Rifle squad composition

[Richard W]

Fuchs:

Interesting background information.

Regards

Richard W

[120mm]

Indeed the only clear advantages that the 2008 squad has is in radios, night vision and body armor.

You mean the only improvements between then and now is the ability to see in the dark and communicate?

####, man... What were we thinking???

P.S. - Have you ever worn PVS-7Bs or better at night??? Or tried to lead a platoon without radios???

Of course, we haven't really "improved" the rifle squad, because the real improvements have come through various and sundry supporting arms and logistic things...

[Fuchs]

I understood that he was disappointed by firepower development and didn't really comment on the whole thing.

[Tom Odom]

In comparison an American 2008 Army Squad has 9 men at full strength. It consists of a leader with an M 16, 2-fire team leaders with M 16s, 2 grenadiers with 203's, 2 SAW Gunners with the M 249 and two riflemen with M 16s.

The modern U.S. squad is rather an all-round design.

The truth is that the US infantry squad has suffered for reasons that have nothing to do with the infantry. We configured the squad according to transport capacity, nine for Bradleys and 11 for light as that is what will fit on a Blackhawk. In the latter case, we downsized the light squad as a bill payer for the advanced attk helo, which we cancelled.

Tom

[Richard W]

120mm:

Thank you for your kind reply wherein you posted in part: "You mean the only improvements between then and now is the ability to see in the dark and communicate?"

I reply: Is it enough? As one commentator put it "we may own the night but we do not own the ground". Enemy insurgent infantry armed in the main with WWII technology (and above all the shovel) appears to have frustrated high tech Western infantry in Afghanistan, Southern Lebanon and Iraq. (see Drudge for links to Israeli papers wherein IDF infantry veterans have bitterly complained about the infantry fighting in Southern Lebanon.)

You also posted in part: "Have you ever worn PVS-7Bs or better at night??? Or tried to lead a platoon without radios???"

I reply: No. Am I missing something here? Are they worn during the day for some reason - zero a weapon? And yes. Was it not the norm in Western infantry until around 1990 to operate without an effective squad radio? The only functional radio was with the Platoon Leader. It was so heavy he needed a dedicated RTO. He also often had to climb to higher ground to talk to the Company Commander. How many Western infantry companies have had effective and complete internal 24/7 radio communications prior to 1990?

You also posted in part: "we haven't really "improved" the rifle squad, because the real improvements have come through various and sundry supporting arms and logistic things".

I reply: Perhaps we should. I have been reading some very well documented accounts of infantry fighting in Afghanistan. The enemy infantry appears to be able to stand and fight against Western rifle squads which backed with massive supporting fires and even small UAV's. (Strategy page reports that American infantry is being supported by 9,000 Raven UAV's.)

The CIA Director recently announced that a massive effort is being made to capture UBL. He has been at large for around 6 1/2 years now. It is not the fault of our rifle squads, However I think our rifle squads must be even more effective in the fight against Islamic insurgents.

Regards

Richard W

[Fuchs]

Strategy page is not to be recommended. It's barely good enough to tell somebody to keep the eyes open for something as perhaps for some reason they didn't get it wrong again.
Strategypage is at least 60% propaganda imho.

The whole 'infantry performance in combat' discussion depends heavily on expectations. Some people's expectations are easily exceeded, others are never content.
Equipment cannot be good enough if someone knows for sure how to improve it at acceptable costs, though.

[jcustis]

For the current Army squad, are the grenadiers true grenadiers, whose sole job is to work the M203? Or are they in practice a morph of something, like the USMC team leader who has a M203 for a T/E weapon?

If it is the former, then I could see how the Army squad may have some good things going for it, as I have never liked the fact that our Tm Ldrs have tried to work C2 and one of the most potent weapons in the squad's arsenal, thus resulting in the 50% effect rule.

[ODB]

The M203 is the most underutilized weapon in an Infantry squad. One of the main reasons is that there is slim to none training ammo (HE variety). Another is many leaders have never used/trained with it and therefore do not know how to properly utilize it. Funny story and prime example. Many years ago as a young squad leader we were conducting a night blank fire before going live. I taught my grenadiers how to properly ground burst illum rounds. I was maneuvering my flanking element and told my grenadier to shoot an illum round (ground burst). Little did we know that the entire chain of command had moved up on to the objective to observe our actions on the object. My grenadier did what he was taught and in the process about took the Company commanders head off. After we finished our actions on the commander started to chew my grenadiers ass. I immediately told him what I trained him to do and that he executed as trained. I was told by the commander that "we" are not proficient enough to utilize the weapon in any other way except for lauching illum into the sky. This is a fine example of leaders not knowing how to utilize the M203 and therefore soldiers for years have suffered. IMO bring back the M79 then maybe it'll actually get utilized.

