Australia: catch all

[Ken White]

Move along... no cultural cringe to see here...

I'm also not an expert or even mildly knowledgeable about Australia - US relationships but my limited experience with Australians leads me to suggest to an Australian, no less, that cultural cringe with reference to Australians is perhaps an oxymoron...

P.S.
I cannot believe you guys are wasting time and money on SAMS...

[Mark O'Neill]

P.S.
I cannot believe you guys are wasting time and money on SAMS...

Ken, Hence my point about cringe...

It is often discussed here in Australia how we as a society have continually sought 'affirmation' or 'inspiration' from others. To some extent that has also been true of our military thinking. Until 1942 ,we looked to the UK for this, since then , more so the US. A good example of this trait was our wholesale embrace of the 'Pentomic' Division rubbish in the 60s...

[Ken White]

...the 'Pentomic' Division rubbish in the 60s...

It wasn't totally rubbish. As a plank owner in the very first Pentomic Airborne Infantry Combat Group (later to be a Battle Group), it wasn't nearly as bad as painted. The concept was not properly applicable to Mechanized or Armored organizations (a minor reason for its demise) as the US Army understood Armor. However, it was a good fit for Parachute units * and an acceptable one for other walking Infantry -- the difference being the relative quality of troops at the time.

The concept suffered from being designed and activated in the Mid '50s to use equipment that did not become available until the mid 60s. That was after the experiment was ended and we had reverted to Regiments (to be falsely renamed Brigades and which had no need for much of the equipment designed for a different type of organization...). That reversion and the demise of the concept was principally due to vociferous opposition from the Colonels of the US Army who, mostly, were not physically capable of keeping up with the required foot mobility nor tactically flexible enough to employ the units to best advantage and who really objected to being told to command a 14-15 hundred man unit instead of a 3-4,000 man regiment with three or more subordinate Lieutenant Colonels. Then Colonel Frederick C. Weyand, Commander of the 1st BG, 6th Infantry and later to be CofS, Army was one of the major players in that; he had a lot of help. There were other issues. CSS for a fairly important one, Division Staffs (pretty mujch unchanged from the old triangular Div Hq organization) unwilling to tolerate the flexibility and independence required of the Battle Groups was another...

The bottom line is that if one is going to radically restructure one's force, one should lay the foundation for proper personnel support and rules, equipment and logistics BEFORE activating the new units.

Oh -- and better training is always a plus...

* Both US Airborne Divisions were reasonably successful in their employment of the concept, due primarily to much younger leaders at all levels than was the US Army norm at the time. Even they suffered from the equipment, CSS and Colonel attitude issues though. Those who then said and now say that there is no need for parachute units (but who have not yet figured out another way to move a few thousand troops over hostile territory to a very distant objective or operating area) saw that and an insured that the airborne elements were drug into the mainstream Army 'system' and that time in service and time in grade became prime promotion criteria, competence was not an issue...