Afghan Exit:why, how and more in country and beyond

[Dayuhan]

Ah yes, the ever reliable fallacy of the false alternative.

Have you got a real alternative?

It would be if you reduced your force level. Doesn't matter now though. Too late. And of course it would have been hard to do, always a good reason not to do something.

Reducing your force level would have consequences of its own... and even if you do it, what would you do then?

Asked and answered on many occasions.

Nope.

You can go back to JMM99's post, print it out and wave that piece of paper around when you use this argument. It will work good.

If you're basing a demand for a course of action on a need to keep promises, the issue of who promised what to whom really does need to be addressed.

[Gurkha]

I somehow don't think it will end in abrupt surgical departure.Gaining in confidence after his endorsement for a second term, Obama will definitely not wish to wash away whatever gains the West has made in the past decade. The majority of the troops will withdraw, the civilians will and so will many International NGOs.. but the special forces will continue, so will the funding, Karzai may change but an anti-Taliban regime will continue.It has to.. nobody in their right senses would wish to leave a Vipers nest behind. While it may not benefit the Afghans especially the 'South Helmand Farmer', the Taliban may not find it very easy to operate in an Afghanistan covered by satellites & UAVs : if they concentrate.. they will be taken out... so it may not be as unequal as you think. And hey.... 2016... another attack, another President, afresh set of military leadership rarin' to go.. who knows ? Perhaps finally the Indians may grow some balls to do something instead of whining as usual, because by 2016 Pakistan will be on fire & fragmenting as will Kashmir !!Who knows we will shake hands across the Indus !!

[davidbfpo]

In May 2012 a hitherto unknown US think tank the Center for National Policy (CNP) published a short paper on a strategy for NATO; one of the co-authors is Ryan Evans, whose work I have cited before.

From the summary:

The main elements of this plan, some of which are already in place, are as follows:

• Continue transition plans to place Afghan Government and Security Forces in the lead across the country by April 2013. However, “transition” must take on more substance than it has so far. The April 2013 transition cannot be a political fig leaf for home audiences, but an end to American and Allied (non-Afghan) combat operations against Afghan-oriented insurgents outside the scope of embedded mentoring and fire support.

• Dissolve the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and place Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) in charge of the military mission by April 2013. This will be accompanied by a drawdown of US-NATO troop levels to a force of approximately 30,000 – 6,000-8,000 of whom should be non U.S. military personnel. This large drawdown will ensure that “ownership” is transitioned
to the Afghan state. The primary military mission will be to continue the intelligence and direct action campaign against transnational terrorist networks in the region.

• Full transition of governance and development efforts in Afghanistan to the United Nations by April 2013. Governance and development efforts do not aggregate to form an American political strategy.

• The United States and NATO allies will provide enduring material and political support to the Afghan state in order to ensure sufficient stability around Kabul, the north, and the west and prevent transnational terrorist networks from operating from Afghanistan.

Keeping more troops in Afghanistan through 2013 will not result in appreciable and durable gains in consolidating the Afghan government's hold over the country. Therefore, the costs in blood and treasure associated with a more gradual drawdown are simply not worth the meager gains they will deliver.

Link:http://cnponline.org/ht/a/GetDocumentAction/i/38128

I noted they recommend paying attention to how the USSR withdrew!

[Dayuhan]

In May 2012 a hitherto unknown US think tank the Center for National Policy (CNP) published a short paper on a strategy for NATO; one of the co-authors is Ryan Evans, whose work I have cited before

This makes pretty good sense as far as I can see, and I can find little to argue with in it. I would point out that "enduring support" will have to walk a thin line between a desire not to fund corruption and acceptance of the reality that it is a patronage-based political culture and no Afghan central government can endure without indulging in a level of patronage that we will consider corrupt. How far we're willing to let that go before restricting aid will have to be worked out as we go along.

Of course this strategy can fail, but that will ultimately be in the hands of Afghans, as it must be.

[jcustis]

• The United States and NATO allies will provide enduring material and political support to the Afghan state in order to ensure sufficient stability around Kabul, the north, and the west and prevent transnational terrorist networks from operating from Afghanistan.

I like most elements, but not this one. Material support aimed at Kabul runs the risk of being squandered, and so it needs to be very clearly defined. I doubt we can do that in a satisfactory, honest way.

[davidbfpo]

A neat article on an issue some may prefer not being in the open; which opens with:

One of the outcomes of the current US-Afghan summit in Washington reported by Afghan media is the apparent emergence of a new Afghan special operations force, the “Foundation Force for Afghanistan”. Still there is no official confirmation of this. Our guest blogger Gary Owen(*) writes, however, that this would be very much in line with the US emphasis on Afghan SOF training and partnership and, when involving private military contractors, would enable the US to maintain direct influence over Afghan SOF while still withdrawing troops.

Link:http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/index.asp?id=3199

I noted the re-appearance of Blackwater PMC, now known as Academi.

A longer backgrounder, by the same author:http://www.aan-afghanistan.org/index.asp?id=3069