The Best Trained, Most Professional Military...Just Lost Two Wars?

[Ken White]

Historically, the American Army and NATO are huge boosters of the Pakistani Army for a variety of reasons, some good, some bad:

All true -- but that was then, this is now and Pakistan has done much to help us and is also doing some things that are far from helpful and we all know that. As Bob's World is fond of illustrating, the Cold War with the USSR is over and Nations are pursuing, properly, their own interests. There are areas where our interests and those of Pakistan diverge and Pakistan rightly pursues its interests.

This is a DC lobby. There is no other phrase for it.

True. However it is equally true for several other nations and areas. Regrettably, our political system today seems to require minor crises and oversea involvement here and there. Part of that is true interest, part to keep the US economy pumped up and part is pure selfishness and / or job security on the part of those who are assigned or fall into such work. Rightly or wrongly Pakistan is no more important to us than are the Philippines or Paraguay. We have interests and relationships a lot of places, Pakistan is more important at the moment than some but not as importan as others. Times change, things shift.

Ken, I'm sorry, but you must know better.

For what and why are you sorry? I see nothing for you to be sorry about...

Behind the scenes there are factions that insist we must work with parts of the Pakistani Army and Intelligence services while others suggested this wouldn't work. Those that argued the first had egg on their faces after Abbottabad and there is a lot of CYA going on.

All true and I do indeed know all that. None of this changes the fact that Carl wrote: ""Do very high ranking military officers still go along with the fantasy that the Pak Army/ISI is useful?"" *

To which I responded ""I'm not sure any ever did believe that though they were told by their civilian masters to be nice for several reasons. They do what they're told..."" I responded in that vein because that is how I see the situation today and part of that is based on a fairly close relationship with some former USArCent commanders and staff folks. Both nations pursued their interests and differences were plated over by both -- that is less true today. Carl specifically addressed "high ranking military officers" and not the US polity in general. The attitudes of and within the Armed forces and those of an within the rest of government often vary but the military guys do what they're told. It's that simple.

We've known, always known, but tried to have our cake and eat it too.

True that. So too is Pakistan practicing the same game.

We would have the old working relationships back and use our contacts to go after Al Q internally. And then mission creep....but this is on everyone involved, everyone. Simply everyone.

IMO that reversion is unlikely, water under bridges and all that.

* I have no particular bone to pick with Paksitan, they are merely pursuing their own interests and are leery of us -- with good cause -- as we are pursuing our interests and are leery of them -- also with good cause. Carl's the guy who keeps excoriating them here. Mayhap you should educate him.

[carl]

* I have no particular bone to pick with Paksitan, they are merely pursuing their own interests and are leery of us -- with good cause -- as we are pursuing our interests and are leery of them -- also with good cause. Carl's the guy who keeps excoriating them here. Mayhap you should educate him.

Who me? I don't need no edjucation.

I do have a bone to pick with the Pak Army/ISI. Those Americans they've killed. Don't really care if they were simply and innocently pursuing their interests as they perceived them, our guys are still dead. I have a bigger bone to pick with the suits and multi-stars on our side who won't see the sun in the sky. I figure we shouldn't buy the bullets for guys whose simple pursuit of their interests results in our guys being dead.

The attitudes of and within the Armed forces and those of an within the rest of government often vary but the military guys do what they're told. It's that simple.

Military guys do do what they are told. Multi-stars live in a whole 'nother world and sometimes they do, sometimes they don't, sometimes they will and sometimes they won't. It is a different game up there, as you well know.

[Dayuhan]

Multi-stars live in a whole 'nother world and sometimes they do, sometimes they don't, sometimes they will and sometimes they won't. It is a different game up there, as you well know.

Possibly so, to some extent, but I don't think they get to dictate policy re Pakistan, or on most other issues.

[Bill Moore]

Originally Posted by carl
Multi-stars live in a whole 'nother world and sometimes they do, sometimes they don't, sometimes they will and sometimes they won't. It is a different game up there, as you well know.

Certainly a lot of multi-stars getting relieved of command for not following guidance from the beltway.

[carl]

Certainly a lot of multi-stars getting relieved of command for not following guidance from the beltway.

Who? I lose track.

