Rifle squad composition

[Richard W]

Fuchs:

Thank you for your kind reply. I have not got to the part yet where Reynolds explains why the SS Panzer Grenadiers fought almost the entire campaign on foot. But I suspect you are right.

Regards

Richard W

[Richard W]

Back in the Dark Ages the American Army started teaching something called the Dupuy foxhole. (I believe that polite company used the term "fighting position" in lieu of foxhole.) Apparently an American Army General (Dupuy) had studied the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. He came up with an entire system of military thought based upon his study. ("If it can be seen it can be hit")

This translated to a new foxhole for the grunt (and a lot more digging). The Dupuy foxhole essentially was a two man position with a protective berm to it front. The soldiers shot to the oblique from behind the protection of the berm. In order to counter such protective positions, and survive enemy indirect fires, General Dupuy proposed that the then five-man fire team maneuver more aggressively on the battlefield. Almost like a small Squad. In order to do this the fire team had to have its own maneuver elements. It was divided into two "buddy teams" and a leader. One buddy team was built around the M79 and one around the automatic rifle (for a short period of time the echo model of the M14 or M14A1 was reintroduced.)

General Dupuy thought that indirect fire was the big killer on the battlefield. The fire team with its M79 had its own indirect fire weapon. The automatic rifle would pin down the enemy. The grenade launcher would finish him off. The leader woudl mark target with tracer.

With the end of the draft most squads shrank to the size of a fire team. Then the Army switched to the 4-man fire team. It appears that the system never really took root. However indigenous forces, based on a large population, sponsored by the US government used the Depuy fire team tactics. Reportedly with success.

Regards

Richard W

[Ken White]

...This translated to a new foxhole for the grunt (and a lot more digging).

and regrettably ill informed as to reality versus theory. Not to be confrontational, I truly do not mean to be but you make these assertions based on your reading as if they were fact. Mostly, they aren't.

Yes, you're correct -- but DePuy (with an 'e' not a 'u[') forgot that Americans hate to dig. We're lousy defenders, we do not do it well. Note that every celebrated British battle is a defence (they do it well) but all ours are attacks -- we don't defend at all well, never have. The DePuy bunker died a natural death.

...General Dupuy proposed that the then five-man fire team maneuver more aggressively on the battlefield. Almost like a small Squad. In order to do this the fire team had to have its own maneuver elements. It was divided into two "buddy teams" and a leader. One buddy team was built around the M79 and one around the automatic rifle (for a short period of time the echo model of the M14 or M14A1 was reintroduced.)

That didn't work either. There were three problems; Americans prefer to select their own buddies; the level of training of most fire team leaders couldn't handle the control issue in a dispersed combat setting; and most squads were never full, stateside or overseas (the recruiting problem even with no war was not providing enough people and the draft also failed to fill everyone).

... The grenade launcher would finish him off. The leader woudl mark target with tracer.

More great theory. Unfortunately, most Team leaders did not get any tracers; those that did quickly stopped using them. It seems a tracer not only shows where one is shooting, it also shows from where one is shooting...

With the end of the draft most squads shrank to the size of a fire team. Then the Army switched to the 4-man fire team. It appears that the system never really took root.

Incorrect on both counts; the former was very much a function of where the unit was located and what its required mission readiness criteria happened to be. The second item is true but was driven by the desire to create two new Divisions without a concomitant increase in end strength. The 'system' you describe never took root because it didn't work. That's not to say teams and squads did not successfully use fire and maneuver, they did -- they just didn't do it in the way you describe.

However indigenous forces, based on a large population, sponsored by the US government used the Depuy fire team tactics. Reportedly with success.

Could you share you source for this assertion with us?

[Fuchs]

It seems a tracer not only shows where one is shooting, it also shows from where one is shooting...

