We need less Chemo and Surgery and more "Voom."

[Dayuhan]

Did Caesar struggle with insurgencies?

...But soon it was not just the emperor's legions and his goods moving on those roads and vessels. All manner of commerce, migration and information moved with greater speed as well. This breakthrough in "information technology" designed to ease the control of empire soon drove the cost of sustaining empire to exceed the benefits. When people cannot be controlled in isolation, they will tend to act out en mass.

The same happened to the Holy Roman empire upon the advent of the printing press. When Rome could no longer control information and knowledge, they soon could no longer control those many diverse people who increasingly came to question the legitimacy of that system of rule.

Great Britain's empire began before the age of steam powered industry and transportation and electronic communications. But as their empire was a major facilitator of developing and expanding those technologies in efforts to maximize the income from their far flung possessions, it was those very technologies that soon came to tax the ability of a government in London to exercise control over diverse populaces around the world.

...The Soviets offered glasnost to the suppressed populaces of the Soviet Union in the hopes that this "openness" and increased transparency of governance would reduce criticisms of governance. Instead it provided a catalyst of information empowerment to many diverse populaces across the empire, and within a decade the empire collapsed. Oh, it could have sustained itself for decades no doubt, through generations of bloody, suppressive state violence and control over the people, but Gorbachev did what few in his position have done before or since: He let the people go, and in so doing sealed the fate of the Soviet empire.

All of these seem to wedge the history into the theory, and I'd have to question the fit: in each of these cases there were many factors active and the spread of information was not necessarily the dominant factor in any case.

In any event the fall of empires past seems of questionable relevance to the fight against terrorism and AQ. The US is not en empire, and does not hold the Middle East as an Imperial possession, neither does AQ threaten the existence of the US. The Middle Eastern countries now facing actual or potential upheaval are not parts of any empire, each has its own internal issues.

What is going on today in the Middle East is little different. A region of frozen conflicts, autocratic regimes, and powerful external influences. The people there are informed now in ways they have never been before, and with no threat of Soviet dominion to serve as rationale for accepting a much more benign brand of Western manipulation they are drawing courage from each other and acting out to force their own governments to listen and evolve, and to remove what they deem as inappropriate external influence.

I think it's very different indeed from any of the cited examples.

Certainly there's a great deal of tension between governments and various populaces and popular factions all over the Middle East, and in many other places as well. That's not about us, though, and our role in the resolution of those tensions is and should be generally pretty minimal. In some cases there may be scope for action by the US or other outside parties, but only when it's asked for and clearly needed: the last thing we want to do is to try and impose ourselves as a mediator, still less as a spokesperson for "the populace".

The link between AQ and this populace/government internal dynamic is the weakest point in your argument, and you've presented little evidence or reasoning to support it. It seems to me that AQ grows less out of the tension between individual Muslim governments and their own populaces than out of a perceived tension between a long-oppressed but rising Islam and a long-dominant but crumbing West. Again, AQ have tried to extend that perception to generate support against Muslim governments they dislike, but those efforts have seen very limited success. Tho only narrative that's ever really worked for them is opposition to direct foreign occupation.

Equally the cost of control is going up. Governments overly reliant on control to sustain an artificial stability create very brittle systems, and those systems are shattering. Governments that have more flexible systems are also under pressure to evolve, but are better able to flex and bend and continue on.

The cost of controlling what, for whom?

When we learn how to facilitate and accept for others the same freedoms we demand for ourselves, we will break free from the challenges of this period of post -Cold War transition and enter a new age of American influence. But if we cling to the past and the comfort of a status quo designed by and for us, it will break us, just as it has so many before us.

When we learn that the internal affairs of other nations are not our business, and that we've no business trying to define any other government's relationship with its populaces, we may (or may not) begin the process of extracting our collective head from out collective bung. That may take time and effort; it's been there a while and it's in deep.

There's a lot to be thrashed out, all over the world. Most of it isn't about us, though it may have some effect on us.

After all, it is human nature.

It's also human nature to shove reality into our pet theories, whether or not it fits.

[Bob's World]

The theory comes from history, not the other way around.

Too many seek to understand and solve "terrorism" and "insurgency" wholly within the context of a particular place and time and set of facts, and wholly within the context of the mission and ability of their particular institution sent out to deal with the same. This is so incredibly limiting.

Our history books love the war stories, but more often the truly interesting and helpful insights are buried in footnotes, or must be derived from clues authors sprinkle across their text without even being aware they are doing so. Often their main points and conclusions are of questionable value, but buried within the verbiage they use to make those points one finds the nuggets that helps form greater understanding.

