Thoughts on a possible "surge" in Iraq

[Smitten Eagle]

Amen JC Amen. Especially about starting an I/O campaign yesterday!

Indeed on the IO campaign. This is exceedingly difficult though. Informing the population while still maintaining enough surprise to successfully operate on the tactical level will be quite difficult. (I'm not even talking about killing insurgents. I'm talking about not getting ambushed by exceedingly large Mahdi Army or [insert militia/terrorist group here].) The only way to ameloriate this is probably more mass in our formations, which is something we don't necessarely have, or something we don't have the political will to muster without a sufficient IO campaign on the home front.

On a related note, Wretchard analyzes Keegan on a 50,000-troop surge, and the lack of a corresponding IO campaign. Here.

At any rate, it was a pleasure to read, jc. Kudos.

[RTK]

On a related note, Wretchard analyzes Keegan on a 50,000-troop surge, and the lack of a corresponding IO campaign. Here.

At any rate, it was a pleasure to read, jc. Kudos.

I guarantee you, as someone who knows many of the authors, the IO and reconstruction campaigns are not being overlooked. They're just not being made public.

[jcustis]

That post on the Belmont Club was peculiar. If there policymakers out there think that a temporary surge will have a side effect of more capable ISF and lasting stability, then we need to simply pack up our HMMWVs and head home now.

The forces that seek to pull the country apart (or gain the upper hand - ala Sadr) will simply hand the ISF their lunch, if they stand and fight at all.

[jcustis]

Indeed on the IO campaign. This is exceedingly difficult though. Informing the population while still maintaining enough surprise to successfully operate on the tactical level will be quite difficult.

On the IO campaign, I was thinking more on the side of our non-kinetic operations. Something along the lines of, "The Americans are going to be with us in this for as long as it takes, to make our children safe and our lands more prosperous...Now tell us where your homies went."

[marct]

Really great post, JC. I definitely agree on the timing of he IO campaign - say starting 4 years ago...

Marc

[120mm]

I'm assuming a "bigger, sweeter carrot" for Sadr involves a large piece of the political "pie"?

I'm wondering if there is a solution which involves incorporating the "militias" into the overall polity.

I think we will be forced to either engage Iran and grant them greater power in the region, or to confront them and interdict their efforts.

[Ironhorse]

Edited after the clarity of a cup of coffee.
Re-reading, I am even more impressed with jcustis' 1st post in this thread. But I am still skeptical about our ability to surge on the strategically significant scale needed to impose security (COA 1). I see the Stratfor outline in my post below perhpas as COA 2 -- let there be a brawl, but a steel cage match rather than a free-for-all. Self-determination by "free market" principles. Is that a different end-state, or just a radically different path to achieving the same end-state?
Time for another cup.
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Excecptionally well articulated, jcustis.

Pardon the label, but I would categorize that as Go Big, Do It Well. Definitely the wise approach to trying to accomplish the original objective. But I ponder whether that objective is now feasible, and if so, what actions are necessary to gain and maintain the large surge needed to establish the presence that enables that security, and whether the resultant risks elsewhere in the GWOT and global environment are worth taking. Can we / should we go big enough, long enough?

Still getting my head around the Stratfor Special Report, U.S. Options in Iraq, I recently read. I read a hard copy via a subscribed compadre, I don't know if it is available on the web via their free trial, it was one of their premuim reports.

If I can do their analysis justice in this short summary, their assessment -- which is about the only one that has rocked me off my "we must win" position -- is as follows:

• We don't have the forces to sustain a significant surge.
• We can't just leave and let the place implode (as Iran wins too much)
• We can't just stay the course (not winning, slippery slope to losing).
• We don't have any real allies left on the ground. (that make a difference)
• Iran, not just Iraq and not really anyone else, is the key. And their influence (but not control) over Iraqi Shia.
• Iraqi forces do not need training, they need loyalty and alignment of interests. We can't provide that.

The fallback objective becomes CONTAIN Iranian power and PREVENT their regional hegemony, with the caveat that since we've screwed up as much as we have so far, they're going to gain a little status/power. Just stop them from gaining too much. If we shoot the moon in Iraq, we might lose and let Iran win big in the region.

The tactics they propose:

• Withdraw U.S. forces to containment positions:
• Bulk in southern Iraq, in Shiite territory (watching them, esp for Iran influence) and buffering Shiite / Iran influence from Saudi Arabia.
• Smaller force w/ Kurds (they have more organic capability, and aren't main effort)
• Let the Sunnis have Al Anbar. Influence through diplomacy and local partners, esp. Saudia Arabia. Dicey, but less so than some of the other diplomatic miracles we're counting on.
• Let the Iraqis solve their own problems, in a contained, mitigated environment. Maybe still ugly, but lightest shade of gray feasible.

They suggest we should not maintain our myriad strongpoints anywhere but in the relative safety of our buffer zones, but note there will be political pressure to do so far more than makes sense. Compromise suggested is BIAP only.

So...at first it pissed me off as defeatist. But the more I mull it over, the more I like it. What do you think?