This is where the cultural intelligence aspect comes in. There needs to be a more unified recognition of the value of this kind of intelligence. Right now I'm not sure if that exists.
This is where the cultural intelligence aspect comes in. There needs to be a more unified recognition of the value of this kind of intelligence. Right now I'm not sure if that exists.
A bit of a dilemma...
... we find ourselves in. I am a big fan of cultural intel - General Zinni sold me on this, but how much can we absorb? What do we give up in exchange, combat and SASO training?
With global deployments and sub-cultures in each AO we operate in - what is the breaking point? Moreover, there are those who subscribe to the school of thought that no matter how much cultural awareness training we receive we will always be subject to trying to mirror-image cultural nuances to fit with the cultural values we are ingrained with.
Don't get me wrong - we need a certain level of cultural awareness and training but I think we need cultural advisors attached from the culture we are operating in - and trusted agents.
That is what I think was the most important aspect of the CAP in Vietnam.
This could be seen also as a blending of local trusted agents/liaison types and U.S. area specialists. I agree that you always need to involve the locals, and work with them as closely as possible, but Vietnam also showed (as did other LIC operations) that you need an outside specialist viewpoint as well. For example, the Vietnamese would at times only tell their US counterparts what they thought the US officers wanted to hear. Without an 'organic' area specialist (who granted may have some of the mirror-image issues you mentioned but is still valuable), new arrivals may not be aware of this habit.
This also leads into the practice of short deployment tours. While this does have its pros, there is also a downside to it. Compare, for example, the Vietnam CAP/CAC program and the efforts in Haiti and elsewhere during the 1920s (or the Philippenes before that). Troops are often not in an area long enough to begin to understand the culture they're operating in. This makes them more susceptable to manipulatin by local interests, a sense of disengagement, and other problems. Having area specialists as a part of the chain of command (each command staff level, perhaps) would help to offset this to some degree, but longer tours might be a better long-term answer (or a combination of both). This might hamper ticket-punching activities (a reference to Vietnam, not any current situation), and would I think make for stronger, more adapted teams on the ground.
Agree
FAOs (and they do not have to be officers) would be a great asset down to the lowest tactical level. Too bad FAOs have historically not done well in the promotion arena - I believe that is true in most services and hopefully that has changed or is now changing.
Still, we need to be integrated with the locals - and CAP did that. No FAO can come close to the cultural nuances and "rhythm of the streets" as a local trusted agent - in the case I present - military and civil service locals integrated with US / coalition military and interagency personnel.
One thing you brought up and is very, very valid is the length of tours - we do learn by living in a culture - learn many valuable lessons that only come after time "in country". That said, how to you tell a hard-charging Cpl, Sgt or Lt that his tour is extended because he is too valuable to be sent back home. We have Marines and Soldiers on their 3rd tour in Iraq - there has to be a trade-off somewhere.
The key with tours may be to extend the basic tour by a set amount of time...say two years instead of one (and that's just a discussion example, by the way). Another way to look at things is to rotate units and not individuals. Vietnam should have shown us the folly of the individual rotation system. Units would come in for X amount of time and then be replaced by a unit that has had Y amount of lead-in training. Complex, to be sure, but it may provide a better way to manage things. This is being done already in varying degrees, I believe.
I agree that one of CAP's greatest strengths was the integration with the population. I also tend to view the ideal solution as a combination: a CAP-type effort with an attached FAO-type (officer or enlisted; either way an area specialist) to provide counsel as needed.
Quick Response
Have to run some errands - but your comment on individual replacements vs unit rotation is spot on. Then LTC Hal Moore saw that early on in Vietnam... We Were Soldiers Once...and Young.
Tour of Duty
This was also noticed in the early advisory effort (pre-1965), but little was really done. That and the six month field command tour did great harm to unit stability. Hopefully we've learned since then.
I'm surprised no one has brought up the Army SF Civilian Irregular Defense Group program in this context. Like the Marine CAP, the SF Team on CIDG duty was integrated with the locals, but they also had a small slice of Intel, CA and PSYOP support in a structure that almost brings to mind the intended structure of the PRTs in Afghanistan. (I say "intended" because, too often, they don't have full manning or key personnel do not possess the regional expertise and/or language ability required) The linchpin with the CIDG program was cultural understanding and the ability to communicate in the local language. Although you certainly can't paste the concept on top of current ops, there are many valuable lessons to be learned from the program.Originally Posted by Steve Blair
The Vietnam Studies texts are available on-line at the Center for Military History, this one talks a bit about the CIDG program: US Army Special Forces 1961 - 1971
The Virtual Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech University is a tremendous resource for pulling up a number of primary documents on the topic at hand.
The problem with CIDG is that the main line army began using the CIDG strikers as deployable light infantry instead of leaving them in their home regions where they could secure their own villages. Shelby Stanton talks about this in his "Green Berets at War," as do other personal memiors. CIDG if memory serves originally started as a CIA/SF project and reverted to main Army control during Operation Switchback. There were also issues because CIDG was aimed mainly at the Montegnard population, who had little love for the Vietnamese due to years of poor treatment.
It was a good program that was later misused, much to the detriment of pacification operations.
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