We need less Chemo and Surgery and more "Voom."

[Dayuhan]

I think the discussion on getting to a more sensible perspective on terrorism and counterterroism is an important one.

I think the discussion is going around in a rather unproductive circle.

Just as it is important to understand what is insurgency, role of the energy source of the nature of the relationship between those who govern and those who are governed, as well as the role of those external to those dynamics (such as AQ today) who seek to leverage that energy to their own ends.

The problem with this formulation is that AQ is not leveraging "insurgency" at all, if we define insurgency as conflict between governments and the populaces they govern. They've tried, but they've failed. What AQ does leverage effectively is a widespread (but not universal) perception of Western oppression among Muslims, particularly resentment toward direct "infidel" occupation of Muslim countries. When deprived of this stimulus - such as after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan - AQ's relevance and support decline rapidly. Paradoxically, this is when they are most dangerous: because they need foreign intervention to survive, they will lash out and attack in hopes of provoking that intervention and restoring their relevance. That's no reason to give them what they want.

Dayuhan mentions that there are many Muslim populaces who still have high levels of this "energy," or what I call conditions of insurgency across the Pacific. That is very true and I am very encouraged by recent actions by the government of the Philippines to change their approach in their Bangsamoro program to better address those conditions. But AQ's agents have not had much success with their UW campaign in the Pacific. Indonesia and Malaysia are primarily Muslim, and both of those countries have, since addressing the colonial problem, been largely stable. Are these works in progress? Absolutely, revolution brings change, but typically also brings ineffective and chaotic government. These things take time. I don't think they are very vulnerable to AQ exploitation, nor do I think they need much US help in dealing with the few agents of AQ that do show up, or those small internal movements who still act out within their current systems. Less is more. We need to focus, as we have in the Philippines, on respecting host nation sovereignty and helping to build partner professionalism, rather than capacity.

SE Asian Islamic insurgent/separatist movements are generally not that susceptible to AQ manipulation mainly because they and their popular support base are focused on local issues and not really concerned with the pan-Islamic narrative or the perception of general oppression of the ummah that AQ has to sell. There are of course a few exceptions to that rule, and local organizations will cooperate with jihadi groups to the extent they deem convenient, but in any broad scale sense SE Asian Muslims are concerned with local issues and don't particularly care about foreign occupations in Iraq or Afghanistan, about Palestine, etc.

For me this is one of those important nuance issues. CT is threat centric. So inevitably when one bundles activities under a CT banner they all have an ultimate purpose of making some particular threat go away. I think that is far too symptomatic, and results in an endless series of short-sighted tactical approaches, driven by intel and led by the threat. I believe we are better served by keeping CT narrowly defined, and then coming up with a better name for a more holistic approach that CT would be a mere sub-set of.

I agree that "CT" as we know it now should only be one part of any effort to address terrorism and its underlying issues. It remains an important part, and it's natural that it's the part that will dominate military discourse because it's the part of the program that the military, along with the intel and LE communities, is responsible for implementing. Whatever we think of causes and whatever we can do to alleviate causes, it has to be clear beyond doubt that people who attack us or our allies, plot to attack us, or shelter those who attack us will be subject to direct action, wherever they are. No nation can condone or accept attacks on its territory or citizens, whatever the cause.

CT approaches tend to conflate those all as one "terrorist" problem, as that facilitates easier targeting. Far better if we take approaches that force is to break these organizations down by the nature of their relationships and by their primary purposes for action, rather than conflate them by their shared tactics, associations and ideology.

To a large extent I agree, but I think your assessment of the "primary purposes for action" is flawed in a way that leads to some very dangerous conclusions. If we assume that AQ draws its sustenance from the relationships between Muslim governments and the populaces they govern, there's a tendency to try to affect causation by trying to influence those relationships. That's both wrong and dangerous: AQ draws its sustenance not from relationships between Muslim Governments and those they govern but from the perceived relationships between the Muslim ummah and the non-Muslim world around it. Trying to interfere in relations between Muslim governments and those they govern will be ineffective and probably disastrous: we have little influence in most of these relationships and we have no credibility as a mediator. Neither populaces nor governments want us involved and trying to push our way into the picture uninvited just reinforces AQ's narrative of Western interference. That doesn't mean engagement is never a good idea, but it should be multilateral whenever possible and it should be as requested by local groups with a credible claim to speak for the people, not initiated by us.

We can effectively deprive AQ of much of their impetus simply by not invading or occupying Muslim territory, and my minimizing our overt interference and military footprint. We have to understand that if we do this we will be attacked: AQ will try to provoke a response that they can manipulate. That doesn't make it any less important. Trying to change the patterns of governance in the Muslim world is both futile and dangerous. We shouldn't obstruct change, and we should work with it as it occurs (as we've been doing) but trying to compete for influence over Muslim populaces or trying to appoint ourselves as a mediator or champion of the populace is going to snap back in our faces in a major way.