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  1. #1
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    My response on the current SWJ thread COIN--Failure? Reading the 2007 interview is critical as the same writer now a professor wrote an editorial that was in the NYTs today ---the Abu Ghraib scandal has never been fully investigated. See:http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/10/op...-was.html?_r=0

    Then my friend you have not fully understood one of the key reasons we and COIN failed in Iraq---which by the way I have often called a war of perception.

    Your problem is you throw so much theory, academic readings, books,and quotes that you simply fail to both "see" and "understand"---until you do you will never progress. You would do well to fully understand the concept "seeing" and "understanding"--ie reality on the ground vs reality in books.

    Remember people die from reality not books.

    I knew this individual you did not thus you do no have any concept of the reality of Iraq thus the "war of perception."

    You have never had an Iraqi insurgent look you in the eyes and say---"what if I do not say anything-- you will send me to Gitmo anyway right or to Abu Ghraib anyway"--that my friend is and was Iraq---so get out of the books and into the field.

    You have never had to be a prosecutor, defense lawyer, jury, and judge and make decisions on individuals that had second and third or even fourth order of effects if you made one wrong decision.

    You have absolutely no true knowledge of Iraq and yet you seriously think Iraq was a COIN success.

    Would do yourself well to read the article and to think about it since the release yesterday of the CIA report.

    AND then ask yourself how did that drive the insurgency against the US--and in that part of the world "perception matters".

    An Iraq Interrogator's Nightmare:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...020801680.html

    Network News

    By Eric Fair
    Friday, February 9, 2007

    A man with no face stares at me from the corner of a room. He pleads for help, but I'm afraid to move. He begins to cry. It is a pitiful sound, and it sickens me. He screams, but as I awaken, I realize the screams are mine.

    That dream, along with a host of other nightmares, has plagued me since my return from Iraq in the summer of 2004. Though the man in this particular nightmare has no face, I know who he is. I assisted in his interrogation at a detention facility in Fallujah. I was one of two civilian interrogators assigned to the division interrogation facility (DIF) of the 82nd Airborne Division. The man, whose name I've long since forgotten, was a suspected associate of Khamis Sirhan al-Muhammad, the Baath Party leader in Anbar province who had been captured two months earlier.

    The lead interrogator at the DIF had given me specific instructions: I was to deprive the detainee of sleep during my 12-hour shift by opening his cell every hour, forcing him to stand in a corner and stripping him of his clothes. Three years later the tables have turned. It is rare that I sleep through the night without a visit from this man. His memory harasses me as I once harassed him.

    Despite my best efforts, I cannot ignore the mistakes I made at the interrogation facility in Fallujah. I failed to disobey a meritless order, I failed to protect a prisoner in my custody, and I failed to uphold the standards of human decency. Instead, I intimidated, degraded and humiliated a man who could not defend himself. I compromised my values. I will never forgive myself.

    American authorities continue to insist that the abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib was an isolated incident in an otherwise well-run detention system. That insistence, however, stands in sharp contrast to my own experiences as an interrogator in Iraq. I watched as detainees were forced to stand naked all night, shivering in their cold cells and pleading with their captors for help. Others were subjected to long periods of isolation in pitch-black rooms. Food and sleep deprivation were common, along with a variety of physical abuse, including punching and kicking. Aggressive, and in many ways abusive, techniques were used daily in Iraq, all in the name of acquiring the intelligence necessary to bring an end to the insurgency. The violence raging there today is evidence that those tactics never worked. My memories are evidence that those tactics were terribly wrong.

    While I was appalled by the conduct of my friends and colleagues, I lacked the courage to challenge the status quo. That was a failure of character and in many ways made me complicit in what went on. I'm ashamed of that failure, but as time passes, and as the memories of what I saw in Iraq continue to infect my every thought, I'm becoming more ashamed of my silence.

    Some may suggest there is no reason to revive the story of abuse in Iraq. Rehashing such mistakes will only harm our country, they will say. But history suggests we should examine such missteps carefully. Oppressive prison environments have created some of the most determined opponents. The British learned that lesson from Napoleon, the French from Ho Chi Minh, Europe from Hitler. The world is learning that lesson again from Ayman al-Zawahiri. What will be the legacy of abusive prisons in Iraq?

    We have failed to properly address the abuse of Iraqi detainees. Men like me have refused to tell our stories, and our leaders have refused to own up to the myriad mistakes that have been made. But if we fail to address this problem, there can be no hope of success in Iraq. Regardless of how many young Americans we send to war, or how many militia members we kill, or how many Iraqis we train, or how much money we spend on reconstruction, we will not escape the damage we have done to the people of Iraq in our prisons.