[Bob's World]

Bill,

Actually this is not "pop-centric" at all. If it were we'd be doing this and not be in the hole we are in. No, pop-centric is little different than threat-centric, in that both tend to hold the government harmless, both the host nation and our own. Both are also two paths to the same end: Defeat the insurgent.

Pop-centric thinks one can bribe the populace to success, and that manufacturing better effectiveness of host nation services is the long-tern answer. There is no evidence of that ever working for long, if at all.

Threat-centric thinks one can simply defeat the various aspects of the threat: his fighters, his sanctuary, his ideology, his funding, etc, and that that is the long-tern answer. Equally, while this has indeed suppressed the fighting in many places over time, and has eradicated more than a few specific insurgent groups, I am not aware if it ever producing an enduring peace, and it typically drives the conditions of insurgency deeper into the fabric of the society.

No, sometimes I feel a little lonely on these thoughts, so perhaps they are "Bob-centric"; but in simplest terms they recognize that the roots of these conflicts reside in the nature of the relationship between various aspects of some populace and the systems of governance that affect their lives. Actual sins of governance and grievances of populaces vary widely, but the core human emotions that seem to pop up again and again in the many histories of these types of conflict around the globe and over time are the ones I try to focus on here.

Those chasing threats or populaces either one with a package of tactical programs that do not keep an eye to the the larger strategic criteria I attempt to discover, define and describe, tend to fail. They may put up great numbers, get a great report card and big promotion for their efforts on their tour, but they fail at their mission. Truth.

As to this:

Of course what you don't address is how will abandoning this tactic enable the opposition? Will it increase their freedom of movement? Will they be able to conduct more operations against coalition forces if they're not disrupted (especially if the population doesn't reject the insurgents)? There are two sides to this coin, and they're both important.

I have never advocated abandoning any tactic, what I have said is one must frame their COAs and CONOPS for implementing any tactic or program, be it one to defeat, develop or shape governance, with these simple strategic questions as their framework. One must then also employ these same considerations for their measures of success. If one does this and the government one is supporting still falls to the insurgency?

Well, sometimes you just can't fix something no matter how bad you want to and it will go sooner than you want it to. You don't know what will replace what goes, and most likely things will be chaotic and messy for quite some time while the people who this directly affects sort it out on their own terms. Sometimes the insurgent is right and needs to win, more often the government is just too wrong and needs to go; better however, if one can convince said government to cure itself and avoid that uncertainty and chaos all together.

But we have put GIRoA in a sanctuary. We don't honor their sovereignty, but we allow them to act in all manner of self-destructive ways and protect them with our blood and treasure. History will judge us poorly for this. Public opinion already has.

Cheers.

[Madhu]

Ken - you wrote (and I've searched the thread a couple times and don't see it right now but it was there, it's there I tell you! ) that Pakistan looks after their interest just as the US does.

The words you used and the way you put them together created an equivalency it seemed to me but I'm not entirely fair on this subject around here. (Doesn't help when I scan a thread and can't find the quotes now does it? Maybe I'm just nuts....)

Anyway, I apologize for assuming an intent that wasn't there.

I read the use of words like "merely" and "rightfully so" (Pakistan looks after its own interests, rightfully so) as approval or at least a "benign understanding".

At any rate, there is no point engaging me on this topic because I've got knee jerk qualities, major knee jerk, on the subject. The emotional well is poisoned on this subject, I'm not fair on it, it's better to ignore me.

During the Cold War, and as a younger person, it was painful, personally painful, to watch many people forget the US' anti-colonial and revolutionary history and to lose all feeling for a people struggling toward something other than colonialism simply because it was outside a Western context and because their choices with regard to the Soviet Union were, IMO, often foolish.

The well is emotionally poisoned and it won't be unpoisoned. It's not your fault, it's not anyone's fault, it's just what happened.

And I loathed the Soviet Union. My book shelves have plenty of Soviet dissident books on them. To read about those camps or the security states and what it did to the people!

But other people mattered, too. I agree with everything Bob says about self-representation.

Anyway, I apologize. You are experienced enough and savvy enough people to know what is happening. You've worked with various diaspora and other nationals. You know sometimes it's all uphill because of trust issues.