Consider this popular example. Comparing British tactics in Malaya to US tactics in Vietnam is great sport; but it offers very little toward the understanding of why either situation occurred to begin with or equally what led to one result in one place, and very different results in the other. No pure military study helps one get to better understanding of what the truly interesting and important lessons from those conflicts are.

Military professionals love to put these conflicts into the context of war, identify a "threat" and wage war against it.

Development professionals love to put these conflicts into the context of basic needs, identify ways to meet those needs, and then poor money and energy into addressing them.

Governance professionals look for external factors for why they might be so rudely, illegally, and quit often violently, challenged in their governance. They then place blame on those external factors and set out to defeat them. This might be some ideology or form of governance different than the one they promote, or it might be some "malign" and "evil" competitor internal or external to the state that is somehow leading the populace to this dangerous state.

This is all human nature as well. People are the common thread. We are assigned roles and we play those roles out. History repeats over and over again as these roles are cast in the universal context of human nature, but flavored with the unique facts of each particular event.

I know I irritate many on this site when I tend to point out the futility of arguing tactics and weapons when one is pursuing such a flawed strategic understanding to begin with. Likewise when I dare to suggest that Clausewitz's very brilliant insights on war and warfare are often not much help (indeed, often quite dangerous) when applied to the internal conflicts and competition for power internal to some particular populace of system of governance.

I also know I don't have all the right answers or are asking all of the right questions. But I pursue answers and ask questions all the same. We have an opportunity to evolve, but opportunities only matter if one is willing to risk departing the well trod path of business as usual to pursue other insights that might actually help us get to where we are seeking to go.

[Dayuhan]

History's a big place, and you can pick something out of it to support practically any point you want to make.

I think the comments in the previous posts about the decline of empires are dangerously oversimplified and of debatable relevance to issues between the US and AQ, and more generally between the US and the Islamist terrorist fringe.

I think you're overrating the extent to which AQ specifically and Islamist terrorism in general derives from an insurgency dynamic, meaning conflict between governments and the citizens of the countries those governments govern. I think the relationship you're claiming needs a great deal more supporting evidence than you're providing.

I think the model you propose has real relevance to questions of insurgency, but I think, again, that you overrate the connection between AQ and insurgency, and exaggerate the extent to which AQ is a reaction to specifically American actions. The issues you cite can help understand populace/government relations in the Middle East, but I think you overrate the extent to which these conflicts are about us or require our involvement.

There is real risk in this construct: if we adopt the idea that AQ exists because we "broke" Muslim governments and put them out of touch with their people, some bright person is likely to conclude that we can disable AQ by "fixing" Muslim governments and making them accountable to their people. I can imagine no worse strategy.

[davidbfpo]

In recent discussions with analysts several have commented on the importance of the local Muslim faith context changing, as the Salaf school gains adherents, so enabling the strand that supports the violent Jihad (Salafism has many strands and may not support the violent Jihad). Islam has changed in many ways recently, notably with external private funding of the more conservative schools of thought - even in places like Kashmir, where a local variant dominated.

I expect someone has written on this private funding, much of it from the Gulf and Saudi Arabia and the possible impact on the violent Jihad. Suggestions or pointers please.

We know that the local context can suddenly and rapidly change when foreign fighters arrive to reinforce an existing insurgency. Of late Mali and Syria have been cited as examples, although the Pakistani reinforcement, if not creation of the Taliban in Afghanistan is the most well known example.

Clint Watts directed attention to a pro-regime, Syrian newspaper report yesterday, so a caveat applies:

published the names of 142 foreign fighters from 18 countries the regime said were killed alongside rebels in Syria's conflict....47 Saudis, 24 Libyans, 10 Tunisians, nine Egyptians, six Qataris and five Lebanese. It also listed 11 Afghans, five Turks, three Chechens, one Chadian and one Azerbaijani.

Link:http://www.thenational.ae/news/world..._campaign=feed

The violent Jihad has a long history before 9/11 and the appearance of AQ. Sometime ago I read a book on them in Imperial India and beyond, they were simply called something else.

[wm]

Bob's World started this thread with a reference to a Panetta speech, a medical metaphor, and the The Cat in the Hat Comes Back. He proceeded to ask "Where is Cat Z and what is 'voom'?"

