Rifle squad composition

[Ken White]

Just upgrading assault rifles to the point where they are better capable of firing full auto reliably (AR role) without adding too much weight to the system, does not mean that they must always be used on ‘rock ‘n roll’. I fully agree with you, Ken, that aimed single shots should be the norm. Full auto must be carefully managed and controlled...

That's fairly easy to do in peacetime and in training; it is extremely difficult to do in combat and particularly so as the war goes on a new intake training declines in time and quality and expereinced leaders are killed and replaced by inexperienced folks. It is not that easy to control even with combat experienced troops as my multiple thrown helmets testify. Better to remove the temptation; it is not really necessary.

...However, any ‘decent’ assault rifle is capable of it...

Does it not then become and Automatic Rifle (AR2) instead of an Assault Rifle (AR1) leading to --

...Adding a single AR ( beefed up assault rifle) to a fire team invites for that weapon to be fired on full auto most of the time...

just that?

...whereas the team leader ordering one, or a few, riflemen to fire a few bursts when the situation demands it, eliminates the perceived need for an AR. And that does of course mean, fire burst “at my command”, not willy nilly.

Works in peacetime and in training; sometimes in combat but it isn't reliable.

As to an AR in the Team / Squad / Section, it is far simpler to train one man than a few and it is quite possible for a junior leader to control the fire of one man who is directed to remain as close as feasible to said leader just as it is extremely difficult for him to control the fire of several. In the desert, separation between men should be on the order of fifty meters or even more; no way to control fire at that optimum distance and to close that distance for control purposes (as is now generally done; that plus the herd instinct) is to create a lucrative target that extended order doesn't provide. Even in rolling temperate terrain, distances of fifteen to twenty meters between men should be the norm. In the jungle, the distance is not a problem but the vegetation is. Fire control is just very difficult and your people have to know what to do -- and have temptations to err removed from their grasp.

...I do however believe that there is still a place for a beltfed (lighter then GPMG) at section level, with the option of grouping them at platoon level. (not the other way around, with a gun squad at platoon level, agree with you there Ken). With greater quantities of ammo, as required for MGs, belt can actually be lighter and less bulky (volume) than magazines; certainly high capacity mags like Beta at 1 kg empty.
6.5 Grendel........keep on dreaming!

Disagree on belt fed (on grounds of complexity and reliability; several levels) and weight is vastly overstated as a problem; mostly because many insist on carrying too much ammo. The Beta Mag is too complex to survive in the infantry and serves mostly, while it works, to encourage excessive full auto firing.

[Kiwigrunt]

As usual, you make some very clear points, Ken. Your 'been there done that' experience is hard to ignore.
Not sure about that helmet throwing thing though, what if it breaks?

[Schmedlap]

I disagree with him on equipping every man with an automatic weapon. Uses too much ammo for no good reason; as Wilf says, one round per second is as effective as five -- and is a whole lot better for staying power in the fight and for resupply.

I think a good consideration is that with the urban combat that we are engaged in, and likely to engage in the future, there is a significant need for every fire team or vehicle crew to have the capability to quickly suppress multiple rows of windows in multiple buildings. This requires an automatic weapon with a large ammo capacity. Even vehicle crews must have this dismounted capability. If a vehicle is ambushed, the turret weapon is often put out of commission due to a catastrophic malfunction, enemy suppressive fire that precludes the gunner from correcting a minor malfunction or laying down effective fire, or some circumstance that precludes any effort - such as the gunner being killed or the weapon being destroyed. The crew must often dismount immediately to avoid being burned alive in the vehicle. In the following minute, there is a dire need for the ability to put suppressive fire upon multiple rows of windows in multiple buildings, as most of those windows are in hand grenade range and the crew has little to no available cover as it egresses the vehicle. Likewise, fire teams operating independently (as they often must do, due to manpower being stretched thin) have an even greater need for a light, fully automatic weapon with a large ammo capacity due to the tight confines and numerous suspected enemy positions (windows and rooftops) that must be suppressed if ambushed. Even when operating at the squad, platoon, or company level, the compartmentalized nature of urban terrain can quickly degenerate into a series of isolated fire team battles. It was for that reason that we often pushed a M240B down to each squad and kept an M249 in each team, even if manpower dipped down to 3-man teams or 6- to 7-man squads. Even at the platoon level, an M240B could often not be brought to bear in any way to support a fire team in contact due to the compartmentalized nature of the terrain. Keeping an M249 in each team and pushing an M240B to the squad level - in dense urban terrain - was the happy medium that we found worked best.