I am sorry.

[carl]

Possibly so, to some extent, but I don't think they get to dictate policy re Pakistan, or on most other issues.

Dictate? No. They do have more than a small bit of influence though.

[Madhu]

Ken -

In my opinion, you veer toward the latter.

And no one has a problem with Pakistan, we are talking about the leadership of the Army and the intelligence agencies, certain of which are able to help us because it just so happens that they trained huge numbers of so-called non-state actors (some of whom just happen to live in training camps and safe houses inside the country), some of which killed Americans on American soil and abroad. Also, they get paid a lot. Add that to the drug money and misdirected aid money and it adds up. Over the years, how much does the missing money add up to (I'm talking total world aid from the 1950s onward). A nuke or two?

Call it a different kind of Marshall Plan.

It's only natural that civilians such as Carl and I are leery of militaries that have a history of coups, interfere internally in governance and buy journalists and air time, and threaten their own populations physically. When American military--retired or otherwise--express admiration or a kind of benign understanding indulgence toward such a military, then, well, you can bet civilians start to become a bit testy.

'Cause it makes us worry about some of you (kidding but you know what I mean).

I understand that there are brave individuals who don't like the situation and may be trying to help us, but we are talking the realm of dissidents here and not "rogue actors". I sometimes think the term rogue actor was developed to distance ourselves from the fact that we are to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia what Russia and China are to Iran. It's a way to misdirect and lie.

PS: Training scores of state/non-state actors is a bad strategy, so, no, I don't see how these agencies are acting in their nation's interest. It has hurt them badly and hurt their people badly. It's one thing to say, "this is the situation and we are not going to change it," it's another to say, "gee, they are just following their interests," in a mirroring fashion as if their Army is just like the American Army. Providing intellectual cover probably isn't a good idea because it means that you can't think about a situation properly. Poor rhetoric sometimes leads to poor decision making.


I didn't think you lot represented the same sort of institution, but if you do think that, can you point me to the American coups that I've missed?

PPS: Getting this right matters because we are about to embark as a society on a discussion about how we are to work with the currently changing Mid East. I have a sinking feeling we will do the same thing we've done over the years with Saudi Arabia and Egypt and Pakistan and now Afghanistan. It matters to understand how our aid, military or otherwise, how our building up of armies, Egypt, Pakistan, Afghanistan or otherwise, may have long term negative implications for our nation. We inadvertently hurt people, including our own.

[Madhu]

....in my first post on this thread. I was referring to the following:

Document 2 – State 109130
U.S. Department of State, Cable, "The Secretary’s Lunch With Pakistani Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar," June 22, 2001, Confidential, 8 pp. [Excised]

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell has lunch on June 19, 2001 with Pakistani Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar to discuss Afghanistan, U.S. sanctions and Pakistan-China relations. Secretary Powell encourages the Foreign Minister to explain Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan as “the United States and Pakistan have different perspectives about the Taliban.” Minister Sattar describes the Pakistan-Taliban "relationship as ‘reasonable, but not problem free,’ and listed points of contention such as: smuggling of goods through Afghanistan to Pakistan, Afghan refugee/migrant flows into Pakistan, and Pakistani fugitives in Afghanistan.”

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB325/doc02.pdf

I've got more (you all know by now I like to use references for my comments. Plain ole' opinion kinda bores me right now....you guys got good reads for me, I'll read them).

We strung things out during the Afghan campaign a lot longer than we needed to because we believed our own fairy tales about that region and our ability to outsmart locals when they did the outsmarting. Given the location of prominent Al Q leaders within that country, they did a lot of outsmarting of us (even if the leadership didn't know about OBL, it means they weren't looking very hard and so that is kind of outstmarting us too). I can understand why people want to sweep this stuff under the rug. I sometimes think there is a touch of the "soft bigotry of low expectations" about our dealings in that part of the world.

PS: I mean, read that document. We keep doing the same things over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over again and expect different results. At this point, though, I am waiting for the history books and more interviews and declassified material. I need more intellectually. And to go all school marm on you, young people lurking, you demand more too.

[Steve Blair]

PS: I mean, read that document. We keep doing the same things over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over again and expect different results. At this point, though, I am waiting for the history books and more interviews and declassified material. I need more intellectually. And to go all school marm on you, young people lurking, you demand more too.

