Page 3 of 3 FirstFirst 123
Results 41 to 44 of 44

Thread: The Kargil War (new title, all aspects)

  1. #41
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Jan 2011
    Posts
    123

    Default

    A peek at the summer course of High Altitude Warfare School (HAWS).

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QBZbu-Y0pfE

  2. #42
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    13,011

    Default A stitch in time saves nine

    A short excerpt from a new book 'The Evolution of India’s Israel Policy' on how India's disadvantages at the time of the Kargil crisis enhanced the Indo-Israeli relationship, it describes how India turned to Israel after finding itself short of crucial surveillance and military equipment. The link refuses to allow citing passages.

    Link:http://www.caravanmagazine.in/vantag...aeli-relations

    Link to Amazon.uk:http://www.amazon.co.uk/Evolution-Indias-Israel-Policy-International/dp/0199450625 and publisher:http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780199450626.do
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 01-18-2015 at 02:00 PM.
    davidbfpo

  3. #43
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    13,011

    Default New book review 'From Kargil to Coup'

    No, not the book that led to one retired Pakistani General being prevented form leaving, rather one by a Pakistani journalist and a review in a Pakistani newspaper. Here is a chunk:
    Indeed the misadventure exposed the civil- military gap, but that was only one aspect of the story. The real issue was how a coterie of generals could bring the country to the brink of a nuclear conflagration. So much so that even the senior military leadership was unaware of the operation until things started unravelling. The Kargil clique, as the author described the “group of four top generals” who later usurped power overthrowing the elected government, declared it a brilliant strategic move that failed to achieve its objective because of “spineless” civilian leadership. The book has assumed greater significance because the Kargil issue had not even been discussed or critically examined at various military forums.
    From Kargil to Coup confirms that the civilian leadership was never taken into confidence on the operation, leave aside getting its approval that is legally required. It was in May 1999, almost six months after the start of the operation, that the then prime minister Nawaz Sharif and the Defence Committee of the Cabinet was given a full briefing by the military leadership about it.
    Link:https://www.dawn.com/news/1410891/facts-and-fiction
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 05-30-2018 at 02:05 PM. Reason: Thread re-opened. 100,055v today.
    davidbfpo

  4. #44
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Aug 2009
    Location
    USA
    Posts
    861

    Default

    I had a post about the Kargil war a while ago at Brownpundits

    Excerpt:

    ..Back in 1999 I thought that Musharraf should have been dismissed and prosecuted for his role in the affair, but I also bought into the propaganda that the operation was a “great tactical success but a strategic blunder”. As time went on and more details came out, it became clear that the planning at the tactical level was as bad as the stupidities and mistaken assumptions that underlay the strategic vision of General Musharraf and inner coterie and in particular the commander of Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA), General Javed Hassan.

    The men (primarily Northern Light Infantry (NLI) and Special Services Group (SSG) volunteers) who did the actual fighting from the Pakistani side performed with suicidal bravery, but once the Indian army learned from its early mistakes and brought all its resources to bear on the operation, these brave men were left to literally starve and bleed to death while Javed Hassan and his boss tried to bluster their way past their disastrous mistake. Musharraf’s coup protected the plotters from facing any consequences within Pakistan and a systematic disinformation campaign was used to crease (not just in Pakistan but also in some casual observers and Anatol Leiven level analysts abroad) an impression of tactical brilliance. The above reports provide a good corrective and one hopes that the day may still come when Musharraf and Javed Hassan will face the music for their role in this terrible disaster…a disaster that led to hundreds of needless deaths on both sides in an operation that civilian prime minister Benazir was able to see as “crazy” at first glance. Unfortunately, Nawaz Sharif was not that sharp…

    ..All these assumptions proved wrong. After some early charges that failed with heavy casualties (but also showed that Indian troops were perfectly capable of suicidal bravery of their own) the Indian army figured out how to use its artillery to great effect and went up near vertical slopes at night under cover of accurate artillery fire and recaptured crucial heights. They also managed to interdict most of the resupply effort, leaving many freezing Pakistani troops exposed on the heights without food or water. There is no evidence that either Javed Hassan or Musharraf made any real effort to come up with new solutions once their original assumptions proved wrong. Musharraf seems to have focused mostly on making sure the blame could be pinned on Nawaz Sharif, and that some sort of domestic (or intra-army) propaganda victory could be salvaged from the disaster.

    The status quo is indeed in India’s favor by now. The critical period for India was the early nineties. Once they got past that, they were never going to be kicked out of Kashmir by force; and by using outside Jihadis and then the regular army and failing to dislodge them, Pakistan has already played all its cards. Another attempt could set the whole subcontinent aflame, but is not likely to change that outcome.

    The fact that Kashmiri Muslims (or at least, Kashmiri Muslims in the Kashmir valley proper) remain thoroughly disaffected with India provides some people with the hope that human rights and democracy campaigners can win where brute force did not. But this too seems unlikely. The same Kashmiri Muslims are almost as disaffected with Pakistan as they are with India, so that the main demand seems now to be independence. But the demographics, geography, history and international situation of Kashmir all make any smooth passage to independence inconceivable. Inconceivable in the literal sense of the world; what I mean is, try to conceive or imagine in concrete detail what this independence would look like and the steps via which it would be achieved. Enuff said.

Similar Threads

  1. China's Emergence as a Superpower (till 2014)
    By SWJED in forum Global Issues & Threats
    Replies: 806
    Last Post: 01-11-2015, 10:00 PM
  2. Doug Macgregor on "Hybrid War"
    By Gian P Gentile in forum Futurists & Theorists
    Replies: 15
    Last Post: 07-10-2010, 11:16 AM
  3. "The Folly of 'Asymmetric War' " is the title
    By Ken White in forum Strategic Compression
    Replies: 8
    Last Post: 09-20-2008, 01:55 PM
  4. The argument to partition Iraq
    By SWJED in forum Iraqi Governance
    Replies: 26
    Last Post: 03-10-2008, 05:18 PM

Tags for this Thread

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •