Them thar' smart folk gots themselfs commmpuuuters to do that.Originally Posted by jcustis
Anyone know if the DO folks are reading about the LRDG? I've got a whole shelf of books they are welcome to browse. They may learn some minor tactics that have always been known.
So....
with all this deliberation, what is the ideal rifle squad and platoon organization, in all of yall's opinion.
ROKMAN, were you in the infantry, and if so, what rifle squad composition did you find yourself either favouring, or just simply having to make the best of while over in the Sandbox? Your platoon or company - mech, air asslt? Your command - Plt, Coy?
Last edited by Norfolk; 10-22-2007 at 03:30 AM.
Tank man myself....
No, I spent all my time with tanks. I lack the experience of small unit tactics since the use of tanks is inherently for large scale battle and often employed as a battalion. I know that the future wars most of the conflict will involve small units. Which I don't really have experience but do read quite a lot of.
There are four general options that I am currently studying, which led me to this forum.
The Commando 21 organization used by the British Royal Marines. On a large unit viewpoint I like it. Basically it is a battalion sized unit, consisting of a logistics company, a C4ISR company, 2 firepower support companies that "shoots in" the 2 close combat companies. Each close combat company has a dedicated firepower support company. Hence this battalion generally has two field commands mimicking the "Combat Command A/B" system used by the US in WWII. However the close combat company is based on the 8-man squad. Is this squad too light or does it matter at all, since they have the support of a firepower support company. Should or shouldn't such firepower assets be allocated at lower echelons, like Tom Odom's idea.
The US Marines Distributed Ops is another candidate, based on experience in Iraq and Afghanistan but are they too focused on COIN? What about the case for conventional wars where the enemy is not an insurgent?
Tom Odom's idea, tested in experiments but creates a rather large platoon of over 60 soldiers and a company of over 300 soldiers, do we have the manpower for this? Or is it the case where the brigade treats these units more like mini-battalions and thus will be employed as such? Also there seems to be a lot of specialization, wouldn't it be better to arrange for general purpose unit organization.
German Panzergrenadiers a squad of 10 soldiers, a Squad Leader and Assistant Squad Leader, 2 Machine Guns, 2 Assistant Machine Gunners, 4 Rifleman. The squad can be split into two just like how the British do with their 8 man squads. However this seems that the squad can only operate as part of a platoon. (They basically operate like typical platoon of 3 squads.)
Another question is which performs best in terms of Squad organization the ones in current usage that I have are these:
The old 11 man Army squad of 2 teams plus Squad Leader.
The Marine squad of 13 man of three teams plus Squad Leader.
The DO Marine squad of 12 man of three teams with the Squad Leader embedded in a team.
The Army mechanized infantry platoon of two 9 man squads plus a five man machine gun team of two machine guns (the 2 X 9 plus 5).
The German 10 man squad of two teams with a Squad Leader and Assistant Squad Leader.
The British 8 man squad operating (similarly to the German squad) within the British Commando 21 system in all its entirety.
Gotta ask.... and appreciate the responses.
Last edited by ROKMAN; 10-22-2007 at 04:30 AM.
ROKMAN - very good questions to ask, but I don't think you're as out of your league as you seem to think. General William E. DePuy, who gave the US Army much of its present tactical doctrine, obeserved that there was quite a striking correlation between infantry and armour small-unit tactics; the principles of movement, suppression, assault, and security were the same.
The RM Commando 21 organization is remininiscent of that of the Bundesheer's Mountain and Parachute Battalions (at least until recent years - they've reorganized, I'm not clear on their present composition): Two Rifle Companies and two Anti-Tank Companies, plus HQ and other CS and CSS elements. I'm not completely sold on it, but it offers intriguing possibilities.
The 8-man Rifle Section is a personal peeve of mine. That's what I had to use in the RCR (most Commonwealth Armies use an 8- or 9-man Rifle Section, the difference between 8 or 9 being dependent upon funds for troops slots, and when the 9th man is authorized, he's stuck carrying a Carl Gustav. The 8-man Rifle Section is easy to control, and responsive, but vulnerable. Having 8 men gives you almost no capacity to sustain battle losses, and as I was told in the RCR, such a Section would lose 60% of its strength in the first 24 hours of offensive operations (while attacking a dug-in Soviet Motorized Rifle unit, I presumed - and after attacking such a position on ex, I can see why). Clearly, there's a problem there.
The other problem with the 8-man Section is that the Section Commander and the Section 2i/c are not free to move about as necessary within the Section. The 8-man Section is divided into two 4-man Fire Teams (Australian, British, and New Zealand Armies) or Assault Groups (Canadian Army). The Section Commander personally leads one fire team/assault group, and the Section 2i/c the other. While discipline is certainly tight and control good (and the NCOs are practically indistinguishable from the other soldiers of the section - a good thing), the NCOs are necessarily divided in their attentions by fighting the section as a whole, fighting their own fire teams/assault groups, staying alive themselves, and handling commiunications and sitreps, etc., with platoon, company, etc. That's a lot of burden and a lot of potential distraction.
The final problem with the 8-man Section is its tactical use in offensive operations. It does not typically use the US technique of sending a fire team forward a safe distance with the other (or in USMC others) following, thus potentially avoiding the total destruction of a squad in the first bursts of enemy machine gun/mortar fire. The entire section, both fire teams/assault groups advance like an over-sized US fire team, while the rest of the platoon supports; the advantage of this is that, coming under fire, the entire section instantly responds, bringing its entire firepower to bear on the source of enemy fire; the disadvantage of this is as I described immediately above - the section might not survive the initial enemy fire to respond in kind.
Yeah, ROKMAN, I agree that the Marines' DO Squad is hardly ideal for non-COIN ops. This is a reconaissance/forward observer/raid element, not really a line squad.
I like Tom's ideas for a squad (except for the breech specialization by just one element). As for whether it and higher units are too large and too demanding upon manpower, I'll put it this way: using the present US Army organization and tactical concepts, you'll suffer up to twice the losses while having only 2/3rds of the manpower to begin with, compared to Tom's organization and the tactical concepts it uses. When the shooting starts in a high-intensity war, no one is going to like the fact that the infantry battalions are running out of rifleman at least a few times faster than the Army can train replacements for them - that's a real manpower problem. Tom's way goes a long way to avoiding that.
The German panzergrenadier sqaud was similar to British Commonwealth section with the following differences:
1. Used GPMGs/MMGs instead of LMGs - YEAH!
2. The Squad Leader had control over the Squads' machine guns, while ASL led assault; in Commonwealth Section, the Section commander "leads" the assault, while the Section 2i/c "controls" the cover fire
.
3. The Germans did not use Battle Drill or Fire Teams; once the fire fight was won, the machine gun teams simply stayed with the SL, and the riflemen went with the ASL into the assault. But as the Squad reduced in size from an authorized 12 men and finally down to 8-9 men, it lost its offensive power. In the defence, the machine gun teams nominally remained under the control of the SL; in practice, the machine gun teams were the defensive line, as there were so few riflemen left by late in the war - so an NCO per machine gun team was not exactly unheard of.
The Germans, like the Commonwealth, held that the squad was not independent, but just a part of the platoon. But like the Commonwealth, the Germans found that independent squad/section operations were necessary.
As to your last question ROKMAN, the answer requires some explanation. The USMC Rifle Squad is best (but not quite ideal) in and of itself, provided that it has machine guns, rather than automatic rifles. But the RM Commando 21 organization follows the German Mountain/Parachute Battalion organization, which provides for the best minor-unit level suppression. In WWII, German infantry battalions either had a full machine-gun company, or each rifle company had a full machine-gun platoon (depending on circumstances), plus either a separate Heavy Company (mortar, pioneer, AT, AA platoons, etc) or elements of those attached from Regimental companies. With 4-6 MGs per platoon, and 2-3 platoons per machine gun company (plus mortar fire), German rifle companies were often able to more or less walk to their objectives (yes, I said walk, not pepper-pot/bound) with such fire support coordinated at either company- or even battalion-level.
The more recent German organizations are developments of this, and with the Royal Marines also adopting this organization, having 8-man Rifle Sections is only a problem when:
1. Either the terrain or cover masks the Fire Support Companies' fires.
2. Coordination with the Fire Support Companies breaks down or said companies come under serious attack.
3. When 8-man Rifle Sections are detached on independent missions by as a result of tactical circumstances.
In these circumstances, the 13-man USMC Rifle Squad is much better suited. It can provide its own heavy suppressive fires using two of its three fire teams while the other assaults; it can take heavy losses and still remain effective; the squad as a whole does not have to reorganize to accomodate unfamiliar and newly attached strangers who themselves are unfamiliar with this particular squad; and you don't have to take fire support (platoon weapons sqaud or heavy weapons attached from company) away from the parent platoon or company which is already having to deal with the loss of an entire squad while still facing the potential for contact with the enemy.