I think that the starting point and frame of reference are somewhat mistaken. Try reading "Yertle the Turtle" instead:

The eponymous story revolves around a Yertle the Turtle, the king of the pond. Unsatisfied with the stone that serves as his throne, he commands the other turtles to stack themselves beneath him so that he can see further and expand his kingdom. However, the stacked turtles are in pain and Mack, the turtle at the very bottom of the pile, is suffering the most. Mack asks Yertle for a respite, but Yertle just tells him to shut up. Then Yertle decides to expand his kingdom and commands more and more turtles to add to his throne. Mack makes a second request for a respite because the increased weight is now causing extreme pain to the turtles at the bottom of the pile. Again Yertle yells at Mack to shut up. Then Yertle notices the moon rising above him as the night approaches. Furious that something "dares to be higher than Yertle the King", he decides to call for even more turtles in an attempt to rise above it. However, before he can give the command, Mack decides he has had enough. He burps, shaking the stack of turtles and tossing Yertle off into the mud, leaving him "King of the Mud" and freeing the others.

As I'm sure you can see, at least two levels of metaphoric interpretation are available for King Yertle and the pond/mud puddle. Please note that the turtles solved their problem without recourse to outside intervention. The turtles apparently saw no need to ask an eagle (Little Cat Z?) to swoop down from the sky and carry King Yertle away (voom?).

The polar positions taken in the rest of this thread remind me of another Theodor Geisel (AKA Dr. Seuss and Theo. LeSieg) story--"The Zax"--while the need to define terms precisely in order to identify the problem and its sources)/solutions is reminiscent of "Too Many Daves" (both in The Sneetches and Other Stories). For those who want to get past the children's literature, I'd suggest a review of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations discussion of family resemblances as a way of trying to solve the problems of applying definitions to achieve identification.

BTW, my simple answer to Bob's initial question is to suggest that maybe the Cat in the Hat with his matroysha (nested Russian Dolls) solutions ought to stop calling in places where he isn't invited.
Or, more tersely, "Cat in the Hat, MYOB!*"

*MYOB =mind your own business

[Bob's World]

There is some truth to the idea that everything we need to know about dealing with these situations "we learned in kindergarden."

But that would be "too simplistic," so we seek the long, complex, expensive, intrusive, violent, controlling solution instead. (and the special equipment, gangs of contracted SMEs, massive defense budgets to go with).

[jmm99]

"the two levels of metaphoric interpretation" are what ?

Regards

Mike

[wm]

"the two levels of metaphoric interpretation" are what ?

Regards

Mike

Level 1: King Yertle is the US (post Truman Doctrine), the Pond is the Earth and the other turtles are the various countries in the world.
Level 2: Yertle is the tyrannical leader of any country/organization with grandiose ambitions, the pond is just that country/organization while the other turtles are various segments of the dominated populace/workforce/organizational membership.

[Dayuhan]

"Cat in the Hat, MYOB!*"

Amen.

"Simple" and "Simplistic" share the same root word, but are on opposite ends of the spectrum when it comes to understanding some situation.

I applied the term "simplistic" purely to your conclusions about the fall of the Roman, Holy Roman, British, and Soviet empires, and the extent to which those falls were caused by expanded access of populaces to information. I would stand by the observation that both those conclusions and their application to the interface among the US, Muslim Governments, insurgents, and terrorists are simplistic.

Simple is so very incredibly difficult to get to yet so very easy to apply. So often we reject simple solutions because we fear they are so, well, "simple," that they could not possibly have merit. So we instead embrace confused, complex and complicated approaches, because if anything is so hard it must be worthwhile, and if I am not producing the results I intended, that is to be expected, after all, this is "complex."

I've nothing against simple solutions, but they have to presented in clear and specific terms to be implemented. I note that your pescriptions are often cast in extremely general terms.

As to AQ, I don't overrate AQ, but certainly our approach to AQ over the past decade-plus holds them in very high esteem. After all, if everything we have so carefully crafted (from our image of ourselves to our goals for the governance of the Middle East, etc) are all falling about our ankles, it must be some very important, very powerful enemy that is causing that to happen. Right? Wrong.

No, I think AQ is largely a joke, but a very dangerous one who will have the last laugh if we do not stop chasing them in such a complex, complicated, confused manner from pillar to post around the country, with Intel leading our strategy, and military leading our foreign policy, and no nation's sovereignty more important than our own fear of this little band of opportunists.

I don't think AQ is a joke at all: people attacking us and killing our people are never a joke. I don't see any evidence that anything is "falling around our ankles" in the Middle East, and to the extent that anything is, that's not a consequence of anything AQ has done.

