History's a big place, and you can pick something out of it to support practically any point you want to make.

I think the comments in the previous posts about the decline of empires are dangerously oversimplified and of debatable relevance to issues between the US and AQ, and more generally between the US and the Islamist terrorist fringe.

I think you're overrating the extent to which AQ specifically and Islamist terrorism in general derives from an insurgency dynamic, meaning conflict between governments and the citizens of the countries those governments govern. I think the relationship you're claiming needs a great deal more supporting evidence than you're providing.

I think the model you propose has real relevance to questions of insurgency, but I think, again, that you overrate the connection between AQ and insurgency, and exaggerate the extent to which AQ is a reaction to specifically American actions. The issues you cite can help understand populace/government relations in the Middle East, but I think you overrate the extent to which these conflicts are about us or require our involvement.

There is real risk in this construct: if we adopt the idea that AQ exists because we "broke" Muslim governments and put them out of touch with their people, some bright person is likely to conclude that we can disable AQ by "fixing" Muslim governments and making them accountable to their people. I can imagine no worse strategy.