[Richard W]

jcustis:

Back in the Dark Ages the Army fire team grenadier was the only guy who carried and operated the M79/203. At one point the Army was authorized a five man fire team. This was during the Draft. State side infantry squads were often over strength. So the five man fire team actually had five men.

The fire team was organized into a leader and two buddy teams. The lead or right buddy team was led a by an automatic rifleman supported by a rifleman. The trail or left buddy team was led by the grenadier supported by a rifleman.

The team leader would use tracer from his M16 to designate the target for the automatic rifleman. The grenadier would put rounds down on top where the the automatic rifleman's fires were hitting. The two riflemen carried ammunition for their principals and pulled security. They were not expected to shoot much. It was a good system.

I am told by very impressive young soldiers that the only things that have changed is that they are usually understrength and they carry a lot more gear. The grenadier is still the grenadier.

Regards

Richard W

[Richard W]

Fuchs:

Than you for the tip. Do you recommend another site?

Regards

Richard W

[Ken White]

theoretical as opposed to the actual...

...I reply: Is it enough? As one commentator put it "we may own the night but we do not own the ground".

Meaningless comment and applies to a point on the ground and in time. It is not a universal truth by any means. Ground can be owned when necessary and relinquished when not. It is not possible for most forces today to fully occupy all ground in an area of interest -- nor is it necessarily desirable.

Enemy insurgent infantry armed in the main with WWII technology (and above all the shovel) appears to have frustrated high tech Western infantry in Afghanistan, Southern Lebanon and Iraq. (see Drudge for links to Israeli papers wherein IDF infantry veterans have bitterly complained about the infantry fighting in Southern Lebanon.)

Drudge? Okay...

What do you mean by frustrated? All combat forces get 'frustrated' on occasion; nature of the beast. If you mean that "Enemy insurgent infantry" has denied terrain to western infantry when said infantry really wanted the terrain in question, perhaps you could provide examples; I know of no cases where that has occurred in the last six or seven years. Hezbollah, by the way are not insurgents and the Israelis erred in letting their infantry skills atrophy and in the tactical decisions at high levels of command, I don't blame their infantry for being bitter.

I reply: No. Am I missing something here? Are they worn during the day for some reason - zero a weapon

Perhaps; we now have the night vision equipment however it is widely available on the market and has already appeared in Lebanon, Afghanistan and Iraq, it's proliferating world wide and rapidly. Point being that relative advantage will soon disappear and you're back to relative equality of squad versus squad wherein firepower is a minor factor and state of training and attitude are the major factors. The tendency for theorists to count things as opposed to the intangibles always dooms theories to dustbins.

...And yes. Was it not the norm in Western infantry until around 1990 to operate without an effective squad radio? The only functional radio was with the Platoon Leader. It was so heavy he needed a dedicated RTO. He also often had to climb to higher ground to talk to the Company Commander. How many Western infantry companies have had effective and complete internal 24/7 radio communications prior to 1990?

True but is it germane to the issue of improved capability today? We used to ride to work on elephants and we no longer do that; things change. The issue is not the item(s), it's their effective use.

...Perhaps we should. I have been reading some very well documented accounts of infantry fighting in Afghanistan. The enemy infantry appears to be able to stand and fight against Western rifle squads which backed with massive supporting fires and even small UAV's. (Strategy page reports that American infantry is being supported by 9,000 Raven UAV's.)

These well documented accounts are written by whom? Media people?

The 'enemy' in Afghanistan does not have infantry, they have fighters. They are either really good at what they do (the old guys) or are inexperienced but quite brave (the young ones). Of course they can and will stand and fight. The issue is who prevails at the end of the day.

However I think our rifle squads must be even more effective in the fight against Islamic insurgents.

Obviously your prerogative to believe that. However, my sensing is that you have allowed that belief to dictate amendments to a process and structure based on a theoretical construct and that perception without regard to actuality on the ground.

Still, your point may be valid, what precisely would you propose?

Might I again suggest you go to the "Tell us about you" thread and provide us a little background; surely your young contract administrator has had time to ponder that...

[Ken White]

...The fire team was organized into a leader and two buddy teams. The lead or right buddy team was led a by an automatic rifleman supported by a rifleman. The trail or left buddy team was led by the grenadier supported by a rifleman.

The team leader would use tracer from his M16 to designate the target for the automatic rifleman. The grenadier would put rounds down on top where the the automatic rifleman's fires were hitting. The two riflemen carried ammunition for their principals and pulled security. They were not expected to shoot much. It was a good system.