    I am desperate to get on with my life and erase my memories of my experiences in Iraq. But those memories and experiences do not belong to me. They belong to history. If we're doomed to repeat the history we forget, what will be the consequences of the history we never knew? The citizens and the leadership of this country have an obligation to revisit what took place in the interrogation booths of Iraq, unpleasant as it may be. The story of Abu Ghraib isn't over. In many ways, we have yet to open the book.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 12-10-2014 at 08:06 PM. Reason: citation in quotes, add links

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    Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 12-10-2014 at 06:43 PM.

  3. #3
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default Two professionals say

    First John Schindler, ex-NSA, who was serving after 9/11, has a long column and I cite only one passage:
    Let there be no misunderstanding. While CIA officials are now insisting, contra the SSCI report, that the special interrogation program was a success, having prevented terrorism — and there is no doubt their claims are largely correct, in a technical sense — from any big picture view, it was a disaster, having delivered minimal gains at vast and enduring political cost.
    Link:http://20committee.com/2014/12/10/ci...#comment-30998

    Second Nigel Inkster, ex-SIS (MI6) and now @ IISS. Again one passage:
    The entire global history of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency shows that when governments are suddenly confronted by a seemingly existential threat they do not understand, they invariably overreact and resort to illiberal techniques to address the threat. This appears to be part and parcel of the human condition.
    Link:http://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices...r-torture-c673
    davidbfpo

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    Council Member Firn's Avatar
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    Looking back it is amazing how quickly key institutions of the USA endorsed wide-spread torture and too which degree they tried to justify with 'legal' arguments. Considering the incredible investment into that whole aspect of the war against terrorism it is just astonishing how little mostly rational and objective arguments for the long-term benefit of the USA as a nation seem to have played. Insititutional imperatives, often self-interested actors, social and political pressure and other internal dynamics trumped them badly, with some good 'ol gut feeling thrown in at the highest decision levels. In the end the ever present ordinary men tortured on the orders of other ordinary ones sitting at their desks. Many around the world, US citiziens obviously included, already payed a high price and will many more will likely pay for those actions by the US and to a lesser degree by some of it's allies.

    I feel mostly sadness, so much blood, effort and capital invested, so much pain inflicted and so much wasted for so little overall gain, if at all.
    Last edited by Firn; 12-11-2014 at 11:53 AM.
    ... "We need officers capable of following systematically the path of logical argument to its conclusion, with disciplined intellect, strong in character and nerve to execute what the intellect dictates"

    General Ludwig Beck (1880-1944);
    Speech at the Kriegsakademie, 1935

  5. #5
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
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    Default Did torture cost American lives?

    In an article in Strife (from KIngs War Studies) a former US Army colonel asks questions that maybe fit here better than the partisan politics in the USA:
    There are important questions about how the program may have affected the conduct of the wars, including:

    • To what extent did the perceptions and justifications of the program, to include the actual and perceived use of torture, affect our soldiers and their mission?
    • To what extent did senior leaders’ public justifications of the program affect broader policy and strategy options in the conduct of the wars?
    • To what extent did perceptions and justifications of the program promote an ends-justify-the-means mentality within the military in Afghanistan and Iraq?
    • To what extent did the perceptions and justifications foster a belief in the military that such practices were acceptable and could be used by them in combat?
    • To what extent did ‘false positives’ or erroneous reports, perhaps made out of fear of torture, lead to military actions that cost lives (civilian and military) and created unnecessary enemies?
    • To what extent did the actual and perceived use of torture compromise the military’s moral standing in the eyes of the people in Afghanistan and Iraq? In what ways did that affect the mission and its prospects of success?

    Link:http://strifeblog.org/2014/12/11/did...merican-lives/
    davidbfpo

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    Quote Originally Posted by davidbfpo View Post
    In an article in Strife (from KIngs War Studies) a former US Army colonel asks questions that maybe fit here better than the partisan politics in the USA:[/LIST]
    Link:http://strifeblog.org/2014/12/11/did...merican-lives/
    Bluntly put---it killed any chance of a success in Iraq---the CIA program was only one part of a systemic intel problem throughout the entire military detainee and interrogation program in Iraq that "cost" the US in the long run the support of the Sunni population.

  7. #7
    Council Member Firn's Avatar
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    I just came across the latest global surveys by Pews. It is important to conserve a critical view, especially in some cases of some countries but it is still highly interesting stuff:



    Despite all the reservations it is stark stuff to see where the US are on that chart and in which company...
    Last edited by Firn; 06-24-2015 at 06:33 PM.
    ... "We need officers capable of following systematically the path of logical argument to its conclusion, with disciplined intellect, strong in character and nerve to execute what the intellect dictates"

    General Ludwig Beck (1880-1944);
    Speech at the Kriegsakademie, 1935

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