Rifle squad composition

[William F. Owen]

I understand your ammunition and weapons weight concerns. I never liked to carry a GPMG myself. But to take away firepower in all missions is not the solution, especially no solution that deserves to be associated with being "optimal".
That's why I advocate a flexible platoon that partially reorganizes and re-equips to suit a mission.
Deliberate defense = 6 GPMG.
Patrol = much less GPMGs.
Offense = some machine guns, but most important external support.
Recce = no machine guns, sub squad size.

I believe that such a flexible TO&E is a much better answer than to have an all-round TO&E that is still quite heavy for some tasks and much too weak on machine guns for other tasks.

The ultimate test would need to be actual combat against even-sized opponents, as lots of psychological and Murphy's law components play into this. Exercises won't help to test the effect in a firefight.

I'll start here as this is the useful bit.

Sven, you can add 4 more GPMG. I don't say you shouldn't. As long as you add 2 more TI sights, and loose other weapons systems to keep the cost and weight the same, then OK. I can't tell you you're wrong. Just tell me what you are prepared to loose to have the extra 4 guns and 2 TI sights.

...but I see no difference in the weapons needed for what you call deliberate defence, patrol, offence and Recce. This is a WW2 form of infantry operations which I believe we have moved beyond. - and this also assumes that each phase is distinct, which it is not.

We don't need actual combat to gather good data. Suppression can now be very accurately modelled, but fear less so.

..and why are we so focussed on the Weapons? The communications and sensors deliver the greatest increase in capability.

[Fuchs]

Sensors and communications gear seemed to be OK. It would be nice to incorporate the personal radio into the more powerful radios so nobody would have to carry two radios, but that's it.

What I would sacrifice for more GPMG in certain missions? Mobility. Some missions don't require much foot mobility.

My view on classic infantry is very much WW2-like because I split infantry into two groups in my mind; classic infantry for very closed terrain (forest, settlements, mountains) for WW2-like missions.
Completely different skirmisher infantry for screening & delaying actions with emphasis on stealth and indirect fires. The latter would be used to screen efficiently terrains that provide some concealment and cover, but also long lines of sight in some directions.

I took this as a conversation about classic infantry. The platoon didn't look at all like a platoon for my concept of skirmishing (which is still maturing). That's why my demands look old-fashioned at times.

I doubt that suppression can be modeled. I've seen such modelling in papers, and it looked like nonsense.
Consider the OCSW suppression claims, for example. They claimed a huge suppressive effect for a munition that cannot be evaded.
To stop shooting and to lie down to eliminate exposure to direct fire bullets doesn't help against OCSW, so why should it suppress? It would either not suppress anymore as soon as the opponents understood the weapon or it would make them run - both isn't suppression.
In the worst case all enemies would have a ghillie-suit with 20 layers kevlar base and would become almost immune to OCSW.
Some other modelling was not as much nonsense, but still not convincing because too many training and morale factors contribute that cannot be modelled ex ante.

[Distiller]

Just 2 GPMG for ~30 men is not enough. Somebody talked about the "natural grouping" in combat, which is like 6 or 8 men. Every one of these groups need a high-volume direct fire weapon = GPMG.

But do I get it right from that you assume just one man per GPMG? Is that realistic? I don't think so. No sustainability here without the second guy *only* there for carrying extra ammo and help with the MG.

@ Fuchs: You don't like the marksman rifle (long barrel full caliber)? Well, you wouldn't need it if you wouldn't give those 4 riflemen (or so) in the "natural" group a carbine optimised for close to mid-range work only. Because of that you need a long-range precision rifle to supplement the GPMG. But it's not a sniper, neither from his ops characteristics, nor from his equipment.

To complete the "natural group", a 1-man grenade launcher, and a 1-man SRAAW shooter would round it out. (Here of course too the question of sustainability with just 1 guy per hungry weapon arises, but ...).

The idea of LMGs in my mind is (besides the caliber thing) a high-volume direct fire weapon with only a 1-man crew. But does it work? If you got too much money, for certain missions you could equip the 2-men GPMG crew with two LMGs, but basically I wouldn't want to trouble them with an unfamiliar weapon.

[jcustis]

The idea of LMGs in my mind is (besides the caliber thing) a high-volume direct fire weapon with only a 1-man crew. But does it work?

This is an excellent point that I don't think has been mentioned yet in all 18 pages of this thread, or the weapons thread.

If we are considering the sphere of influence of one tm leader, and then the squad leader, followed by the platoon commander, and roll that up into a metric whereby X leader can control X number of men, does this issue of a 1-man LMG vs. a 3-man GPMG tm come into play?

With the right personal weapon, a 3-man team can do much more than simply employ the machine gun, assuming that the gun is not actually emloyed for whatever reason. But has this been a concern for any of the planners of weapons/squad size and whatnot?