I remain convinced that belt fed weapons below company level are not a good idea. Yes, that means I support the concept of a Machine gun Platoon and disagree with the US Army concept of a Weapons Squad

I think the M249, as we now configure it, is priceless. With a shorter, heavier barrel, collapsible buttstock, rail system with pistol grip attachment, and a 100-round pouch, it makes for a compact, reasonably light means of suppressing large swaths in confined spaces, such as narrow streets, while also being small enough to move quickly through doors, windows, halls, etc. The only drawback is that changing out an ammo pouch on a belt-fed weapon is not as smooth or quick as a magazine change for a carbine (that was the first time in my life when I was actually cognizant of the "pucker factor." While flailing about with the feed tray cover of an M249 and a string of ammo to do a "pouch change" while lying 10 feet from a burning HMMWV, I actually felt tension in muscles that I did not know existed). But the positives outweigh the negatives.

[RJ]

Ken,

Know that feeling. It tends to focus one on the task at hand.

Question for the board. It has been a long time since I ran a 13 man Marine Rifle Squad. 1961 or there abouts. After reading this long and insightful discussion on the Rifle Squad, I haven't seen a word about inter squad comm equipment.

Coming from the old school of "Follow Me" and pride in my ability to "BELLOW" orders and a great command of hand and arm signals, I knew the first time I was trying to run a squad through a life fire exercise that voice, and hand signals were not an efficient way to do the job. Standing up and yelling and standing up and making eye contact to pass on hand signals got many a man shot.

Is there a tactical inter Squad comm net available for rifle squads to use to improve efficiencya nd surivability?

This question is an obvious one and I'm curious why we are not talking about communications down to the rifle man.

3 four man fire teams to a squad gives great manueverbility and a lot of fire power. In my day the B.A.R. was the base of fire volume for assualting fixed positions if we didn't have a brace of LMG 30 assigned to our rifle platoon for that coverage.

Wouldn't a comm connect between the SL and all the squads troops be a necessary enhancement.

I realize that there are multiple radio security issues, but in todays electronic wizard era a simple, and safe commo connection should be do able.

[Ken White]

I have no problem with specific weapon fits for a given situation. to the extent of issuing additional or alternate weapons to units, situation dependent -- my perception is that is happening in both theaters now. I could quibble on the need for or desirability of automatic fire in the suppression role you cite and have seen a slew of folks with only M1s do that quite effectively (an amplification of my point that any provided capability will be used, needed or not). Understand on the vehicle bit.

I totally agree with the need for a light fully automatic weapon with large ammo capacity for each Fire Team -- just don't think it should be belt fed -- and I think the Ultimax is a solution; it's ultra reliable and its magazine is also (unlike the Beta Mag). There could be others but no one has particularly pushed the idea though I understand the Marines are looking at a non-belt fed at Squad level so no development work has really been done until the last few years. Ideally, it would be a version of the standard long arm like the LWRC Infantry Automatic Rifle I linked above with a big magazine.

Believe me when I say I have no intention to be a smart ass or be snarky when I repeat what I said earlier -- "A better solution is to not get caught under fire (not getting hit probability 95:5). Not always easy but doable more often than not if one knows what one is doing and trusts one's instincts." I really mean that and yes, I know that is difficult. My very strong belief is that knowing what one is doing is very much training based and we simply do not train people well upon entry (or later for that matter). Our training is better now that it has ever been in my overlong life but it's still got a long way to go compared to what we could and should do. If the other guys is initiating more than 50% of the contacts, we're simply wrong and I know that his initiations can be reduced to less than 25% with good techniques and aggressive dismounted patrolling...

