The Best Trained, Most Professional Military...Just Lost Two Wars?

[Bill Moore]

Fuchs wrote,

The real test of competence for the German army was France, though. The U.S. military had no such test. Its major victories came to being with vastly superior, not about equal, resources.

For this reason I withhold final judgement of the U.S.ground forces' actual (relative) competence even for what's called conventional warfare. Their way of war and especially their love for gold plating and radio comms is dubious.

Bill; show me American ground troops fighting against well-armed opposition and we'll see whether this ability to destroy isn't overcompensated by an inability to survive in face of such an opposition.
I understand American army troops pride themselves in their supposedly unique quality at shattering formations, but this self-image appears to found almost entirely on fighting demoralised and 1970's monkey-model-equipped Iraqis.

If you're talking post Korea it is difficult, but I think an argument can be made that the US Army proved its ability to endure against a potentially superior force during the Battle of Ia Drang in 1965. Some may have some valid arguments to counter argue this.

It seems the fact of the matter is we simply haven't had a hard test in the past few decades, but I'm not sure what nation could test us in a conventional battle based on our current technological dominance? Obviously irregular warfare is a different animal altogether.

[Dayuhan]

"Best in the world" isn't a measure of absolute capability or competence, it's a measure of relative capability and competence. What military would anyone say is better, and on what basis?

Certainly there's room for improvement, as there always is, but I'm not sure we should be pursuing improvement in pop-centric COIN or state-building, tasks that are likely to degrade competence at core military functions. If we really want to run about building states - and I can't see why we should - it's time to develop a specific non-military state building capacity, in which the military's only functions would be providing security and training corresponding military forces.

[Entropy]

show me American ground troops fighting against well-armed opposition and we'll see whether this ability to destroy isn't overcompensated by an inability to survive in face of such an opposition.
I understand American army troops pride themselves in their supposedly unique quality at shattering formations, but this self-image appears to found almost entirely on fighting demoralised and 1970's monkey-model-equipped Iraqis.

Yes, the American force in Desert Storm outclassed the Iraqi's. Still, I think the American forces did a lot better than most expected. The fact that more American troops were killed in accidents than in combat losses (115 total US combat KIA compared to ~25,000 Iraqis) tells me that one can't simply write off the success of that campaign as merely the product of superior resources and an incompetent enemy.

You're right, though, that the US hasn't fought a peer force for a long time. I, for one, hope that is a"test" we never have to take. Also, I suspect that any "peer force" we'd fight would love their radio comms as much as we do.

[JMA]

Yes, the American force in Desert Storm outclassed the Iraqi's. Still, I think the American forces did a lot better than most expected. The fact that more American troops were killed in accidents than in combat losses (115 total US combat KIA compared to ~25,000 Iraqis) tells me that one can't simply write off the success of that campaign as merely the product of superior resources and an incompetent enemy.

Been there done that... and yes I agree.

Not sure who expected a lesser result? The smart people knew it was going to be a walk over (especially because of US control if the seas allowing safe and secure LoC).

That is the way the US knows how to fight... by applying overwhelming force to a lesser (in all respects) force. The key here is that at division and maybe brigade level is where the US operates best. Below that all bets are off - as seen by outsiders. US special forces are obviously world class and that offers a ray of hope. But the competence gap between small teams of SF and a convention bde or div is just too great in any form of insurgency war.

[Entropy]

Not sure who expected a lesser result? The smart people knew it was going to be a walk over (especially because of US control if the seas allowing safe and secure LoC).

Yes, I agree the smart people knew we would soundly defeat the Iraqis (I was in college at the time and ignorant on military topics, so I certainly wasn't one of the smart ones). My point is one of degree - I don't think many of those smart people thought the defeat would be as decisive as it turned out to be. I think this is reflected in the casualty numbers. The degree to which we bested the Iraqis says something about our competence at that time (I think a lot of that competence is gone thanks to ten years of fighting insurgents).

How might things have looked had the U.S. been allowed five weeks rather than five months for the buildup?

I'm sure we could come up with a multitude of "what-ifs" and counter-factuals, but in this case I wonder where a five-week limitation would come from?

