The Best Trained, Most Professional Military...Just Lost Two Wars?

[Steve Blair]

There are a number of reasons for the evolution of the risk-adverse culture. Some come from within the military, others originate outside it. Hanging it all on Congress is the easy answer, and ignores the problems that exist within the services. Doesn't mean that Congress doesn't have a share in the blame...but just that they aren't the only ones.

Constant rotation, a stunning cultural inability to look at its own history (but at least they've been consistent in that inability), accelerated deification of the military by outsiders with their own agendas, and a host of other things contribute to the military's inability to look at itself honestly and find answers. Congress...they're a mixed bag as well. If they pay attention at all, they remember the Cold War and its associated misconceptions and flawed assumptions about the US's historical military norms. They like spending programs, because those translate to jobs they can brag about and a certain level of myth creation.

[Bill Moore]

There are a number of reasons for the evolution of the risk-adverse culture. Some come from within the military, others originate outside it. Hanging it all on Congress is the easy answer, and ignores the problems that exist within the services. Doesn't mean that Congress doesn't have a share in the blame...but just that they aren't the only ones.

Constant rotation, a stunning cultural inability to look at its own history (but at least they've been consistent in that inability), accelerated deification of the military by outsiders with their own agendas, and a host of other things contribute to the military's inability to look at itself honestly and find answers. Congress...they're a mixed bag as well. If they pay attention at all, they remember the Cold War and its associated misconceptions and flawed assumptions about the US's historical military norms. They like spending programs, because those translate to jobs they can brag about and a certain level of myth creation.

Steve, while I may sound like an apologist for the military I'm far from it, but it gets a little old when everyone, especially those uninformed on how things actually work only throw stones at our senior military leaders.

I don't think we have a cultural inability to look at our history, but rather like most we cherry pick our history to conform with our preconceptions. I agree strongly with Ken that our problems are largely cultural in orign. The only saving grace is that most others, perhaps all others, have even worse cultural problems which is why most militaries around the world are somewhat of a joke. That is no excuse for us not to adapt, but it does put it in perspective.

The last two weeks at my location have been exceptionally frustrating. Dealing with officers who can't see past doctrine and they continuously struggle to make problems conform to their preconceived doctrinal solutions. I have seen nothing positive come from our officers indoctrinated in JMPE. I think it is a stretch to call it education, at best it is training. This is how you will work in my factory.

We have many, many constraints on our people ranging from cultural, educational, Congress, media, and of course good ole ineptness. We should actually be pleasantly surprised we're as good as we are.

Carl,

You have a media fed bias against night raids, so it is your opinion they should cease, and just because the military doesn't share your opinion they're inept? The fact of the matter is those targeted by them fear them, but yes it also disrupts normal life, but it should be needless to say that war disrupts normal life, and even if we were naive enough to quit conducting them their life would still be disrupted by those you are indirectly arguing that we support. Until we're allowed to address the threats that reside relatively safely across the border, night raids are a viable tactic (not a strategy) to disrupt attacks on our troops. It is not a strategy for winning, but then we never a strategy for winning.

[Bob's World]

Night Raids are a tactical masterpiece. No question about it. Equally, they are a strategic disaster. That is the counter-intuitive reality of operations such as being conducted in Afghanistan today. Caveat: This was not nearly as true in Iraq, but that is because in Iraq they were conducted primarily against another foreign party to the fight (AQ proper, there conducting UW and Guerrilla Warfare, and the foreign fighters they brought with them).

This is one of many examples where we simply transplanted a reasonably successful tactic from one fight to the next with no strategic understanding of why it worked in one place but had little chance of doing much more than temporary suppression of the insurgent at the cost of growth of the insurgency in the other. The Marine's transplant of Clear-Hold-Build from Anbar to Helmand is another example of this.

Why is this true? Largely because those measures implemented to increase tactical efficiency and effectiveness against the insurgent by a foreign force come at the direct expense of reinforcing the very perceptions of the host nation government among the affected populaces that are critical to success. Night Raids and C-H-B operations as we have been conducting them absolutely destroy any perceptions of host nation Sovereignty, Legitimacy; They also destroy any perception that the affected populace is being treated with respect or justice.