Yet again beguiled by theory. What's stated above was the theory written by some young Snowbird in the air conditioning of Building 4. Practically, in combat, that rarely ever worked or happened.

[Richard W]

ODB:

Would not the grenadier feel exposed without an assault rifle attached to his grenade launcher? There was at one time 40mmm "shotgun round" for close defense. But it was a one shot capability and like a 12 gauge shotgun the pellets only opened up about one inch in pattern per yard traveled. Or do you think the M79 should be carried as an additional weapon like the LAW or AT4?

Regards

Richard W

[jcustis]

Perhaps; we now have the night vision equipment however it is widely available on the market and has already appeared in Lebanon, Afghanistan and Iraq, it's proliferating world wide and rapidly. Point being that relative advantage will soon disappear and you're back to relative equality of squad versus squad wherein firepower is a minor factor and state of training and attitude are the major factors. The tendency for theorists to count things as opposed to the intangibles always dooms theories to dustbins.

Once we hit parity, it will be interesting to see if there is a shift towards personal mini thermal viewers. It'll be a trip to see attacks scheduled to occur during slivers of moonlight, to somehow reduce an oppo's NVG capability.

The ammunition issue for M203s has been terrible for a long time, and there is a dead and buried Marine Gunner probably rolling over in his grave as I type. I also remember practice ranges being oriented towards more distant shots, with decent arcs of fire. The challenge is working a HEDP round at close-in distances, and getting it over and behind intervening cover. Training to that standard is definitely the objective, but we will likely never even be able to hit the threshold.

[Fuchs]

Once we hit parity, it will be interesting to see if there is a shift towards personal mini thermal viewers. It'll be a trip to see attacks scheduled to occur during slivers of moonlight, to somehow reduce an oppo's NVG capability.

A shift to thermal viewers might lead to massive use of smoke (the old IR-transparent varieties) to regain the advantage.
Smoke can be ordered, moonlight is difficult to control.

Next in the tech race would probably be a 3D mm wavelength radar helmet-mounted display. Followed by mm wavelength jammers.

B2topic:
Thermal sights should be limited for some years/decades to sharpshooters, leaders and machine gunners, just like LL sights were in the past. Grenadiers have only a small long-range role in comparison and can be tasked with close-range security without long-range sights.
Infantrymen were supporting their main weapon (machine gun) most of the time in WW2, that's probably a good idea in general.

[Richard W]

I have just started to reread Steel Inferno by Michael Reynolds. It is the story of the 1st SS Panzer Corps in Normandy. One of the things that strikes me in the story is the willingness and ability of the SS Panzer Grenadiers to get out of their vehicles for extended periods of time (weeks) and fight and march effectively. It seems to me that our modern Western infantry, even the light infantry is becoming more and more mechanized. They do not seem to operate away from vehicles for extended periods of time. Vehicles mean roads. Roads mean mines.

Perhaps this cannot be helped. However all three rifle companies in a SS Panzer Grenadier company led by their Battalion Commander would march and fight on foot. Much to the confusion of the Allies in Normandy. Perhaps it is a skill our infantry need to relearn? Perhaps such a skill would demand a reorganization of the rifle squad?

Regards

Richard W

[Fuchs]

I have just started to reread Steel Inferno by Michael Reynolds. It is the story of the 1st SS Panzer Corps in Normandy. One of the things that strikes me in the story is the willingness and ability of the SS Panzer Grenadiers to get out of their vehicles for extended periods of time (weeks) and fight and march effectively.

IIRC they did so because their vehicles (IIRC several hundreds SdKfz 250 and 251) were too thinly armoured (.3" bullet-proof) for Western Front conditions (.50 machine guns, ground attack aircraft) and because the terrain was too closed for classic Panzergrenadier employment anyway. They were also short on gasoline.

[Steve Blair]

IIRC they did so because their vehicles (IIRC several hundreds SdKfz 250 and 251) were too thinly armoured (.3" bullet-proof) for Western Front conditions (.50 machine guns, ground attack aircraft) and because the terrain was too closed for classic Panzergrenadier employment anyway. They were also short on gasoline.

Quite so. A shortage of vehicles also played a role with some (but not all) units.

[jcustis]

Perhaps this cannot be helped. However all three rifle companies in a SS Panzer Grenadier company led by their Battalion Commander would march and fight on foot. Much to the confusion of the Allies in Normandy. Perhaps it is a skill our infantry need to relearn? Perhaps such a skill would demand a reorganization of the rifle squad?

If we did re-learn this, we wouldn't be wearing the current levels of body armor with side plates anymore.

[Richard W]

jcustis:

Would it be possible for an American Rifle Squad leader to be granted leave to decide for himself when and when not for his Squad to wear armor?

Thank you

Regards

Richard W.