We need less Chemo and Surgery and more "Voom."

[Bob's World]

Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
The greater Middle East has been heavily manipulated by the Ottomans, the Europeans and the US for centuries. Now those populaces are largely free of those external systems and at the same time more connected and empowered by modern information technologies than ever before. Those are indisputable facts.

AQ seeks to exploit this situation for their own interests and goals. They do not cause insurgency, but they do seek to leverage the conditions of insurgency that are so prevalent among the people of that region.

Dayuhan's response:
You keep repeating this, like a mantra, as if repetition were a supporting argument. It's not

.

Actually it is true. If I come across as a mantra it is only because I bother to respond to your mantra claiiming my position to be false.

I've never claimed AQ was successful in taking charge of or leading an insurgency anywhere. Most don't want what they are selling. But that does not mean they are not selling it, nor that their primary source of "energy" (funding, sanctuary, recruits, etc) does not come form these many latent and active insurgent populaces. They are, and it does.

If your point is yes, but they are failing in taking over these insurgencies and that the whole "Caliphate" paranoia in the West is much more an over reaction to AQ propaganda than anything we really need to worry about, then with that I can totally agree.


You keep arguing against a point I have never tried to make.

[Bob's World]

That's particularly relevant in the Arab heartland: what specifically would you have us do with regard to, say, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States?

Dare I address this yet again, only to be accused of reciting a mantra? :-)

Look, the "tactics" of what precisely needs to be done in any particular place is always going to be unique, and must be shaped to the specifics of the problems, cultures, types of governance, nature of grievances, types of active revolutionary and pre-revolutionary organizations, any outside state or non-state UW or FID actors, etc. Oh, and then of course shaped by what, if any, national interests we might have in that place or the issues taking place there.

Good tactics must be based in the details of how things/people are different. Good strategy, however, must be based in a good understanding of how things are the same. My focus is on strategy, as that is, IMO, where our problems lie.

To apply an indirect fire or navigation comparison: An error is tactics is like a location error, a 10M mistake at the start equates to equal 10M errors regardless of range; but an azimuth error of a single degree is a 17.7 Meter error at a 1,000 meters and continues to grow by that same amount every 1000M farther out one goes.

We have made tactical errors throughout our response to 9/11, that happens and they are easily addressed and recovered from. But we have made azimuth errors in our strategic framing that send us farther and farther from where we want to be every day we continue to pursue them. But with these three countries you name, a similar strategic understanding and framework applies:

1. All have high conditions of insurgency (that are unique in how they manifest and how active they are etc).

2. All are primarily Muslim.

3. All have systems of governance that are, or have been until recently, highly reliant upon their relationships with powerful external partners

4. All have been "targeted" by AQ as sources of funding, sanctuary, recruits, etc

5. All are tied to long-stated US national interests as either a producer of, or controlling a crucial LOC for movement of vital energy resources.

6. All were under Ottoman and European control prior to the Cold War, and all were locations the US/West worked diligently to maintain or gain the role of primary security ally (rather than the Soviets) throughout the Cold War; and then worked to sustain those relationships through the comfortable certainty of sustaining particular people, families.systems of governance in place post-Cold War.

7. US will continue to have interests in these places for the foreseeable future.

8. The populaces of these places are, I suspect, much more comfortable with their own values and concepts of what proper governance is than they are with the US brand version of those things our NSS directs that we should promote.

9. The status quo is increasingly unsustainable at acceptable costs (though the Saudis and the Gulf States are pouring in increasing amounts of bribes, security, etc as their fear of revolution grows).

10. As Morsi is finding out, the people do not want to trade one dictator for another. These populaces have evolving expectations of governance that are more liberal than what they have had, but not nearly so liberal as what we promote. Grabs of excessive powers by new governments will be resisted (regardless of the ideology of the new government) just as clinging to excessive powers is resisted now.

11. Everyone is better served by evolution of governance far more than they are by revolution of governance or simple suppression of the problem, either one. The tendency in governance, however, is to resist change until change is forced.

