If that's what he said, he was wrong.
The BAR used 20 rd magazines, the BAR man needed no help in loading. No one routinely carried extra ammunition for the BAR though it was done on rare occasions (METT-TC again). The BAR Man had a BAR Belt. One model that carried 20 magazines, 400 rounds plus one in the weapon for 21 mags / 420 rounds, more than enough for most situations, another that carried 12 mags but that was issued with two six mag bandoliers for a total of 24 mags / 480 rds -- the idea was that the bandoliers could be carried by Riflemen in the squad; said Riflemen quickly figured out the solution to that was to lose their bandolier.... Links:Originally Posted by selil
LINK.
LINK
The two imperatives were that the BAR Man be a little guy (harder to hit) and that if he got hit, the nearest man took the weapon and ammo to keep the weapon in play.
Agree with the rest of your comment.
It's interesting how US Army and USMC tactical thought has been so powerfully influenced by an AR that was competing against LMGs back in the World Wars, and still exerts such force that neither the Army nor the Marines seem to be able to dispense with the "Automatic Rifleman" role and transition to the Light Machine Gunner at Squad level in doctrine as well as equipment. Even two generations after most other Western Armies did so. Very curious; not sure what to make of this situation.
Belt feds, like all weapons, have pluses and minuses.
For the Infantry platoon, the negatives are bothersome, not least that the weapons are heavy and unwieldy -- and they fire up too much Ammo in different packaging (the two biggest problems). The Model 1944 Johnson was a good compromise in all directions but was doomed by politics. Having worked with everything from the BAR through the M1919A6, the M14E2, M60 (several variants), M240, an experimental M16 w/ heavy barrel and the MG 3 and a couple of exotics, a heavy barrel AR that has adequate mag capacity would be ideal. The 249 is not great but slides by.
The Ultimax has merit, so does this LINK -- it fires semi-auto from a closed bolt and full auto from an open bolt, ala the FG42 and the Johnsons.
Nice piece of kit, Ken.A few of those in each Squad or Section conceivably could resolve certain nagging matters.
The more I used the M-249, the less I was impressed with it. Besides jamming more often than I cared it to, I hated the sound of the link swishing and even rattling around inside the box.
I just remember that Kirby on Combat! was always gettin shot and never ever used the sight on his BAR...
This is excellent point that I used to try to make. Since I'm 6'4 it was always assumed that I (or anyone else who was big) should carry the 240 or 249. I used to bring up this very point about being harder to hit. The argument against my argument is that I could carry it longer. Anyway, I always ended up carrying it.
"Politics are too important to leave to the politicians"
RE:I think adding the two BARs to the Squad to create two fire teams was a huge mistake. "Huge" as in it perpetuated the problem it was supposed to solve in terms of creating effective fire and manoeuvre for the squad and not the platoon.Originally Posted by William F. Owen
...The other damage done by Marshall was the 2 x BARs in Korea and the loss of the .30 M1/M2 Carbine.
I am a fan of the M1/M2 Carbine. (you can carry 90 rounds on the weapon) It was a superbly designed military weapon (albeit by a convicted felon), far superior to 9mm SMGs, that were also in widespread use at the time, and far lighter, and more controllable than .45 SMGs.
Marshall recommended ditching it, just on hearsay, and did not do any empirical testing. While the .30 Carbine was denigrated in US service, it was successful elsewhere - UK, France and Israel. Like 5.56mm, the issue of "stopping power" did not arise.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I am a fan of the M1/M2 Carbine. (you can carry 90 rounds on the weapon) It was a superbly designed military weapon (albeit by a convicted felon), far superior to 9mm SMGs, that were also in widespread use at the time, and far lighter, and more controllable than .45 SMGs.
Indeed, if the M1/M2 carbine (I have no experience with it) is anywhere near as simple, reliable and user-friendly as my 5.56 Mini 14, then certainly the older dime a dozen SMGs like Sten and M3 grease gun would be hard pushed to beat it.
