Historical Parallels?

[Bill Moore]

Merv,

I don't disagree with your statement, but I think if we only use PSYOP as a line of operation to acheive limited tactical operations, then we're under utilizing a tool. Your example of using PSYOP will always remain a viable use, but staying course on Small Wars where political actions trump military actions, our PSYOP activities must effectively influence the target audience to support our political objectives. Obviously we're not going to convince a thinking man that it is in his interest to support U.S. economic or strategic interests, so we need to tailor our approach to find a win-win theme that convinces the target audience this is the direction they want to go. Then all our actions and words must support that theme if we want it to be credible. Perhaps using the term PSYOP is the wrong approach because it is already hamstrung by existing definitions and perceptions. I like term someone used earlier in this thread "Influence Operations". The objective for our GWOT wars are not geographical, but the space between the ears. Bill

[Steve Blair]

It's also possible that Psyops as a whole have gotten an undeserved bad reputation due to some of the operations that have been conducted under that title.

Historically, the SW campaigns that have been successful have always included an innovative (or at least active) psyops component. The key is that this component was always integrated with the entire campaign. Looking at it in isolation tends to lead to some incorrect assumptions, IMO.

[DDilegge]

We had several Army PSYOP teams attached to us (1st MARDIV) during Desert Storm. They were quite effective. That said, they were targeting conventional forces in open terrain with little to no noncombatants (excepting Kuwait City which just rolled over).

Things are different in the situation we now face in Iraq and I have to agree with those that advocate pushing influence capabilites down to the lowest tactical levels. Every level must understand the "influence plan" and be culturally savvy enough to ensure actions do not sink this plan. That said, there are times when the velvet glove must be pushed aside and a hammer used. In those cases the influence plan must be able to "explain" the why.

Moreover, the influence " plan" must be consistent and reinforced with ALL actions. There must also be a mechanism to respond to rumor (rampant in the areas we now operate in) and in doing rapid "damage control' when an event or action detracts from the mission / achieving our goals (endstate if defined).

[Hansmeister]

Let me comment as a PSYOPer.

Overall, our PSYOP capabilities are quite limited for three reasons.

1. The training our PSYOPers receive is quite pathetic. It amounts to little more than an entry-level college marketing course, wholly inadequate for the mission.

2. Our focus is too tactical and towards WWII media. We still focus mainly on loudspeakers/leaflets/radio, while having only limited competence in modern media.

3. Legal constraints make it impossible to operate at a truly global scale and to influence independent media, which is what is necessary today to win IO.

[Strickland]

While I agree that we have limited dedicated PsyOps assets, this does not mean that we have limited capabilities overall. PsyOps are about influence and assisting and enabling the commander to influence people. ANY competent infantry officer can develop effective influence programs as part of overall operations. These become extremely difficult when commanders are required to seek the approval of HHQ, both in and out of country, for the authorization to distribute fliers, play radio messages, etc.

[zenpundit]

Re: Cuban revolutionaries in 1890's

To go back to the original premise, there's another factor to consider in such revolutionary situations - the gap between the local elite who are connected and adept at influencing the outside world in enlisting ( or resisting) American intervention and the general populace. The latter may not speak English, be familiar with mordern media, be literate or have experienced much beyond the horizon of their own village, yet their attitude may be determinative to the outcome of any American mission.

In the case of Cuba, the light skinned, well-educated economic elite in contact with Pulitzer and Hearst reporters who struggling against Spanish rule had different objectives from the mostly black Cuban agricultural laborers in revolt in the interior. Guess which group gave the USMC the most problems after the Spanish-American War and which one misled American authorities in the first place as to the nature of peasant grievances ?

We have to be very careful not to be snookered by the friendly, smiling locals who speak excellent English. They have invaluable local knowedge but usually came by that information by running the system prior to our arrival and they intend to run things again after we leave. We need to be plugged in to the non-elite as well simply to keep our own frame of reference in reality rather than in some fantasy zone our " friends" wish us to be.

[Steve Blair]

This is where the cultural intelligence aspect comes in. There needs to be a more unified recognition of the value of this kind of intelligence. Right now I'm not sure if that exists.

[NDD]

Merv,

I don't disagree with your statement, but I think if we only use PSYOP as a line of operation to acheive limited tactical operations, then we're under utilizing a tool. Your example of using PSYOP will always remain a viable use, but staying course on Small Wars where political actions trump military actions, our PSYOP activities must effectively influence the target audience to support our political objectives. Obviously we're not going to convince a thinking man that it is in his interest to support U.S. economic or strategic interests, so we need to tailor our approach to find a win-win theme that convinces the target audience this is the direction they want to go. Then all our actions and words must support that theme if we want it to be credible. Perhaps using the term PSYOP is the wrong approach because it is already hamstrung by existing definitions and perceptions. I like term someone used earlier in this thread "Influence Operations". The objective for our GWOT wars are not geographical, but the space between the ears. Bill

Excellent post. We are of one mind.

[NDD]

There is a program ongoing in Colombia somewhat similar to CIDG - it is called Soldado Campesino or Peasant Soldier (peasant doesn't hold a negative connotation in this context). The soldiers are locally recruited, given basic training and operate in their native areas. They are led by professional officers and NCOs. When it first started, I thought it would be a disaster, but I was wrong. As for how effective they will be, that remains to be seen. It is difficult to measure the contribution of specific programs, as the admin has done a good job of integrating them seamlessly (or as closely as possible.)

I am a huge proponent of these types of programs, however it requires a different mindset and not every soldier will be able to function in this type of environment. And it is risky - against a dedicated enemy, you will likely lose a couple.

A-Teams tend to do this very well, if they are mature Teams. It is basically what an A-Team was deisgned to do. Unfortunately, it takes a decade to develop a Team to this level. Not collectively, but individually. Most young guys want to kick doors and that is as it should be.

As for cultural intelligence - it is one thing to be told or even know. It is quite another to apply. It would be nearly impossible to area orient the force structure - and that is what it takes. We spend years and millions doing it in SF, and the results still vary. I am also not sure it is even possible in the case of the ME. The differences are much greater than in LATAM and other places. The really successful operator will have an affinity for the AO. He will learn and adapt because he likes it, not just because it is his job. In SF, it is quite common to marry inot the culture, speak the language and pick up the mannerisms. One sort of morphs - not really from the target country but not the same old person either.

My thinking is, if we can do it, we need to develop FID units. Hand-over units, whatever you want to call them. Trainers capable of leading indig against low level insurgent problems, but primarily focused on rapport, nation-building, local government etc. More mature individuals, well grounded in such things as local government administration, civic action, psyops, etc. And they need to have organic language capabilities - at least until they can trust their trusted agents.

The SF FID or USMC CAP programs are good models, but they don't have the scope we need now. It is not a task for the infantry battalion.