Thanks to a lurker's pointer to this Carnegie research paper on an intriguing issue in a delicate setting:http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/kargil.pdf

From the preface:
The role of airpower, however, was tinged with controversy from the very beginning. Both during and immediately after the conflict, it was not clear whether the Indian Air Force (IAF) leadership of the time advocated the commitment of Indian airpower and under what conditions, how the IAF actually performed at the operational level and with what effects, and whether the employment of airpower was satisfactorily coordinated with the Indian Army at either the strategic or the tactical levels of war. Whether airpower proved to be the decisive linchpin that hastened the successful conclusion of the conflict was also uncertain—but all these questions provided grist for considerable disputation in the aftermath of the war.

What the Kargil conflict demonstrated, however, was that airpower was relevant and could be potentially very effective even in the utterly demanding context of mountain warfare at high altitudes.
There is an earlier short thread on Kargil, although the word appears on twenty threads:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=5576