The Best Trained, Most Professional Military...Just Lost Two Wars?

[Ken White]

I do read what you write and what you imply too. There was a plainly implicated suggestion that I responded to...

Not so but I'd never expect you to acknowledge that.

I hope Flag Os don't make decisions about promoting from O-1 to O-2. They should leave those decisions to people lower down. I don't see how a Flag O could possibly know enough about an individual not on his immediate staff to know if that person should go from O-2 to O-3.

Yet another case of perceiving an implication that wasn't there. You're focusing on the wrong things, those symptoms. Of course they don't make those decisions -- and your lack of knowledge is showing. There decisions are made in accordance with the Congressionally dictated Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) as amended into OPMs 21. Those acts are nominally produced by the Armed forces and Congress merely writes them into law and the Prez signs them. In fact, congressional staffers virtually dictate what goes into them and the FlagOs sign off because they have little choice.

But those Flag Os get paid to use their noodles and adapt in imaginative ways. They don't seem to do that very well. And no sympathy for the Flag Os if they want to complain about political constraints. That is the way it has always been.

I'm not disputing that, I'm merely trying to show you that the system isn't as simplistic as you seem to think.

It would be much better to fix "the long standing political, systemic and societal problems at the root of the dysfunction.", but that is a pretty tall order and not likely to happen. If all that isn't done, problem will likely return, but not for a while and during that while things may be a bit better.

As it did when Max Taylor turned the Army around in the late 50s (that worked until McNamara got in an screwed up everything...) and Shy Meyer and others did in the 70s. It'll happen again -- but not until last years LTCs hit four stars -- in about 6 to 10 years.

"This is what you wrote about Congressional risk aversion "Again, speak to your Congress. The Armed forces are risk averse; all those things you cite would entail risk of more casualties and lost careers. It's not a 'risk averse' calling, so why are they so risk averse?" It seems quite reasonable to view that as a powerful statement about how risk averse Congress is. But I was wrong. Good. We are in agreement that Congress isn't all that risk averse." (emphasis added / kw)

We obviously define 'quite reasonable' differently. I specifically wrote the Armed Forces were risk averse.

Congress isn't risk averse, not a bit, they are not in danger and basically don't care much about anything military -- they just want happy voters and do not want the Armed Forces to upset anyone...

If the Flag Os won't do what they know is the right thing because "they're afraid of Congressional disapproval and 'harmful' media attention", that is moral cowardice. No sympathy nor absolution for what is plainly a lack of strong moral character.

I'm not sure they want your sympathy and I certainly wasn't seeking it. It is quite easy to stand outside any system or process and kibitz rifghteously. Neither you nor I know what you would do in their situation. What I do know is that I've seen a number stand up for what they thought was right and get creamed for it and that trend has worsened in the last 30 years or so. As one of the better three stars I've known once told me "I'm mediocre -- all Generals are mediocre; if you're too good the system will kill you as threat to its well being." Another said "I can walk down the hall and stick my elbows out but if I stick them out too far, they'll get cut off -- I can't do any one or any thing a bit of good with no elbows..." Should it be that way? No, absolutely not but unlike you, they have to deal with what is, not what's ideal or should be.

You and I agree that it should not be that way, we disagree on what can be done. I served through two major reform periods when things were dramatically improved but the underlying problems were not addressed and so I watched all those reforms dissipate -- and in each case, the system worsened after the reform period to a lower state than it was before the reforms started. That's why I'm adamant that fixing the symptoms is not wise. It's been done and each time, things not only reverted, they worsened. I contend no major fix is going to happen absent an existential problem. Not necessarily a big or bad war -- real and significant national economic problems could do it.

I disagree about the MRAPs. They were developed and fielded because the Humvees couldn't take the hits. It was pretty apparent that the choice wasn't between getting off the road or going MRAP. The military establishment wasn't going to get off the road. So that left the MRAP as the only out. That was a perfectly rational response to the situation. And it was caused by a military failure.

Yes and no. There was a failure to procure and adequate vehicle when there were plenty of indicators of probable need as far back as the late 70s. That's lick on the Generals. However, the MRAP was a terrible answer to that failure, not really rational or tactically sound but it certainly was expedient (and expensive...). That's a lick on the politicians.