You don't need to wait that long. Many of the patterns you're talking about in US policy go back to our own Indian Wars (the constant struggle between the Army and the Department of the Interior). There's plenty out there about the US in the Philippines (anything by Brian Linn is well worth the read), and the interaction between State and the Marine Corps in Central America is also pretty well covered.

This, incidentally, is why I contend that the US military is often reluctant to learn from its own past...or in some ways may actually be incapable of learning.

[Fuchs]

Sometimes I sense that the usual suspects at SWC (not that many are active here...) think of the U.S. heavily armed bureaucracies as something more special than they are.

I suppose you don't need to look at individuals, individual laws or events to explain the state of affairs at all. The global socio-economic and psychological theories apply to U.S. humans just as to almost all if not all others.


This fits well to he persistence of certain problems.
You might close with the solution an inch or two more if you look at the problems as fundamental, human ones - and strive to search for some policy lever that could trick the bureaucracies into being better (illusionary) agents of the people.


Or you simply destroy the beast and replace it with a newborn version, one without all the accumulated scars, poisoning and decrepitude. The newborn will need some time until it can acquire all those bad old habits.

[Ken White]

Sometimes I sense that the usual suspects at SWC (not that many are active here...) think of the U.S. heavily armed bureaucracies as something more special than they are.

Not special but breeders of ineffectiveness in the name of efficiency...

Or you simply destroy the beast and replace it with a newborn version, one without all the accumulated scars, poisoning and decrepitude. The newborn will need some time until it can acquire all those bad old habits.

Exactly -- which is why I'm a fan of our ad-hocery. And why the bureaucracies hate and stomp on ad-hocery; thery like all those old habits. Job security, y'know...

Ideally we'd have a big training base from which we select individuals, form and deploy units for specific conflicts and durations and then disestablish them to be replaced by another newly formed bunch when needed. That's not about to happen, costs would be too great and even if we did that, the training base would still become an old bureaucracy...

[Dayuhan]

This conversation has wandered a bit, nothing unusual.

Certainly most here can find something to complain about in US foreign policy, though different people will have different complaints. I don't see how that can be laid at the door of the military: foreign policy is an executive function. The military may have some debatable degree of influence, but responsibility lies with the executive branch. I can't see any instance in which one could state with any certainty that policy would be different if the military had taken a more aggressive role, nor do I think the military taking an aggressive role in the formulation of foreign policy would necessarily be a good thing. Like Fuchs, I believe the only thing worse than a military under civilian control is a military not under civilian control, and thus under no control at all.

The citation in the original post seemed to complain that the claim that the US military is the strongest that has ever existed is inconsistent with that military's performance in recent COIN campaigns. I don't see any inconsistency there. The US military is by any objective standard the most powerful military force that has ever existed. Not all goals are achievable through the application of military force, though, and recent campaigns are evidence of that.

Certainly the US military has its share of weaknesses, defects, and inefficiencies. Some of these are common to almost any large bureaucratic organization. It is perhaps some saving grace that the potential peer competitors have similar problems: the overt corruption in the Chinese and Russian military is as severe an obstacle to performance as anything afflicting the US.

I still think the equivocal results in COIN campaigns are attributable less to military deficiencies (though they certainly exist) than to policy errors. I see no reason why American forces should be taking a primary role in any fight against another country's insurgents. If we need to assist a government in a fight against insurgents, fine: that's why we have Special Forces. It's not something to be undertaken lightly, but it something we've some capacity to do. Sending our own forces to fight another country's insurgencies is something to be avoided in almost any case. Fighting insurgents is a fundamental governance function, and it is not our place to be taking on fundamental governance functions in other countries. That's a recipe for a mess, for reasons RC Jones has explained many times.

Our government has a hammer. It's not a perfect hammer in any way, but it's better than anyone else's hammer. If the government chooses to employ the hammer as a screwdriver, we shouldn't blame the resulting mess entirely on the hammer.

[Ken White]

It's only natural that civilians such as Carl and I are leery of militaries that have a history of coups, interfere internally in governance and buy journalists and air time, and threaten their own populations physically. When American military--retired or otherwise--express admiration or a kind of benign understanding indulgence toward such a military, then, well, you can bet civilians start to become a bit testy.