An additional facor is that given our current state of training, automatic fire is pushed in suppression; I submit that's a relic of WW I and WW II experience with large conscript armies when it was easier and quicker to let people spray than to train good shooters. We have a professional Army now and the time now to train good shooters. We ought to take it, if we have to restart the Draft, we can always go back to spraying.

I have no experience at all with the M249. What little I know of the weapon I base on my son who's spent quite a few years running light infantry rifle and scout platoons and has recent experience in both current large theaters; he despises the weapon. Most other folks I've talked to who have used the M249 are at best lukewarm on it. That said, my objection is not to that specific weapon but to belt fed weapons at that level. I base that on overall logistic and compatability problems plus weight, reliability and excessive ammunition usage factors, not mention your cited reload problem -- and that is a large problem...

We all have different experiences; what matters is that whatever we do works; there is no one best answer in combat.

[Norfolk]

Coming from the old school of "Follow Me" and pride in my ability to "BELLOW" orders and a great command of hand and arm signals, I knew the first time I was trying to run a squad through a life fire exercise that voice, and hand signals were not an efficient way to do the job. Standing up and yelling and standing up and making eye contact to pass on hand signals got many a man shot.

Is there a tactical inter Squad comm net available for rifle squads to use to improve efficiencya nd surivability?

This question is an obvious one and I'm curious why we are not talking about communications down to the rifle man.

3 four man fire teams to a squad gives great manueverbility and a lot of fire power. In my day the B.A.R. was the base of fire volume for assualting fixed positions if we didn't have a brace of LMG 30 assigned to our rifle platoon for that coverage.

Wouldn't a comm connect between the SL and all the squads troops be a necessary enhancement.

I realize that there are multiple radio security issues, but in todays electronic wizard era a simple, and safe commo connection should be do able.

Hello RJ,

Great point. I think jcustis and a few others have used the new squad-level radios that each soldier carries - great piece of kit, apparently.

Yes, using these radios enables the Squad to move in very different ways potentially, than with the old spoken orders and visual signals. When rounds are going downrange, orders can't be heard, and hand signals are, obviously, rather attractive to enemy bullets. Not to mention that men have to be bunched up to within 5-10 m of each other in order to "retain" (and I use that term advisedly) control.

The distances that Ken described are only sensible, and intra-squad comms allow not only for greater dispersion whilst improving control, they also permit the Squad to break down into its constituent Fire Teams. The Fire Teams can then move semi-autonomously and take full advantage of available cover and concealment in order to minimize their visibility and sign. Basically, it allows them to seek and find the enemy without being themselves seen as easily as if advancing in the formally taught field formations. In that respect, the Fire Teams may sort of take on an SF-patrol type mode of movement, but with an obvious difference being that the Infantry are still going out of their way to look for trouble, while the SF are usually (not always of course) trying to avoid it.

The essential criteria of what makes for a Squad is "the smallest unit commanded by a single man". Clearly, the "Squad" as it presently exists doesn't really fit into that definition; the Fire Team is the "Squad", and the "Squad" has become a "Section" since the introduction of the Fire Team - the true Squad. Intra-Squad/Section radio communications are more and more making this so, and Squaddies in the future may increasingly come to both operate as and identify with, their "Squad"/Fire Team than their Squad/Section. Especially as Fire Teams disperse over ever-wider areas of the battlefield; the Squad/Section, as we know it, is in danger of becoming the Platoon of the future in that sense. At this point, Wigram's and Wilf's ideas on Platoon organization are brought increasingly into consideration.

KiwiGrunt, even if belt-fed guns are not the way to go below Company-level (normally, but with exceptions), I still share your view that something along the lines of the 6.5mm Grendel should be the common cartridge of the Squad/Section. The 5.56mm is not fully adequate, and as the 6.5mm gives something close to 7.62mm performance at typical infantry engagement ranges and at a substantial reduction in weight, it's probably most suitable for Platoon needs.