[William F. Owen]

Just 2 GPMG for ~30 men is not enough. Somebody talked about the "natural grouping" in combat, which is like 6 or 8 men. Every one of these groups need a high-volume direct fire weapon = GPMG.

Again, why is 2 not enough? The Current US platoon has 2 GPMG/M240. Does it not have enough GPMG? I have seen no AAR mentioning this, nor any opinions from the now 60+ combat veterans I have interview notes on.

What the platoon model under discussion lacks is LMG/SAW in 5.56mm. - yet the platoon still has 26-28 fully automatic 5.56mm carbines. Thus I submit that this is where the discussion lies. Can 4 men with 5.56mm carbine match the all round capability of 4 men with 3 x carbines and 1 x LMG/SAW

If we are considering the sphere of influence of one tm leader, and then the squad leader, followed by the platoon commander, and roll that up into a metric whereby X leader can control X number of men, does this issue of a 1-man LMG vs. a 3-man GPMG tm come into play?

Sorry. I assumed this was a given. If the 30 man platoon is operating as 6 x 5 man teams, 2 of the teams have 1 GPMG each. Just like the UKs 1918 Platoon,(also only had 2 x Lewis Guns) each team is dedicated to supporting the action of the GPMG. If required they can use other weapons, but that is their primary function, should the weapon be deployed on the mission.

[William F. Owen]

It would be nice to incorporate the personal radio into the more powerful radios so nobody would have to carry two radios, but that's it.

The more powerful radios may cause unsafe dispersion. PRR capabilities seem fine. As you see, all the Officers and NCOs have PRC-148s/710s.

What I would sacrifice for more GPMG in certain missions? Mobility. Some missions don't require much foot mobility.

I can't think of any mission or role where the reduction of mobility would be acceptable.

My view on classic infantry is very much WW2-like

Well this would explain our difference of opinion. I consider a lot (not all) of WW2 infantry doctrine about as relevant as Napoleons infantry.

I doubt that suppression can be modeled. I've seen such modelling in papers, and it looked like nonsense.

There are pretty good suppression models for comparing weapons effects. Obviously they are models, and there purpose is not to replicate human behaviour but to compare data. We can now measure a vast range of human factors and apply them in useful ways. This is far better than relying on very poor sources, such as opinions and memories.

[jcustis]

Can 4 men with 5.56mm carbine match the all round capability of 4 men with 3 x carbines and 1 x LMG/SAW

All-round? Perhaps. In the defense, I would argue that they cannot, especially across extended operations. I'd argue that it is easier to bring fires to bear quickly with a LMG/SAW when a team is on 25% alert, than with a single carbine.

Put another way, I would have an easier time planning a 25% alert status for rest purposes with several SAWs being manned, than 25% alert with just riflemen.

[Ken White]

...
I can't think of any mission or role where the reduction of mobility would be acceptable...

...I consider a lot (not all) of WW2 infantry doctrine about as relevant as Napoleons infantry...

...This is far better than relying on very poor sources, such as opinions and memories.

All very, very true and the first two are hypercritical and too often ignored. You do good work; take the rest of the day off...

[Norfolk]

Given that despite having a pair of 5.56mm LMGs and UGLs in each Squad (in order to reduce or eliminate the old need to attach the Platoons' GPMGs to them), the US Army Platoon still often finds itself attaching its two 7.62mm GPMGs out to them in order to gain fire superiority in the firefight, perhaps each Fire Team requires its own AR/LMG of a calibre appreciably greater than 5.56mm, or also that GPMG teams are eliminated in favour of every Fire Team possessing such an AR or LMG of 6.5-7.62mm calibre. AR's or magazine-fed LMGs, used by well-trained troops, would be capable of solid suppression without compromising mobility by having to haul great amounts of ammo for belt-feeds.

But that would entail a substantial expansion in the size of the Platoon (which was handily sidestepped in Wilf's Platoon by concentrating the guns in two dedicated teams), as each Fire Team would have to be capable of both fire support (AR/LMG and UGL) and assault (double the number of riflemen/carbineers as AR/LMG/Grenadiers). Melody went to pains to explain how war experience demonstrated the need for 2 men dedicated to assault/CQB for each man dedicated to fire support/suppression. One problem leads to a solution, which in turns leads to another problem.

[William F. Owen]

Given that despite having a pair of 5.56mm LMGs and UGLs in each Squad (in order to reduce or eliminate the old need to attach the Platoons' GPMGs to them), the US Army Platoon still often finds itself attaching its two 7.62mm GPMGs out to them in order to gain fire superiority in the firefight, perhaps each Fire Team requires its own AR/LMG of a calibre appreciably greater than 5.56mm

Which is why I can't see the reason for a 5.56mm LMG/SAW apart from psychological support for the team. Not a trivial issue, but it needs to be recognised.

