There is a big difference between extremely limited (assuming it ever happened prior to the Bush administration) exceptions to policy that are not overtly advertised as a change in policy by an administration.
We're discussing the possibility for an exception to policy, not a change to policy, and keeping it on the low. I still agree it is a method the weak and twisted, but I still allow for a potential exception.
New title:
Torture versus taxation; the bigger evil?
That should make for a short thread.
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The first part seems obvious. But I’m not sure that the intentionality of the act is what makes it intrinsically immoral. Going to war in the sandbox was also intentional, and so is the death penalty.Torture is intentional, collateral damage is accidental.
Collateral damage may be unintended, but I should think that in many cases it is clearly possible and probable. So it would seem an accepted side effect to the intentional action.
Is the acceptability contingent on the (un)predictability of its scope? Does that provide a smoke screen over the morality of it?
Craphappencidental seems to hover somewhere between accidental and intentional.
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
Again, setting up circumstances that seem almost designed to reward and encourage "immoral" financial behavour and then blaming "moral degradation" for the consequences seems... well, see the analogy above with the dog and the ground beef.
Has there ever been a war that was not marked by accusations of torture, atrocity, etc? One might call those parts of collateral damages, as they inevitably seem to accompany war. Of course it was... clumsy, to put it mildly, for the administration to openly sanction that behaviour, rather than expressing shock and carrying on, as the habit of the past has generally been.
Going to war brings a host of miseries, torture and collateral damage among them. It guts the finances too, if we want to get taxes back into he picture. Still we do it... because we believe we must? Because we know it's right? Because we have the "moral courage" to stiffen our upper lips and take on the grim tasks that we know, or maybe believe, must be done?
“The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”
H.L. Mencken
An academic paper 'The (in)effectiveness of torture for combating insurgency' by an American academic; the abstract is quite long, so this is from the opening passage:Link:http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/early...313520023.fullIt is commonly believed that torture is an effective tool for combating an insurgent threat. Yet while torture is practiced in nearly all counterinsurgency campaigns, the evidence documenting torture’s effects remains severely limited. This study provides the first micro-level statistical analysis of torture’s relation to subsequent killings committed by insurgent and counterinsurgent forces. The theoretical arguments contend that torture is ineffective for reducing killings perpetrated by insurgents both because it fails to reduce insurgent capacities for violence and because it can increase the incentives for insurgents to commit future killings. The theory also links torture to other forms of state violence. Specifically, engaging in torture is expected to be associated with increased killings perpetrated by counterinsurgents. Monthly municipal-level data on political violence are used to analyze torture committed by counterinsurgents during the Guatemalan civil war (1977–94). Using a matched-sample, difference-in-difference identification strategy and data compiled from 22 different press and NGO sources as well as thousands of interviews, the study estimates how torture is related to short-term changes in killings perpetrated by both insurgents and counterinsurgents. Killings by counterinsurgents are shown to increase significantly following torture. However, torture appears to have no robust correlation with subsequent killings by insurgents. Based on this evidence the study concludes that torture is ineffective for reducing insurgent perpetrated killings.
davidbfpo
I am sure SWC readers, many of them in the USA, have seen the media flurry over the US Senate report on the CIA's use of torture. There are many arguments over the report's contents, whether it should have been released and what has been / is the impact.
I shall link only one UK press report:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...t-summary.html and one desscriptive piece on the abuses:http://www.vox.com/2014/12/9/7360823...orture-roundup
I did find the remarks of John McCain worth reading in full; his stance on torture is well known and he does ask questions the USA should get answers to:http://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/...1-a58f984db996
Instead of citing Ali Soufan, the ex-FBI Agent, I have chosen an ex-British Army interrogator. His short piece ends with:Link:http://adrianweale.com/2014/12/09/in...n-and-torture/I personally think that one of the key weapons which will defeat Islamic fundamentalism is the moral superiority of the plurality of those who oppose it, whether Muslim, Christian, Buddhist, secular or whatever, and what the Senate Intelligence Committee has told us today suggests that, for a time, the CIA gave up that superiority. How can we now claim that we are better than they are?
(Added later) A detailed riposte by:Link to WSJ article:http://www.wsj.com/articles/cia-inte...ves-1418142644....former CIA Directors George J. Tenet, Porter J. Goss and Michael V. Hayden (a retired Air Force general), and former CIA Deputy Directors John E. McLaughlin, Albert M. Calland (a retired Navy vice admiral) and Stephen R. Kappes.
Last edited by davidbfpo; 12-09-2014 at 11:10 PM.
davidbfpo
David---an interesting and timely thread which ties into two other ongoing threads.
I will comment more later when I have read through the main document but as someone who was a strategic debriefer here in Berlin for over 15 years at eight hours per day five days a week and year after year working in two languages and using interpreters for four others.
And having been a CWO Interrogation Technican and having been an a defense contractor interrogator in both Abu Ghraib and in the field with the 3/3 BCT in Baqubah Diyala AND having been in the IC when the Nixon years forced the system to use effectively for years the "intelligence bible" as what one could and could not do--people need to go to jail.
Why--we sent young soldiers to military prison for their actions in Abu G but not a single senior personality went with them---and now what we just look the other way again?
I spent hours talking with some of the hardest of the hardest Salafists in Abu G, Bucca and in the field---and regardless of their and my personal biases using rapport and respect I had conversations that would raise the eyes and ears of the current senior civilian leadership.
Mistakes that were serious from the beginning;
1. we use often unexperienced interrogators on the military side who where often under the age of 22
2. they had absolutely no understanding of Salafism, insurgency and or it's TTPs and only simply wanted to put people in prison
3. large numbers of these interrogators had never worked with interpreters at all before Iraq
4. a large number of Intel analysts spoke no Arabic and were under the rank of SGT
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
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