We need less Chemo and Surgery and more "Voom."

[jmm99]

The OP deals with Chemo, Surgery and Voom - which means that almost anything is fair game for discussion.

Bob: I decline, as a retired gentleman, to be drawn into a discussion of "joint and several liability" (a rather primitive legal construct; better replaced by comparative fault and comparative causation).

But, seriously, strategic interaction (e.g., direct and indirect strategies; sequential and cumulative strategies) applies across the board to any armed conflict.

More later.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

done in one easy step by rearranging the deck chairs.

Bob: thank you for bringing up the DoD (JCS) 7500 Campaign Plan; as well as your perception of what the term "indirect approach" means - presumably a view prevalent in your community. However, there is another way to look at "direct" and "indirect" approaches.

That way (see below) is not the grandiose, "indirect" approach set out in Robert Gates' Jan 2009 statement (quoted in the three balls graphic) and in the graphic itself:

Where possible, what the military calls kinetic operations should be subordinated to measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs that spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the disacontented, from whom the terrorist recruits. It will take patient accumulations of quiet successes over a long time to discredit and defeat extremist movements and their ideologies.

The main thrust here is simply "nation (state) building". But, it gets "better" (or "worse").

Following the now primary green lines (just as in the investment commercial), we come to:

Global Environment
Shape
Inhospitable to Violent Extremism
Stabilize

It seems the DoD has reached a program of "world building" (Global Synchronization), which will then (following the big, big green line and arrowhead), isolate the threat - the ENEMY (confined to its red circle and presumably rendered powerless).

Now, turning to a much more modest view of "direct" and "indirect" approaches, generally defining them as follows:

Direct - a plan which adversely affects the enemy's capacity to conduct armed conflict.

Indirect - a plan which adversely affects the enemy's will to conduct armed conflict.

The plan may be offensive, defensive, offensive-defensive or defensive-offensive; and may be executed in a sequential or a cumulative manner. "Direct" and "tangible"; "indirect" and "abstract" seem synonyms to me. BTW: the question of "win, draw, lose" is also handled modestly - with admission that days of reckoning may be postponed.

Even this modest set of "definitions" leaves many questions open for discussion and improvement.

To be continued.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

This seems a useful resource - because of its added thoughts and its multiple questions. 2011 Kotula & Richardson (thesis), Defeating David - Looking Beyond a Matched Strategy.

Its abstract deals with the generalization that, when strategies are matched, the stronger power wins more often than not; but:

Abstract : This thesis builds upon existing contemporary theories that attempt to explain the outcomes of asymmetric conflict. Specifically, this thesis uses Ivan Arreguin-Toft's Strategic Interaction Theory as a baseline to identify theoretical gaps that can not only help further explain asymmetric conflict outcomes, but also provide insight into developing the proper strategy for strong actors.

Arreguin-Toft contends that when the strong actor employs the correct strategy then it will win over 75 percent of conflicts against a materially weaker adversary. This leads to a fundamental question: if the strong actor uses the correct strategy against a weaker opponent, then why do strong actors still lose nearly 25 percent of the time?

In an effort to identify other key variables that help explain non-conventional war outcomes, this thesis evaluates case studies where the strong actor both won and lost an asymmetric conflict after choosing the correct strategy.

This study finds two other factors that are important to achieving victory in an asymmetric conflict.

First, the strong [intervening] actor must have a viable indigenous political authority to work by, with and through. This concept has little to do with political legitimacy. Instead, it focuses on the capacity of the host nation, with strong [intervening] actor assistance, to synchronize its military and political effort to defeat the insurgency.

Second, the strong [intervening] actor must not only use restraint in applying direct military power, but it must also use the correct force: a cadre that is trained in conducting irregular warfare.

As such, this thesis' conclusions are aligned with the belief that it is the host nation's war to win or lose-adhering to this principle provides the strong actor with the best chance of defeating David before losing its political will.

The question comes to the forefront as to what is a "viable indigenous political authority"; as well as whether the intervening strong actor has the "correct force" available.

The authors' analysis summarizes what we have already seen in prior studies:

As previously discussed, no one theory by itself answers the question(s) concerning why strong actors lose to weak actors in asymmetric conflict. However, to date, Ivan Arreguin-Toft’s Strategic Interaction (STRATINT) theory is the most complete. In his 2005 book, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict", Arreguin-Toft successfully demonstrated that if the strong actor employs the correct strategy then it will win over 75 percent of the time against a materially weaker adversary. Whereas, if the strong actor chooses the wrong strategy, then its weaker opponent will win over 60 percent of the conflict engagements.

Matched & Unmatched Strategies.jpg

Arreguin-Toft breaks down the STRATINT possibilities into four scenarios with each actor controlling what strategy it employs. In simple terms, the strong actor can either employ a direct or indirect offensive strategy, and the weak actor can choose either a direct or indirect defensive strategy. He further defines direct versus indirect for each actor based on the following typology. In a direct-direct engagement, strong actors use a conventional attack and the weak actor uses a conventional defense. In an indirect-indirect engagement, the strong actor uses a strategy of barbarism and the weak actor employs a guerrilla warfare strategy.

