Torture versus collateral damage; the bigger evil?

[OUTLAW 09]

David---an interesting and timely thread which ties into two other ongoing threads.

I will comment more later when I have read through the main document but as someone who was a strategic debriefer here in Berlin for over 15 years at eight hours per day five days a week and year after year working in two languages and using interpreters for four others.

And having been a CWO Interrogation Technican and having been an a defense contractor interrogator in both Abu Ghraib and in the field with the 3/3 BCT in Baqubah Diyala AND having been in the IC when the Nixon years forced the system to use effectively for years the "intelligence bible" as what one could and could not do--people need to go to jail.

Why--we sent young soldiers to military prison for their actions in Abu G but not a single senior personality went with them---and now what we just look the other way again?

I spent hours talking with some of the hardest of the hardest Salafists in Abu G, Bucca and in the field---and regardless of their and my personal biases using rapport and respect I had conversations that would raise the eyes and ears of the current senior civilian leadership.

Mistakes that were serious from the beginning;

1. we use often unexperienced interrogators on the military side who where often under the age of 22

2. they had absolutely no understanding of Salafism, insurgency and or it's TTPs and only simply wanted to put people in prison

3. large numbers of these interrogators had never worked with interpreters at all before Iraq

4. a large number of Intel analysts spoke no Arabic and were under the rank of SGT

After reading in excess of 500 pages it struck me that a number of things came out that even surprised me;

1. many of those CIA personnel conducting interrogations were not even trained interrogators or even strategic debriefers

2. and actually how little they themselves even knew of the Salaifst movements

3. how little those involved in the actual interrogations actually raised their voices and stated this is not working--almost to a degree a cognitive dissonance thing

What is not discussed is that after the Abu G scandal and until this released document no one has seen fit to go back and look at the enhanced interrogation techniques being used at Abu G and what was ongoing in the CIA program---it was one and the same thing--AND this is key just how did the military side fully understand them and or felt they were "allowed" to use them? We sent low ranking military personnel to jail for what the CIA was doing and yet none of them have been charged.

There were some serious rumors that CIA civilians were also in Abu G at the same time as the scandal but never verified which is easy of one takes the time to investigate as a number of civilian contract interrogators can verify it.

I arrived at Abu G right after the scandal and the lines of what were allowed and what were not was strictly enforced---came back in early 2006 and presto there were again "enhanced measures" in play that I even asked questions about and everyone pointed upwards and stated---they have been approved from MNF-I---but still they were a "modified enhanced concept" that pushed my GC buttons.

One of the most serious mistakes made by the Bush administration was the definition they used to define who was and was not an "enemy combatant"--as that determined whether one was a POW and or just a "civilian" with no rights.

By denying thousands POW status the Bush administration basically under cut the GC which in the end is the only protection a US soldier has when captured.

Yes POWs can refuse to answer questions---so what --it makes the job a little harder but it still can work and did work well with those interrogators who knew what they were doing.

Again back to US Army interrogators---most Americans would be totally surprised if they knew the interrogators often had absolutely no idea about any of the Iraq insurgent groups, understood very little about guerrilla warfare ie the TTPs and just about anything else in Iraq---even up to 2010 they were still having problems in the field and at Abu G.

Example---with a prison holding 6000 prisoners one would expect to find similar ongoing issues that one sees in US prisons but with an insurgency focus--there was ongoing "rock mail" where the detainees knew everything that was ongoing in the camp and what questions were being asked and held recruitment, indoctrination training and IED training all within the prison and under the noses of the guards---when I brought that to the attention of the IC and asked for collection guidance--was told we are not interested.

Only after forcing on to the IC several reports about the ongoing insurgent training inside Abu G ---then finally the national level IC sent down collection guidance---this was early 2006 three years into the war.

Another example--in 2006 due to the extreme shortage of trained interrogators the Army in all of it's wisdom sent a strategic debriefing BN from of all places Korea-- who spoke only Korean and had not an earthly idea even where Iraq was and or who was QJBR/AQI? It took them almost six months to get settle in and then they were mentally "going home" three months later.

OR the other services would send volunteers ie Navy and AF to the Army interrogation school and then off to Iraq where they went home after six months creating a massive amount of churn and instability in the collection processes.

It just was not the CIA--the entire US intelligence interrogation system had serious issues and yet no one talks about it.

The overall failures of the Army interrogation program in Iraq is a little know disaster that no one wants the rug lifted on because someone might just ask-- Why?