A belt-fed weapon, especially if the belt is contained in a box like on the Minimi LMG/M-249 SAW, can make a terrible racket when a few guys are trying to avoid being heard by the enemy in the bush or during the night. Magazine-fed is definitely preferable here, particularly if Infantry Squads/Sections are going to spend a lot more of their time on the battlefield moving from cover-to-cover, firing position-to-firing position as semi-autonomous Fire Teams in order to minimize detection and losses, and to maximize surprise and shock effect. The big guns, like the MAG/M-240 were used with good effect in Rhodesia and the Falklands, amongst others, in four-man teams, but again that was mostly with SF and Commando Forces. When the big guns are attached to regular Squads/Sections, as Ken says, it's usually in order to make up for inadequate individual and sub-unit training standards - but not always.

In any case, while "small wars" may allow for the comparative luxury of attaching heavy weapon to minor- and sub-units, "big wars" rarely do, and the German and USMC Machine Gun/Weapons Platoons at Company level were the products of wartime experience; in the former case, drawing on the lessons of WWI as well as WWII, and in the latter, as a result of the experiences of fighting in the Pacific. Taking together, the German and USMC experiences (which included far more close-quarter fighting than almost anything since then) arrived at pretty similar conclusions despite very different experiences, of what worked, in most places, most of the time. And of course both were readily able and willing to adapt to the circumstances at hand.

[William F. Owen]

The big guns, like the MAG/M-240 were used with good effect in Rhodesia and the Falklands, amongst others, in four-man teams, but again that was mostly with SF and Commando Forces. When the big guns are attached to regular Squads/Sections, as Ken says, it's usually in order to make up for inadequate individual and sub-unit training standards - but not always.
.

Uniquely, in 1982 2 PARA, arbitrarily, and for reasons I am still researching added a GPMG to each section, thus giving them two. This is exactly what Marshall had done with the BARs.

I have yet to find any written or oral evidence that it made them any more effective than Battalions who did not do the same thing.

[Kiwigrunt]

Uniquely, in 1982 2 PARA, arbitrarily, and for reasons I am still researching added a GPMG to each section, thus giving them two. This is exactly what Marshall had done with the BARs.

I have yet to find any written or oral evidence that it made them any more effective than Battalions who did not do the same thing.

Indeed, other than the odd noncommittal one-liner in a few books and magazines, any substantial feedback and after-action reports are severely lacking.
It would be equally interesting to get same info on marines experience with L7 gimpy alongside L4 Bren in the Falklands.

And along those lines, and in line with Ken’s concerns on ammo expenditure, it has been stated that US troops in Vietnam expanded an average of some 50,000 rounds of small arms ammunition per confirmed kill.
The UK forces in the Falklands found that they were going through their ammo allocation much faster than anyone could have imagined.
It would be interesting to see rounds fired per kill statistics on the Falklands and now in Iraqastan.

[Schmedlap]

I could quibble on the need for or desirability of automatic fire in the suppression role you cite and have seen a slew of folks with only M1s do that quite effectively

I'm speaking more to the occasion when it is 3 or 4 guys responsible for their own 360/4D security and they're outnumbered. While it is fleeting in nature, it does happen often enough to consider it, and that small team generally needs to fend for itself for a few minutes. There needs to be a capability to suppress 2 or 3 floors of doors, windows, and rooftops in a 90 to 100 degree horizontal field of fire and 30 to 45 degree vertical field of fire. Either that, or we need to find a way to accomplish our mission without spreading our fire teams so thin across a compartmented battlefield.

What little I know of the weapon I base on my son who's spent quite a few years running light infantry rifle and scout platoons and has recent experience in both current large theaters; he despises the weapon. Most other folks I've talked to who have used the M249 are at best lukewarm on it. That said, my objection is not to that specific weapon but to belt fed weapons at that level.

