Rifle squad composition

[Rifleman]

I can see the advantages to the 13 man Marine Corps squad. Since I think that won't happen in the Army I would at least like to see the Army return to the old 11 man squad of two five man fire teams and the squad leader.

Organize the 11 man squads into big platoons of 50 soldiers: three 11 man rifle squads, one 11 man weapons squad, and two three man command cells. I wouldn't even mind seeing a platoon zeroed out of each company, if necessary, to fill up two big 50 man platoons. How many two up/one back company attacks are we doing these days anyway?

11 men is a bigger than usual weapons squad but I think it makes sense. Base each five man team around a GPMG gunner and his assistant. Now add in a grenadier to cover the gunner's dead space, a sharpshooter/DM (might as well put all the 7.62 weapons in the same squad), and maybe rocket launcher. It would probably be best to have the grenadier be the team leader.

The old 11 man squad isn't as flexible as the Marine Corps three team squad but it's more robust and sustainable than what we have now.

[Norfolk]

I can see the advantages to the 13 man Marine Corps squad. Since I think that won't happen in the Army I would at least like to see the Army return to the old 11 man squad of two five man fire teams and the squad leader.

The old 11 man squad isn't as flexible as the Marine Corps three team squad but it's more robust and sustainable than what we have now.

And sad to say Rifleman, the Army will not get even that.

[CPT Holzbach]

Take a look at this article, written by COL Hackworth. It's about how he re-organized one of his battalions to fight the VC in Vietnam. Fascinating look at adapting to circumstances on the ground in terms of MTOE and a guerrilla enemy. Oh, and Norfolk, I think you'll like the picture at the top...

[Norfolk]

Take a look at this article, written by COL Hackworth. It's about how he re-organized one of his battalions to fight the VC in Vietnam. Fascinating look at adapting to circumstances on the ground in terms of MTOE and a guerrilla enemy. Oh, and Norfolk, I think you'll like the picture at the top...

Oh Cap'n, all those belts of ammo bring back a few memories best left unrecalled.

But it was sure fun burning them all up!

[Duke Togo]

This thread is why I joined the forum.

Wow it has so much information I have to take a few days to absorb it. Timing is every thing as I’m actually researching a similar topic for an article I’m writing for Special Warfare magazine on the restructuring of ODAs to adopt a more modular flexibility.

Many of my resources have been quoted here already but there are so many additional points brought up in this thread that I have to reconsider some of my points. I understand that the topic was more based on an Infantry Squad but IMO base building blocks of “what works” in small unit tactics..well…works. The enemy doesn’t know he’s facing Infantry or Rangers or SF (maybe we’re older) so I feel the points brought up are definitely applicable to my article.

However I try to look at the structural needs for the full range of SF core mission sets ie. What is needed for FID (re JCETs), UW, COIN, SR, DA etc. I try to use historical examples and show there is precedence to a smaller sub structure that can be managed within the ODA construct. (ie 3 X 4 Man “stacks” or “cells”). This will allow for adaptation WITHOUT any serious MTOE changes that will shake up the old hands resistant to change. A 12 man ODA can still exist but instead of breaking down into a MOS driven split team (current not practiced TTP) it would be able to split into the 3 MOS immaterial cells. Of course mission to mission the MOS factor may come into play as needed but in the middle of a firefight is not the time to have to think the junior Bravo is supposed to be the number one man and the senior Charlie is the number two man. Assault stacks are kept generic because each man may/will have to fill each position based on area coverage. The same for fire and maneuver, MOS is really not an issue at that point.

The 4 man element also works well in our current mobility tactics as 2 cells can fully man a two vehicle element.

Again I need to read and look closely at the great points made about heavy vs light etc and the types of fire power a single stack/cell realistically would have. I truthfully approached this from the generic modularity stand point thinking we should better suborganized to be better suited for the full range of missions and didn’t look at it from a straight tactical/Infantry POV.