We need to strike 80% of the organizations currently on the "terrorist" list off, not add more to. We need to analyze why some group loosely associated with AQ is not part of AQ so the we can address them wisely, not why they are AQ so that we can address them simplistically.

I agree that affiliation to AQ is vastly overestimated and that many organizations described as "AQ linked" probably have little or no impact on us. A better question would be whether any given organization is attacking us or killing our people, or trying to. If they are, that requires a response, whether or not AQ is involved.

But the Pied Piper is a fairly tale, and so is the idea that ideology causes terrorism and insurgency. Governments cause these conditions and they manifest deep withing broad segments of any given populace.

I'm disturbed by the way "terrorism" and "insurgency" are lumped together here, suggesting that they are the same thing, or inextricably linked, or are products of the same causes. Any such contention would require supporting evidence that is not given here. I'd certainly agree that governments are a leading cause of insurgency, but I think the link that you draw between insurgency and the type of terrorism exemplified by AQ is extremely tenuous and requires far more support than you've provided. It's not enough to say that it is so.

Governments are the arctic winds blowing down from the north, and insurgent populaces are like large masses of ice that form and break away from the pack to cause trouble. Our COIN and CT approaches go after that aspect of such masses that floats above the surface, and largely ignores the reality that any effort designed to simply shave ice off of the top or to press the entire mass through brute force beneath the surface, out of sight and mind, is a fool's errand. It can produce temporary effects that look like success, but that are very temporary and symptomatic in nature, and that require constant energy to sustain. So the typically fail, unless the warm waters of good governance work to melt and blend that entire mass into the larger sea.

I can see how this analogy applies to insurgency, but I don't see how that needs to concern us: other than the ones we created with our ham-handed regime changes, there's not an insurgency on the planet that requires a major commitment from us. In fact, I think we need to ditch the "COIN"-driven assumption that insurgency is someting that by definition should be countered, and start looking at it as an opportunity.

How this all relates to "terrorism" in the AQ mold is another question entirely, and again the proposed link between insurgency and AQ-style terrorism is in no way clear.

AQ does not make icebergs, but they work to leverage the destructive energy within and across a sea of such icebergs of popular discontent.

AQ has not successfully leveraged popular discontent with Muslim governments. They've tried, but they've failed. The discontent that they have leveraged stems from broader relations between "the West" and the Islamic world, and the perception that "the West" oppresses Islam. I see no evidence to suggest that the terrorists who struck at the west or the fighters who flocked to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan or the Americans in Iraq were driven by anger at their own governments. Any claim that this was indeed the case needs to be supported with specific evidence and compelling logic. It is not self-evident truth.

As to Muslim governments being broken, no, we did not "break" them any more than a rich, entitled man "breaks" his children when he allows them to act out with massive unearned wealth with few rules and little consequence for bad behavior. We have manipulated the governance of the region for our own purposes and our actions have indeed allowed many regimes of the region to act with growing impunity toward their own populaces.

This contention seems to me paternalistic to the point of being patronizing. These governments are not our children. Certainly we tried to manipulate them; they also tried to manipulate us. Arguably they were the more successful manipulators. These governments did not require our permission or help to oppress their populaces; they did it on their own and of their own free will. We can't make them stop and we never could. I don't see any evidence that we "enabled" them to oppress or that they would have been any less oppressive if we hadn't been there.

We did not break this and we cannot fix this. We are, however, the major player in the mix.

I don't think we are or need to be "the major player in the mix".

We can, however, form a more helpful perspective and be willing to accept that change is happening and that many of these systems will find solutions that work for them that do not necessarily make us happy. It is not about us. We must learn when to simply let people sort things out for themselves, and how to better set red-lines for all parties that work to minimize the violence of change, and how to better mediate from neutral positions, rather than mandate from biased positions we take so often.

I agree for the most part, though I don't think this requires much change: again, these governments do not depend on us for sustenance, we are not keeping them afloat, and we have little or no control over their actions. Setting red lines for all or any parties is something I'm less comfortable with: we have no business setting red lines in the internal affairs of other countries and there's no point at all in setting red lines you're not able or willing to enforce.

It is not for us to mandate, nor do we do so. Neither is mediation any of our business, unless it is requested by all parties to a given conflict. Trying to impose ourselves as a mediator or as self-appointed spokesperson for any group is an excellent and dramatic way to self-destruct.

So, yes, simple is hard. But it is my goal. But what I offer may not be quite to simple yet, I assure you, it is not simplistic.

Mind our own business to the greatest possible extent. Do not unilaterally interfere in the internal affairs of others. Kill those who attack us.