Yes, I am definitely among the minority of people who tout the virtues of the M249. My observation is that most of these weapons are reaching the point in their life cycle where they are in dire need of depot-level maintenance. In OIF I, one of my SAW gunners was known as THE guy in the company whose SAW was not deadlined. 17 out of 18 were paperweights for the entire deployment. When we got home and I became XO, my armorer and I made dozens of trips to the 40 level repair folks who did the mother of all technical inspections on every weapon in our arms room. They must have done over a million dollars in parts and labor. It was incredible. After that, we were 18 of 18 FMC SAWs for the next 18 months. I think people are too quick to assume the SAW is unreliable and too hesitant to hold their XO's feet to the fire. Any weapon will become unreliable if beaten, not maintained, and abused for a decade.

That is in no way intended as a rebuttal to your point. A magazine-fed, high capacity, full-auto weapon in the hands of each fire team would be gold.

[Schmedlap]

The 5.56mm is not fully adequate.

The 5.56mm round for the Squad Designated Marksmen rifles is fully adequate. It is 72 grains and has a (lawfully) hollowed tip. Whereas the tracer and 68-grain ball often only resulted in blood trails, the 72-grain 5.56mm scored first-round kills or sufficient trauma to foil the evil-doer's plot almost without exception. As noted, the round was for the SDM rifles, but we started requesting these rounds on our LOGSTAT in lieu of the regular 5.56mm ball. We never got enough of it, so we started loading it in a 3:1 ratio or however best we could mix it into our magazines.

Cure projectile dysfunction: replace the 68-grain ball with the 72-grain hollow tip.

[Ken White]

I'm speaking more to the occasion when it is 3 or 4 guys responsible for their own 360/4D security and they're outnumbered. While it is fleeting in nature, it does happen often enough to consider it, and that small team generally needs to fend for itself for a few minutes. There needs to be a capability to suppress 2 or 3 floors of doors, windows, and rooftops in a 90 to 100 degree horizontal field of fire and 30 to 45 degree vertical field of fire. Either that, or we need to find a way to accomplish our mission without spreading our fire teams so thin across a compartmented battlefield.

The quick response to that would be that what you say cannot be done even if every one of those four men had an MG. However, you were there and I was not so I'll defer to you on that. I will point out that my "...slew of folks with only M1s do that quite effectively" was citing just such situations, Marine four man fire teams, in an urban environment, Seoul, much like Baghdad (I didn't make DS/DS or OIF, too old for both but was there almost 40 years ago; from the pictures, the infrastructure hasn't changed that much, just gotten bigger) but with real and good reinforced concrete instead of poor cinder block and mud bricks. We can differ on the fire volume required.

I would point out that receiving a large volume of automatic fire most of which cracks overhead or is obviously high is not nearly as a good a suppressant as a far lower volume of effective fire wherein he who exposes himself gets hit...

Honest. At least, I always looked at it that way.

Edited to add: We have become too risk averse. Force protection is IMO overdone. Patrolling is at the same time poorly trained, inadequately performed and arguably one of the -- if not the most -- important missions of the Infantry. That is true in COIN and in full scale high intensity war. Regrettably, it is dangerous and that is true in any environment, urban, desert, woods, jungle -- everywhere. It's got to be done, heavily and repeatedly and Fire Teams can and should do it regardless of terrain. It's the job, just goes with the territory. There may be another way to accomplish some missions but most are going to require patrols; the more, the better and, generally, smaller is better; what's lost in firepower and mass is offset by a huge gain in overall coverage and agility.

Yes, I am definitely among the minority of people who tout the virtues of the M249. My observation is that most of these weapons are reaching the point in their life cycle where they are in dire need of depot-level maintenance. In OIF I, one of my SAW gunners was known as THE guy in the company whose SAW was not deadlined. 17 out of 18 were paperweights for the entire deployment. When we got home and I became XO, my armorer and I made dozens of trips to the 40 level repair folks who did the mother of all technical inspections on every weapon in our arms room. They must have done over a million dollars in parts and labor. It was incredible. After that, we were 18 of 18 FMC SAWs for the next 18 months. I think people are too quick to assume the SAW is unreliable and too hesitant to hold their XO's feet to the fire. Any weapon will become unreliable if beaten, not maintained, and abused for a decade.