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
Fully agree. The Brits tried it with their L86 and went to beltfed.It's interesting how US Army and USMC tactical thought has been so powerfully influenced by an AR that was competing against LMGs back in the World Wars, and still exerts such force that neither the Army nor the Marines seem to be able to dispense with the "Automatic Rifleman" role and transition to the Light Machine Gunner at Squad level in doctrine as well as equipment. Even two generations after most other Western Armies did so. Very curious; not sure what to make of this situation.
The USMC are currently again looking at introducing a ‘true’ AR, in addition to keeping the Minimi’s at …squad level? Yet another class of weapons! Like the UK section where only the section commander and the 2ic carry an IW. The other 6 all carry some form of support weapon. To support what exactly? As there are no riflemen to support, the support weapons, by default, become IWs. How effective are they then as support weapons with their high ammo expenditure and the section commanders’ relative lack of control. I would suggest that they are not effective to their full potential as support weapons. And by the way, who carries the additional handouts like tank and bunker teasers, claymore’s, etc?
So how many different classes of weapons do we justifiably maintain and how minor can the distinctions between those classes be before the differentiation becomes muddled and therefore possibly defeats the purpose.
The difference between a rifle and an MG is clear.
The difference between a 5.56 MG and a 7.62 MG is a little bit less clear.
The difference between an M4 and an M16 gets petty foggy (unless maybe if it’s got a good scope on it).
I would suggest that the difference between a SAW and an AR and from there to an IW becomes a smudge and therefore a waste of time. Every individual holding a slightly different weapon becomes a specialist at nothing clearly distinguishable. It’s a good way to confuse the section commander/squad leader and get his concentration from ensuring everyone is shooting at the enemy, to pin picking on which specialist should shoot at which target in particular, with associated rates of fire.
When GPMG’s are brought down to section level, the 5.56 Minimi becomes little more than an AR. Without the GPMG there, the 5.56 Minimi is THE section machine gun.
An AR at fire team level? How about riflemen (when needed) switching their IWs to full auto during the final stages of the assault, when the supporting guns have to switch their fire? Isn’t that what assault rifles were designed for? During the final stages of an assault I deem it unlikely that the fire team will be ‘manoeuvring around the AR’.
Indeed a very nice piece of equipment, I want one!Originally Posted by Ken White
The Ultimax has merit, so does this LINK -- it fires semi-auto from a closed bolt and full auto from an open bolt, ala the FG42 and the Johnsons.
Instead of calling it an AR and issuing it to one person in the fireteam, why not call it something like a product improved assault rifle and give it to all riflemen? It does not look like it weighs much more than a rifle.
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
@ The officer primarily responsible for that decision is a friend and we have had long and frank exchange of views on the merits 5.56mm belt fed weapons. I disagree with the introduction of the Minimi, because the advantages are not measurable and it adds carried weight. 1 round per second suppresses just as well as 5 rounds per second.
@ This is all because the fixation with the section/Squad, which has now become overloaded with capability. You are exactly right to point out that the proliferation of differing systems is a problem.
@ In terms of terminal effect, there is no difference between a 3-5 round burst from a 5.56mm AR, and an LMG, given the same length of barrel, sighting system and use of a bipod or similar device.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Thanks for the response.
We can disagree on that. While I agree with you that the Squad is essentially not a maneuver element, adding additional automatic fire capability to the Platoon was a net benefit; where it's located is a continuing quibble...As I said, it was a really good weapon afflicted with a very bad cartridge.I am a fan of the M1/M2 Carbine. (you can carry 90 rounds on the weapon) It was a superbly designed military weapon (albeit by a convicted felon), far superior to 9mm SMGs, that were also in widespread use at the time, and far lighter, and more controllable than .45 SMGs.I have personal and empirical experience -- and not in any dumb test -- that it was not an effective man stopper. The UK, France and Israel used it only because it was readily and cheaply available and disposed of it fairly quickly when they could afford to do so. Those nations also used and do use the 9mm pistol cartridge *, a pathetic and underpowered creation so not sure that's any recommendation. The Hospitals in South Africa receive a number of walking wounded and note that many patients have multiple gunshot wounds, the majority -- 9mm pistol.Marshall recommended ditching it, just on hearsay, and did not do any empirical testing. While the .30 Carbine was denigrated in US service, it was successful elsewhere - UK, France and Israel. Like 5.56mm, the issue of "stopping power" did not arise.