Any/all ideas of course are welcome. Thanks again for this post.

Duke

[Norfolk]

This thread is why I joined the forum. Duke

Glad you enjoy the thread; kind of fond of it myself.

[Ken White]

FWIW, long ago in another lifetime (and before "The A-Team" caused an A team to become an ODA) while prowling around rice paddies and through elephant grass and sleeping in bamboo clumps, the usual mode was to just break into four man teams that fell out sort of by default without regard to grade or MOS. Worked for most Teams most of the time. Every now and then a team would have a difficult to like personality and someone would have to be ordered to use him but that usually worked out okay as well.

Back in the day with a bunch of iconoclasts there was strong aversion to top down doctrine so Group just said do it and most C teams just let the teams work out the TTP. Had the added advantage of encouraging initiative -- and bouncing different ideas around helped everyone develop better approaches. People are pretty quick to sense what will work best and adopt it but, conversely, regardless of what Building 4 says, one size doesn't fit all in the realm of minor tactics...

There was always a battle between the UW versus ID versus DA crowds, fans for all three approaches could be found. My observation was the DA guys didn't like indig work (and that varied by country or area), the UW guys didn't like the extra and repetitious work that went with training for DA and the ID folks were in between and mostly were in the "whatever it takes" mode. I mention that only because it affected the way the 4 man teams shook out, they tended to be different for each mission.

[Duke Togo]

Ken

That’s exactly what I’m talking about. With a more modular MOS immaterial force structure comes better mission flexibility and the ability to task organize based on the mission or the over quoted and seldom used “Troop to Task” concept.

This smaller MOS immaterial structure also builds leaders as NCOs will lead their cells at a far more junior rank then when they traditionally become the Detachment team sergeant. With the high OPTEMPO and commitment to CENTCOM can we not better divide and conquer on the force commitment to FID missions in other theaters world wide? I’ve been on many JCET with one or two guys on the platform and the rest of the team either prepping the material for the next day or sitting in the back of the class.

At the more advisory type LCE roles (re JSOTF-P) are 12 advisors needed at the Battalion level? Can a four man element form the advisory LCE while the remainder of the ODA breaks down into a intell/targeting cell and maybe another out doing village assessments? Or can we cover down on 3 Battalions with a four man cell at each, thus spreading our unit coverage and not committing more forces?

Here’s some of the Pros and Cons I’ve come up with, of course as I mentioned this is BEFORE I discovered this site and thread so this weekend I’m going to print off the entire thread and comb over it with a fine tooth comb.

Pros
• Flexible
• Modular
• MOS immaterial-troops to task
• Fits most current TTPs (CQB stack, 4 man recce team, 4 man Mobility, etc)
• Allows for force multiplication (re more missions): 12 divided by 3 equals three times the amount of useable “teams” for many missions.
• Reinforces the “thru-by-with” mentality: Hard to take a target down with four guys, becomes doable with 12 or even more 15 or 20, the larger we make ODAs the more we promote unilateral mission mindset.
• Develops tactical leaders at the lower levels
• Smaller profile/footprint element
• MOS immaterial- Promotes Generalization of Operators: DA centric operations have forced SF to become more and more specialized (shooters/assaulters) and less and less generalized.
• Smaller units (not always four I know) have some historical precedence in SOF units: ie recce teams, OSS jedbugs, etc

Cons
• Smaller package=weaker force pro posture: Will higher fear deploying 4 operators without the safety in number (albeit only 12 normally)
• MOS immaterial force structure downplays MOS technical expertise
• Breaks from SF centric historical ODA/split team concept
• Less control of smaller teams: Will higher allow 4 man teams led by a senior NCO deploy on missions with no officer?

Feedback is appreciated. And all good ideas/quotes will be credited in the article. Paul Howe (Leadership and Training for the Fight) sent me some great ideas about this stuff I’ll pull out of my notes and post later this weekend.

Thanks again for the feedback and great stuff.

VR

Duke