I think you just made my kids point and one I made about the Mk 48 (the '7.62 SAW') -- in attempt to lighten the weapon, they adversely impacted the sturdiness and ruggedness needed for an Infantry platoon full auto weapon. What you did was exemplary, and you deserve kudos for it -- but IMO, you shouldn't have to do that. If the weapon were rugged enough, you wouldn't have had to. However, all belt feds need tender treatment, that's why I don't believe they belong below Company level. Maybe the PKM might work -- it's pretty Joe-proof...

Re: your response to Norfolk, agreed. Using the Mk 262 also works -- in the M16 and the SDM; in the M4 you still have the problem that the short barrel won't give even the heavier bullets enough push. The 5.56 is just an inadequate cartridge, always has been. Unit I was in ran the Troop Test on the then AR 15 back in '64. We killed a lot of pigs for the local Oscar Myer plant -- with the control weapon, the M14; not so many with the AR 15s. We recommended keeping the M14 and 7.62. McNamara disagreed...

I note that SOCOM has ordered beaucoup SCAR Heavies in 7.62 and fewer SCAR Lights in 5.56 than originally contemplated.

[William F. Owen]

That is in no way intended as a rebuttal to your point. A magazine-fed, high capacity, full-auto weapon in the hands of each fire team would be gold.

I used to think the same, but having laid around on the floor and swapped out a few C-Mags on the G-36 LMG, it is far from easy. Same is true of the Ultimax. Those big box magazines are heavy and bulky, plus someone needs to re-fill them!! I think 30 round boxes actually regulate rates of fire very well, and for speed of change they can't be beat.

There is a new CL-Mag around now, supposedly for the USMC AR.

[Sabre]

That's fairly easy to do in peacetime and in training; it is extremely difficult to do in combat and particularly so as the war goes on a new intake training declines in time and quality and expereinced leaders are killed and replaced by inexperienced folks. It is not that easy to control even with combat experienced troops as my multiple thrown helmets testify. Better to remove the temptation...

While I definitely see the point, the US Army is historically *terrible* at "drawing the line" between putting capability in the hands of the troops vs. worrying that they will abuse it and create logistical problems, perhaps starting with repeating rifles in the Civil War...

Why is it so completely impossible to teach fire discipline?
We always sell ourselves so short, living too much in fear of logistics (something that the US Army is better at than most) and our perceived inability to train our own troops. I submit that it *is* something that can be taught.

Heh, what the government should really do is require video game developers to include strict ammunition limits in their games (with the realistic consequences of running dry in the middle of a fight), since that is the "earliest training" that so many potential recruits receive.
It sounds silly, I know, but I'd bet that would yield surprisingly good results.

[Ken White]

fire discipline (among other things...) is not due to the American psyche, it's due to poor training. The troops have always been more capable than they're allowed to be. These kids today are particularly good and deserve better, they'll do what they're trained to do.

The abysmally stupid Standards based training and the equivalent ARTEP were both disasters. The current too tentative switch to outcome based training needs to be accelerated and adopted Army wide ASAP.

[selil]

The abysmally stupid Standards based training and the equivalent ARTEP were both disasters. The current too tentative switch to outcome based training needs to be accelerated and adopted Army wide ASAP.

Seconded..... all in favor?

[Sabre]

However, all belt feds need tender treatment, that's why I don't believe they belong below Company level. Maybe the PKM might work -- it's pretty Joe-proof...

I note that SOCOM has ordered beaucoup SCAR Heavies in 7.62 and fewer SCAR Lights in 5.56 than originally contemplated.

So, let me make sure that I have this straight: the big problems with having MG's down in the platoons is that the platoon-level leaders don't have the experience to handle them, there is no depth of experience among the machine-gunner crews (no slots in the TOE for machinegun NCO's), and there are many tactical situations where the Company CO needs 3 or 4 guns to shoot the rest of the company onto the obj.