What could be simpler?

[Bob's World]

So, what, pray tell, is a "terrorist" organization?

Terrorism is, after all, merely a tactic. Many insurgents use terrorist tactics. Many governments (to include our own) use terrorist tactics. Many non-state actors with broad political agendas, such as AQ, use terrorist tactics.

Frankly it is a label that bundles all manner of actors based upon a particular tactical approach. I don't find that very helpful, as it does not create a category that frames or suggests a particular family of solution to apply.

Which leads to "counter-terrorism," which equally is a little more than a commitment to seek to disrupt, defeat, deny, etc those individuals and organizations that employ terrorist tactics. It is very symptomatic in nature, and as such does not much consider WHY some organization or individual is acting out, or why they have come to a position where they believe terrorist tactics are their best hope for achieving their goals.

AQ is actually more accurately a non-state political action group that operates outside the rule of law to conduct unconventional warfare to leverage the insurgent populaces of a wide range of primarily Muslim states, employing both guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics, to force change upon the governments of those states and their foreign allies.

This cannot be well addressed by "counter-terrorism." Nor can this be well addressed by the slightly broader concept of "combating-terrorism." What I have long argued is that we we really need is a much broader, more holistic construct of "counter-unconventional warfare." This gets us past an excessive focus on the tactics employed, and instead forces us to think in the context of the actual operations being waged. Much of our jousting in the "3rd world" with the Soviets during the Cold War was essentially counter UW. We did not fly drones to Moscow and attempt to kill soviet leaders with missiles. But we fly drones in the sovereign airspace of many countries where AQ and nationalist insurgents operate and attempt to kill them. I find this odd at best.

But the energy source of any successful UW campaign is an insurgent populace. One cannot go to a stable, satisfied populace and create an insurgency. One can, however, go to place where such conditions are strong, but suppressed, and employ ideology, motivation, arms, leadership, funding, etc to move such a populace to action.

Che Guevara did not understand this fundamental truth of UW. He wanted to ignite a flame of insurgency that would spread and envelope all of South America. He looked at his map and picked a country in the middle of the continent and decided to light his fire there. So he went to Bolivia. But Bolivia had already had a revolution and much of the latent insurgent energy of the populace there was already released. He found few recruits and no sanctuary among the people. He was in short order hunted down and killed. He failed because he did not understand UW and the necessity for conditions of insurgency to fuel any such movement. AQ does not make that mistake, or perhaps they do not understand either, but the fact is there are so many populaces across so many countries in the Middle East with high conditions of insurgency that they cannot hardly help but finding fertile ground for their operations.

If not AQ, it would be someone else. They exploit the opportunity, they do not create the opportunity. I suspect this is why AQ has never resonated nearly as well among the Muslim populaces of the Asia-Pacific Region as they have in those areas that have not had the political revolutions yet such as have occurred there. As you well know, things are not perfect in Malaysia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Cambodia, or the Philippines - but these people and these nations have already thrown off the major aspects of external, illegitimate manipulation and are working toward their own destiny. Small groups and small numbers of individuals are open to help from groups such as AQ, but nearly so much as in the greater Middle East.

This is political. There are simple, fundamental aspects of human nature that provide a framework for understanding these problems. Each is unique in its details, but all are similar in their fundamentals.

[Bob's World]

History's a big place, and you can pick something out of it to support practically any point you want to make.

I think the comments in the previous posts about the decline of empires are dangerously oversimplified and of debatable relevance to issues between the US and AQ, and more generally between the US and the Islamist terrorist fringe.

I think you're overrating the extent to which AQ specifically and Islamist terrorism in general derives from an insurgency dynamic, meaning conflict between governments and the citizens of the countries those governments govern. I think the relationship you're claiming needs a great deal more supporting evidence than you're providing.

I think the model you propose has real relevance to questions of insurgency, but I think, again, that you overrate the connection between AQ and insurgency, and exaggerate the extent to which AQ is a reaction to specifically American actions. The issues you cite can help understand populace/government relations in the Middle East, but I think you overrate the extent to which these conflicts are about us or require our involvement.

There is real risk in this construct: if we adopt the idea that AQ exists because we "broke" Muslim governments and put them out of touch with their people, some bright person is likely to conclude that we can disable AQ by "fixing" Muslim governments and making them accountable to their people. I can imagine no worse strategy.

