Rifle squad composition

[William F. Owen]

I find the Distributed Operations concept of the Marine Corps very interesting.

You may want to consult the DO thread http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=5636

The support squad has a designated marksman or DM, the grenadier humps a M32 multi-barrel grenade launcher, and the SAW man has a 7.62 AR.

Dedicated support squads make sense. I am a fan of M32, but I can't see a good reason for a 7.62mm AR. Makes no sense on the weight versus effect case unless it's actually a semi-auto sniper rifle.

I have read a great deal about bullets and which one the military should change to. 5.56, 6.5, 6.8 and 7.62. Also which rifles - HK416, M16A4, XM8, SCAR, LW, etc. It gives me a headache. I feel like the guy in Hamburger Hill talking about which eye to close when a flare goes up and which pill to use to clean his water.

Concur. As an area of discussion it serves no purpose, as concerns IWs unless you are on the extreme end of the spectrums. - and IMO, the area of real discussion is not really about the bullet but other issues.

I am probably way out of my element, but what the heck. Feedback would be nice

No you are not. To my mind, the merit of SWJ is that it's all about what you say, and the strength of reasoned argument. Credentials count for little if you are prone to talk rubbish, or cite your credentials in support of your argument.

[reed11b]

Main advantage of GPMGs is RANGE RANGE RANGE. Otherwise a SAW is just as capable. Any support weapon that can reach the range of a GPMG can supplant them in support. I like the 25mm payload rifle myself, but other options abound. Mortars are a possibility if they could be equiped with PGMs.
As far as big or small sections, that concept is based upon sections being the smallest unit that can act INDEPENDENTLY. Truth is, they can not, not for the most part. So big sections are still to small to effectivly use fire and movement techniques, becouse they can not sustain casulties or meet the variety of threats on the modern battlefield. A platoon is really the smallest unit you want patroling on it's own. See Mr. Owens article on Patrol-based Infantry for an example.

[Ken White]

"A platoon is really the smallest unit you want patroling on it's own. "

Having led or participated in well over a hundred recon and combat patrols in less than Platoon (some less than even Squad) strength, I'm having difficulty seeing a rationale for that.

I would, in fact suggest that a Platoon patrol is a bad idea, too big to hide and too small to fight much...

[reed11b]

I have been on many squad sized patrols as well, but I feel we were lucky to have never been hit with any level of sustain contact. As soon as a squad starts taking casualties, it becomes practically imobilized. Become imbolized and you need rescue. A small platoon may be too large to patrol as a massed unit but it can be dispersed into sections that remain within support range of each other. Particularly for urban combat, lone squad patrols risk the entire squad.
Reed
P.S. Yes I know NCO's LOVE squads becouse that is the tactical echelon they get to lead. Doesn't make them well sized or structured for independent ops however.

[selil]

I guess the Marine fire team patrol to contact concept is gone? LRRPs were five or seven?

[Steve Blair]

LRRPs were 5-7, as was the standard SOG Spike Team or RT. I think Force Recon also ran with a 5-7 man structure. Of course, it also came down to mission. SOG ended up having reaction companies on standby in several areas, and would use those for missions as needed. Basically, if they were sneakin' the small element went in.

[Ken White]

I have been on many squad sized patrols as well, but I feel we were lucky to have never been hit with any level of sustain contact....

but I would hope you were never hit because you were doing it right, not due to luck -- which IMO, is finding a parking place at the Mall during the Christmas Season.

... As soon as a squad starts taking casualties, it becomes practically imobilized. Become imbolized and you need rescue....

I'd say "not necessarily" to either but the more important point is to avoid taking casualties by just doing it right.

...A small platoon may be too large to patrol as a massed unit but it can be dispersed into sections that remain within support range of each other. Particularly for urban combat, lone squad patrols risk the entire squad.

Small or large is immaterial, a Platoon is still too large to hide and to small to fight much of anything even slightly larger.

P.S. Yes I know NCO's LOVE squads because that is the tactical echelon they get to lead. Doesn't make them well sized or structured for independent ops however.

Not the issue at all; that's just silly. I've led more Platoons than I did Squads and in more places; the issue is getting the job done and for Infantry in most cases that means patrolling -- lots and lots of patrolling and then more patrolling. Doing that by Platoon limits the area you can cover and the times you can cover a given area. The advantage to Squad and smaller size patrols is quantity, coverage area and a certain amount of stealth.