*If* I were in charge, the company commander would have a heavy weapons group of say, 3 GPMG's (heck, you can even say they are in the "sustained fire role") and 3 60mm Mortars. Each platoon still gets their 2 or 3 MGs. Thus a support by fire position could have the 3 company GPMGs, plus a rifle platoon with 2 or 3 more, for a total of 5 or 6.

The company commander has his own machineguns, there are slots in the TOE for NCO's that are machinegun specialists (who back in garrison can ensure the gunners in the platoons are well trained, and the weapons are well cared for), and platoons get some tactical flexibility if, in the chaos of combat, they end up needing that firepower.
...and if our infantry platoon leaders don't know how to employ belt-fed MGs, then we had better'd teach them, because they are about one sniper's bullet away from company command.

Oh, and on the last note, I have been quite disappointed to see how the "great rifle caliber debate" has panned out. The competition between 6.8 and 6.5 only served to stall the process long enough for the "5.56 is good enough" idea to find a voice, and Lord knows, it only takes the tiniest obstacle to stop a change from occuring. The salient point, I would think, is that no one has touted the 5.56 round as being *better* than the other calibers, merely that it is "OK". We pay top dollar for this stuff - we can do a little better than just "OK"?

[Ken White]

So, let me make sure that I have this straight: the big problems with having MG's down in the platoons is that the platoon-level leaders don't have the experience to handle them, there is no depth of experience among the machine-gunner crews (no slots in the TOE for machinegun NCO's), and there are many tactical situations where the Company CO needs 3 or 4 guns to shoot the rest of the company onto the obj.

The major issues are that the GPMG is a tad tempermental mechanically and people who handle it exclusively do a better job than those to whom it is part time effort, it's too heavy to function well in an Infantry platoon, it complicates ammo resupply and that added firepower is only rarely needed at that level.

*If* I were in charge, the company commander would have a heavy weapons group of say, 3 GPMG's (heck, you can even say they are in the "sustained fire role") and 3 60mm Mortars. Each platoon still gets their 2 or 3 MGs. Thus a support by fire position could have the 3 company GPMGs, plus a rifle platoon with 2 or 3 more, for a total of 5 or 6.

Only Ranger platoons have three guns; whether one has two or three, the issues at platoon level remain. I'd also note that your solution would significantly increase ammo usage which is far from an unalloyed good thing.

...and if our infantry platoon leaders don't know how to employ belt-fed MGs, then we had better'd teach them, because they are about one sniper's bullet away from company command.

That's not the issue, knowing how to employ them is easy, it's the actual employment that is the issue. * The Platoon leader isn't the problem, the weapons squad leader and the vagaries of reassignment within the platoon are a part of the problem, finicky belt feds, massed fires, ammo resupply and coherent training are some other parts. It is easier to train a MG platoon to use their guns effectively en masse and to farm the Squads to rifle platoons as needed than it is to centralize fragmented and not trained together squads when that is required -- and in a high intensity conflict that will be the norm. At the risk of cycling Gian here, let me point out that we HAVE to organize and train to do high intensity combat, we can always scale down to do the easier COIN stuff when it's required.

I'd also suggest that the use of automatic weapons fire in the suppressive mode in urban COIN situations is not always advisable.

Oh, and on the last note, I have been quite disappointed to see how the "great rifle caliber debate" has panned out. The competition between 6.8 and 6.5 only served to stall the process long enough for the "5.56 is good enough" idea to find a voice...We pay top dollar for this stuff - we can do a little better than just "OK"?

No argument from me -- I voted against the 5.56 over 44 years ago. You need to talk to PM Soldier and BG R. Mark Brown.

P.S.

When you talk to Brown, don't forget to tell him you're fully aware that we forced the 5.56 on a reluctant NATO and then signed a STANAG saying we'd stick with it, that we've sold a lot of weapons and ammo worldwide, that you know how many millions of rounds are in Depots in Europe, Okinawa and Korea as well as on the PrePo ships at Diego Garcia, Guam and elsewhere and that you fully understand the costs involved in a switch as well as the length of time and the training penalty it would take to do that.

