Rifle squad composition

[kaur]

News from UK.

The British Army is already providing an immediate
response by redeploying 7.62 mm L96 sniper
rifles (made surplus by the arrival of the L115
.338 rifles) and 7.62 mm L7 General Purpose
Machine Guns (GPMGs) down to section level,
carried by foot patrols. This is good, but not
ideal; the manually-loaded L96 is slow-firing,
the GPMG very heavy.

http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/btbjdw.pdf

It seems that 1 unit has HK 417 in squad.

[William F. Owen]

The British Army is already providing an immediate
response by redeploying 7.62 mm L96 sniper
rifles (made surplus by the arrival of the L115
.338 rifles) and 7.62 mm L7 General Purpose
Machine Guns (GPMGs) down to section level,
carried by foot patrols. This is good, but not
ideal; the manually-loaded L96 is slow-firing,
the GPMG very heavy.

GPMG very heavy? Really? Compared to what? A Javelin Round? Sorry but the article referenced is trying to say that something that is not actually a problem, is problem.

GPMGs into the platoon, some sniper weapons, and light mortars solves 90% of the problems. Giving every man an HK-417 just makes the old problem worse and the platoon less effective per kg of carried weight. The UK could solve the problem. It chooses not to.

[Kiwigrunt]

Also interesting to see that (on the photo that Kaur posted) the UK SF are using L85's instead of their much lighter Colt Canada sfw (M4 with 16" barrel). Wonder if that is for increased long range accuracy or maybe to do with reliability. The latter would be a reverse from early L85 days.

[William F. Owen]

Also interesting to see that (on the photo that Kaur posted) the UK SF are using L85's instead of their much lighter Colt Canada sfw (M4 with 16" barrel). Wonder if that is for increased long range accuracy or maybe to do with reliability. The latter would be a reverse from early L85 days.

These guys are actually SFSG, so not actually SF. They are using the L85 because they are not scaled as SF except for UORs. SF are still using C8's (L-119) ... last I heard.

[Kiwigrunt]

These guys are actually SFSG, so not actually SF. They are using the L85 because they are not scaled as SF except for UORs. SF are still using C8's (L-119) ... last I heard.

Ah, I see, all maka da sense now. That's partly the 'old' 1-Para, isn't it?

[William F. Owen]

Ah, I see, all maka da sense now. That's partly the 'old' 1-Para, isn't it?

Well yes, that's the idea. Last plan I heard it was 2 Coy's of Para, 1 Coy of Royal Marines and 1 Coy of RAF Regiment (the old "2 Squadron!"), but I think that may have all gone by the way in recent times - as there simply aren't enough bodies in RM or RAF Regt.

[Firn]

Some further thoughts.

Let us look at a similar mission in difficult terrain to the one in the video. I think we all know that the GPMG is heavy and looses some of its effectivness (grazing fire) in the mountains. The fire support by mortars becomes more important because they can touch almost all places of the terrain. This goes also for the to a lesser extent for the 40mm.

Would it make sense if the element on overwatch swaps the second GPMG for the observation and target acquistation/fire direction gadgets mentioned above, some additional MG ammunition and a DMR rifle? I could also imagine to have a dedicated HE-projector instead of the second GMPG, perhaps something like that new Korean Rifle, the XM25 or simply a simple 40mm GL with more ammunition carried by the team.

Perhaps the key idea of the above post to emphasize and strenghten the ability of a "normal" element of the infantry to observe, recon and surveil the battlespace. This way it can better hunt for precious and much needed information and enemy elements. The same unit should also have the capability to effectively and efficiently direct the supporting indirect fire across two organic levels, the grenade launcher of the unit and the platoon's mortar and those of other layers. In certain missions under a certain METT-TC it may be worth to do so at the expense of the second GPMG.

Overall this is part of the larger debate about the mobility, protection and firepower of the infantry.

Firn