So:

The US has an opportunity to be a agent for peaceful, evolutionary change on the terms of the people, cultures and governments actually involved. But so far we have demanded to cast this on our terms in our context. Step one is to abandon our context and embrace theirs. This is there problem, it must be their solution.

1. We need to mediate or facilitate mediation in as neutral a way as possible.

2. We need to set redlines for both governments and populace groups in terms of violence, and other activities counter-productive to the process.

3. We need to encourage populaces to embrace non-violent tactics for their insurgent movements, and then deter governments from applying excessive violence against such activities.

4. We need to use our full DIME(but light on the M) to get these governments to hold true, substantive talks with their many diverse populace groups.

5. We need to stop conducting CT operations against elements of these revolutionary populace groups simply because they are talking to AQ. We need to incentivise them to work in the context of our concept for supporting evolution, rather than in the AQ context of supporting revolution. So long as we support status quo or Western values AQ will win this competition for influence.

There are, I believe 5 broad, fundamental perception of governance that we should use as our guideposts. All of these are as perceived by the actual populaces we are working with in the context of their unique cultures and situations. What we perceive is moot.
1. They need to feel that governance is acting in a manner consistent with evolving perceptions. As example, there is significant voice in Saudi Arabia that they would like a judicial system not totally under the King's control. That is the type of issue that needs to be on the table. We don't need the al Saud family run out of town, but we do need them to listen (they need to listen even more than we need them to. We can always work with whomever runs them off, but if we allow that we will need to compete with the Chinese, Russia, various European, etc for what we have there now, and we should avoid that if possible).

2. The people need to recognize the right of their government to govern them. If current regimes have tarnished legitimacy, they need to work to repair that. This will most likely mean they will need to relinquish some of their near total power. But better to be forced at the negotiation table (yes, I realize Kings don't negotiate, they prefer to be beheaded) to transition to a parliamentary monarchy than to lose the whole thing attempting to cling to what is no longer sustainable. They need to sort this out for themselves. The UN cannot 'grant' or bestow legitimacy, it must be earned.

3. They must fine-tune law enforcement approaches and policies to be perceived as more just. A lot of work for all of these countries on this one. Just stepping back for attempting to force the status quo of governance will help. if the government is not dedicated to the suppression of popular opposition, they do not have to be nearly as heavy handed in their law enforcement.

4. Respect and dignity. The Shia in the gulf, Christians in Egypt, etc all must perceive that they have equal treatment and opportunity under the law as other similarly situated segments of the populace (this all applies in Israel-Palestine as well, by the way).

5. And lastly is some system of official empowerment. These governments must find what works for them (as assessed by their people) to ensure that within the context of their culture they have systems in place for the shaping of governance that are perceived by the people as being trusted, certain and legal.

If we can convince these governments to do this; if we can accept the risk associated with the uncertainty of change; if we can step back from pushing our own ideology or fearing the ideology of others; if we can come to the realization that we have our over characterization and response to "terrorism" must be toned way back, then we can do this.

There are a lot of "ifs" that good tactical approaches tailored for each place will need to address. But all of those tactics must be in synch an over-arching strategy similar to what I lay out here. To date we set tactical metrics, and then get so focused on putting up big tactical numbers that we lose sight of what we are actually trying to do. Time to put good strategy in the lead, and let intel and tactics follow. My opinion.

[Dayuhan]

Dare I address this yet again, only to be accused of reciting a mantra? :-)

No, this is not a mantra... mantras are the short ones, like "insurgency is the source of AQ's energy" and "foreign fighters travel to fight in order to change governance in their home countries". Finally we get a bit specific, a good thing.

Look, the "tactics" of what precisely needs to be done in any particular place is always going to be unique, and must be shaped to the specifics of the problems, cultures, types of governance, nature of grievances, types of active revolutionary and pre-revolutionary organizations, any outside state or non-state UW or FID actors, etc. Oh, and then of course shaped by what, if any, national interests we might have in that place or the issues taking place there.

I was looking more for policies than tactics but this will suffice.

But with these three countries you name, a similar strategic understanding and framework applies:

With much of this I agree; no response to those is necessary. There are some sticking points.

1. All have high conditions of insurgency (that are unique in how they manifest and how active they are etc).

As I've said before, I think you're using a non-standard definition of "insurgency" here, which makes discussion confusing. I'd agree that there's widespread discontent with governance in these areas; whether or not that has reached a point where it can be called "insurgency", as the term is generally understood, is debatable. If you're going to use non-standard definitions of terms it's good to explain your definition before using it. Discussion gets complicated when people ascribe different meanings to the same words.

3. All have systems of governance that are, or have been until recently, highly reliant upon their relationships with powerful external partners

Major red flag on this one. Looking at Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States, I don't see one case in which you could realistically claim systems of governance that "are, or have been until recently, highly reliant upon their relationships with powerful external partners". Reliant for external defense, possibly, but not for control of the populace and certainly not for economic sustenance. One of the consistent weaknesses of your argument is that you consistently and drastically overrate the reliance of other governments on us, and therefore the degree of influence that we can bring to bear on their behaviour. Assuming influence that you haven't actually got is dangerous.

6. All were under Ottoman and European control prior to the Cold War, and all were locations the US/West worked diligently to maintain or gain the role of primary security ally (rather than the Soviets) throughout the Cold War; and then worked to sustain those relationships through the comfortable certainty of sustaining particular people, families.systems of governance in place post-Cold War.

Again, you overrate the degree to which these governments were "sustained" by outside influence.

9. The status quo is increasingly unsustainable at acceptable costs (though the Saudis and the Gulf States are pouring in increasing amounts of bribes, security, etc as their fear of revolution grows).

I think "increasingly unsustainable" is simplistic and inaccurate. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States are arguably more stable today than they were in the 90s. Not that they've solved the problems, but domestic investment, decreased unemployment, etc have bought a substantial reprieve.

So:

Now we get to the sticky bits...

The US has an opportunity to be a agent for peaceful, evolutionary change on the terms of the people, cultures and governments actually involved. But so far we have demanded to cast this on our terms in our context. Step one is to abandon our context and embrace theirs. This is there problem, it must be their solution.

You assume that "they" have a consistent context, that we know what it is, and that we have a part to play in the changes. I'm not sure any of these assumptions are sustainable.

1. We need to mediate or facilitate mediation in as neutral a way as possible.

2. We need to set redlines for both governments and populace groups in terms of violence, and other activities counter-productive to the process.

3. We need to encourage populaces to embrace non-violent tactics for their insurgent movements, and then deter governments from applying excessive violence against such activities.

4. We need to use our full DIME(but light on the M) to get these governments to hold true, substantive talks with their many diverse populace groups.

This, frankly, fills me with horror, and I can imagine no worse course of action. What right or standing have we to mediate in these disagreements? re we being asked to mediate, or to impose red lines, or to "use our full DIME" by any of the actors in these environments? Very simply put: no, we are not. The governments don't want us involved, the populaces don't want us involved, our own populace doesn't want us involved. Any attempt by us to impose ourselves as "mediator" is going to offend everyone involved and be perceived by all concerned (including most Americans) as a Trojan horse ruse aimed at building our own influence and taking control. This directly supports AQs narrative of western interference and subversion.

We are not trusted or wanted in these places, and any attempt to impose ourselves in these internal consequences is likely to blow up in our faces. Even where we've played a part in creating problems through meddlings past, bad meddling can't be corrected by more meddling. It has to be corrected by less meddling: unless there's a specific request from groups with a realistic claim to represent the populace or a significant portion thereof, we need to stay out of the internal affairs of these countries. Even where such a request exists, it's best managed mutilaterally.

Look at what happened in Bahrain. We came in advising accommodation, negotiation, and reform. We were promptly ignored, and achieved nothing beyond underscoring our own impotence.

Effectively what you're proposing here is that these governments need to be "fixed" and that we have a central role to play in making the fixing happen. That's scary.