For obvious safety reasons I've refrained from trying to see a dark ignition tracer shot from the far business end.
I wonder whether the late ignition (10-50m away from muzzle) helps to keep at least the exact position difficult to spot as it is supposed to do (besides reduction of barrel wear).

Any experiences?

edit: And if it's still too compromising (likely, as most post-WW2 tracer cartridges were of the dark ignition type afaik), how about using incendiary cartridges? Incendiary provides a more visible impact afaik (I never shot with INC - environment and no real training requirement anyway).

[Richard W]

After the American five - man fire team went the way of the dinosaur something interesting happened. The Army authorized every Rifle Squad not one but two belt fed machine guns. One for each fire team.

The German Army had invaded Poland in 1939 with one light machine gun per squad. Later the German Army and Air Force authorized some squads (Panzer Grenadiers and Parachute) two light machine guns per squad.

By June 1944 most second line Infantry formations in Normandy (like the 352 Division) were authorized 4-light machine guns in each rifle platoon (one in each squad and one in the platoon headquarters.) The German Company also had a two gun heavy machine gun squad. Finally there was a gun in the company trains. A total authorization of 15 heavy and light machine guns. (and as Max hastings pointed out in Overlord the Germans also had the ammunition authorization on the ground to match the guns.)

An American Army Rifle Company by contrast had only two machine guns authorized and a much less scale of ammunition. (See Beyond the Beaches, the story of teh American 29th Infantry Division during the Normandy campaign for a very interesting discussion regarding the opposing machine gun tactics.)

This was not good for the good guys.

For reasons I cannot understand the American Rifle Squad continued to soldier on through WWII, Korea and Vietnam without a belt fed machine gun. (I understand that some specialist units had one or more machine guns assigned to each rifle squad.) Apparently it was not until Gulf War I that most American Rifle Squads received their light machine guns.

But when they received the light machine guns the American Squads, for the first time in their history, suddenly had serious fire power at their disposal. However at the same time the perennial Western manning problem raised its ugly head. The American Rifle Squad with an authorized strength of nine men was often reduced to five or six men.

These five or six soldiers had to carry two light machine guns, two grenade launchers, assault rifles, various missiles, rockets and other explosive devices, viewing aids, one or more radios, sundry items, ammunition and armor. And unlike their 1944 German Rifle Squad opponent they did not have a pony cart to assist in movement.

Which brings us back to Rifle Squad composition. Can we have a truly foot mobile Western Rifle Squad in the 21st Century?

Regards

Richard W

[William F. Owen]

Which brings us back to Rifle Squad composition. Can we have a truly foot mobile Western Rifle Squad in the 21st Century?

I can only repeat my enduring observations and opinions, that foucssing on the Squad is a waste of time. It's platoons, multiples and sub-units that actually do the fighting. Squads exist soley to function within a platoon context.

You do not want to be foot mobile. You want to be able to operate dismounted as and when required. The ability to do this is based purely on good training and judgement. EG: When you need to carry lots of water and rations to go long distance through the jungle, you don't wear body armour, or just carry one plate in a plate carrier.

Of course I could be wrong, so anyone things to the contrary, speak up.

[Richard W]

William F. Owen:

Thank you for your kind reply.

I have formed a snapshot in my head of a healthy German Rifle (Grenadier) Squad and Platoon on the Eastern Front in 1944/45. (See Carrol's Hitler Moves East, Sajer's The Forgotten Soldier, Michael Reynolds' works on the Waffen SS. and also Beyond the Beaches).The German Squad consists of five or six soldiers. The Squad, in open terrain, is armed with a MG34/42 light machine gun. The other soldiers carry a variety of German and captured small arms. The soldiers carry little else. Most of their meager gear (along with a antitank weapon or two and mines) is dumped in a Russian all terrain, all weather vehicle called a pony cart. The cart is led by a Soviet

prisoner who is quite happy to exchange the horrors of a German prisoner camp for the dangers of the Eastern Front.

