Quote Originally Posted by carl View Post
When we cut off the money to Afghanistan sometime after 2014 and we don't make provisions for those who trusted us and worked with us to get out, you tell yourself whatever you need to so even the tiniest thought of our country shaming itself doesn't cross your mind. The arguments you have presented here should work very well.
What would you have us do, annex Afghanistan as the 51st state and govern the place ourselves? Sooner or later they have to stand on their own, at which point it ceases to be our responsibility and becomes theirs. If we wait for them to be fully ready that will never happen, because as long as we're their they have no incentive to get fully ready.

As far as bringing people with us goes, how do you propose to distinguish between those who are at risk from working with us and those who just want a ticket on the gravy train?

Quote Originally Posted by carl View Post
You made the point that there was no way around dealing with the Pak Army/ISI because of supply considerations.
It was done briefly, at a time when everybody expected access would eventually be restored, as it was. That doesn't mean it would be sustainable.

Even without the access issue, options for dealing with Pakistan are limited. We could top giving them money, but that wouldn't stop them from doing what they believe is in their interest. All very well to rant about "fixing" or "doing something", but what exactly do you propose to do?

Quote Originally Posted by carl View Post
I think, just me, that regardless of how you go about making the promise, you incur the same moral culpability if you don't fulfill it.
Did anyone make a promise? Who? When? To whom? Did this hypothetical promise involve eternal support and security?