There certainly was a danger that Iraqi forces could have pressed into Saudi when there were only the Saudis and (if I remember correctly), the 82nd and some aircraft there to stop them.

[Surferbeetle]

The Rolling Stones -- Doom And Gloom (Lyric Video), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rPFGWVKXxm0


...the mechanics of the global kill chain continues to evolve and although Mars may take a breather or change weapons from time to time, he isn't going anywhere...

SAC, ICBM, Trident , and...

[Ken White]

Contrary to some assertions here, we have a history of doing just that -- the Pols and the Generals screw it up and the Kids pull their fat out of the fire. That was true in times past, that was true in WWI and WW II, in Korea, in Viet Nam, in DS/DS and in Afghanistan and Iraq. We ain't great; we are adequate.

The degree to which we bested the Iraqis says something about our competence at that time (I think a lot of that competence is gone thanks to ten years of fighting insurgents).

True dat...

I'm sure we could come up with a multitude of "what-ifs" and counter-factuals, but in this case I wonder where a five-week limitation would come from?

There certainly was a danger that Iraqi forces could have pressed into Saudi when there were only the Saudis and (if I remember correctly), the 82nd and some aircraft there to stop them.

As one thoroughly involved at the time, admittedly personally all stateside, DS/DS would've been a bit more difficult, we would've had a few more casualties and it would have taken a bit longer but the result would've been pretty much the same.

As is and has often been the case, we're far from perfect -- but our opponents historically and over 200 plus years -- have always been either militarily or politically even less competent. It is no particular accident that our own Civil War was one of our longer wars and produced more casualties and losses than any others.

[Bob's World]

America is a nation with many competitors. In fact, arguably everything not American, be it state or non-state, is in competition with the US. That is as it should be. Competing with powerful states possessed with a sense of "right" and "righteousness" to rule or dominate wide areas beyond their borders is how America herself rose to power. When our competitors stubbornly clung to obsolete positions and expended their waning strength in the process it served to accelerate our rise.

Today it is America clinging to obsolete positions, and it is America that expends its waning (relative) strength in the process. We have grown so used to the idea that competitors can be "contained" or simply directed (backed by the force of our wealth and military power) to act in the manner we deem appropriate that we appear to find it beneath us to simply roll up our sleeves once again and compete.

To blame the military for "losing" wars that are not truly wars (we easily won the war parts, it was the subsequent policy aspects of clinging to old policies and refusal to recognize change, while employing the military to somehow enforce such inappropriate positions to work that challenged our forces. The largest failing of the military was their dog-like loyalty to continue to play, to continue to chase that ball, until they collapsed in exhaustion. Good dogs don't tell their masters to stop throwing the ball, and good masters don't need to be told.

What are the existential threats to the US today and into the foreseeable future?? By and large, these are not military problems. We need to reframe how we see ourselves and how we see the world. We need to stop resisting the resistance, and decide once again to compete.

But first we must tone down the ideological mantra that shapes our current policies and that hinders the ability of US citizens, companies, as well as our official policies, to compete effectively in the current environment. This not all that hard, after all, it is primarily a return to what got us where we are, and an abandonment of what we have adopted to stay there. The ideas and motivations that fueled our rise are far superior to those that we have applied to stifle the competition of others to stay on top.

The principle of the right of self-determination of governance for all is far superior to the belief that all should embrace some form of US-like democracy.

Appreciate that values are rooted in history and culture, and that while the US history an culture is not evil, to push the values born of it too aggressively onto others certainly is.

Look hard at corruption laws that drive US business to either stay home or simply abandon the US altogether to avoid harsh rules and penalties that no other nation emposes upon their citizens that dare to go out and seek international opportunities. (Watch an episode of "Jungle Gold" about the raw world of gold mining in Ghana for a glimpse at just one aspect of this as armed Chinese operations dominate the scene)

We are in a confused place as a nation. Just listening to the rhetoric of the current Presidential contest gives clear evidence of that. One candidate calling for a doubling down on the perceived successful approaches of a past that no longer exists, while the other recognizes change must happen, but has yet to map out for anyone what our approach to that might actually look like. In the mean time we rely heavily on CT, sanctions and excessive military postures to attempt to slow the change until we figure things out.