* In a neat ### for tat, note that for forcing first the 7.62 (A good move) on NATO -- and later the 5.56mm (a bad move) -- NATO got even by forcing us to use the 9mm Parabellum cartridge. Fair's fair, I guess...
I'll add that I agree with your responses to kiwigrunt just above.
I disagree with him on equipping every man with an automatic weapon. Uses too much ammo for no good reason; as Wilf says, one round per second is as effective as five -- and is a whole lot better for staying power in the fight and for resupply. In a number of years as a Platoon sergeant, I was adamant that no one would fire on full automatic (yes, even in reaction to an ambush) and I've bounced a steel pot off more than one troop for ignoring that hard and fast rule of mine. I never had cause to regret that and did have cause -- as did some of the kids -- to be thankful for it.
I agree with kiwigrunt that putting the GPMG in the squad is a mistake for a number of reasons but I also believe that a couple of fully automatic weapons in the squad or section are advisable. I put them there instead of consolidating simply because it forces them to be spread out (and thus no group target or loss) normally but available for concentration if required.
Complaints of the M240 / FN Mag under its various guises being 'too heavy' are mostly due to that misuse. For its designed role and intent, the gun is an ideal mix of weight and of reliability. Reliability I suspect a much lighter weapon ala the Mk 48 will not achieve; nor, given its role and users does that weapon need to have the reliability of an infantry GPMG. Different strokes.
I remain convinced that belt fed weapons below company level are not a good idea. Yes, that means I support the concept of a Machine gun Platoon and disagree with the US Army concept of a Weapons Squad
2 Squads: 1 for fire suppression; 1 for the assault.
I began re-thinking the way infantrymen should be organized to fight and which battle drill techniques should be used in various combat situations a little over 12 years ago, when one of my colleagues -a LtC at the time- sent me a report prepared for the U.S.Army's Command and General Staff College on the Russian-Chechnya War (about 1994).
The Russians were tied to their vehicles. They rode those vehicles until they triggered an ambush by the Chechnyas. The Chechnyas did not have the weapons to match the Russians of course; but they deployed a mix of semi-automatic riflemen and rocket-propelled grenadiers quite effectively.
The Chechnyas used the RPGs to frighten and disrupt the Russians. They didn't seem as concerned with scoring direct hits on the vehicles (once first and last had been immobilized), as they were with making noise and spreading shrapnel. The riflemen took careful aim to shoot the leaders and soldiers as they tried to move. Apparently, the ambushes were set up so that the kill zones were more than 200 meters away from the positions taken up by the Chechnyas. This meant that the Russians could not easily "assault" their way out of the kill zone to break up the ambush; and their "5.something" ammunition could do no more than "spray and pray" in the general direction of where the fire was coming from.
This got me thinking that infantry units must be able to pour intense effective and well-aimed fire on positions 400 meters or more away; and at the same time infantry must be able to assault positions with high intensity short-range automatic weapons as well. I eventually came up with a 48-man platoon, divided into a 22-man "firing squad" with 7.62mm MGs and semi-automatic rifles, a 22-man "assault squad" with 5.56mm assault rifles and 40mm grenade launchers, and a HQ unit of 4 (PLdr, PSgt, 2 RTOs). (I realize now that these would be more properly called "sections" rather than "squads".) On the move and in firing positions, the teams within these squads (sections) would be blended by the PL, just as MGs were blended into the infantry squads by PLs in days gone by.