Testy is okay, misperceptions less so. You and Carl have misperceptions about the US Armed Forces and you tend to accord the hundreds (thousands when you include those retired) of US Flag Officers far more power than they actually possess. As I told Carl and as you objected to, they do what they're told. In many ways, they're more constrained than are Majors and Lieutenant Colonels.

Not just militaries buy journalists and air time -- in fact, when it comes to that, the militaries, here, there or elsewhere are generally way down the power curve...

American military people, retired or otherwise do not set the policy of the US toward any given nation. None. You may judge people on what they say if you wish, but I'd suggest that being aware of what they're directed to say and appear to do is not the same as watching what they actually do and to whom they respond.

I sometimes think the term rogue actor was developed to distance ourselves from the fact that we are to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia what Russia and China are to Iran. It's a way to misdirect and lie.

Yep. Agreed but who directs that? What level of government?

PS: Training scores of state/non-state actors is a bad strategy, so, no, I don't see how these agencies are acting in their nation's interest. It has hurt them badly and hurt their people badly.

I agree, so does Bob's World. Shame that many don't agree with us, isn't it?

It's one thing to say, "this is the situation and we are not going to change it," it's another to say, "gee, they are just following their interests," in a mirroring fashion as if their Army is just like the American Army. Providing intellectual cover probably isn't a good idea because it means that you can't think about a situation properly. Poor rhetoric sometimes leads to poor decision making.

Usually does lead to poor decision making -- doesn't change the reality that both we and Pakistan are pursuing our interest as seen by some in each Nation.

I can assure you that I do not see their interests and ours in the same light nor do I see their -- or any other Army -- as a mirror image of the US Army. We're kind of unique -- not special, not great (usually just barely adequate, in fact) but we are different. I've worked with enough others to know that, to appreciate the good points of that difference (and there are some) and dislike the bad issues (and there are some of those as well).

I didn't think you lot represented the same sort of institution, but if you do think that, can you point me to the American coups that I've missed?

Nope, I can't. That's due to a strongly entrenched civilian control ethic. As I said, the Generals do what they're told...

You have assumed, as Carl often does, that I have attitudes that I do not possess and did not state. Y'all tend to make standing broad jumps at wrong conclusions and infer things that tickle your sensibilities, things that were not written or meant.

PPS: Getting this right matters because we are about to embark as a society on a discussion about how we are to work with the currently changing Mid East. I have a sinking feeling we will do the same thing we've done over the years with Saudi Arabia and Egypt and Pakistan and now Afghanistan. It matters to understand how our aid, military or otherwise, how our building up of armies, Egypt, Pakistan, Afghanistan or otherwise, may have long term negative implications for our nation. We inadvertently hurt people, including our own.

I could not agree more. However, you're talking to the wrong guy. I'm with you on all this -- you need to address this to the Council on Foreign Relations and the rest of the US governing and foreign policy elite. They're the idiots that sway our government of the day in certain directions with their misguided vision of what's needed.

ADDED: I agree with the thrust of your later post. Many in the US Armed Forces who had experience in the area (and many more like me who had that but were retired) let the powers that be know we were getting taken for a ride and that we were not going to outsmart people playing a game they've played for centuries -- especially not on their own turf. You see how much good that did,

[ganulv]

It's only natural that civilians such as Carl and I are leery of militaries that have a history of coups, interfere internally in governance and buy journalists and air time, and threaten their own populations physically. When American military--retired or otherwise--express admiration or a kind of benign understanding indulgence toward such a military, then, well, you can bet civilians start to become a bit testy.

Having spent time in Central America in the mid-90s as a very impressionable 20-year-old I came to pretty much the same conclusion about the State Department. My view of the world is much more nuanced now but I think my knee is going to jerk for the rest of my life when I see a blue blazer. The DOD does not have the job of spreading truth, justice, and the American way. State, on the other hand, says its mission statement is to “[a]dvance freedom for the benefit of the American people and the international community by helping to build and sustain a more democratic, secure, and prosperous world composed of well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty, and act responsibly within the international system.”