To frame this as our military "losing two wars" is far too narrow and symptomatic of a viewpoint to help us truly fix what ails us.

[Surferbeetle]

...hang on....

Creative destruction, From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Creative_destruction

Creative destruction, sometimes known as Schumpeter's gale, is a term in economics which has since the 1950s become most readily identified with the Austrian American economist Joseph Schumpeter,[1] who adapted it from the work of Karl Marx and popularized it as a theory of economic innovation and the business cycle. The term is derived from Marxist economic theory, where it refers to the linked processes of the accumulation and annihilation of wealth under capitalism. These processes were first described in The Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels, 1848)[2] and were expanded in Marx's Grundrisse (1857)[3] and "Volume IV" (1863) of Das Kapital.[4]

At its most basic, "creative destruction" (German: schpferische Zerstrung) describes the way in which capitalist economic development arises out of the destruction of some prior economic order, and this is largely the sense implied by the German Marxist sociologist Werner Sombart who has been credited[1] with the first use of these terms in his work Krieg und Kapitalismus ("War and Capitalism", 1913).[5] In the earlier work of Marx, however, the idea of creative destruction or annihilation (German: Vernichtung) implies not only that capitalism destroys and reconfigures previous economic orders, but also that it must ceaselessly devalue existing wealth (whether through war, dereliction, or regular and periodic economic crises) in order to clear the ground for the creation of new wealth.[2][3][4]

In philosophical terms, the concept of "creative destruction" is close to Hegels concept of sublation. In German economic discourse it was taken up from Marx's writings by Werner Sombart, particularly in his 1913 text Krieg und Kapitalismus:[14]

Again, however, from destruction a new spirit of creation arises; the scarcity of wood and the needs of everyday life... forced the discovery or invention of substitutes for wood, forced the use of coal for heating, forced the invention of coke for the production of iron.

It has been argued that Sombart's formulation of the concept was influenced by Eastern mysticism, specifically the image of the Hindu god Shiva, who is presented in the paradoxical aspect of simultaneous destroyer and creator.[1] Conceivably this influence passed from Johann Gottfried Herder, who brought Hindu thought to German philosophy in his Philosophy of Human History (Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit) (Herder 179092), specifically volume III, pp. 4164.[1] via Arthur Schopenhauer and the Orientalist Friedrich Maier through Friedrich Nietzsches writings. Nietzsche represented the creative destruction of modernity through the mythical figure of Dionysus, a figure whom he saw as at one and the same time "destructively creative" and "creatively destructive".[15]

[Fuchs]

America is a nation with many competitors. In fact, arguably everything not American, be it state or non-state, is in competition with the US.

I'll tell him once I meet the next farmer from Malawi.


Seriously, you added a lot to the more usual US-centric view here.
Your statement would be trivial if true, for it could then just as well be said that everything not Turkish is in competition with Turkey.

[JMA]

To blame the military for "losing" wars that are not truly wars (we easily won the war parts, it was the subsequent policy aspects of clinging to old policies and refusal to recognize change, while employing the military to somehow enforce such inappropriate positions to work that challenged our forces. The largest failing of the military was their dog-like loyalty to continue to play, to continue to chase that ball, until they collapsed in exhaustion. Good dogs don't tell their masters to stop throwing the ball, and good masters don't need to be told.

Yes, these losing wars claims are quite provocative hence my comment to the author that he should not run to mommy if he gets an aggressive response when he posts this sort of nonsense.

So where in your opinion does moral courage or the lack thereof play a part in all this?

[Ken White]

That is the way the US knows how to fight... by applying overwhelming force to a lesser (in all respects) force. The key here is that at division and maybe brigade level is where the US operates best. Below that all bets are off - as seen by outsiders. US special forces are obviously world class and that offers a ray of hope. But the competence gap between small teams of SF and a convention bde or div is just too great in any form of insurgency war.

While you are absolutely correct in the main, that isn't totally true; there are varied and changing units (due to the vagaries of personnel rotations) that operate competently. There are just far too few of them and the pattern of change and competence is essentially unpredictable.