Two of the three Squads in the platoon are led by experienced soldiers. One Squad is led by a noncommissioned officer. Each leader is assisted by a deputy (As far as I know the only deputy position in the German Army in WWII.) Two soldiers are assigned to the light machine gun. The remaining soldier(s) is designated a grenadier.

The Platoon is led by a noncommissioned officer. He is assisted by a headquarters leader, two runners, a medic and a pony cart again led by a Soviet helper.

In urban terrain the light machine guns are removed from the first and second squads and placed in the third squad and platoon headquarters which form "resistance points". The first and second squads perform outpost, patrolling and counter attack duties in a built up area. This is a platoon with a maximum field strength of around 24 combatants. It was incredibly mobile and required very little in terms of resupply.

I think its field strength is remarkably similar to a British Army Infantry Platoon's strength in the Falklands (See Max Hastings and General Frost's works on this subject). (Note: I am privalaged to have copies of the post action reports of several of the British Army Infantry Batallions which faught in the Falklands. Except for the Gurka Battalion all of the Rifle Platoons were very small.) However I do not think, and I say this with the greatest respect for the British soldier, that the Professional British Squad is as moblie as the conscript WWII German Squad.

(as you know one of the great criticism's of the French Army in IndoChina was that it was far too mechanized and had forgot how to walf (with certain outstanding exceptions like Bigerd's 6th Colonial Parachute Battalion. [See Falls' Strret Without Joy and Hell in a Very Small Place.])

It appears that the instant British Rifle Platoon still has a remarkably low field strength. It is is even less foot mobile than its South Atlantic father. In my opinion, and I write this with the greatest respect, a rifle platoon prior to comabt that has a field strength of 20-24 combatants is likely and naturally to break down into four groups one of which is a headquarters. The remaining three groups I think will be hard put to avoid bearing the title "squad".

How that "Squad" is organized, trained and equiped may one day be of the greatest importance to the West. And, at the risk of appearing arrogant, I think our Squads may have to regain extended foot mobility.

Forgive the long post.

Regards

Richard W

[William F. Owen]

I'll try and make this as succinct as possible as I can deal with all the points you make, in detail.

1. Squads/Sections very rarely operate alone. The British Sections of 1918, fought as part of a platoon. There was not intention of making them fight as sections. Platoon Strength was 27-28 men.

2. The German Army of WW2 is a very poor reference point for modern operations. It didn't have the communications and sensors we have today, and by 1944 the infantry was so pushed for man power and training time, it was far less than optimal. How Armies equipped and organised their sections had no effect on the outcome of WW2.

3. A 24-30 man platoon capable of variable groupings, and weapon sets, probably best fulfils the requirements of modern operations. 1 Officer, 1 Sgt, 2 Corporals and 2 L/Cpls is about right.

4. How Platoons are trained, equipped and organised, is of some importance, both in terms of operational capability and also the best use of the budget.

5. What do you mean "Foot mobility?" I am an infantry Apostle, Heretic, Critic and annoyance, but the issue of foot mobility is an utter mystery to me and I never understands it's fascination. Physical fitness, rational operational loads and patrol skills are all essential. Only Infantry can operate across the spectrum of terrain, populations and threats. None of this has anything to do with being "foot mobile", but maybe I am missing the point.

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...t=Patrol+Based This may be useful.

Not to bore the ever tolerant population of SWC, but I now have some pretty firm ideas as to what the modern platoon may look like, and how it should work. Happy to pass it on, if you PM me.

[Fuchs]

Your corporals need to be well-trained if that leadership layout shall suffice in high intensity operations.
I doubt the effectiveness of platoon leadership in both urban and forest combat because of LOS interruptions. Such terrains demand a robust squad leadership imho.
Some patrol scenarios require sub-units of no more than three, sometimes even two men for maximum efficiency. Full platoons leave too many traces, are too easily spotted, don't fit in many hideouts.

