We need less Chemo and Surgery and more "Voom."

[Dayuhan]

People contribute to this for many reasons, but if it is hard evidence you seek, if you much touch the holes in Jesus's hands, look simply at products such as the report on foreign fighters in Iraq prepared by Dr Joe Felter several years ago, and then compare where those "foreign fighters" came from with where the "Arab Spring" later burst into action.

That's not evidence. It's not even a very compelling correlation.

AQ drew upon the the very high conditions of insurgency in those states and drew upon the sub-populaces who were most dissatisfied with their own governments. They traveled to Iraq not to help make Iraq part of some "Caliphate," but rather to help defeat this source of foreign influence so that they could finally find some success at home.

And you expect us to take this statement, unsupported, on faith? As revealed truth? Sorry, but that's stretching faith beyond the breaking point. Just a few of the problems with that formulation:

1. The "foreign fighter" phenomenon is not limited to Iraq, or to places where the fighters are fighting the US. Foreign fighters have appeared in numerous conflicts, most of which have no plausible connection to conditions in their home countries. Are you suggesting that foreign fighters who traveled to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan or the Russians in Chechnya did so to defeat foreign influence in their home country? That Arabs who fought in Bosnia or the Tajik civil war were trying to affect governance at home? Or that foreign fighters in conflicts where the US is involved have a completely different set of motivations than foreign fighters in other conflicts?

2. Many foreign fighters who fought came form countries where foreign influence in general and US influence specifically have no meaningful place in sustaining the regime that ruled their home country. There's no imaginable reason why a Libyan or a Syrian would fight Americans in Iraq to remove a source of support for a government he disliked at home. These governments were not in any way supported or sustained by the US, but they still provided foreign fighters.

3. Studies based on interviews with captured foreign fighters do not reveal any hint of the motive that you suggest. In fact this idea is notably absent from every study of foreign fighters that I've seen. Now maybe it's true that everybody else looking at the problem is just a dumb city slicker wandering around in the bush missing all the signs that are clear to you alone... but is there not at least a chance that some of them aren't so ignorant? It would be useful if you could describe these signs nobody else sees in specific detail, not in generalities.

Now, when those insurgencies did finally go active at home (with AQ support and influence), did the people all rally under an AQ flag and attempt to elevate AQ into the governance of their country or to join some "Caliphate"? Of course not.

I see little evidence to suggest that AQ support and influence had anything to do with the Arab Spring. Looked more to me like AQ was taken by surprise and failed to capitalize to any significant degree, largely because their message was simply inconsistent with the desires that drove the Arab Spring.

AQ's most notable failure to inspire revolution, of course, had nothing to do with the Arab Spring. Throughout the early to mid 1990s AQ tried desperately to provoke revolution in Saudi Arabia. Circumstances should have been ideal for this effort: he was coming off what was perceived as a great victory over the Soviets in Afghanistan, he had drawn extensive support within Saudi Arabia during that fight and had a deep network of contacts. Conditions in Saudi Arabia looked ripe: the oil glut had caused massive dislocation and the presence of American forces was a major irritant. Still the effort fell flat on its face. Osama was unable to generate anything even remotely approaching the critical mass needed to challenge the government. His message just didn't resonate: Saudis were more than willing to support his jihad against the Soviets, but when he took it home they weren't interested. It's not plausible that his failure was caused by exile and repression: the Ayatollah Khomeini, for one, had inspired a revolution from exile in an equally repressive environment bys mailing cassette tapes. His message resonated with Iranians, and repression failed. Osama just didn't have the support. That doesn't mean Saudis loved the royal family, it meant that they don't see AQ as a viable alternative.

Again, AQ has certainly tried to push the narrative built around opposition to apostate regimes. That narrative hasn't really worked for them, though: they've only been able to draw widespread support when they've opposed foreign invaders in Muslim lands.

We are too quick to jump in and help certain governments exercise their "rights" to defend themselves from their own insurgent populaces

Again, other than in Iraq and Afghanistan, where are we helping a Muslim government to fight an insurgent populace, or enabling a Muslim government to oppress its populace? They don't generally need our help or ask our permission, and they aren't going to stop because we want them to.

Your argument would be more effective if it referred to specific policies and specific countries, and gave examples of policies that you think are counterproductive and the policies you believe should replace them.