P.P.S

* Our training of new entries, officer and enlisted is better than it's ever been but it still isn't good enough. However, as I said, employment is the problem. Next time you see a platoon running a live fire, try this; listen to the two guns, do they fire alternately; does one pick up the rate of fire while the other reloads, all automatically and without command? Then, ask them to place their beaten zone on a reverse slope as you would have to do if attacking a defender who used a reverse slope defense. After that, ask them to do a set up for night final protective fires. If they can do all that, you have just seen an unusually good Weapons Squad leader's product...

[RJ]

Thanks for the PPS, Ken!

P.P.S

* Our training of new entries, officer and enlisted is better than it's ever been but it still isn't good enough. However, as I said, employment is the problem. Next time you see a platoon running a live fire, try this; listen to the two guns, do they fire alternately; does one pick up the rate of fire while the other reloads, all automatically and without command?

Then, ask them to place their beaten zone on a reverse slope as you would have to do if attacking a defender who used a reverse slope defense. After that, ask them to do a set up for night final protective fires. If they can do all that, you have just seen an unusually good Weapons Squad leader's product...

Memories from the San Margarita Hills - 1959

Guns Up!

[Ken White]

earlier.

I don't guess I should even mention a Clinometer (LINK) should I?

[ODB]

My bread and butter at one point in life. Yes this is a lost art, depending on the unit. I will be the first to admit sometime around 10 years ago the Army shifted focus from individual tasks to collective tasks, one of the biggest misakes we have ever made. A few of us old dinosars who grew up under good leaders know the importance of individual tasks, afterall last time I looked collective tasks are nothing more than individual tasks put together. Basics, basics, basics.

I remember my first few years in the Army if the company had a M60 range the entire company was out there. There would be concurrent training stations set up, conducting training on every aspect of the weapons systems, and everyone in the company was trained. The same would take place on M249, M203, M16, Claymore, etc... ranges. We shot Laws, AT-4, threw frags, if it was in the inventory we trained with it, from Pvt E-1 to 1SG.

I'm sorry all that high speed sh*t is cool but it doesn't get the job done. Need to learn and execute elementary level before graduating. Show me a unit that can execute the basics at near perfect execution and they will look "high speed". Now taking all of this into account when looking at rifle squad composition. What is the proficientcey level of (automatically promoted) squad leaders? Can they handle emplacing machine guns in an effective SBF? C2 the SBF and the maneuver element? IMHO they cannot unless they have effectively trained their team leaders.

There is so many factors involved in figuring squad compostion. Personally I believe in weapons squad not weapon platoon. Being a bit aged I don't believe in a platoon having to carry MG ammo, if you want the gun man up and take the gun, have pride in carrying it. Sorry my rule as weapons squad leader is you simply did not give up the gun, if you did you'd no longer be in my weapons squad. We did not put subpar performers on our guns, weapons squads were the best a platoon had to offer and we carried our own ammo, many times with two man teams.

To comment on a previous post about leadership not knowing how to employ the guns, had a PL one time shut down my SBF about 400 rounds into it, I had 1500 rounds per gun. Guess who carried the ammo back, the PL. He needed to learn what it felt like. Never again did he shut me down early, he learned to control his maneuver element, to allow his guns to do the work. I know many who want MG in their squads but can't handle tem, sorry easiest way to misuse them and to get someone killed.

Another heartache of mine is the designated marksmans concept, not buying it. Everyone should be proficient with their weapon. Additionally without a spotter and some serious optics(spotting scope) how far out can you obtain positive ID of a threat? Just food for thought. M249, finda better weapon, they are out there or can be developed, we have people living in a space station, yet our squad automatic rifleman is using junk.

The most underutilized weapon in our inventory is the M203, so do we go back to the M-79? Use it as a secondary weapon? I am also a fan of every combat arms soldier having a secondary weapon, no matter the terrain. Sorry for the jumbled thought process on this post, my mind is going a 100 different directions.