This strategic interaction chart is somewhat similar to a strategic interaction chart based on sequential and cumulative strategies in tangible and abstract areas.



The roles of attacker and defender easily flip. E.g., the 2001 Taliban was engaged in a direct-direct engagement in which it was attacking (with some success) the Northern Alliance. Intervention by limited US and UK SOFs - and not so limited US airpower - flipped the attacker-defender roles. When the Taliban later came back, it took on another attacker role - the weak actor employing a guerrilla warfare strategy (as well as a localized political strategy).

The authors then raise some direct questions re: gaps in using the "matching strategies" theory:

On the surface, Arreguin-Toft’s theory is also intuitively logical: the key to victory is choosing the right strategy. However, even as sound as his argument is, several gaps exist in his theory concerning indirect conflicts that merit additional research and consideration.

First, Arreguin-Toft contends that in conflicts where the strong actor chooses the correct strategy, then it will end quickly. While this assumption often holds true in a direct v. direct engagement, it fails to address the inherent protracted nature of indirect conflict.

Second, Arreguin-Toft’s labeling of “Barbarism” and “Guerrilla Warfare” as respective strategies for strong and weak powers in an indirect v. indirect conflict is problematic. These terms over simplify the strategies used by each actor and focuses on the ability (or inability) of the strong actor to defeat its enemy militarily with little regard for the other (social, economic, political) aspects of irregular warfare.

Third, Arreguin-Toft devotes little attention to analyzing the resources employed by the strong actor, and whether or not the strong actor is trained or has experience fighting an irregular war. Clearly, the strong actor is materially superior; however, are there other competing interests that preclude the strong actor from bringing the full weight of its strength to the conflict? More importantly, just because a strong actor chooses the correct strategy as defined by Arreguin-Toft, does not mean its military is adept at implementing the associated tactics.

Finally, Arreguin-Toft fails to distinguish the specific nature of a given conflict particularly when defining the indirect approach used by both actors. For example, what is the nature of the insurgency and its associated grievances? Is it a nationalist movement? Is it motivated by religion? Is there a minority in power? Moreover, there are clearly more tactics available to strong actors than just barbarism. Did the strong actor primarily attempt to kill/capture the insurgents? Did the strong actor attempt to isolate the population from the insurgents with re-location programs? What type of force did the strong actor use? Ignoring these additional considerations fundamentally reduces the STRATINT theory to the military aspect of asymmetric conflict. In short, considering the exact nature of given conflict, as well as clearly defining the political environment, are not only critical to determining the appropriate counter-strategy, but also in determining conflict outcome.

The authors claim no magic bullet - in fact, here is what they see as missing:

The value in summarizing and evaluating the major theories on asymmetric conflict outcomes is that it helps to identify any areas not adequately addressed by the existing literature. Several areas that require additional consideration are missing.

First, in all four theories outlined above, not one considers in detail the exact nature of the weak actor and the type of insurgency it is fighting. This analysis needs to go beyond the type of military strategy (indirect) and tactics (guerrilla warfare/terrorism) used, and instead needs to focus specifically on the nature of insurgency and its grievances with the existing governance structure. How can a strong actor develop a proper counter-strategy if it does not understand the nature of its opponent, and not only what it has to work against, but also what it has to work with? While all four theories appear to address it, not one accounts for popular support of the weak actor as the deciding factor in the conflict outcome. When in fact the ability (or inability) of the strong actor to isolate the weak actor from the population and deliver the essential services such as security, healthcare, education, and infrastructure may be the most important factor in determining the conflict outcome.

Second, what type of force did the strong actor use? Was it a force trained in irregular warfare with experience in conducting counterinsurgency? Did the strong actor use indigenous forces to supplement its effort? This question specifically addresses if the strong actor used the right tool (force) for the job.

Finally, were there any domestic or international constraints levied on the strong actor? Were there domestic economic issues, or another conflict, that precluded the strong actor from using its full capacity? Was there international pressure (or norms) that precluded the strong actor from implementing its military and political agenda? In sum, the only way for the strong actor to develop the appropriate strategy is to not only fully understand the nature of its enemy, but to also understand the operating environment—both at home and abroad. Failure to account for these factors will likely mean a decreased winning percentage for strong actors engaged in an irregular war against a significantly weaker adversary.

All being said, a strong power (considering intervention) has a lot of questions to answer before taking the leap.

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

The OP deals with Chemo, Surgery and Voom - which means that almost anything is fair game for discussion.

Actually the OP referred specifically to terrorism, and was built around references to a speech that dealt specifically with AQ. How we got from there to insurgency, populaces, nation-building, and world-building is an interesting question. Conversation creep, perhaps.