What it also did was provide mobile cocoons, armored shelter -- troops that use them quickly become conditioned to the relative safety and don't want to leave them. The Generals know that and would force the Troops out but they know if they get a whopping number of casualties that the news media and a fickle congress can be unpredictable so best to avoid casualties. The Good guys don't worry about it but due to a personnel system that rewards mediocrity to achieve 'fairness,' every Commander isn't a good guy...

Also, be careful what you assume. A lot of folks in the Army and Marines did and do today in fact get off the road -- too many do not but a lot do and much depends on the quality of the unit and its commander. That all commanders are not good or strong enough to do that is an indictment of that Officer Personnel Management system that says selection must be 'fair' and 'objective.' What that essentially means is that he or she whose turn it is gets to command, competent or not. Back to those O1 and O2 folks -- virtually everyone on of them will be a Captain. Some should not be. Many will make Major and so on...

On that score and on risk aversion aside from the BLT sitting off the coast of North Africa there were some elements at Sigonella who could've been in Benghazi very quickly. They were ready and willing and I hear some FlagOs wanted to go -- I'll bet big bucks they were told to forget it by ecehlons above reality. We'll see...

... then the sin is actually jealousy by the establishment.

A bit, there's more to it. The two Stars and above see themselves as Stewards of the Institution -- no question in my mind they overplay that role.

And besides, you said at those levels the whims and wishes of Congress are made known so the people become known to Congress anyway.

Yes but the key to their survival is in how well they 'protect' the institution and that means not offending Congress OR slamming the institution. McMaster was not viewed as adequately protective...

But they are more likely to do something, a little tiny bit anyway, if they don't have dopey statements about being the best in world history ringing in their ears.

For every person in a position to achieve some change, positive or negative, who believes that stupid trope, there are five to ten who do not. Things are neither as broken or as easy to fix as you seem to think.

[carl]

On that score and on risk aversion aside from the BLT sitting off the coast of North Africa there were some elements at Sigonella who could've been in Benghazi very quickly. They were ready and willing and I hear some FlagOs wanted to go -- I'll bet big bucks they were told to forget it by ecehlons above reality. We'll see...A bit, there's more to it.

Over at the The Captain's Journal

http://www.captainsjournal.com/

information is posted that Gen. Ham wanted to go and was going to send forces despite the word from above and was relieved just seconds after telling people to act.

You have no idea how much I hope that is true. Speaking for myself, it would be a huge morale booster if an actual made member of the multi-star club was determined to do the right thing regardless of career consequences. That kind of demonstration is important beyond immediate effects I think. It is good example and shows the people low down on the totem pole that maybe all isn't lost. Of course, the story, if true includes that Gen Ham's second in command was so willing to relieve him put a bit of a damper on the thing but I'll take what I can get.

[Ken White]

...information is posted that Gen. Ham wanted to go and was going to send forces despite the word from above and was relieved just seconds after telling people to act.

May or may not be true, we'll see. Too early to tell

Regardless and as I wrote things aren't nearly as bad as you seem to think -- nor are they going to be as easy to fix as we both wish...

...That kind of demonstration is important beyond immediate effects I think. It is good example and shows the people low down on the totem pole that maybe all isn't lost.

True but it is far too often incredibly difficult to do that -- unless the circumstances lend themselves to it...

[carl]

True but it is far too often incredibly difficult to do that -- unless the circumstances lend themselves to it...

That is why it is so admirable when it is done.

I didn't know there was a BLT sailing about. Where off the coast was it?

[Fuchs]

(...)
information is posted that Gen. Ham wanted to go and was going to send forces despite the word from above and was relieved just seconds after telling people to act.

You have no idea how much I hope that is true.(...)

You do seem to vastly under-appreciate the benefits of civilian control over the military.
It's human and thus not perfect, but orders of magnitude better than a military not under strict civilian control.

[carl]

You do seem to vastly under-appreciate the benefits of civilian control over the military.
It's human and thus not perfect, but orders of magnitude better than a military not under strict civilian control.

