Historical Parallels?

[Steve Blair]

One of the aspects of Small Wars that I find especially interesting are the way they tend to link back through history. For example, you had the Cuban revolutionaries in the early 1890s using the Western press to make their case for support in their fight against the Spanish - something that we see appear again later in the 1960s and of course today. While each war or conflict is clearly different in many ways from what came before, it's also important to be able to recognize those similarities that do exist and learn what we can about what did (or didn't) work.

Perhaps this is simply stating the obvious, but it's a way to get some discussion started.

[DDilegge]

We talk a lot about Information Operations but seem to lag in executing the same successfully. Many believe that IO equates to influence and that in the case of Small Wars it is tactical in nature. Grand IO campaigns have a place, but only if they enable boots on the ground - those that come into daily contact with the local population. The USMC / JFCOM Joint Urban Warrior war game in 2004 called this "IO ON POINT".

That said, there are some now who call for an IO component command at the operational level. I remain skeptical until this is thought out fully and adequately experimented with prior to implementation.

One could argue we hold too many capabilities and responsibilities at too high a level and might be better off "pushing" them down to the tactical. In the case of urban operations tactical may be the "strategic corporal"...

[Steve Blair]

As far as I'm concerned, it's the "boots on the ground" that end up making the most difference. There's also a pronounced tendency in American military thought on the whole to "drag" capabilities up in the chain of command instead of leaving them at lower levels where they would be most useful. One need only look at the changes in intelligence gathering and desimination to see the reality of this. All too often the "need to know" of higher command levels gets in the way of those who really NEED to know the information.

[Bill Moore]

I join the growing crowd of skeptics concerning information operations. I think they tried to embrace too much, and should have restricted their focus to technical targeting and exploitation of enemy C4I systems and protecting ours. Psychological operations needs to be removed from the IO umbrella and further matured. While PSYOP has had some limited success in the past, real influence generally takes place between individuals on the ground (read soldiers, marines, etc.) talking to local decision makers or key speakers. The radio broadcasts, speaker teams, leafet drops have their purpose, but until we somehow grasp that we're all responsible for influence operations, then we'll continue to execute disjointed attempts of getting our message across.

Consider our PSYOP/influence objectives being briefed as part of every OPORD down to squad level. I'm not sure how to get there, but the intent is to convey to every soldier that your words and behavior are absolutely critical to winning this war, as critical as your fighting skills. In a perfect world (always a goal, never reality) every leafet, radio broadcast, tactical operation, every conversation, all personal behavior etc. should convey a consistent theme to our audience. Of course there is a training/education piece associated with this, and not just for the troops, but for the senior leaders to ensure that their statements are in synch with what is really happening on the ground, and that their stated goals are obtainable. We can't afford to lose our credability, because it is extremely tough to regain. Food for thought.

[Merv Benson]

Combined arms operations have usually resulted in the quickest least costly victories because they cause the enemy several dilemmas at once, which tends to overwhelm them. For example strategic bombing is rarely deceisive. At best it is a set up for future attacks. However tactical air attacks combined with ground forces that include armor and infantry "fix" the enemy and are usually devastating. Psyops I think fall into the setup category, although there were some examples during the major combat operations phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom where psyops caused the enemy to make irrational attacks on tanks and other weapons systems that destroyed them.

[Bill Moore]

Merv,

I don't disagree with your statement, but I think if we only use PSYOP as a line of operation to acheive limited tactical operations, then we're under utilizing a tool. Your example of using PSYOP will always remain a viable use, but staying course on Small Wars where political actions trump military actions, our PSYOP activities must effectively influence the target audience to support our political objectives. Obviously we're not going to convince a thinking man that it is in his interest to support U.S. economic or strategic interests, so we need to tailor our approach to find a win-win theme that convinces the target audience this is the direction they want to go. Then all our actions and words must support that theme if we want it to be credible. Perhaps using the term PSYOP is the wrong approach because it is already hamstrung by existing definitions and perceptions. I like term someone used earlier in this thread "Influence Operations". The objective for our GWOT wars are not geographical, but the space between the ears. Bill

[KenDawe]

On the subjects of Information Warfare and Cultural Intelligence...
Twice in my career as a 98G I was assigned to Intelligence Battalions that had tactical deception units. They were referred to as "Operanal Detatchments", which made them sound like they were SpecOps, which they weren't, strctly speaking.
In the 109th MI, 9th ID (Mot), it was staffed by MIGs like me. They had all sorts of nifty toys, including digital recorders with which they could allegedly record a commander's tranmissions, and edit them to broadcast him giving his units the commands we wanted him to. Sounds like a great idea, if they could have made it work right...
15 years later, in the 102d MI, Cp Essayons, ROK, the 2d Infantry Division, in it's infinite wisdom, assigned Infantry and Engineer NCOs to be in charge of MI juinior enlisted. They had all sorts of mockups which looked pretty realistic, right down to heat-makers which could give the simulated Abrams the correct IR signature. (My favorite was the simulated supply depot with inflatable cartons of toilet paper.)
From what I could see, neither of these units was used very effectively, and as a result of the perennial identity crisis of tactial Intelligence in the US Army they were both deactivated. (Although the 102d continued to get the odd infantry or Combat Engineer NCO, who usually felt he was being assigned to purgatory.)
I also read an article in MI Journal talking about a similar Army-level Deception unit in WW2, which was usually ineffective, since it's actions were rarely coordinated with the local maneuver units. I think the lesson here is that you need people at the maneuver level who know to request the support from higher, and people at higher who know how to employ the assets to support the maneuver level. Does a Division-level unit have the assest to successfully simulate a division?

As for cultural intelligence, I think expecting the average MI Geek linguist to be able to handle that task in addition to his normal duties--usually operating a Signals Intelligence system--is too much. Unless things have changed drastically in the 5 years since I retired, they are to busy doing "other stuff" to even attend a decent language refresher/maintenance program, let alone become Junior FAOs.
("Other Stuff" usually=Motor Stables, Police Call, CTT, and Post Support Activities like range cleanup, Ammo Supply Point/Ammo Holding Area guard, funeral detail... No more gate guard, at least at Ft Lewis.)