These are all fair concerns. But I would offer a few thoughts to consider:

1. "Simple" and "Simplistic" share the same root word, but are on opposite ends of the spectrum when it comes to understanding some situation. In between the two lay some of our favorite stomping grounds of "complicated," "complex," and "confused." You are very right that "simplistic" solutions do not offer much, unless through pure happenstance they fall upon the right approach. But simple is genius. Simple is so very incredibly difficult to get to yet so very easy to apply. So often we reject simple solutions because we fear they are so, well, "simple," that they could not possibly have merit. So we instead embrace confused, complex and complicated approaches, because if anything is so hard it must be worthwhile, and if I am not producing the results I intended, that is to be expected, after all, this is "complex."

My goal for years has been to get to "simple." The problem is that once once starts to get close to simple one tends to get farther and farther from the comfortably confused, complex, complicated place where most everyone else is happily mucking around. Thus the quote from Einstein I keep at the bottom of my posts. Einstein was the grand master of simple.

2. As to AQ, I don't overrate AQ, but certainly our approach to AQ over the past decade-plus holds them in very high esteem. After all, if everything we have so carefully crafted (from our image of ourselves to our goals for the governance of the Middle East, etc) are all falling about our ankles, it must be some very important, very powerful enemy that is causing that to happen. Right? Wrong.

No, I think AQ is largely a joke, but a very dangerous one who will have the last laugh if we do not stop chasing them in such a complex, complicated, confused manner from pillar to post around the country, with Intel leading our strategy, and military leading our foreign policy, and no nation's sovereignty more important than our own fear of this little band of opportunists.

We need to strike 80% of the organizations currently on the "terrorist" list off, not add more to. We need to analyze why some group loosely associated with AQ is not part of AQ so the we can address them wisely, not why they are AQ so that we can address them simplistically.

It is convenient to our egos, and those of the many out of touch regimes around the Middle East, if in fact AQ is Pied Piper, and that they have indeed brain washed good people to do bad things with their radical, Islamist ideology. But the Pied Piper is a fairly tale, and so is the idea that ideology causes terrorism and insurgency. Governments cause these conditions and they manifest deep withing broad segments of any given populace. Governments are the arctic winds blowing down from the north, and insurgent populaces are like large masses of ice that form and break away from the pack to cause trouble. Our COIN and CT approaches go after that aspect of such masses that floats above the surface, and largely ignores the reality that any effort designed to simply shave ice off of the top or to press the entire mass through brute force beneath the surface, out of sight and mind, is a fool's errand. It can produce temporary effects that look like success, but that are very temporary and symptomatic in nature, and that require constant energy to sustain. So the typically fail, unless the warm waters of good governance work to melt and blend that entire mass into the larger sea.

AQ does not make icebergs, but they work to leverage the destructive energy within and across a sea of such icebergs of popular discontent.

As to Muslim governments being broken, no, we did not "break" them any more than a rich, entitled man "breaks" his children when he allows them to act out with massive unearned wealth with few rules and little consequence for bad behavior. We have manipulated the governance of the region for our own purposes and our actions have indeed allowed many regimes of the region to act with growing impunity toward their own populaces. Those governments did this of their own free will, they need to own their problems and address them. Most seek to simply bribe or suppress such problems back into submission. This is a new era and I don't think such approaches will work. Those Republicans who yearn for the forced, artificial stability of the final years of the Cold War are idiots, or rather "intelligent fools." Likewise those who think we can "fix" this through regime change, nation building, US values and US-brand democratic governance.

We did not break this and we cannot fix this. We are, however, the major player in the mix. It is easy for these governments, and for organizations such as AQ to blame the US. This is human nature, just like the US blames AQ and ideology. We can, however, form a more helpful perspective and be willing to accept that change is happening and that many of these systems will find solutions that work for them that do not necessarily make us happy. It is not about us. We must learn when to simply let people sort things out for themselves, and how to better set red-lines for all parties that work to minimize the violence of change, and how to better mediate from neutral positions, rather than mandate from biased positions we take so often.

So, yes, simple is hard. But it is my goal. But what I offer may not be quite to simple yet, I assure you, it is not simplistic.

[davidbfpo]

An article based on 2iC SOCOM's presentation to an open conference, amidst the "we need more" approach there is some balance by a CFR expert:

Successful employment of the indirect approach requires both proactive involvement and patience for the effort to produce results. It requires placing SOF teams out in troubled regions for extended periods so they can gain familiarity, knowledge and relationships and then begin to execute solutions with the resident partners...This runs counter to a common tendency to wait until crises are full blown and action is imperative.

Link:http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.o...st.aspx?ID=983