Melody went to pains to explain how war experience demonstrated the need for 2 men dedicated to assault/CQB for each man dedicated to fire support/suppression. One problem leads to a solution, which in turns leads to another problem.:wry

I just don't get the Assault/CQB stuff. I was taught this back in 1980, and straight after the Falklands, it was junked. Once you have struck and suppressed, someone (very few) needs to go forward and confirm the position as suppressed and find the next fire position to exploit your advantage. This is the same inside buildings as it is outside or on some wooded hillside. I just don't buy this FUP/Assault/ fight through stuff. No one ever seems to do it, and have it work well. This is why my platoon functions are concentrated around fire support and reconnaissance. The Reconnaissance teams can exploit once the suppression/destruction has gained them the opportunity.

[Norfolk]

I just don't get the Assault/CQB stuff. I was taught this back in 1980, and straight after the Falklands, it was junked. Once you have struck and suppressed, someone (very few) needs to go forward and confirm the position as suppressed and find the next fire position to exploit your advantage. This is the same inside buildings as it is outside or on some wooded hillside. I just don't buy this FUP/Assault/ fight through stuff. No one ever seems to do it, and have it work well. This is why my platoon functions are concentrated around fire support and reconnaissance. The Reconnaissance teams can exploit once the suppression/destruction has gained them the opportunity.

I think it's not so much having such-and-such numbers of bodies dedicated to Assault/CQB itself per se, as simply having enough bodies to perform both the aforementioned roles and to serve as a sort of ready replacement pool for battle losses, both those suffered by the assault elements as well as the support elements. After all, who takes a machine gunner off his gun so that he can replace a rifleman who's become a casualty? But few hesitate to take riflemen as replacements for machine gunners who become casualties. I wonder how much of this is more or less a reflection of an immutable reality of the battlefield, or how much of this is simply a reflection of certain pragmatic views on the actual fighting abilities of most less-than-thoroughly-trained infantry? Personally, I'm a big believer in GEN DePuy's proposition that Infantry Platoons that use two elements to suppress and only one element to assault afford the best chances for a successful Platoon attack (reinforced of course by Kilcullen's reflections on his time at Warminster that using only a c. dozen men in the assault during a Company Attack while the rest of the company suppressed worked best). It's just that how much redundancy do you really need in a Platoon, Section, etc. in order to deal efficiently with battle losses?

[Ken White]

I can't even bloviate and make that better...

[Norfolk]

I can't even bloviate and make that better...

Blovete, bloviet, blovaite...whatever that word was, Ken? Take pity on the functionally illiterate peons of this world, wise old Master.

[William F. Owen]

Personally, I'm a big believer in GEN DePuy's proposition that Infantry Platoons that use two elements to suppress and only one element to assault afford the best chances for a successful Platoon attack (reinforced of course by Kilcullen's reflections on his time at Warminster that using only a c. dozen men in the assault during a Company Attack while the rest of the company suppressed worked best). It's just that how much redundancy do you really need in a Platoon, Section, etc. in order to deal efficiently with battle losses?

I'd be a bigger believer if it was not DuPuy that made that observation!

...but yes. I concur. UK Platoon Attack doctrine has the whole platoon suppressing while as few as one fire team actually tries to get forward and exploit. - This is what Kilcullen was observing, and what the Australians are now doing. The problem for the UK is that no one has ever written down or explained why this is done! - or as of the last time I was invited to observe a Platoon Attack at the infantry school.

And then we might want to ask if the Platoon/Company should create a "reserve" or have an element specifically held to exploit, in addition to that already given the task.

[Ken White]

I'd be a bigger believer if it was not DuPuy that made that observation!

and so too did Ken White -- proving even a General can be correct occasionally...

[Norfolk]

Well, since that proposition has been verified in both testing and war by a Digger, a Four-Star General, a Field Marshal, and a Living Fossil, I suppose all must now bend to the imperious will of this Council on the matter of the ratio of suppression to assault elements (GETM/METT-T dependent of course).

Obstinate deniers of this verified truth will be cattle-prodded, hog-tied, flogged until flayed alive, and roasted on a spit...and then subjected to a continuous loopback recording of reviews and interviews re: all recent autobiographies/articles/books/memoires and the like by past and/or present civilian officials of the current Administration.

Wilf: Dupuy or DePuy you meant to refer to?

Probably a Platoon should have one of its elements designated as its Exploitation element/Reserve, but perhaps only Company itself should possess a more "formal" Reserve per se. Kilcullen noted that the heavy weapons element of the Company was the most useful element from which to form a Reserve; personally, I would qualify that strongly by stating its dependence on GETM/METT-T.

[Ken White]

Sections 1.12 and 1.13, Canadian Human Rights Act ( R.S., 1985, c. H-6 ).