5. We need to stop conducting CT operations against elements of these revolutionary populace groups simply because they are talking to AQ. We need to incentivise them to work in the context of our concept for supporting evolution, rather than in the AQ context of supporting revolution.

Are we "conducting CT operations against elements of these revolutionary populace groups" in any of the countries under discussion?

There are a lot of "ifs" that good tactical approaches tailored for each place will need to address. But all of those tactics must be in synch an over-arching strategy similar to what I lay out here. To date we set tactical metrics, and then get so focused on putting up big tactical numbers that we lose sight of what we are actually trying to do. Time to put good strategy in the lead, and let intel and tactics follow. My opinion.

The overarching strategy you describe seems based on the assumption that the governments in question are reliant on us and must do what we want them to do, and that the populaces concerned want us to step in and interfere in the domestic affairs of their nations. These seem to me like unsupported, exaggerated, and very dangerous assumptions, and I don't see how you can build "good strategy" on faulty assumptions.

[Bob's World]

Look, I stand by both my assessment and my recommendation.

Would love to hear yours.

We can ignore these conditions; we can attack the symptoms; or we can address the causes.

I believe we need to largely ignore where our interests are small; we need to attack symptoms only to the degree necessary to mitigate the dangers, and always subjugated to: our efforts to work with governments to address causes in those places where our interests are high.

Not nation building. That is an even bigger, more flawed concept than excessive CT. You cannot develop a country to stability, nor is effective government as measured by Western standards in any way a cure for instability.

As to using a non-standard definition for insurgency, what choice do I have? The doctrinal definition that demands that there be active, organized violence in order to be an insurgency is so narrowly symptomatic. It is no wonder we always attack symptoms and call it success when those overt symptoms die down. After all, at that point is no longer "insurgency" under the accepted definition. I merely recognize that the narrow case in the doctrinal definition is an apex condition of a much broader dynamic. We get to better understanding and smarter approaches when we open our aperture and our minds to better consider where these things come from and how to best prevent or cure the same.

My definition requires governments to own their role in causation. Governments prefer to blame anything else. Be it some ideology, some malign actor, some foreign government waging COIN poorly in your country, the economy, drought, unemployment, etc. Anything but owning their own key role. This is why we "counterinsurgency" rather than "counterpoorgovernance." We counter the symptom rather than the problem. Most often we actually make it a major goal to actively protect and preserve the problem as is. I find that odd, but I realize most don't think much about that at all. They just apply the doctrinal definition and approaches and merrily attack the symptoms.

[Dayuhan]

Look, I stand by both my assessment and my recommendation.

Seems to me that if you're going to put a proposal on the table you should be willing to defend it against reasonable criticism. Repetition is not defense.

Would love to hear yours.

I gave them a while back, I will try to resuscitate them. Not sure if it was on this thread, there are many on the same or similar subjects. Wasn't that long ago.

(edit: general outline here: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...20&postcount=2)

We can ignore these conditions; we can attack the symptoms; or we can address the causes.

It's difficult to address causes that are rooted in history; we haven't got a time machine. There's always the temptation to look at the legacy of past meddling, decide that meddling was a mistake, and try to correct it with more meddling. That won't work: the cure for bad meddling isn't good meddling, it's less meddling. We cannot address causes by forcing our way unwanted and uninvited into the government/populace dynamic in other countries: all that's going to do is get all sides pissed off at us. Sometimes there's a place for multilateral mediation, if it's requested by all parties to the dispute being mediated, or intervention, in rare and extreme cases where it's requested by someone with a credible claim to speak for the populace or a substantial part thereof. Trying to push into these matters unilaterally and on our own initiation seems to me a very dangerous idea.

I believe we need to largely ignore where our interests are small; we need to attack symptoms only to the degree necessary to mitigate the dangers, and always subjugated to: our efforts to work with governments to address causes in those places where our interests are high.

We can only work with governments where they choose to work with us, and we generally can't force them to do that.

