Australia: catch all

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Mark,
How do you think this is going to go in terms of standng it up, manning, training and equipping? What do you see as the major challenges? How is the debate shaping up at both the uniformed and political levels? Will the capability be leveraged when not deployed in a domestic capacity? Did not mean to broadside with the 1000 questions, but its of great interest

Your comment:

The IDG is really a case of necessity being the mother of invention. We have been engaged in wide range of stabilisation missions in our immediate region over the last eight years or so that have been demanding on resources -and even a casual scan of the issues would reveal that our requirements to be engaged would appear to be enduring. Quite simply, we had been doing this in an ad hoc fashion with the AFP working the the military in these areas, it made practical sense to institutionalise the arrangements and achieve some efficiencies of planning , training and readiness.

makes me wonder about the "tipping point" (can't shake Gladwell) of political risk and how that influences organizational change. I'd mentioned in the "adapt or die" thread that I thought the grass roots was sewing change with regards to SSTRO.

If as this develops you can provide insights and commentary on how this goes, I for one would really appreciate it. I honestly see this as a key capability in the area of security cooperation based on the threats of non-state types, and sponsors of non-state types - which I think translates well to conflict prevention and conflict resolution.

Best regards, Rob

[Mark O'Neill]

Hi Mark,
How do you think this is going to go in terms of standing it up, manning, training and equipping? What do you see as the major challenges? How is the debate shaping up at both the uniformed and political levels? Will the capability be leveraged when not deployed in a domestic capacity? Did not mean to broadside with the 1000 questions, but its of great interest

Your comment:


makes me wonder about the "tipping point" (can't shake Gladwell) of political risk and how that influences organizational change. I'd mentioned in the "adapt or die" thread that I thought the grass roots was sewing change with regards to SSTRO.

If as this develops you can provide insights and commentary on how this goes, I for one would really appreciate it. I honestly see this as a key capability in the area of security cooperation based on the threats of non-state types, and sponsors of non-state types - which I think translates well to conflict prevention and conflict resolution.

Best regards, Rob

G'Day Rob,

I will try and address your questions - I must stress that I have no 'special' knowledge of how the organisation is going - I am merely an interested mil observer. That said, I have met with and discussed the groups with some senior AFP officers in my capacity at the Think Tank I am currently attached to.

Firstly, my overall sense is that the development is proceeding relatively well. Recruitment seems to be meeting its targets (they are taking folks from within the AFP, various state police forces and are also attracting some current and ex-military folk). The leadership and development is a mix of AFP hands and ex-mil staff employed for their knowledge of the mil planning, log and deployment aspects.

I have some confidence in their 'ops' training - I know the ex-mil advisers they are using. I cannot offer any competent or professional assessment of their police training as it is beyond my area of knowledge and expertise, but I would think it a reasonable assumption that it meets the standards of the wider AFP.

I believe that there is the likelihood that the capacity will be leveraged domestically - it makes sense when you consider that many of the capabilities inherent in the IDG could supplant the 'traditional' concept of using the military in what we generally refer to as the 'aid to the civil power' role. For example, in the case of a requirement for the provision of cordons etc during any possible domestic terrorism incident. It would also be a lot 'neater' legally than using the military in some circumstances.

Regarding the 'debate' in the pol and mil circles, there seems to be a fair bit of bipartisan consensus that this is a good and useful development. I would summarise the military view as being the same (you have to remember we currently only have 6 and a half infantry Battalions on a growth path back to eight. We are quite 'busy' with these 6.5 bn (Iraq, Afghanistan, East Timor and the Solomons - before you allow for contingencies and 'reserve'). So, as you can imagine, any extra boots that may be available to assist with some of our 'lower order' stabilisation tasks in more benign security environments are very welcome.

One important thing that needs to be kept in mind is that whilst these guys are more 'deployable' than the average police officer, ultimately they are still cops - use of lethal force will remain a last resort culturally, and even a mild form of 'non-permissive' environment will quickly see them out of their depth. That said, I believe that they will (do) provide a useful additional capability in our national response options.

I note your request for me to keep the forum posted on developments as they occur here in Oz, I will comply as best I can, although this will probably become limited as I will be deployed soon-ish on an operational tour and will necessarily lose touch with these issues (and maybe this site) for a while.

Best,

Mark

[Rob Thornton]

Mark,
Many thanks for your thoughts. You know we ought to send an observation team or two to document and embed early on. Given the US/UK/AUS/CAN special military relationship this capability not only stands as one that might possibly be emulated, but one that will be in high demand (a case for more of it??).
I made a case in the last SWJ volume that ISF needed more capabilities along the lines of para-military given the type of domestic and domestically enabled threat they face,and arguably will face for awhile - (we'll take care of deterring the neighbor's conventional forces I suspect).
A Joint/Inter-Agency LNO team could save us allot of steps down the road if through persistant experience our view of the world accomodates constructing a similiar capability - or even to note how they augment and enhance domestic Civil Response crises. It would also serve as the bridge to resourcing the AFP IDP right and smooth over C2 issues if they become part of a coalition.
I was thinking about how their education might go and wondering if it will be a combination of AFP and Mil type service schools? Not so much about idividual development, but how the inter-action and sharing will benefit both sides of the coin.
If you drop off the net before long, be safe and have a good deployment.
Best Regards, Rob