The radio equipment in combination with the present lethality of direct and indirect fires plus a good responsiveness of indirect fires influences my opinion on this. Infantry needs to be able of skirmishing / reconnaissance / counter-reconnaissance missions in high intensity warfare. A minimal signature (being a small element helps a lot) helps to survive, and a team of two can as easily call for indirect fires as an entire platoon.
Counter-reconnaissance doesn't require entire platoons as well - sniping and fire&forget ATGMs plus proper ambushing is enough.

Let's consider modern "Jagdkampf" as it exists in German and Austrian theory (I see some inherent problems in the concept, though):
A reinforced platoon operates ahead of friendly forces (possibly unintentionally because neighbouring units were overrun).
Small teams provide area reconnaissance, several squads or smaller teams are used as manoeuvre elements to join for an ambush on detected opponents.
This requires much more squad-level leadership than you described imho.

I've seen some texts on your platoon designs, but I had several times the impression that
- it's either a simple 2-section platoon
or
- you assume that the platoon is the smallest element and teams/sections are not really capable of temporarily pursuing independent missions

[Richard W]

William F. Owen:

Thank you for your kind reply.

I have read the link to your posts regarding patrol based infantry. I am on my second reading. They are brilliant. I am having a difficult time trying to grasp some of the points.

I will certainly take you up on your generous offer to send you a private message wherein I will beg for more information on this subject.

Please allow me to publicly pontificate on the following subjects:

Foot mobility: Some years ago I had the opportunity, privilege really, to do a job with the French Army on the ground. The leadership consisted entirely of veterans of the Colonial Parachute Battalions and Regiments and 2REP. 3BEP and even the dreaded 1REP. Their idea of foot mobility was for an entire Battalion, to include the commander and his staff, "to disappear" in the back country for 3-5 days without backpacks or resupply. Rightly or wrongly I was profoundly impressed with their idea of "foot mobility". (They were nuts on mobilityI am not making this up. They had a unit brothel. It was termed a "mobile" brothel. .) The French had a lot of experience fighting Muslim insurgents. I think their "foot mobility" may be useful in the present fight.

Rifle Squad Man Power: I fear the West may not be able to sustain ground combat against Muslin insurgents because of man power limitations. The Germans had a lot of innovative ideas to get around their man power shortages. We may have to adopt them if we are to survive. (I followed British media reports about an 8-man Rifle Squad from a regular battalion preparing for a six month tour in Afghanistan. In order to bring it to authorized strength the Army had to draft in 4-territorial soldiers, one Army Air Corps soldier and a regular from another infantry battalion. How long can the West keep this up?)

Terminology: I am struck as to how confusing military titles for the same size unit can be. For instance since 1939 English speaking Armies have used the following titles for the same size formation: Regiment, Regimental Combat Team, Regimental Landing Team, Brigade, Brigade Group, Brigade Combat Team, Combat Command, Group and my favorite: "Unit of Action". My head hurts. I hope we can stick to "Squad".

I shall attempt to send a "PM". Thank you for your patience.

Regards

Richard W

[Norfolk]

The key to German Infantry tactics and performance was leadership that emphasized the development and use of judgement, boldness, and risk-taking. As any good infantry leader will do, he takes what men and weapons are available to him, and matches them to the stituation at hand. Formal structures are for apportioning troops and equipment to anticipated tasks, and act as a basis for change, and should not act as a constraint on the leader's ability to anticipate, to plan, and to act. They are useful as a starting point for allocating available resources (I hate phrases like that, but offhand I don't know what other to use) in peacetime and for the start of campaigns or operations. The Germans were fluid in their thinking and their TTPs. They paid no more attention in practice to formal structures than was necessary for planning the allocation of available resources to general concepts of missions and tasks to be performed, and doctrine served principally as a learning aid for developing tactical judgement and for providing common sources of reference.