The "firing squad", equivalent to 2 German infantry squads of the 1940-43 era, would be capable of all the tasks traditionally assigned to infantrymen over the past 70 years, including the assault. But the weapons mix would be more effective at 200+ meters than the small caliber weapons which became standard in the post-Korean War era. I have read that some U.S. infantrymen in Iraq have used heavier caliber weapons when clearing buildings, because 5.56mm ammunition cannot penetrate doors or ceilings. So, even at close quarters larger caliber rifles can give the infantryman some advantages.
I realize that this discussion is intended to focus on the composition of the squad. But, after reading the reports from places like the Korengal Valley in Afghanistan, the city of Falluja in Iraq, and many other places, it is hard to look at the squad of 8-13 men as capable of winning any of these confrontations alone, without incorporating more soldiers and more weapons in the fight. And I still cannot figure out how anyone gets out of a HUMVEE under fire without getting hit by fire.
Viewpoints and criticisms welcome!
METT-TC rules - but reality can impact even that...
One could organize any echelon from the Squad upward to best accommodate the fight of the moment and the terrain and enemy at hand. However, doing so significantly complicates equipping and training the force to a possibly unacceptable degree. Not least due to the fact (present today in both theaters) that a low intensity fight can turn high intensity in a few minutes with disastrous consequences unless units are flexible enough to cope.
Better therefor to have a fixed organization that offers flexibility to adapt to circumstances and most current organizations do that well enough. Not perfectly -- well enough. and that's okay.
Multiple weapon calibers at Platoon level can be accommodated but are a burden. That burden is sustainable in the current two major theaters at current conflict levels but would not be supportable in a major war or even a short but high intensity conflict. Even four calibers (9mm, 5.56mm, 7.62mm, 40mm) push the envelope; for Afghanistan and Iraq add two more (.50 cal, 40mm High Velocity) and it's still bearable due to the low intensity but in a big moving war, it would be a tremendous burden and the likelihood of shortfalls in supply could be potentially disastrous. A far better solution would be to minimize caliber proliferation by a better multi-purpose round plus a grenade of >25mm.
On the HMMWV question, depends on the type. If it's an open truck, just hop out (not getting hit probability 65:35 * ); if it's Armored, it'll take longer to get out and you're more likely to get hit but the same technique is used after opening the door; just hop out (not getting hit probability 55:45). A better solution is to not get caught under fire (not getting hit probability 95:5). Not always easy but doable more often than not if one knows what one is doing and trusts one's instincts.
Best not to hold our breath on a single effective caliber...
* All probabilitiy estimates by author, YMMV.
Last edited by Ken White; 04-26-2008 at 08:59 PM. Reason: Add estimates.
Yes, even setting aside all the other arguments vis-a-vis magazine- versus belt-fed weapons, the best use of GPMGs/MMGs is usually made at Company level. The Germans were frequently able to suppress the enemy so effectively with the four or six guns at Company level that the Platoons sometimes did little more than walk to their objectives in some attacks. The USMC, likewise, uses much the same approach.
Conversely, holding the guns, even in pairs, at Platoon level, reduces their overall effect, even if the same number of guns as what the Germans or the Marines had are present. Not to mention that they are under the control of less experienced officers and NCOs, and have less ability to train more specifically in their roles; machine gun crews often find themselves training as riflemen instead of as machine gunners in such situations. More than one company comander has had cause to regret this arrangment anyway, and such unfortunates who have not pulled their guns in under company control in the defense have sometimes paid the price. The Germans and the Marines usually avoided this with their arrangement, while still retaining the ability to attach said guns (and other company weapons) out to individual platoons as circumstances warranted.
As for Marshall's advocacy of the fire team, each with a BAR, in order to improve the aggression and firepower of the Squad, the error was probably less in adding what it did, than in failing to add what was really necessary under the circumstances - the adoption of a USMC-pattern Squad with a full three fire teams, each with a BAR, thus allowing for not only independent Squad action when necessary, but above all for the weight of suppressive firepower necessary to enable effective Platoon fire-and-movement without encumbering Platoons with unnecessarily heavy weapons. And in those cases where independent Squad action is necessary, the Marine Squad allows for the "magic" "one-up, two-back" attack formation that is so often the most successfull, and least costly.