While that variance has always been true to an extent -- and will always be -- the percentage of less competent units is now several orders of magnitude larger than it has historically been. That is due almost totally to the terribly flawed BTMS -- Task, condition and Standard -- individual training model. The troops learn to do some tasks quite well but other important tasks are not well taught (many due to having a low initial pass rate, thus making the trainers look bad) and the troops do not learn how to integrate and combine those tasks for combat. A flawed and excessive rotation of individuals dependent personnel system does not help -- though it does provide jobs for a lot of personnel folks...

There are Officer and NCO competence problems as well but they mostly result from the same training process flaw with an added unintended consequence of a personnel system that for them significantly over emphasizes 'fairness' and 'objectivity' in selection criteria and that seems to believe all people of like rank are equally competent. That is not true, never has been and never will be.

It should also be noted that until the early 1980s, movement of Officers and and NCOs between conventional and SOF units was quite common. As the 'new' training system took hold, the SOF guys very quickly insulated (isolated ? ) themselves in order to achieve and maintain a little 'purity.' Equally noteworthy is that they are not forced to use that flawed training model and that attempts to export elements of their training process to the broader Army in the past few years have been stoutly resisted -- by both communities...

We have major systemic flaws; little will change until the entire 'system' is revamped. Tom Ricks is right for a change, the Generals are a big part of the problem, no question -- but they are far from solely responsible; who, after all, approves their selection...

[ganulv]

The fact that more American troops were killed in accidents than in combat losses (115 total US combat KIA compared to ~25,000 Iraqis) tells me that one can't simply write off the success of that campaign as merely the product of superior resources and an incompetent enemy.

How might things have looked had the U.S. been allowed five weeks rather than five months for the buildup?

[carl]

If you're talking post Korea it is difficult, but I think an argument can be made that the US Army proved its ability to endure against a potentially superior force during the Battle of Ia Drang in 1965. Some may have some valid arguments to counter argue this.

American air and artillery support available may militate against that being a good example.

[carl]

The main point of the article is that military boosterism (We're number 1! We're number 1!) blinds one to the obvious military deficiencies exhibited by the American military establishment. And if those flaws are not seen they cannot be corrected. This statement of Sen. McCain "We have the highest trained, most professional, best military in history.” is a fine example of unthinking boosterism. It is the kind of thing that gets in the way of fixing the things, many things, that are broke. The C brothers expand upon this general theme in this post

http://www.onviolence.com/?e=641

about how generals aren't held responsible. And in this post

http://www.onviolence.com/?e=634

about politically correct views of the military.

There is nothing at all objectionable or controversial about the main point of the article. It is simple common sense that if you continually hear that you are the best of best ever that you won't be very inclined to change.

The second big point in the article is that the military establishment (the author uses the word culture) can't adapt. This also seems obvious given the events of recent history. The guys lower down can and have, quite a lot in some cases. But the establishment, all of it, political and military can't. They just go blindly along doing what hasn't worked for the past 10 or 20 years whether it be knowing the F-35 is going to make it or knowing with even more certainty that this is the year the Pak Aarmy/ISI is going to come around.

We have been getting away with this but the lower ranks may not have time to make up for the incompetence of the suits and multi-stars the next time. Which it why it is important that we remove the stars from our eyes. (Get it? Stars in our eyes, a dual reference to removing the baleful influence of the generals and the blindness that We're number 1! afflicts us with. I just now thought of it.)

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Surferbeetle,

Some of your comments had no context, so I didn't understand what you were implying, but comments on a couple.

Iraq - Saddam, his sons, and many of his gang no longer walk the earth....blood has been spilled to atone for what was taken from us. Oil production is back up to what it was before Saddam took power ~ 3 million bbl/day. Internet penetration has gone from something close to zero to what appeared to be more than 50% in urban areas by my observation.