I just received a copy of the 1942 draft of H.Dv. 130/2a, The Rifle Company (it covers the field from individual soldier right up to Company and is only 200 pages long), and it not only confirms but expands on whatever I've read on the German approach to infantry tactics, and English-speaking Armies would have a hard time adapting to German methods, or rather lack of formal methods. We just won't allow in practice (not for long at least) giving our infantry leaders the sort of freedom of thought and action that the Germans gave theirs, or the sort of very thorough training that they gave their leaders (and of course their soldiers, too). The Germans were minimalist on formal methods, and maximalist on honing the tactical judgement of each leader to respond to each situation. Two words can describe the essence of German infantry tactics: boldness and fluidity. All else flows from that. And few, if any present-day Armies match or even approach the Wehrmacht in these regards.

Richard W.:

Agreed, foot-mobile infantry are necessary, provided that one qualifies the statement by saying that most non-Armoured/Mechanized Infantry Battalions should be able to march and fight entirely on foot if need be, but should at the same time possess a full roster of organic wheeled transport for use when terrain, visibility, or the mission do not preclude their use. In the case of true Light Infantry (Mountain Troops, Paratroops, Commandos, etc.), wheeled transport may also be necessary, but it may often be dispensed with depdending upon conditions. Mountain troops may find themselves very dependent upon hauling their own supplies on their own backs, or by helicopter when possible. Deep-forest or riverine/swamp operations likewise render motor-transport useless, or mostly so, and helicopters again (and small boats) help to fill in when troops aren''t having to carry everything on their own backs. And Paratroops and Commandos may have to do without full motor-transport during raids, seizure of beacheads/airfields, key terrain features, etc. for several hours or even several days. But generally speaking, foot-mobile infantry need access to full motor-transport (preferably organic) when and where possible.

One of the problems in LIC is when motorized/mechanized/armoured infantry are used in lieu of regular foot infantry; the mobility of the former encourages the belief that one can perform the same missions with fewer troops than the latter. Unfortunately, nothing less than having troops physically present most or all of the time suffices in many LIC situations, and being fully dependent upon motor-transport renders one more vulnerable to booby-traps, roadside bombs, ambushes, etc. Not to mention that not being physically on location all the time deprives you of intelligence and leaves the enemy more or less free to act - and you unable to react on the spot as things are justing starting. It's kind of like the difference between having a cop on each street corner and having the streets patrolled by cops in squad-cars.

Edited to Add:

On the subject of ARs vs MGs in the Platoon, Ken handled the matter pretty comprehensively starting at this post, and his next few subsequent posts.

[Fuchs]

We just won't allow in practice (not for long at least) giving our infantry leaders the sort of freedom of thought and action that the Germans gave theirs, or the sort of very thorough training that they gave their leaders (and of course their soldiers, too).

IIRC the Bundeswehr attempted in the 90's to give every squad a Feldwebel (Staff Sergeant) as leader and at least one Stabsunteroffizier (Sergeant) more.
I cannot comment on the past few years because I left and the meaning/requirements of NCO ranks changed (rank inflation).
One rank higher than Staff Sergeant (that would be Oberfeldwebel) was already very appropriate rank for leading a platoon if no officer is available.

Low level initiative helps in difficult situations like when just one or two boats successfully cross a river and 6-30 men need to overwhelm a defense grid of interlocking machine gun positions. That's how the Meuse river crossing at Sedan 1940 worked. No officer survived the initial crossing, but NCO-led teams tore a gap into the French defence.

[Richard W]

Norfolk:

Thank you for the link regarding the automatic rifle v the machine gun. However I remain unconvinced by the arguments found therein. I am on the other hand convinced by the arguments found in the previously cited Beyond The Beaches that the Squad belt fed light machine gun is superior to the Squad magazine fed automatic rifle.