In this case, the two fire team Squad not only encouraged the devolution of fire and movement down to Squad level when not tactically justified - that being most of the time - but additionally led to a burden being placed upon the Platoon as a pair of MGs had to be added in order to provide for effective suppression. Thus, Company in effect lost direct control of its most important weapons in order to bolster weak Platoons, who in turn tended to detach their guns directly to the firepower-deficient Squads. A result of this, in Korea and especially Vietnam, was the phenomenon of Squads more or less routinely having to be reinforced with one of the Platoon's pair of MGs in order to provide for effective suppression of Squad objectives; Platoon and especially Company objectives required either Battalion or even Formation-level fire support for the effective suppression of their own objectives, or in those cases where such support was unavailable, simply had to go without.
Of all existing compositions at Minor-Unit and Sub-Unit level, the Marines remain the best, and the most adaptable.
As an ad hoc measure, I can see the sense, but I submit it compounded the problem in the long run because Marshall's reasoning was faulty.
...and here lies the problem! People tend to listen to highly respected and experienced old war horses such as yourself, and this is a problem for chaps such as myself, (never been in a serious war) when it comes to tracking down the source of your dissatisfaction, or attempting to apply method and logic to platoon doctrine. If decisions are based on observation and anecdote, then there is no chain of evidence or discovery to track and error check. Almost always there is a disconnect between the observation and what testing shows. This is the problem.. I have personal and empirical experience -- and not in any dumb test -- that it was not an effective man stopper. The UK, France and Israel used it only because it was readily and cheaply available and disposed of it fairly quickly when they could afford to do so. Those nations also used and do use the 9mm pistol cartridge *, a pathetic and underpowered creation so not sure that's any recommendation. The Hospitals in South Africa receive a number of walking wounded and note that many patients have multiple gunshot wounds, the majority -- 9mm pistol.
so would it be a mistake to have a GPMG squad? In a 30 man platoon you might have 4 x 5 man "Rifle Teams" and 2 x 5 man "GPMG Teams".I agree with kiwigrunt that putting the GPMG in the squad is a mistake for a number of reasons but I also believe that a couple of fully automatic weapons in the squad or section are advisable.
Mk48 is now the 7.62mm Minimi, and very promising. Of course you could just go and get the HK 21E for about half the price!!Complaints of the M240 / FN Mag under its various guises being 'too heavy' are mostly due to that misuse. For its designed role and intent, the gun is an ideal mix of weight and of reliability. Reliability I suspect a much lighter weapon ala the Mk 48 will not achieve; nor, given its role and users does that weapon need to have the reliability of an infantry GPMG. Different strokes.
Care to add detail? This is intriguing and if you have spoken to this before, then it passed under my radar.I remain convinced that belt fed weapons below company level are not a good idea. Yes, that means I support the concept of a Machine gun Platoon and disagree with the US Army concept of a Weapons Squad
I see a role for belt fed 7.62mm GPMGs in the platoon, but only one or two. I still see no role of a 5.56mm belt fed weapon.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Just upgrading assault rifles to the point where they are better capable of firing full auto reliably (AR role) without adding too much weight to the system, does not mean that they must always be used on ‘rock ‘n roll’. I fully agree with you, Ken, that aimed single shots should be the norm. Full auto must be carefully managed and controlled. However, any ‘decent’ assault rifle is capable of it. Adding a single AR ( beefed up assault rifle) to a fire team invites for that weapon to be fired on full auto most of the time, whereas the team leader ordering one, or a few, riflemen to fire a few bursts when the situation demands it, eliminates the perceived need for an AR. And that does of course mean, fire burst “at my command”, not willy nilly.
I always used to be very keen myself on the idea of adding a bit of everything to the mix, but now believe that it utterly disturbs the balance. A rifle is a rifle, a gun is a gun, an UGL is an UGL, go to it! I see no need to fill every perceived gap with a ‘halfway, neither this nor that’ system.
