The Best Trained, Most Professional Military...Just Lost Two Wars?

[carl]

On that score and on risk aversion aside from the BLT sitting off the coast of North Africa there were some elements at Sigonella who could've been in Benghazi very quickly. They were ready and willing and I hear some FlagOs wanted to go -- I'll bet big bucks they were told to forget it by ecehlons above reality. We'll see...A bit, there's more to it.

Over at the The Captain's Journal

http://www.captainsjournal.com/

information is posted that Gen. Ham wanted to go and was going to send forces despite the word from above and was relieved just seconds after telling people to act.

You have no idea how much I hope that is true. Speaking for myself, it would be a huge morale booster if an actual made member of the multi-star club was determined to do the right thing regardless of career consequences. That kind of demonstration is important beyond immediate effects I think. It is good example and shows the people low down on the totem pole that maybe all isn't lost. Of course, the story, if true includes that Gen Ham's second in command was so willing to relieve him put a bit of a damper on the thing but I'll take what I can get.

[Ken White]

...information is posted that Gen. Ham wanted to go and was going to send forces despite the word from above and was relieved just seconds after telling people to act.

May or may not be true, we'll see. Too early to tell

Regardless and as I wrote things aren't nearly as bad as you seem to think -- nor are they going to be as easy to fix as we both wish...

...That kind of demonstration is important beyond immediate effects I think. It is good example and shows the people low down on the totem pole that maybe all isn't lost.

True but it is far too often incredibly difficult to do that -- unless the circumstances lend themselves to it...

[carl]

True but it is far too often incredibly difficult to do that -- unless the circumstances lend themselves to it...

That is why it is so admirable when it is done.

I didn't know there was a BLT sailing about. Where off the coast was it?

[Fuchs]

(...)
information is posted that Gen. Ham wanted to go and was going to send forces despite the word from above and was relieved just seconds after telling people to act.

You have no idea how much I hope that is true.(...)

You do seem to vastly under-appreciate the benefits of civilian control over the military.
It's human and thus not perfect, but orders of magnitude better than a military not under strict civilian control.

[carl]

You do seem to vastly under-appreciate the benefits of civilian control over the military.
It's human and thus not perfect, but orders of magnitude better than a military not under strict civilian control.

No not at all. That is not what would have (or will) buoyed me up. The hopeful thing is that somebody may have proved himself willing to do the right thing in spite of the personal cost. It was the actions of the man, not the legality of the relief. I would be happier if they had to relieve all the multi-stars in the room to get the job done and then find one in the building down the road (Guess what Chief of European Dental Command, you have a new job.), but like I said, I'll take what I can get.

It is the evidence of some strong moral character existing among the multi-stars that would be the good thing.

But then maybe none of this is true. If it is true, what a black mark upon the Americans, a general relieved in this circumstance.

[JMA]

You do seem to vastly under-appreciate the benefits of civilian control over the military.
It's human and thus not perfect, but orders of magnitude better than a military not under strict civilian control.

Not sure I agree fully... but can see where you, as a German, are coming from .

[davidbfpo]

There are many interesting posts on this thread, some of them refer to domestic American political factors and others are familiar themes or critical points.

I am curious at the timing, as the US presidential election looms near and from this vantage point national security issues do not appear uppermost. Whatever happened in Benghazi remains obscure and the cited source is rather partisan to make a judgement on.

What does strike me is whether the USA is about to enter a period of introspection after the war in Iraq, a failing war in Afghanistan and occasional "fire-fighting" elsewhere versus domestic factors and priorities. Apportioning blame will happen, so who better to blame than the military institution which cannot readily defend itself?

I can discern a pattern of thought, from US military veterans - similar to "Yes we are the best trained, most professional army; you, the politicians gave us the orders after being full briefed and now you say we failed?"

Sadly neither is right or wrong IMHO. Were all those involved "speaking truth to power"? IIRC a post-Vietnam comment by whoever.

[davidbfpo]

The account given on Captain's Journal and the comments made about US forces being in a position to take action in Benghazi appear to lack credibility.

I don't dispute that small SOF / USMC detachments were in Sicily, or that the 6th Fleet's BLT was available - although IIRC it was not at sea at the time. Given the distance from Sicily to Benghazi I do wonder if recce drones could have been overhead quickly, assuming availability. Secondly once mobilised whether any detachment could have flown there in time.

If the AFRICOM commander decided that military force was a valid option - without sufficient intelligence and risk assessment from those on the ground in Benghazi he was a brave man, braver than many I expect.

It is interesting to contrast the decisions made by the then Brigadier David Richards, who was the UK commander in Sierra Leone and decided to go way beyond his orders. His career did not apparently suffer, indeed he rose to be the Army Commander and is now CDS. Perhaps the difference are legion, including not telling London what he had done!

[carl]

David:

There are a lot of unkowns with the Captain's Journal piece. I brought attention to it with that in mind.

From what I've read in other places, the drones got there after the thing started but were there for the majority of it.

What constituted "in time" could not have been known beforehand.

From what has been reported elsewhere there was continuous reporting from the people on the spot almost from the moment the thing began, plus the feed from the drones. We had a lot of people there for a lot of weeks beforehand looking, seeing and reporting. Benghazi is part of Africom's area so I would hope Gen Ham had more than a hazy idea of what was going on from that looking, seeing and reporting. With that in mind, it is not such a leap to make the decision (if made). Tripoli sent a planeload of people to Benghazi the second they heard.

As far as the timing goes, that was in the hands of the people who made the attack.

[Madhu]

This is an Afghanistan specific comment - I think:

How exactly does the day to day decision making work within the larger NATO and ISAF structure? Who is in charge on a day to day, month to month, year to year basis and how does this affect the basic Afghan campaign in terms of operational strategy, resources, training, etc?

