Of course everybody was competing for influence, and of course nobody had clean hands. The communists simply read the direction of events earlier and more pragmatically, and were openly building bridges with nationalist and anti-colonial movements well before WW2. That left the Eurocentric US responding to their move and occupying the ground of defending colonial regimes and post-colonial dictators, a morally indefensible position for the self-styled land of the free. I didn't say the Communists were more moral, I said they recognized the more morally and historically defensible position earlier and moved to fill it, and the US played into their hands by trying to stand against the obvious tide of history. From this they gained a meaningful propaganda advantage in the developing world, and the US gained a long succession of liabilities that still hang over us.
The difference, of course, is that while the populaces in the countries involved may not have considered themselves "communist", many of the insurgent movements the Communists supported actually did identify themselves as Communist and were actually led by declared Communists. Those that won often did set up recognizably Communist governments. I can't think of a single indigenous insurgency (one not primarily directed at an occupying foreign power) in the Muslim world that openly declares itself a part of AQ or is led by AQ members. The victorious insurgencies of the Arab Spring show no signs of significant AQ influence. I see no evidence at all to suggest that indigenous insurgencies in the Muslim world have been successfully leveraged by AQ.
You keep repeating this, like a mantra, as if repetition were a supporting argument. It's not.
Yes, AQ seeks to leverage conditions of insurgency. My point is that this effort has generally failed. What AQ has successfully leveraged is a broad resentment in the Muslim world toward perceived aggression and injustice on the part of the West generically, and specific anger at specific occupations of Muslim territory. That narrative has worked for them. Their efforts to generate or hijack indigenous insurgencies have been resounding failures.
Yes, but you're not demonstrating any connection between this phenomenon and AQ. Again, it's not enough to say it is so. You have to support that claim with evidence and reasoning.
I don't think you're reading what I'm writing. I never said communists or communism caused those insurgencies, I said they recognized those insurgent situations early and moved effectively to exploit them. They were in many cases quite successful. AQ has not had similar success. Anyone here can name a long list of Cold War insurgencies that openly identified themselves as Communist. Can you name even one indigenous insurgency (again, one directed at a local government, not a foreign occupier) that openly identifies with AQ or where AQ has significant influence?
The claim that AQ and its supporters seek primarily to alter relationships between Muslim governments and those they govern, rather than relationships between the Muslim ummah and the world around it, is another mantra. Again, this can't just be stated, it has to be supported with evidence and reasoning.
I think your mind is also made up, and I post for the same reason.
I agree that much of what is enshrined in COIN doctrine is heavily biased and based on invalid assumptions, but I don't see any reason why COIN doctrine has to be part of the fight against AQ. Other than the ones we've created by occupation and "nation-building", there's not an insurgency on the planet that requires more than a small FID presence from us. We don't need to "do COIN", if we stop creating insurgencies we won't have to fight them on any significant scale. If we stop giving our enemy what they thrive on - occupations of Muslim lands - they'll be forced to fall back on trying to exploit indigenous insurgencies, a position that has not succeeded for them and is not likely to.
Again, your position would be more credible and comprehensible if you would identify specific policies toward specific countries (ideally other than Iraq and Afghanistan, where we all know we %$#@ed uo) that you think have failed, and suggest specific policies that you think would improve matters. That's particularly relevant in the Arad heartland: what specifically would you have us do with regard to, say, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States?
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