A patrol is almost never an independent op, it is an integral part of a planned information gathering or combat action plan of generally a Co or rarely a Bn (or even more rarely, hopefully, of a Bde). It is usually short range and fairly short in duration and it should be planned, if a reconnaissance or presence effort, to avoid contact. Squad size combat patrols are more rare but are ideal for prisoner snatches, OP/LP destruction and a few other things.

We can disagree on the utility of platoon sized patrols.

[reed11b]

I guess the Marine fire team patrol to contact concept is gone? LRRPs were five or seven?

The whole point of LRRPs was NOT to make contact. If they did, they beat feet away. Marine fire team move to contact I am not familier with, but I do not hold Marine tactics in very high regard anyway.

In rural or jungle environments, especially at night, a limited squad patrol (With some sort of ready force backup) makes sense, however, in an urban environment it does not. You can expect contact. You can expect to have no safe exit route. you can EXPECT to take casualties. Combat is becoming increasingly urban and any discusion of unit compisition needs to take this in consideration.
Reed

[Norfolk]

Quite agreed with Ken. The only time you'd use a Platoon in a patrol (as opposed to a hasty or deliberate attack) is on a Fighting Patrol where you're very definitely going out of your way to deal real damage to someone, and in a way that's really going to hurt. As for Squad/Section-level Fighting Patrols, Ken's covered that. But Reconnaissance Patrols on the other hand thrive on the smallest possible number of men; the smallest I've been in was 3 men (it was the Regimental standard at the time), and the largest was 6 (and that was for a longer-range patrol that was tasked with recceing and securing an LZ for a Battalion-level air assault. Personally I had issues with the 3-man Recce Patrol, and these have since been resolved, but a recce patrol can't do its job properly if it can't see without being seen, ever. And that means the fewest possible number of men with the tightest control, creating the least noise, and leaving the least sign.

I remember watching a Recce demonstration put on by a reserve infantry regiment from Toronto years ago. The battalion intelligence officer gave the presentation while eight infantrymen formed up for presentation purposes, and said intelligence officer proceeded to describe how an 8-man Recce Patrol would go about its business. Those of us from The RCR just had our jaws drop; we'd been using 3-man patrols (a figure since slightly adjusted, and to my satisfaction) for years to do what these guys were proposing to do with no less than 8, an entire Section. I remember thinking that this might have worked in Korea, but that wasn't how things were done now.

As for sending a Squad/Section out on an Advance/Movement-to-Contact, as Selil said, this is really done best with the Fire Teams moving autonomously, so they each can see while minimizing their chances of being seen, and presenting no massed target for the enemy. Not the same task obviously as a Recce Patrol of approximately the same size, but the basic principles until contact remain much the same.

[Ken White]

...however, in an urban environment it does not. You can expect contact. You can expect to have no safe exit route. you can EXPECT to take casualties. Combat is becoming increasingly urban and any discusion of unit compisition needs to take this in consideration.
Reed

Seems to me METT-TC, as always, applies. Do the guys in Afghanistan and the Philippines know about this urban stuff?

One should always expect contact and to take casualties. One should never expect to have no safe exit route but acknowledging that can happen, there should be an extraction plan...

...but I do not hold Marine tactics in very high regard anyway.

I suspect some of them feel the same way about Army TTP. Both types have advantages and disadvantages -- like everything else in the world.

[selil]

The whole point of LRRPs was NOT to make contact. If they did, they beat feet away. Marine fire team move to contact I am not familier with, but I do not hold Marine tactics in very high regard anyway.

In rural or jungle environments, especially at night, a limited squad patrol (With some sort of ready force backup) makes sense, however, in an urban environment it does not. You can expect contact. You can expect to have no safe exit route. you can EXPECT to take casualties. Combat is becoming increasingly urban and any discusion of unit compisition needs to take this in consideration.
Reed

Actually LRRPs were used for a variety of missions and capabilities. Perhaps through a myopic lens of artificial constraints on size, capability, and environment what you say makes sense. If you take what was one discussion and impose your own set of rules and ideology to bend the requirements to some expected outcome I am sure you can be quite right. In one very specific if rare occasion in the spectrum of conventional warfare and COIN I am sure there is at least one mission where your proposed size and scope holds sway.

I will take a pass on your rather nasty if childish comment about Marines.

[reed11b]

Not the issue at all; that's just silly.

I can be silly...