No not at all. That is not what would have (or will) buoyed me up. The hopeful thing is that somebody may have proved himself willing to do the right thing in spite of the personal cost. It was the actions of the man, not the legality of the relief. I would be happier if they had to relieve all the multi-stars in the room to get the job done and then find one in the building down the road (Guess what Chief of European Dental Command, you have a new job.), but like I said, I'll take what I can get.

It is the evidence of some strong moral character existing among the multi-stars that would be the good thing.

But then maybe none of this is true. If it is true, what a black mark upon the Americans, a general relieved in this circumstance.

[JMA]

You do seem to vastly under-appreciate the benefits of civilian control over the military.
It's human and thus not perfect, but orders of magnitude better than a military not under strict civilian control.

Not sure I agree fully... but can see where you, as a German, are coming from .

[davidbfpo]

There are many interesting posts on this thread, some of them refer to domestic American political factors and others are familiar themes or critical points.

I am curious at the timing, as the US presidential election looms near and from this vantage point national security issues do not appear uppermost. Whatever happened in Benghazi remains obscure and the cited source is rather partisan to make a judgement on.

What does strike me is whether the USA is about to enter a period of introspection after the war in Iraq, a failing war in Afghanistan and occasional "fire-fighting" elsewhere versus domestic factors and priorities. Apportioning blame will happen, so who better to blame than the military institution which cannot readily defend itself?

I can discern a pattern of thought, from US military veterans - similar to "Yes we are the best trained, most professional army; you, the politicians gave us the orders after being full briefed and now you say we failed?"

Sadly neither is right or wrong IMHO. Were all those involved "speaking truth to power"? IIRC a post-Vietnam comment by whoever.

[davidbfpo]

The account given on Captain's Journal and the comments made about US forces being in a position to take action in Benghazi appear to lack credibility.

I don't dispute that small SOF / USMC detachments were in Sicily, or that the 6th Fleet's BLT was available - although IIRC it was not at sea at the time. Given the distance from Sicily to Benghazi I do wonder if recce drones could have been overhead quickly, assuming availability. Secondly once mobilised whether any detachment could have flown there in time.

If the AFRICOM commander decided that military force was a valid option - without sufficient intelligence and risk assessment from those on the ground in Benghazi he was a brave man, braver than many I expect.

It is interesting to contrast the decisions made by the then Brigadier David Richards, who was the UK commander in Sierra Leone and decided to go way beyond his orders. His career did not apparently suffer, indeed he rose to be the Army Commander and is now CDS. Perhaps the difference are legion, including not telling London what he had done!

[carl]

David:

There are a lot of unkowns with the Captain's Journal piece. I brought attention to it with that in mind.

From what I've read in other places, the drones got there after the thing started but were there for the majority of it.

What constituted "in time" could not have been known beforehand.

From what has been reported elsewhere there was continuous reporting from the people on the spot almost from the moment the thing began, plus the feed from the drones. We had a lot of people there for a lot of weeks beforehand looking, seeing and reporting. Benghazi is part of Africom's area so I would hope Gen Ham had more than a hazy idea of what was going on from that looking, seeing and reporting. With that in mind, it is not such a leap to make the decision (if made). Tripoli sent a planeload of people to Benghazi the second they heard.

As far as the timing goes, that was in the hands of the people who made the attack.

[Madhu]

This is an Afghanistan specific comment - I think:

How exactly does the day to day decision making work within the larger NATO and ISAF structure? Who is in charge on a day to day, month to month, year to year basis and how does this affect the basic Afghan campaign in terms of operational strategy, resources, training, etc?

I am not an apologist for the military either, but militaries are only one part of the entire strategic picture. Militaries are a result of their societies and represent the intellectual fashions of the day, including the idea that the Taliban insurgency is a Maoist type insurgency, that poverty when treated by aid and development will "heal" the insurgency, and so on.

I'm not excusing anyone and this is a military site so it focuses on the military and its ideas....population centric COIN seems to be the hammer that is used for this particular nail. A close study of the history of this region, in my opinion, will show that foreign aid and development and outside involvement in building militaries (first Pakistan from the fifties onward) to Afghanistan today is destabilizing rather than stabilizing, in many ways....