We say with one voice that we "support the sovereign and legitimate government of Afghanistan," Then when the President of that "Sovereign" country demands that we make changes to our tactics that will come at the cost of the efficiency and effectiveness we need to maximize our scores on our tactical metrics, he is told to essentially stand down and shut up by a foreign general. That is what US-delivered "sovereignty" equates to? Really?

We are a slave to our tactics and our tactical metrics. We delude ourselves into believing that tactical successes in this kind of conflict can somehow add up to a strategic victory. This is why everyone scratches their heads over the persistent reports of "progress" and "success" in Afghanistan, while at the same time violence is increasing, green on blues are increasing, and the government is showing no signs of interest in becoming what we want them to be. Huh.

The fix is pretty damn easy, but it will cause all of our tactical metrics to plummet. Just ask these questions in the design of every campaign, and tailor the operation until one has a COA that maximizes these perceptions:

1. How will the conduct of this operation shape the perceptions of the populaces both directly and indirectly affected by it to think that their government is going about its business in a manner they deem appropriate?

2. How will the conduct of this operation shape the perceptions of the populaces both directly and indirectly affected by it to think that their government actually has the right to govern them?

3. How will the conduct of this operation shape the perceptions of the populaces both directly and indirectly affected by it to think that their government treats their small segment of the overall populace with equal respect to other similarly situated populaces?

4. How will the conduct of this operation shape the perceptions of the populaces both directly and indirectly affected by it to think that their government implements the rule of law in a manner perceived as "just" by that populace?

5. If the populace affected by this action does feel that it is improper in any way, what effective, legal, vehicles do they perceive they have to raise their concerns and have them addressed?

It is that simple. Putting a couple of Afghan Commandos on a raiding team and gaining a warrant from some judge in Kabul may sound like a good fix to an American commander who wants to appease a whining President of Afghanistan who does not understand how these raids are winning the war; but such fixes in no way address the damage these operations do to those critical perceptions. For every tactical step forward when a true "high value" guy is taken off the battlefield in such a manner is matched with a much larger strategic failure in the effects that same operation had on these critical perceptions among the populaces directly and indirectly affected by the same action.

We are tactical geniuses, and strategic idiots. It is really that simple. And we prioritize tactics and the immediate gratification of tactics executed well. We are woodchoppers.

Oh, back to Iraq: Why the difference? Because when one illegitimate outsider beats up on another illegitimate outsider, the populace doesn't much care. But when an illegitimate outsider is beating up on your friends and family in order to impose upon you a government and system of governance that has little to no legitimacy in your eyes? Then they care very much indeed.

(For any interested I will be briefing an expanded version of this at an assessments workshop next week).

[Steve Blair]

Steve, while I may sound like an apologist for the military I'm far from it, but it gets a little old when everyone, especially those uninformed on how things actually work only throw stones at our senior military leaders.

I don't think we have a cultural inability to look at our history, but rather like most we cherry pick our history to conform with our preconceptions. I agree strongly with Ken that our problems are largely cultural in orign. The only saving grace is that most others, perhaps all others, have even worse cultural problems which is why most militaries around the world are somewhat of a joke. That is no excuse for us not to adapt, but it does put it in perspective.

Bill,

I think you misunderstand my point. I don't think that issues lie only at the feet of senior military leadership. There's enough to go around...and at all levels.

[jmm99]

I have to add the obligatory - the problem is political and not to be solved by the US. So, forget nation building in Astan.

Reasoning: The Kabul government is a lousy bunch; just as the Saigon government was a lousy bunch. In both cases, their opponents are and were even lousier. The major difference between the two situations politically are the multitude of regional power centers in Astan vice only two material power centers in Vietnam.

Regards

Mike

[carl]

Bob Jones:

I second Mike's opinion. Very well written and argued. Asking the questions is a good approach and the questions are good.

I am very interested in an expanded version. Is there any way you can get it to those of us who here in the hinterland (mainly me)?