A Gulf Sheikh down coming?

[davidbfpo]

A good FP article which supplements Post 15. It opens with:

The Arab Spring was hard on Arab presidents: most of the personalist presidential autocracies are now gone. But no Arab monarchs fell during the Arab Spring. Why did the monarchs fare so well? The strong correlation between monarchism and survival suggests, of course, that monarchism had something (or everything) to do with it.

Ending with:

The rest of the monarchs possessed two key advantages over the presidents in the spring of 2011. First, they profited from comparisons between their rule and that of the presidents.....A second factor also helped the monarchs: they could make credible promises to implement political reforms.....The problem for monarchs going forward, in the wake of the Arab Spring, is that these two factors are not at all permanent....The next time around, promises will not likely be enough: real signs of change will need to be clear. Absent that, the monarchs might wind up going down the road of Bahrain's ruling family, ruling over an embittered population that no longer believes promises of reform. That would not necessarily doom the monarchs, especially the family businesses of the Gulf. But it would send them down a dead end of discord and repression.

Link:http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/pos...rchism_matters

[davidbfpo]

A review of 'After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies' by Christopher M Davidson, as per Post 15:http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2012...iew?CMP=twt_gu

It also reviews a second book on Saudi Arabia 'The Islamic Utopia' (Pluto, £17.99), by Andrew Hammond and knowing some here watch KSA:

...neatly decapitates the argument that the ultra-conservative kingdom (which, it bears repeating, is named after its ruling family) is undergoing a credible reform process. Since the 9/11 attacks, which upset their cosy relationship with the US, the Saudis have claimed to be leading the fight against jihadism and to be responding (cautiously) to demands for change at home.

Outside a few "gimmicky" liberal enclaves that are beyond the reach of the morality police, ordinary Saudis are encouraged to shop and pray, but not to think.

[davidbfpo]

A rare commentary on Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province, with a Shia majority, who can have an unhappy relationship with their rulers. Interesting to see some Sunni-Shia dialogue.

Link:http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/20...-promises/ffnh

Ends with:

Finally, many in the province point approvingly to a sweeping investigation into the disturbances of the East published last year by the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies and leaked to an opposition website. Based on extensive interviews, the 125-page document is remarkable for its objectivity and detail in identifying the roots of dissent in the Eastern Province as an entrenched social, economic, and political problem—rather than as the usual explanations of criminality or Iranian-assisted subversion. “It is Saudi Arabia’s own Bassiouni Report,” noted one Shia activist in Safwa, referring to the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry. Sadly though, the document may suffer a similar fate as its Bahraini counterpart; it seems unclear as to whether or not Saudi authorities have the power—or even the will—to act on its recommendations.

[davidbfpo]

Small protests in Suadi Arabia, including in Riyadh; from a previously unknown source via a reputable hat tip:http://muftah.org/saudi-arabia-on-lo...exWNvk.twitter

A taster:

The Saudi regime’s failure to deal in a just manner with calls for reforms and civil and human rights has exacerbated popular frustration, and increased challenges to the government’s legitimacy.

[davidbfpo]

An IISS Strategic Comment, which opens with:

With a popularly elected parliament and relatively open political system, Kuwait is an exception among Gulf states. The resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammed in November 2011 marked the first time in the region that public pressure had succeeded in ousting a head of government. However, after nearly 18 months of feuding and two dissolutions of parliament, there is no sign of an end to the power struggle between the government and opposition factions. As Gulf governments harden their positions in the face of domestic unrest following the 2011 Arab uprisings, the relative openness of Kuwaiti politics may be at risk.

(And ends)As the constitutional court's verdict nears, the government will have to decide whether appeasement or containment of opposition groups is the best way to harmonise and restore balance to Kuwait's political structure. A radical transformation may be unlikely, but a compromise between different political factions could temporarily bring the crisis to a halt. The challenge for Kuwait is to attain stable government and at the same time accommodate an increasingly ambitious opposition.

Link:http://www.iiss.org/publications/str...tical-turmoil/

There is a thread on The US-Kuwaiti strategic relationship, from 2007-2008:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=3924

[davidbfpo]

Yesterday my wife and I watched the hour-long documentary by the BBC's security correspondent Frank Gardner, who had returned to Saudi Arabia, where he was shot by Al Qaeda in 2004, and his explanation how it has so far avoided an Arab Spring revolution. My wife would normally not watch such TV, but remarked it was very good.

Frank Gardner is a fluent Arabic speaker which helps, even if this was made with official "minders" it featured numerous critics.

Sometimes such BBC TV is not available beyond the UK, but assuming it is the link is:http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode..._Saudi_Arabia/

[davidbfpo]

Christopher Davidson, author of 'After the Sheikhs: The Coming Collapse of the Gulf Monarchies', spoke this week:

... the "UAE 94" trial provides a useful example of how these monarchies deal with opposition.

Ah, what is the UAE 94? Very briefly:

Last week, just a day before Morsi's ousting, verdicts were announced in the "UAE 94" case – a mass trial of Emirati activists which has been condemned by human rights organisations as fundamentally unfair. Of the 94 accused, 69 were given jail sentences of between seven and 15 years, while 25 others were acquitted. Many – but by no means all – of them are members of al-Islah, a local Islamic movement which the authorities have been eager to link to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Link:http://www.al-bab.com/blog/2013/july...opposition.htm