I am not an apologist for the military either, but militaries are only one part of the entire strategic picture. Militaries are a result of their societies and represent the intellectual fashions of the day, including the idea that the Taliban insurgency is a Maoist type insurgency, that poverty when treated by aid and development will "heal" the insurgency, and so on.

I'm not excusing anyone and this is a military site so it focuses on the military and its ideas....population centric COIN seems to be the hammer that is used for this particular nail. A close study of the history of this region, in my opinion, will show that foreign aid and development and outside involvement in building militaries (first Pakistan from the fifties onward) to Afghanistan today is destabilizing rather than stabilizing, in many ways....

[Madhu]

Ken,

I respectfully disagree on your point about the American Army and Pakistan.

Historically, the American Army and NATO are huge boosters of the Pakistani Army for a variety of reasons, some good, some bad:

1. As a bulwark against communism during the Cold War.
2. As a potentially useful partner in joint military operations (Mid East and within UN operations).
3. As a potential strategic prize to be kept out of the reach of China and Russia.
4. As a potentially useful ally against Russia and/or Iran.
5. As a potentially useful ally against India or as a conduit for policy toward the 'stans and Central Asia.
6. Large British Pakistani population as a lobby within NATO and the Anglo-American alliance.
7. Perhaps even a Saudi lobby within the web of American alliances, etc.


Traditionally, the Pentagon has been a huge booster and hungered for mil-mil ties and believes in American training of foreign military officers in an almost religious manner. This is likely changed currently, and State is probably the biggest booster. CIA and State and other DC agencies receive huge budgets for administering Pakistan aid programs, military and civilian. This is a DC lobby. There is no other phrase for it.

Retired American military, contractors, and intelligence personnel represent an important lobby for contacts and business with various members of the elite.

In short, "water carriers" in the worst instances....

Ken, I'm sorry, but you must know better. Behind the scenes there are factions that insist we must work with parts of the Pakistani Army and Intelligence services while others suggested this wouldn't work. Those that argued the first had egg on their faces after Abbottabad and there is a lot of CYA going on.


1. I will add some "references" when I have time, but for now, you all can search for Tommy Franks and Musharraf, among other American Generals who are reported to have close working ties from the past.
2. Colin Powell had a meeting which is detailed at GWU site (oh, the name escapes me, the one that posts declassified material) with a Pakistani Minister in Aug 2011 and there was much talk about reviving MeTT training, etc.
3. We tried to work with Nawaz Shariff and then Musharraf prior to 9-11 in order to nab bin Laden. ISI agents were found when Clinton lobbed missiles at training camps in Afghanistan. We've known, always known, but tried to have our cake and eat it too. We would have the old working relationships back and use our contacts to go after Al Q internally. And then mission creep....but this is on everyone involved, everyone. Simply everyone.

[carl]

This is a DC lobby. There is no other phrase for it.

Retired American military, contractors, and intelligence personnel represent an important lobby for contacts and business with various members of the elite.

In short, "water carriers" in the worst instances....

I never thought of it like that before. That is very insightful. Damn clever of the Pak Army/ISI, or very lucky.

[Ken White]

Historically, the American Army and NATO are huge boosters of the Pakistani Army for a variety of reasons, some good, some bad:

All true -- but that was then, this is now and Pakistan has done much to help us and is also doing some things that are far from helpful and we all know that. As Bob's World is fond of illustrating, the Cold War with the USSR is over and Nations are pursuing, properly, their own interests. There are areas where our interests and those of Pakistan diverge and Pakistan rightly pursues its interests.

This is a DC lobby. There is no other phrase for it.

True. However it is equally true for several other nations and areas. Regrettably, our political system today seems to require minor crises and oversea involvement here and there. Part of that is true interest, part to keep the US economy pumped up and part is pure selfishness and / or job security on the part of those who are assigned or fall into such work. Rightly or wrongly Pakistan is no more important to us than are the Philippines or Paraguay. We have interests and relationships a lot of places, Pakistan is more important at the moment than some but not as importan as others. Times change, things shift.

Ken, I'm sorry, but you must know better.

For what and why are you sorry? I see nothing for you to be sorry about...

Behind the scenes there are factions that insist we must work with parts of the Pakistani Army and Intelligence services while others suggested this wouldn't work. Those that argued the first had egg on their faces after Abbottabad and there is a lot of CYA going on.

All true and I do indeed know all that. None of this changes the fact that Carl wrote: ""Do very high ranking military officers still go along with the fantasy that the Pak Army/ISI is useful?"" *

To which I responded ""I'm not sure any ever did believe that though they were told by their civilian masters to be nice for several reasons. They do what they're told..."" I responded in that vein because that is how I see the situation today and part of that is based on a fairly close relationship with some former USArCent commanders and staff folks. Both nations pursued their interests and differences were plated over by both -- that is less true today. Carl specifically addressed "high ranking military officers" and not the US polity in general. The attitudes of and within the Armed forces and those of an within the rest of government often vary but the military guys do what they're told. It's that simple.

We've known, always known, but tried to have our cake and eat it too.

True that. So too is Pakistan practicing the same game.

We would have the old working relationships back and use our contacts to go after Al Q internally. And then mission creep....but this is on everyone involved, everyone. Simply everyone.

IMO that reversion is unlikely, water under bridges and all that.

* I have no particular bone to pick with Paksitan, they are merely pursuing their own interests and are leery of us -- with good cause -- as we are pursuing our interests and are leery of them -- also with good cause. Carl's the guy who keeps excoriating them here. Mayhap you should educate him.