[Madhu]

Ken,

I respectfully disagree on your point about the American Army and Pakistan.

Historically, the American Army and NATO are huge boosters of the Pakistani Army for a variety of reasons, some good, some bad:

1. As a bulwark against communism during the Cold War.
2. As a potentially useful partner in joint military operations (Mid East and within UN operations).
3. As a potential strategic prize to be kept out of the reach of China and Russia.
4. As a potentially useful ally against Russia and/or Iran.
5. As a potentially useful ally against India or as a conduit for policy toward the 'stans and Central Asia.
6. Large British Pakistani population as a lobby within NATO and the Anglo-American alliance.
7. Perhaps even a Saudi lobby within the web of American alliances, etc.


Traditionally, the Pentagon has been a huge booster and hungered for mil-mil ties and believes in American training of foreign military officers in an almost religious manner. This is likely changed currently, and State is probably the biggest booster. CIA and State and other DC agencies receive huge budgets for administering Pakistan aid programs, military and civilian. This is a DC lobby. There is no other phrase for it.

Retired American military, contractors, and intelligence personnel represent an important lobby for contacts and business with various members of the elite.

In short, "water carriers" in the worst instances....

Ken, I'm sorry, but you must know better. Behind the scenes there are factions that insist we must work with parts of the Pakistani Army and Intelligence services while others suggested this wouldn't work. Those that argued the first had egg on their faces after Abbottabad and there is a lot of CYA going on.


1. I will add some "references" when I have time, but for now, you all can search for Tommy Franks and Musharraf, among other American Generals who are reported to have close working ties from the past.
2. Colin Powell had a meeting which is detailed at GWU site (oh, the name escapes me, the one that posts declassified material) with a Pakistani Minister in Aug 2011 and there was much talk about reviving MeTT training, etc.
3. We tried to work with Nawaz Shariff and then Musharraf prior to 9-11 in order to nab bin Laden. ISI agents were found when Clinton lobbed missiles at training camps in Afghanistan. We've known, always known, but tried to have our cake and eat it too. We would have the old working relationships back and use our contacts to go after Al Q internally. And then mission creep....but this is on everyone involved, everyone. Simply everyone.

[carl]

Ken:

I know things will not be easy to fix and I hope that they are not as broke as I fear, though in the aircraft acquisition part I know they are that broke and probably worse.

We obviously define 'quite reasonable' differently. I specifically wrote the Armed Forces were risk averse.

In my own feeble defense, you wrote "are" risk averse. I know because I cut and pasted that part. But that is a quibble.

I'm not sure they want your sympathy and I certainly wasn't seeking it. It is quite easy to stand outside any system or process and kibitz rifghteously. Neither you nor I know what you would do in their situation. What I do know is that I've seen a number stand up for what they thought was right and get creamed for it and that trend has worsened in the last 30 years or so. As one of the better three stars I've known once told me "I'm mediocre -- all Generals are mediocre; if you're too good the system will kill you as threat to its well being." Another said "I can walk down the hall and stick my elbows out but if I stick them out too far, they'll get cut off -- I can't do any one or any thing a bit of good with no elbows..." Should it be that way? No, absolutely not but unlike you, they have to deal with what is, not what's ideal or should be.

You and I agree that it should not be that way, we disagree on what can be done. I served through two major reform periods when things were dramatically improved but the underlying problems were not addressed and so I watched all those reforms dissipate -- and in each case, the system worsened after the reform period to a lower state than it was before the reforms started. That's why I'm adamant that fixing the symptoms is not wise. It's been done and each time, things not only reverted, they worsened. I contend no major fix is going to happen absent an existential problem. Not necessarily a big or bad war -- real and significant national economic problems could do it.

These two paragraphs are intensely interesting and say some big things. First though a critical editorial comment about the first paragraph. I know you don't mean it to come across as a plea for understanding the plight of the multi-stars but, to me, that is what it comes across as. Now to the actual content, the important things.

