Historical Parallels?

[Bill Moore]

I would not be so dismissive of IEDs as a threat. They are the number one killer of our troops. That makes them a bit more than merely a "nuisance".

Their use has significantly affected the way we conduct ops in-country. IEDs won't win battles or campaigns, yet their use is of military significance in the disproportionate amount of resources we have had to use in order to meet the threat. They are too simple and effective a weapon to be dismissed by those overmatched by conventional US combat power.

Jedburgh, I can't argue with your logical counter argument. I expected my post to prompt several heated replies, yet you were the only one that fired back on the IED issue. All of your points are on the money, but taking it a step further:

1. IED's can't "directly" defeat a conventional maneuver unit conducting an attack or defense operation. They sure as hell can make it painful, and they can force us to adapt to our tactics to mitigate the threat (probably true throughout the history of war, it is a constant evolution of tactics and counter-tactics).

2. IED's may defeat us indirectly, much like the Hezbollah defeated the Israelis in Lebanon using similiar tactics. Our foe's definition of success of success isn't winning the battle, but defeating us by with a thousand cuts (on our flesh and in our psychic). In my opinion we still plan military operations to achieve tactical success, which obviously must be done, but tactical victories won't win the war by themselves as some seem to think. Worse, I'm concerned that many of our military planners think our enemy plans their operations to achieve tactical success, which means we're using mirror analysis by assuming the enemy thinks like us. I don't think the enemy in Iraq cares about tactical success; they measure success on how effectively they influence their intended audiences.

For one, they have had some success targeting our national will on the homefront with their IED and other attacks.

For another their successes (by their definition of success) has given Islamists around the world a sense of hope they can defeat us, thus they're successfully able to continuely generate new recruits. This belief in the possibility of winning is strategic and we need to address it.

Another audience is Iraqi people (this group needs further defined), and I assume their intent here is to make them believe that their security forces can't protect them, so it is best to give the insurgents what they want, so they can live in some semblence of peace.

3. Assuming that even half of I wrote in para 2 is correct, then your comments about not making light of IEDs are spot on. We know that winning insurgencies isn't about winning tactical battles (although we better not lose one, the psychological repercussions on the home front would be severe), rather it is winning in the battlespace that lies between the ears.

Thanks for pushing back