Saddam and his sons are dead, and good on us, but killing them did not require a major occupation, an excessive de-bathification program, and a largely failed nation building effort. Once Saddam was dead and the sanctions lifted I believe the Iraqis would have gotten their oil production back up to pre-Saddam years on their own (Western corporations would be allowed to provide technical expertise). The 50% internet penetration in itself is not a positive if 50% of them are using it to inform their views from disinformation on radical websites promoting ethnic hatred. That probably isn't happening, but still referring to internet penetration as a positive without understanding its impact seems a bit of reach. However, despite our win and we did win, we pushed Iraq into, or much closer to, Iran's sphere of influence, and ethnic violence is still very active, and the risk of civil war has not been erased. We won, but what the results of that win is too early to assess.

Iran - The economy is in shambles. The Syrian connection/pass thru supply route is fractured. Velayat-e faqih has a viable competitor in Najaf. Saudi Arabia & GCC, Turkey and Israel circle, scheme, and smell weakness...

Is an Iranian economy in shambles really in our long term interest? We did the same to Iraq, and when we removed Saddam we had to deal with that economic shamble in addition to an insurgency, a civil war, and transnational terrorism. It was assessed by some experts that weaker economy actually made Saddam more powerful. It seems feasible that a country with a strong and diversified economy would be more difficult for the government to control, because government handouts would be less valuable as a tool to control the masses.

Arab Spring - The world's largest youth bulge has a better chance to find employment and apply it's energy to productive efforts than previously.

This will be true only if they liberalize and allow their human capital to increase. If the result of Arab Spring is Sharia law and more oppression then I think we and they will all be greatly disappointed.

US Army - Many of the weak remaining from the '92 purge have been run off. The SOF model is validated and has earned resourcing...GPF will be cut; unless the 2 trillion mentioned in the campaign is needed to bring a proud and headstrong country to heel (the 12th Iman will not get his chance to come home for a while yet)...and if so GPF will gain a reprieve for a time.

In your opinion what is the SOF model? I think the GPF still has many weak senior leaders who are failing to adapt, and can't think beyond the bounds of outdated doctrine (to include our COIN doctrine). As for the SOF model, we have "a" CT model, but is it the best model possible? We also have a Cold War UW/FID model that we try to apply to every security problem. My point is I hope we don't have a SOF model, but rather an adaptive SOF that constantly evolves and unlike GPF isn't constrained by doctrine.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Carl

There is nothing at all objectionable or controversial about the main point of the article. It is simple common sense that if you continually hear that you are the best of best ever that you won't be very inclined to change.

I hate the excessive self-promotion and the everyone in uniform is a hero crap also. It puts the lowest performer on par with the highest performer. Heroes are exceptional individuals, most of us are not heroes and claiming that everyone is weakens the value of the term to mean almost nothing. Most in uniform make sacrifices (deployments, injuries, varying levels of extended discomfort, and of course the ultimate sacrifice), and that deserves some level of respect in my view, but not on the same level as true heroes. Maybe our vocabulary is too limited and we don't have another term that equates to a person to deserves respect, but falls short of a hero.

Claiming that we're the best on the other hand does not prevent us from adapting, and actually it may force us to work harder to retain our position as the best. This seems to apply to corporations who want to retain the reputation of their brand, to athletes, and to special operations. Even Bruce Lee said a little bragging was useful because it forced you to train harder to back up your boasts. There are factors that limit our ability to adapt, but it isn't because we recognize ourselves as the world's best military.

The second big point in the article is that the military establishment (the author uses the word culture) can't adapt. This also seems obvious given the events of recent history. The guys lower down can and have, quite a lot in some cases. But the establishment, all of it, political and military can't. They just go blindly along doing what hasn't worked for the past 10 or 20 years whether it be knowing the F-35 is going to make it or knowing with even more certainty that this is the year the Pak Aarmy/ISI is going to come around.

The author comes from the conventional military, and their ability to adapt is slower than the Special Operations community, but to state we continue to go on blindly doing what hasn't worked for 10 years is a gross exaggeration. The system that holds us back more than any other is Congress and the money associated with military spending. The military is frequently stopped from adapting by our civilian leadership, and in our country we accept that because we believe the military should be subordinate to our civilian leaders, but that comes with a cost also. Additionally, investing in high tech weapons is wise for a number of reasons the author doesn't have the experience to understand yet. We will have enemies in the future that don't look like the enemies we're fighting today, and it takes time to develop and field higher end capabilities. We also have to retain this industrial base as unpleasant as that may sound.