The quotes from the generals are kind of chilling. It is like they are slaves of a police state that is able to exert an almost absolute rigid mind control. I didn't know it was that bad, scary bad. Kinda like the Borg.

I also didn't know that when that veritable police state was able to rescind previous reforms, things were worse than they had been before. I can understand your attitude now. I still think that it may be worth trying, mainly because I fear that the existential problem may not be recognized as such and quickly turn into an irrevocable defeat before the Borg can be overthrown and changes made. Yours is pretty powerful testimony though.

This leads me to a question. From what you say, I gather the Borg is getting more powerful. Do you think it will continue to grow in power such that it will be able to snuff out light of reform burning within last years LTCs before they hit the 4 star rank in 6-10 years? Will it kick reformers out altogether?

Also, be careful what you assume. A lot of folks in the Army and Marines did and do today in fact get off the road -- too many do not but a lot do and much depends on the quality of the unit and its commander.

Yes. Good comment. Comments like this and Bill's are sort of like the opposite side of the coin of Eric and Michael's. You guys are not blind boosters and so see and say what is wrong.

I am still shaking my head at the mind control structure multi-stardom has managed to establish. Those guys are geniuses, not military geniuses but geniuses. It's like Ellsworth Toohey is the beau ideal of the 4 star general.

[Ken White]

I know things will not be easy to fix and I hope that they are not as broke as I fear, though in the aircraft acquisition part I know they are that broke and probably worse.

No more broken than it's always been. We just don't have the money now to throw away on dozens of X- models that never make it into production.

In my own feeble defense, you wrote "are" risk averse. I know because I cut and pasted that part. But that is a quibble.

'Are' is present tense, I wrote that at the time I wrote the paragraph. 'Were' is past tense, I wrote that to show what I'd previously written. I cite all that superfluousity to illustrate how you often seem to tend to concentrate on non essentials to the exclusion of the point of the item.

I know you don't mean it to come across as a plea for understanding the plight of the multi-stars but, to me, that is what it comes across as.

Not a plea but a statement of the facts of life they have to live with.

It is like they are slaves of a police state that is able to exert an almost absolute rigid mind control. I didn't know it was that bad, scary bad.

It isn't scary -- it is pervasive and it does stifle initiative and It isn't a police state -- it's a bureaucracy.

I also didn't know that when that veritable police state was able to rescind previous reforms...Borg can be overthrown and changes made.

The reforms were not rescinded, most are still with us. what happened was that some reforms were implemented but many were simply stalled by the bureaucracy and were never fully implemented however, the bureaucracy learned and developed defenses to preclude similar later attempts at reform. An example is the power of the Training and Doctrine Command and the entrenched civilian bureaucracy there. They're going to make sure that no future reformer pulls a Meyer and tries to eliminate their jobs and power by changing the way they do business. Throughout DoD, senior civilians are a problem -- I can talk about 'em because I used to be one -- they stay and provide bureaucratic continuity, the Generals rotate through at two and three year intervals. So who's running the show? A GO who stays a year or two and is nominally in Command -- or his senior civilians who've been there for years, were there when he got there and will be there when he's gone?

They know the GO is in charge so they just wait out a potential reformer in hopes the next guy will be more pliable. They are masters of the stall and all the arcane and tedious rules and regulations that can be used to stifle change of which they disapprove.

Getting rid of the bureaucracy is likely impossible; reducing it's power and effect is possible. That's the good news. The bad news is that Congressional reform will be needed to do more than superficial change. Almost everyone knows there's a ceiling on Federal Employee numbers. Few know there's also a Floor, a level that agencies cannot go below lest too many workers lose their jobs and become disgruntled voters or the employment figures in an area start to look bad due to Federal layoffs...

This leads me to a question. From what you say, I gather the Borg is getting more powerful. Do you think it will continue to grow in power such that it will be able to snuff out light of reform burning within last years LTCs before they hit the 4 star rank in 6-10 years? Will it kick reformers out altogether?

The bureaucracy always tries and will impact some. Many like Michael C will leave in disgust, a few will try to stay to effect change but will get tossed. Still fewer will stay, survive and may achieve some improvements.