Not nation building. That is an even bigger, more flawed concept than excessive CT. You cannot develop a country to stability, nor is effective government as measured by Western standards in any way a cure for instability.

Agreed. Not can you simply command reform or force a change in the relationship between government and populace, especially in nations where your influence is very limited.

As to using a non-standard definition for insurgency, what choice do I have? The doctrinal definition that demands that there be active, organized violence in order to be an insurgency is so narrowly symptomatic. It is no wonder we always attack symptoms and call it success when those overt symptoms die down. After all, at that point is no longer "insurgency" under the accepted definition. I merely recognize that the narrow case in the doctrinal definition is an apex condition of a much broader dynamic. We get to better understanding and smarter approaches when we open our aperture and our minds to better consider where these things come from and how to best prevent or cure the same.

You can refer to high levels of domestic dissent, or tension between government and populace or portions thereof, or a pre-insurgency condition, or conditions conducive to insurgency. Tension between nations precedes war and can cause war, but it isn't war. The conditions that precede and cause insurgency are closely linked to insurgency, but they are not insurgency. Better to come up with a new word for it than to use a standard word with a non-standard definition that just creates confusion.

My definition requires governments to own their role in causation.

Unfortunately your prescription requires us to compel or persuade other governments to own their own role in causation. That means interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and foreign interference in Muslim countries is what AQ thrives on.

Governments prefer to blame anything else. Be it some ideology, some malign actor, some foreign government waging COIN poorly in your country, the economy, drought, unemployment, etc. Anything but owning their own key role. This is why we "counterinsurgency" rather than "counterpoorgovernance."

If we try to counter what we consider to be "poor governance" in another country, we will inevitably end up using our own metrics to determine what "poor governance" and "good governance" are, which you yourself say is a bad idea. What other metrics do we have, though? Easy to say "those of the people", but we often don't know what those are, and different segments of the people often have very different metrics, often thoroughly incompatible ones. Messing in some other nation's governance is a business we don't need to be in and generally shouldn't be in, IMO.

Most often we actually make it a major goal to actively protect and preserve the problem as is. I find that odd, but I realize most don't think much about that at all. They just apply the doctrinal definition and approaches and merrily attack the symptoms.

Where exactly do we "make it a major goal to actively protect and preserve the problem as is"? Did we "protect and preserve" the status quo in any of the Arab Spring rebellions? If not there, then where? An allegation like that needs to be specific.

[Bob's World]

Where exactly do we "make it a major goal to actively protect and preserve the problem as is"? Did we "protect and preserve" the status quo in any of the Arab Spring rebellions? If not there, then where? An allegation like that needs to be specific.

Why limit ourselves to the Arab Spring countries?

We did this in Vietnam.
We do this in Yemen, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, the Philippines and Isarel in varying degrees currently.

We agree to disagree on our understanding of this dynamic. I personally am fine with that. I find your interpretations of a very subjective field of human endeavor to be cripplingly literal. One need not agree with another's position to understand that positon. At times I feel that the only positions you can understand are the ones you agree with. I'm not sure what to do with that.

[Dayuhan]

Why limit ourselves to the Arab Spring countries?

Trying to stay reasonably current, and within geographic context.

We did this in Vietnam.

Yes we did, and in many other places during the Cold War. That's past, and cannot be changed.

We do this in Yemen, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, the Philippines and Isarel in varying degrees currently.

Yemen, perhaps to some extent. We didn't make any particular effort to preserve Saleh, in fact I think there was a fair bit of machination aimed at getting him out. I'm not sure in any event that it's reasonable to talk about "insurgency" in Yemen, it's more a chaos of clan, ethnic and sectarian conflict. Certainly there's no coherent insurgent movement representing a coherent set of popular demands. Any party, external or internal, trying to mediate in Yemen is in for one massive headache.

