Afghan Exit:why, how and more in country and beyond

[carl]

I don't buy it. A simple description of an act would be "a withdrawal of troops and other resources", or some such thing.

You parse the word as you like. I see abandon and I figure the rest of the world is most likely to see like that too.

There's no way the US can deal realistically with the Pak Army/ISI until we withdraw from Afghanistan: the need to supply forces through Pakistani territory is the single biggest constraint of the revision of that relationship. Absurd to say we shouldn't leave until we deal with Pakistan when we can't do anything about Pakistan until we leave.

We supplied the big force we have there now via routes other than Pakistan for months. If we reduce the force to the point where it can be supplied by air and the north route, we can sustain it indefinitely without Pakistan. We have never really tried. That bespeaks laziness, lack of imagination and being the mark for the sahibs in Pindi. The Afghans see that as does the world.

Even after leaving, of course, all the US can do is stop giving money and threaten various actions if they do things we don't like. Whether or not that will change their policies is debatable: they are not a vassal state and they are not required to bow to our will.

Did you ever see the movie The Servant with Dirk Bogarde? It is a dark and twisted tale about how man servent takes over the household through malevolent force of character that subtly overwhelmed the employer. The employer could have stopped things and ruled the roost at any time but he never even tried. Weak character you see. We're the employer.

And why should we not? It's pretty clear that the Afghan Government is not going to put any effort into defending or sustaining itself while the Americans are there to do it for them.

Yep, heard that exact same argument in 1973-1975.

I would personally have no objection to providing continuing military and civilian assistance, with some provisions. It should be clear that the assistance will be gradually phased out. It should be clear that any organization that doesn't make very visible progress on controlling corruption, meaning specific individual consequences, gets nothing. It should be made clear that if the people training the military get shot, military assistance will stop. I have no personal objection to taking in people who worked with us if they lose - which doesn't have to be a foregone conclusion - with the provision that anyone with a record of stealing public money, dealing drugs, etc is not going to be included.

Well that is a start. Good for you. But I note that you incorporate so many provisos that you would be able to leave any time you felt like it and could easily avoid taking those people with us by saying we haven't been able to fully investigate. IIRC, we did the same thing when we wouldn't take in all the European Jews that there were visa for before WWII because the powers that be said they couldn't be sure they weren't Nazi agents. (I recall reading that in FDR at War but I don't have the book here and I may be wrong.)

And the government on the receiving end has no moral obligation to make a visible effort to step up and carry their share? How long do you throw money and lives down a black hole?

Don't conflate the gov with individuals. In order to save those individuals, millions of them perhaps, we might have to put up with a bad gov. It wouldn't be the first time. If you insist on putting behavior of the gov foremost, that is presenting an excuse to bug out on the individuals.

I don't buy it. The Taliban aren't the NVA, not by a long shot. If Afghans want our help in suppressing them, they need to show that they have the will - they've been given the means - to step up and make real substantive effort to carry the fight themselves. We all they know how. If that will is shown, they deserve support. If not, they don't.

You ignore the outside influences in both cases again, the Soviet Union and Red China in the one case, and the Pak Army/ISI in the other.

There are no blank checks or open-ended commitments in international affairs. None. Never have been, never will be.

Maybe not, but if you make a promise, you should keep it.