I do however believe that there is still a place for a beltfed (lighter then GPMG) at section level, with the option of grouping them at platoon level. (not the other way around, with a gun squad at platoon level, agree with you there Ken). With greater quantities of ammo, as required for MGs, belt can actually be lighter and less bulky (volume) than magazines; certainly high capacity mags like Beta at 1 kg empty.
6.5 Grendel........keep on dreaming!
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
Cool. I would however do it the other way around. Have the 2 sections balanced as they spend most of their time on the move and in firing positions etc. When one needs to be light for assaulting purposes, attach its heavy weapons to the supporting section. When they are balanced they can work independently as well.
Last edited by Kiwigrunt; 04-27-2008 at 12:49 PM.
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
Oh c'mon kiwi...whereas the team leader ordering one, or a few, riflemen to fire a few bursts when the situation demands it, eliminates the perceived need for an AR. And that does of course mean, fire burst “at my command”, not willy nilly.
Once upon a time I was told by a good and
experienced training developer that the most dangerous thing in the world was "an old sweat..." True and your comment illustrates why. I would submit however, that in the case of the M1/M2 .30 cal Carbine cartridge there's enough anecdotal evidence of multiple round hits that did not stop a charging pumped-up adversary to show validity. Admittedly, a much large number were stopped by the Carbine. Whether the issue becomes critical thus, I submit, depends upon whether your Carbine shots were successful or not...
I swapped your second paragraph and the first:All war is ad hocery to the tenth power...As an ad hoc measure, I can see the sense, but I submit it compounded the problem in the long run because Marshall's reasoning was faulty.In my opinion, yes. Machine guns work best when controlled by experienced leaders and crews, in pairs and in laying down a heavy volume of long range (on occasion), accurate suppressive fire. To get there requires training and a separate regimen and even mental outlook form the "Go get 'em" attitude required in an Infantry Squad / Section or Platoon.so would it be a mistake to have a GPMG squad? In a 30 man platoon you might have 4 x 5 man "Rifle Teams" and 2 x 5 man "GPMG Teams".Problem with both those weapons is overall reliability in an infantry at war environment -- that is a very harsh environment in a great many respects, unlike the SOF DA envirionment with a far higher standard of training and a far smaller exposure to constant rugged conditions over extended periods. I submit that both are too lightly constructed to endure in an infantry at war environment; they were purposely lightened to save weight and the flaw, for the infantry GPMG role, is that such lightening encourages the use of the MG as an AR substitute. My belief is that neither is rugged enough to survive proper usage in the infantry.Mk48 is now the 7.62mm Minimi, and very promising. Of course you could just go and get the HK 21E for about half the price!!See the comment above re: training and employment; add supply / resupply of ammo; the need for a heavier caliber / more range than is required for assault elements; and the predilection of humans to misemploy things unless structural bars are emplaced to preclude or at least impede such misuse.Care to add detail? This is intriguing and if you have spoken to this before, then it passed under my radar.OTOH, I see a role for two GPMG (.338???I see a role for belt fed 7.62mm GPMGs in the platoon, but only one or two. I still see no role of a 5.56mm belt fed weapon.to go with the Co Sniper section...) per platoon held and trained in a Company level MG platoon with adequate ammo bearers but agree totally on no 5.56 belt fed for the infantry. SOF and some mech / MP uses for such a weapon possibly exist though perhaps not enough IMO to justify the logistic problems of another weapon system.
Last edited by Ken White; 04-27-2008 at 06:04 PM. Reason: Typos
Once again you bring up an excellent point Ken. A lot of folks would love to say, "But hey, it worked wonders for the team guys," and they fail to realize that the degree of abuse (either intended or not) between a SOF element and a straight leg infantry platoon are on two totally different levels.unlike the SOF DA envirionment with a far higher standard of training and a far smaller exposure to constant rugged conditions over extended periods.
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