Bureaucracies are always self protective. Ours is that and also is not stupid. Last time we had a big personnel cut, in the early '90s, they offered Majors up to a hundred plus thousand in hard cash to depart early and forego their retirement. A lot of smart up-and-comers took that.

I am still shaking my head at the mind control structure multi-stardom has managed to establish. Those guys are geniuses, not military geniuses but geniuses. It's like Ellsworth Toohey is the beau ideal of the 4 star general.

You're focusing on the wrong thing, that's a symptom. The multi stars are slaves to the bureaucracy, a bureaucracy that affects the entire US government which is far too large, far too expensive, has far too much money and tries to do far too many things it should not be doing. The bureaucracy must cater to Congress in all things to get funds; it's self protective so it forces all its minions, regardless of rank, to cater to the whims of 535 people who have 535 different ideas on what should be bought and how the system should operate. Take your aircraft purchase problem; how much of the excessive costs and delays are caused by ECP that some Congroid insists upon because the required part will be produced by a business in his or her district...

It's really amazing that we, the US -- and the Armed Forces in particular -- do as well as we do in spite of the bureaucracy that is in constant conflict with a governmental system that is designed to be dysfunctional. The bureaucracy wants to grow, the system tries to limit that. We all suffer from the results.

You and Michael C are correct, the system needs change. I know that also -- as does almost everyone wearing a uniform but Borg or Bureaucracy, the systems, plural, fight to protect themselves and to grow. Just fixing the symptoms will not achieve lasting results.

I figure we shouldn't buy the bullets for guys whose simple pursuit of their interests results in our guys being dead.

I agree with you but unfortunately, that's not the way the world works.

Military guys do do what they are told. Multi-stars live in a whole 'nother world and sometimes they do, sometimes they don't, sometimes they will and sometimes they won't. It is a different game up there, as you well know.

Not all that different. You'd be surprised about how those guys get jerked around -- and treat each other (lot of jealousies and vengeance up there...). They get a lot of perks to make up for that so there's a veneer of difference but in the end, they do what they're told by civilians who generally do not understand what the forces should do or are able to do -- and in that, I include many senior DoD civilians who have far more rapport with Congroids than do any of the Star wearers. Those folks have a different agenda and military reform is not one of their issues.

[carl]

No more broken than it's always been. We just don't have the money now to throw away on dozens of X- models that never make it into production.

Oh yes, way more broken than it has ever been. The F-35 design won in 2001 and it may get into actual operational service, nobody exactly knows when. When that when comes all those F-15s and F-16s are going to be rather old, as in two decades or more old. The tanker replacement saga seems to be never ending and we still don't have any new ones. The first contract was let and rescinded going on 10 years ago. The Army has tried and tried to get a new scout helo into service and they can't get it done. No, it is beyond busted when we can't even manage to replace the helos used to squire the President around from Andrews to the White House and back.

An awful lot of those X-planes were research aircraft that were never intended go into production. Those were solely tools to learn. Some of the other X-planes were so designated because they were prototypes for aircraft that did go into production. Some didn't. Whether those X-planes were a waste of money is a matter of opinion. Way back when they didn't cost much in any event. You just bent some metal, installed an engine and went. Things really got expensive when the 'trons started to trump aerodynamics. It seems like after the teen fighters it became extremely hard to get things into the air and after the F-22, it is almost impossible. We may or may not have wasted money on X-planes back then but we got things into the air.

The rest of your post was wonderful. It was like a briefing by an insider on the whys and wherefores of the defense machine.

[davidbfpo]

A couple of posts have referred to a letter by Colonel Tunnell, it is on this link:http://www.michaelyon-online.com/ima...cted-redux.pdf

There was a SWJ Blog, with comments:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/arm...soldiers-email

[carl]

There was a SWJ Blog, with comments:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/arm...soldiers-email

The comments over there are fascinating.

Tunnell's missive I read finally. It was very interesting. Some things seem spot on and other things seem to be sour grapes. I think Ike may be frowning at some of the comments. That is merely my opinion of course.