[Norfolk]

Geriatric Abuse! My Attorney will contact you.

Sections 1.12 and 1.13, Canadian Human Rights Act ( R.S., 1985, c. H-6 ).

My apologies Ken, I did not mean to offend your sensibilities.

It is interesting, however, that you did not invoke the Human Rights Act against this little passage:

Obstinate deniers of this verified truth will be cattle-prodded, hog-tied, flogged until flayed alive, and roasted on a spit...and then subjected to a continuous loopback recording of reviews and interviews re: all recent autobiographies/articles/books/memoires and the like by past and/or present civilian officials of the current Administration.

I suppose though that it's all about where you stand depends upon where you sit.

Now let me help you with your wheelchair, Ken...

[Ken White]

My apologies Ken, I did not mean to offend your sensibilities.

Grumpily accepted.

It is interesting, however, that you did not invoke the Human Rights Act against this little passage:

Why would I do that; you merely suggest some possibly excessively light penance for error -- that's to be encouraged. Good job.

I suppose though that it's all about where you stand depends upon where you sit.

Is that a Socratic quote...

Now let me help you with your wheelchair, Ken...

Just hand me that oxygen bottle and get yer grubby paws off my chair...

[gute]

What a topic! All that I have read is very interesting and informative. I am an avid reader of military history and current military affairs. I spent time in the Marine Corps, but never saw combat. I am familiar with weapons because of the time I spent in the Corps and the last 16 years in Law Enforcement.

I read an article a couple of years ago about research conducted at the end of WWII relative to squad size and the squad leaders ability to have effective control. If I remember correctly the research concluded that the ideal size of a rifle squad was 7-9 men. I have served as a fire team leader, squad leader and acting platoon sgt, but never in combat. During training exercises I found it challenging to lead three other Marines, but not hard. Squad leader was more difficult and acting platoon sgt was tough. I do believe age and more so experience are the deciding factors. To most of you this is duh statement.

I find the Distributed Operations concept of the Marine Corps very interesting. Where I diifer is with the squad command structure. With this I believe a 12 man squad lead by a E-6 with one of the fire team leaders acting as an assistant squad leader with the rank of Sgt to be reasonable. The squad would look like this:

SL - E-6
DM - E-3/E-4
GR - E-2/E-3
SAW - E-2

ASL/FTL - E-5
RM - E-4
RM - E-2/E-3
AR - E-2

FTL - E-4
RM - E-3
RM - E-2/E-3
AR - E-2

With the interest in rifle grenades making a comeback and the Marine Corps looking to replace the SAW with an Automatic Rifle, the composition of the three fire teams changes. The SL commands the support unit and directs the squad. I would assume with his rank of E-6 he has been in the infantry for 6-10 years and would have a wealth of experience (that's probably changed with Iraq and Afghanistan). The support squad has a designated marksman or DM, the grenadier humps a M32 multi-barrel grenade launcher, and the SAW man has a 7.62 AR.

The other fire teams have a Sgt to lead all eight Marines as well as provide leadership from a breaching position into the assault.

I have no idea which AR the Marine Corps will choose, but I like the Land Warfare M6A2 - which may also be fired from the open bolt.

I have read a great deal about bullets and which one the military should change to. 5.56, 6.5, 6.8 and 7.62. Also which rifles - HK416, M16A4, XM8, SCAR, LW, etc. It gives me a headache. I feel like the guy in Hamburger Hill talking about which eye to close when a flare goes up and which pill to use to clean his water. I fould a website that provide a lot of great info about the 5.56 and what the round is capable of doing when it is modified. When I write modified I mean 55 grain, 62 grain, 77 grain, etc.

With the military being the military I will venture that there is no change and the 5.56 stays so with that I go with a M16A6 (made up), which is a 5.56 caliber, 16.1 inch barrel with the LR 300 upper receiver. This will allow the stock to telescope and fold, which would be beneficial in vehicles and CQB. The buffer spring is moved to the front of the receiver from the stock. The automatic rifleman will hump basically the same weapon, but capable of firing from the open bolt (maybe a little longer barrel). The AR in the support fire team will have a 7.62 version of the 5.56 AR (def longer barrel). More range, bigger punch. The DM rifle will also be 7.62 (18-20 inch barrel) and the one made by LW rifles seems like it will work.

The CAP concept the Marine Corps utilized in Vietnam could also be used. Increasing the size of the squad to 15 men by adding a corpsman, RO, and a TAC-P type (good time to make TAC-P operations a warrant officers MOS in the Marine Corps - speciality if I have ever seen one).

Maybe I am taking too much current firepower away from the squad. I will not even get into drum mags for the AR's - hit and miss.

I am probably way out of my element, but what the heck. Feedback would be nice.