We have been getting away with this but the lower ranks may not have time to make up for the incompetence of the suits and multi-stars the next time. Which it why it is important that we remove the stars from our eyes. (Get it? Stars in our eyes, a dual reference to removing the baleful influence of the generals and the blindness that We're number 1! afflicts us with. I just now thought of it.)

Many, if not most, of our Generals and Admirals are very competent. The fact that three in the Army are recently called out for character failures (not necessarily competence failures) is news only because it is NOT the norm. As for your shot at humor, it is best if you keep your day job

[carl]

Bruce Lee bragging in order to spur himself to greater efforts to back up the brag was a great stratagem, for Bruce Lee. Anything will work for an individual who is driven from within as he was; elite athletes and spec ops types too for that matter. I am not so sure that works for large organizations. Given the frailties of human nature, I think it much more likely that continually crowing about being the best makes such organizations complacent and keeps them in the same old groove. Why change what has made them the "best"? There is more than one factor that keeps us from adapting, but I think that firmly believing we are the "best" is one of the factors.

Blaming the politicians is something the military establishment has done for years. I'll bet it is something they teach at the secret multi-star school that exists in the basement of the MGM Grand in Las Vegas. It is true to an extent, but only to an extent. To give two examples of things the military does to itself, flip ones but they do go to the point, the politicians haven't created and inflicted the cult of powerpoint nor that of the reflective belt upon the military. The politicians don't much care if the military is FOBed up or not. They have proved that. The politicians are only partially responsible for constructing the temple of the night raid. The military doesn't adapt at military things they way we would hope. That is partially the fault of the military.

We have gone on doing the same thing for ten years, or one year at a time 10 ten times. That is the sense I get from bits of reading. Are we still road bound? I get the sense that we mostly are. Have we lightened the soldiers load in the 10 years we've been walking those sere hills and mountains? Have we cut down on the night raids? Do very high ranking military officers still go along with the fantasy that the Pak Army/ISI is useful? Is the date when the F-35 will be combat ready still unknown? Do we have a new tanker in the sky yet? Does the LCS have anything but a 57mm gun to fight with yet?

Reading On Violence I believe the authors well understand the value of high tech weapons. What they mostly object to is high tech that isn't worth the cost and weapons that don't seem to work. The F-35 example is mine, the little light bomber that can't-be all things to all men at least not until the year 2035. I can't speak for them on the need to maintain an industrial base but I understand the need for it. And I also see that we are very close to having only one, count it, one fighter mfg.

Competent is as competent does. It doesn't matter if most of the multi-stars know what they are doing if the corps of general officers produces inferior results, which it can be argued, they do.

You don't mean I have to give up selling material to Leno do you?

[omarali50]

clearly the US military (not just the political leadership, the military) did not have a clear notion of what an occupation/liberation of Afghanistan would mean and how best to do it if it was needed. I have no doubt that when it comes to an actual tactical maneuver (capturing position X, securing position Y or patrolling down track Z) the US army is one of the best in the world. And without a doubt when it comes to big firepower high tech stuff, its simply in a class of its own; but generals have to be able to think beyond that and the US army does not do a great job of that. It wasnt just the job of some hack in the state department to plan for "the day after" in Iraq, it was General Frank's job and he didnt do it. Same thing in Afghanistan.
And in both cases a reasonably successful outcome (by current standards, a very satisfactory outcome, but of course, not by "ideal" standards, i.e. the standards that are the norm in the liberal imagination) was possible with less treasure and blood then was spent on sub-optimal outcomes.

[ganulv]

clearly the US military (not just the political leadership, the military) did not have a clear notion of what an occupation/liberation of Afghanistan would mean and how best to do it if it was needed.

Of course Cofer Black’s narrative is that the unseating of the Taliban (not to argue that they’re the good guys, but getting rid of them was not exactly a liberation now, was it?) was the CIA’s baby.