effect, as also conservation of ammunition - an important logistic issue given that the single lane precipitous road was under direct enemy observation.

It maybe mentioned at these High Altitude heights there is no cover. Cavalier assault were also not feasible owing the the lack of oxygen which made movement slow and laboured. Therefore, close support was an absolute necessity till as long as possible and so safety distances of Direct Firing infantry weapons were reduced. Artillery in the classical mode of firing would have a greater safety distance owing to the natural dispersion pattern of shells being fired. Direct Firing of Bofors allowed one to overcome the natural disadvantage of the dispersion of artillery shell fired in the classical manner. This allowed the infantry to close in with close support of the Artillery in direct firing mode. The Bofors being capable of greater pin point accuracy than the other guns, having a greater devastation effect of its shell and being capable of faster loading, the number of shells effectively delivered were more and relentless. This had a devastating effect on the physical integrity of the defender's post and also on the enemy's morale. At the same time, it allowed the attacker to close in onto the objective closer with this devastating close fire support and in relatively greater safety.

The credit for deviating from the standard artillery practice goes to Lakhwinder, the Commander Artillery and then Maj Gen Mohinder Puri.