Regards

Richard W

[Kiwigrunt]

...I think its field strength is remarkably similar to a British Army Infantry Platoon's strength in the Falklands (See Max Hastings and General Frost's works on this subject). (Note: I am privalaged to have copies of the post action reports of several of the British Army Infantry Batallions which faught in the Falklands. Except for the Gurka Battalion all of the Rifle Platoons were very small.) ...

Richard W

Reports only on army battalions or also marines?
Do they include some relevant feedback on effect of 2 x GPMG per section as opposed to 1 (2 Para)? And (for marines) the effect of L7 GPMG versus L4 Bren LMG?

[Fuchs]

I am on the other hand convinced by the arguments found in the previously cited Beyond The Beaches that the Squad belt fed light machine gun is superior to the Squad magazine fed automatic rifle.

"It depends"

Belt-feed has generally proved to be more successful, but tactics change.
There's probably no difference between belt and magazine fed machine guns against targets with short exposure like a man running for two seconds from one cover to another. You cannot expend more than a 30rds magazine on this occasion anyway.
Magazine-fed machine support weapons seem to tend to be more accurate and useful as bipod-stabilised long-range single fire weapons (like the LSW), although this is possible with belt feed as well (HK21E). Many belt fed machine guns use open bolt system, though - that's not good for accuracy. Other belt-fed machine guns have their bipod directly attached tot he barrel, which increases dispersion due to troublesome vibrations.

Belt feed is superior in ammo weight (belt pouch + links vs. magazine weight) and in general in volume of fire (this is irrelevant if 100rds magazines compete with 100 or 150 rds belt pouches).

Belt fed weapons tend to be heavier for several reasons, I personally would prefer magazine feed (a lightweight weapon similar in concept to LSW or LMG36) in assault teams and belt feed (open bolt operation, tripod capable, telescope/magnifying scope) for everything else.

Overall it's often a close call which explains why both concepts co-exist at least in the small calibre range (full rifle calibre and AT rifle calibre magazin-fed machine guns are almost extinct).

[Richard W]

Kiwigrunt:

I cannot find a report from one of the Royal marine Commandos. But I recommend a book by their Brigade Commander (Vaux) titled Take that Hill. What I do have:

Scots Guards: The only comment on machine guns regards the ".50 MG were very effective against enemy sangars...they were very good for our morale,,,Their weight and weight of ammunition severely reduced the options for their use when solely manpacked".

2 Para: Under the heading "Minor Tactics": The Battalion was fortunate that it acquired sufficient GPMGs for two per section. Consequently fire and maneuver at section level was between two gun groups, which proved far more satisfactory that between a gun group and a rifle group". (Note this passage was underlined by the writer.) Further: The GPMG, on the other hand, more than proved its worth both in the light and sustained fire role". More under "Recommendations": "A rifle section should be established for two GPMGs". Finally 2 Para reports that its ammunition scale for the GPMG was "800 rds per gun". Ouch!

3 Para: Also "800 rds per gun". Under "Section Organization": "two light machine guns would have been undoubtedly better than one". More: "GPMG. Proved first rate in both light and SF roles. There is a firm need for two light machine guns per section".

1/7 Gurkha Rifle: Each section was divided into "two groups of four: each group had one GPMG". More: "The additional GPMG/LMG per section was most welcome adn provided devastating fire power".

I could not find anything on the Bren.

Regards

Richard W

[Richard W]

Fuchs:

Thank you for your kind reply.

Please see the comments extracted from the British reports above on this subject. In my opinion the 7.62 belt fed machine gun is, in most circumstances, the backbone of Infantry Squad fire power. There is simply no replacement for it. On the other hand it is not too helpful as a personal weapon in room combat. The November 1944 German Squad reorganization (discussed previously) I think addressed this problem. It placed the guns, in an urban setting, with the third squad and platoon headquarters.

Regards

Richard W

[RJ]

Richard W - points of historical order.

When the German Army began the war its primary maneuver elements (Platoons and Squads) were agressivly into assualt mode.