Finally, with the Squad Leader free to fight the squad and not have to fight a fire team as well, the USMC Rifle Squad's only major problem is that it does not have a dedicated ASL likewise free from fighting his own fire team in order to handle communications/sitreps/adminstration/logistics and the like in order to free the SL from having to deal with platoon/company when ever they get on the horn; and the ASL can deal with platoon/company over all the beans n' bullets matters while the SL deals with the enemy. I think Tom had that idea.
Sorry for the long response ROKMAN.
It's all good. Your explanation is helpful.
So basically having an independent Squad Leader (SL) and an Assistant Squad Leader (ASL) to make up a squad of 3 teams each with 4 troops centered around a machine gun (GPMG) is the ideal? Then wouldn't that make the team too small, wouldn't there be a need for an additional ammo carrier? Essentially making it a 5 man team? If this is the case then that would make the squad have 17 troops. Also how would they be able to assault with the GPMG? Should the assaulters then be equipped with LMG (SAWs in fact) to make them effective assaulters?
Recently a friend of mine proposes that the Marines and Army should use a 20 man squad (more like section) built up of 3 teams and a HQ team. The HQ team has the SL, an ASL (communicating with the Company), 2 Sharpshooters, and a medic. Each line team has a fireteam leader, GPMG, 2 GPMG Assistants/Ammo carriers, and an assaulter/grenadier. Basically it seems like a heavier version of Tom Odom's idea. I argued that this itself is more like a section rather than a squad and can act independently from a platoon. Hence a company should be made up of 4 of these sections plus a CO HQ section or squad. He still insists on having platoon organizations to make this up. Resulting in a 300 man plus company. Which I think is too big.
This leads me to a another question. How is the modern German Bundeswehr organize their squad/platoon/companies. From what I can tell the Germans still use a derivative of their MG42 but now chambered for 7.62, which make it so that they are using a GPMG in their squads. Do they still fight in the same way that did since WWII or do they break it down into fire teams now? If so how many fire teams to a squad and how many troops in a fire team?
Lastly the Royal Marines use of the Commando 21 organization for a battalion sized force is a good system but the 8 man squad needs to be ditched for something more robust. Is that right?
Thanks
This sounds like the same kind of thinking that brought the US Army the current Brigade Combat Teams that are supposed to be capable of extended independent action. I shudder to think about the sustainment tail needed for this "squad" and its associated platoon, company, and higher echelons.
ROKMAN,
I'd offer that the ideal rifle squad configuration remains the 13-man Marine Corps rifle squad (though it could stand the 14th man addition as Norfolk mentioned) because of a number of factors.
1) In the USMC, infantry is infantry. We do not differentiate between heavy and light. The only real difference is the manner of tactical mobility to the fight (boats, AAVs, helos, etc.)
2) The USMC Rifle Squad benefits from the larger MTOE of the Rifle Company, and its structure of 3x Rifle Platoons and a Weapons Platoon of 6x M240G teams, 3 LWCM (3x 60mm tubes) sqds, and 6x MK-153 armed asslt teams. The weapons platoon can be tasked out in a mind-numbing number of ways, and that includes teams/sqds attached to any or all of the rifle platoons. even in the context of a meeting engagement, it is not far-fetched to see a 60mm sqd attached to the lead platoon/advance guard for imediate suppression support in a direct lay mode.
3) In the patrolling context, it allows for simple organization and tasking into Assault, Security, and Support teams and facilitates the accomplishment of ambush, security, etc. patrols
Earlier questions of where the remainder of the platoon is when the battle is joined with either a 9-man or 13-man squad are terribly appropriate to this discussion. The Marine Corps does have a mindset of "biting off" all that it can chew, in a sense. It's evident in some of our doctrine on satellite patrolling in an urban environment.
It is interesting to note that in terms of heliborne lift planning, it is not doctrinally correct to plan for a CH-46 to lift a full-strength rifle squad. We're fortunate that manning levels often mean we don't have to come to slicing and dicing the number too much, but adding a 14th squad member would pose greater difficulty in heliborne assault planning until our medium lift platforms transition to pure MV-22s (and assuming floor loading is a possible flight profile).
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