In Afghanistan I tend to agree, but that's an inevitable consequence of regime change and nation-building, a strategy I've disagreed with from the start. We were always going to be to some extent invested in whatever we installed there, and we were never going to install a structurally viable government. That meant we painted ourselves into a corner where no matter what we did we'd be supporting and sustaining a dysfunctional government, because we were bound to be invested in a government we produced and the political culture has not re-evolved (since the devolution of the civil war) to a point where it can sustain functional governance.

I don't think we've been trying all hat hard to "preserve and protect the status quo" in the Southern Philippines. Our entry was largely intended to disrupt the status quo of a bandit-cum-terror group operating more or less freely under a government that could have suppressed it, but didn't because too much money was being made from it. There's been quite continuous pressure to alter the status quo... that pressure has often been based on what I feel is a mistaken assessment of the status quo, and I'm not sure where it will lead, but it has been there.

In Saudi Arabia our position on the status quo is of course quite irrelevant. We couldn't change it if we wanted to, and the government doesn't need our help to sustain it. There's nothing we can say or do that's going to change the way the Saudi government relates to its populace, and trying to push our way into that equation (where nobody, including the populace, wants us involved) is going to be counterproductive at best.

We agree to disagree on our understanding of this dynamic. I personally am fine with that. I find your interpretations of a very subjective field of human endeavor to be cripplingly literal. One need not agree with another's position to understand that positon. At times I feel that the only positions you can understand are the ones you agree with. I'm not sure what to do with that.

How can anyone understand your position if you won't explain it? You declare that it is so, if challenged you repeat that it is so, and if challenged again you say those doing the challenging just don't get it and are some how blind or deluded. I don't think the questions I've asked are all that unreasonable or that undeserving of answers.

If we come over the horizon telling the governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or the Gulf States that we're going to work with them to resolve their differences with their populaces, how can we reasonably expect any answer other than "piss off"? hat do we do when we get that very predictable answer?

[Dayuhan]

I've never claimed AQ was successful in taking charge of or leading an insurgency anywhere. Most don't want what they are selling. But that does not mean they are not selling it, nor that their primary source of "energy" (funding, sanctuary, recruits, etc) does not come form these many latent and active insurgent populaces. They are, and it does.

The claim that AQ's "primary source of energy" is "these many latent and active insurgent populaces" remains unsupported by evidence or reasoning. It's just a claim. It's also a questionable claim, because we an easily observe that AQ is most effective when they exploit the wides[read anger at western influence in general and "infidel" occupation of Muslim lands specifically. If the primary source of energy was an insurgency dynamic, you would expect AQ to be most effective when hey are trying to rally support against Muslim governments. This is not what we actually see, and that needs to be explained. The explanation has to be specific and not dependent on broad correlations. Observing that bad governance (by our standards) is common in countries where AQ draws support is not sufficient cause to deduce that bad governance causes support for AQ, because many other factors are also present in those environments.

You earlier claimed that foreign fighters travel to fight in order to change conditions in their home countries. I pointed tout that this claim is incompatible with 3 consistent observations about the foreign fighter phenomenon. I've seen no reply. Ignoring inconvenient inconsistencies does not advance your argument.

If your point is yes, but they are failing in taking over these insurgencies and that the whole "Caliphate" paranoia in the West is much more an over reaction to AQ propaganda than anything we really need to worry about, then with that I can totally agree.

I don't think there is any "Caliphate paranoia" in the West, except among professional paranoiacs who are afraid of everything. It's pretty obvious that the Caliphate is a fantasy. There is some not unreasonable concern that those who pursue that fantasy want to kill us in the process: not concern that they'll succeed in creating a caliphate, but concern over their habit of trying to kill us.

Of course many of the responses have been poorly calculated, ineffective, and counterproductive. Not all of these have been "threat-centric". The idea that we can "drain the swamp in the Middle East" or that we can disable AQ by restructuring patterns of governance in Arab Countries is not threat-centric, but it is beyond our capacity and it is the kind of hubris that leads us to places like the one we're in now.

[ganulv]

I don't think there is any "Caliphate paranoia" in the West, except among professional paranoiacs who are afraid of everything.

Well…