By 1944, most German Army actions for units at that level were definsive in nature. I suspect the increase in MG's per Platoon or Squad were for defense.

The availability of trained and seasoned infantry in the last 18 months of the war in Europe was minimal at best. With the historical mix in that time frame of very young and very old troopers, a need for more fire power in the defense could have evolved because the ability of the German Infantry Squads just didn't measure up to the quality of the troops in 1939 thuough 43.

A lot of good German infantry had been used up in Africa and the Eastern Front by the end of 1943.

Have you adjusted any of your concepts about Rifle Squads
to include this degradation of quality in the German Formations near the end of hte war?

[Richard W]

RJ:

Thank you for your kind reply.

This is a subject way above me. Right now I am reading several books that discuss this matter. (Van Crevald Fighting Power, Reynolds Steel Inferno, Hastings Overlord, Keegan Six Armies) Based on the foregoing this is my uneducated guess on what was going on in the 1944/45 German Infantry Squad.

At its height in 1944 the German Army numbered around 6.5 million (remarkably similar to US Army Ground Forces). However between 1939 and 1945 it suffered around 1.7 million KIA. There had to be a decline in Infantry quality. However all of the foregoing authors cite testimonials from Western Generals that the German Army had a seemingly endless supply of very good combat leaders (Curiously they did not seem to have abnEisenhower or a Marshall or a King).. Indeed the quality of combat leadership may have increased towards the end of the war.

The German Army, unlike the Western Allies, deliberately organized their Army into a, qualitatively speaking, hierarchal and uneven fashion. Something as follows:

1. Elite units capable of leading the assault.
2. Units capable of offensive operations.
3. Units capable of front line defensive operations.
4. Units capable of rear area security.
5. Units capable of manning static fortifications.

Right up until 1945 the German Army fielded elite, well armed and equipped assault units boasting 10-man rifle squads. I think that the November 1944 infantry reorganization enabled, on paper, the German infantry to better conduct delays and defensive operations while retaining the ability to conduct local counter attacks. My hunch is that the German personnel system made very good use of a declining man power pool (organizing static "Stomach" heavy machine gun units wherein all of the personnel had the same medical aliment.). Above all the German leadership at all levels except the very top were infinitely flexible.

It is a real shame that Hitler got his hands on the German Army.

Regards

Richard

[Kiwigrunt]

Kiwigrunt:

I cannot find a report from one of the Royal marine Commandos. But I recommend a book by their Brigade Commander (Vaux) titled Take that Hill. What I do have:

Scots Guards: The only comment on machine guns regards the ".50 MG were very effective against enemy sangars...they were very good for our morale,,,Their weight and weight of ammunition severely reduced the options for their use when solely manpacked".

2 Para: Under the heading "Minor Tactics": The Battalion was fortunate that it acquired sufficient GPMGs for two per section. Consequently fire and maneuver at section level was between two gun groups, which proved far more satisfactory that between a gun group and a rifle group". (Note this passage was underlined by the writer.) Further: The GPMG, on the other hand, more than proved its worth both in the light and sustained fire role". More under "Recommendations": "A rifle section should be established for two GPMGs". Finally 2 Para reports that its ammunition scale for the GPMG was "800 rds per gun". Ouch!

3 Para: Also "800 rds per gun". Under "Section Organization": "two light machine guns would have been undoubtedly better than one". More: "GPMG. Proved first rate in both light and SF roles. There is a firm need for two light machine guns per section".

1/7 Gurkha Rifle: Each section was divided into "two groups of four: each group had one GPMG". More: "The additional GPMG/LMG per section was most welcome adn provided devastating fire power".

I could not find anything on the Bren.

Regards

Richard W

Thanks for that Richard.

It is interesting to note that there appears to be a consensus through a number of battalions in favour of fireteams with a gimpy each. Not quite in line with Karcher's (or Melody? I get confused) suggestion of one gun per squad.