I've led more Platoons than I did Squads and in more places; the issue is getting the job done and for Infantry in most cases that means patrolling -- lots and lots of patrolling and then more patrolling. Doing that by Platoon limits the area you can cover and the times you can cover a given area. The advantage to Squad and smaller size patrols is quantity, coverage area and a certain amount of stealth.

But did they operate w/o the other squads also patroling or being in range to provide support? If they made contact, did they "fire and manuever" on there own or did they create a base of fire and call in the other squads? Squads are differnt then fire teams in that they are supposed to "Fire and Manuever" on there own, but in real life they very rarely do, so why create an unessasry layer of command and a faulty doctrine based on it? Can a 5-6 man fire team patrol as effectivly as an 8-man squad?

A patrol is almost never an independent op, it is an integral part of a planned information gathering or combat action plan of generally a Co or rarely a Bn (or even more rarely, hopefully, of a Bde). It is usually short range and fairly short in duration and it should be planned, if a reconnaissance or presence effort, to avoid contact.

On this we agree 100% No argument there. My squad size patrols tended to be of the "lets go kick rocks and see what we stir up" variety, hence my feeling of being lucky we rarely did.

Squad size combat patrols are more rare but are ideal for prisoner snatches, OP/LP destruction and a few other things

Again, can a 5-6 man fire team or a stick of 2-3 5 man fire teams perform the same mission as effectivly as a squad?

We can disagree on the utility of platoon sized patrols.

We probably don't disagree that much, Platoon patrol or movement is for urban conflict since it can take casualties and maintain movement. Again usually as part of a larger unit. I think most of our argument was due to me poorly explaining what I was trying to say. I'll try to take more time to explain clearly in the future.

[Ken White]

I can be silly...

But did they operate w/o the other squads also patroling or being in range to provide support?

Rarely, depended on the location and situation. More so in cities but not universally, almost never away from them. Very rarely in Korea, sometimes in Viet Nam. Varied in other places.

If they made contact, did they "fire and manuever" on there own or did they create a base of fire and call in the other squads?

Since most of the time there were no other elements around, we either fought or scooted.

Squads are differnt then fire teams in that they are supposed to "Fire and Manuever" on there own, but in real life they very rarely do, so why create an unessasry layer of command and a faulty doctrine based on it?

I don't think the doctrine is faulty -- the application is. We don't trust each other as much as we used to and many Commanders are afraid to relinquish too much control for fear of failure. Force protection is IMO overdone also. Risk aversion seems to have become a way of life in much -- not all -- of the Army.

Can a 5-6 man fire team patrol as effectivly as an 8-man squad?

Better -- 8 is too many, five's about the limit for a less than squad patrol, four is good, three will work. Eight isn't useful for much; the old 11 man squad was pretty useful and the Marines 13 man squad is even better. A Squad augmented with an M240 team is not a good idea, the 240's too heavy, hurts agility. In small units, skill and agility trump firepower.

On this we agree 100% No argument there. My squad size patrols tended to be of the "lets go kick rocks and see what we stir up" variety, hence my feeling of being lucky we rarely did.

My perception is that "let's go see what we stir up" has become the norm in US patrolling and recon -- not too smart, IMO. Comes a big war, we can relearn the hard way.

Again, can a 5-6 man fire team or a stick of 2-3 5 man fire teams perform the same mission as effectivly as a squad?

METT-TC rules, always. What do you want to do? What's the best element to accomplish that? What is the least number of people you can expose and still get the mission accomplished?

Platoon patrol or movement is for urban conflict since it can take casualties and maintain movement. Again usually as part of a larger unit.

METT-TC or situation dependent???

[Uboat509]

I have spent a lot of time in units where squad-sized or smaller patrols were commonplace, including a few where the maximum sized patrol possible was twelve men (excluding add-ons like terps or officers). I have found that I am generally more comfortable in a smaller patrol. It's sort of similar to the reason I have avoided mech or armor like the plague my whole career, being the biggest baddest thing on the battlefield may provide you with a certain amount of protection but it also makes you the biggest target on the battlefield. In the context of COIN, it also makes a bigger signature which tends to make the bad guys go find something else to do, not especially useful when the mission is to kill or capture the bad guys. I saw a lot of huge operations come up with squat and a lot of smaller ones come up with success. Broad sweeping statements like, x number of men on a patrol is too small and can't work are not useful and are, in my opinion, generally unsupportable. Even in Iraq, small sniper patrols are having quite a bit of success, largely due to the stealth and agility afforded them by their size. As Ken points out, there is no magic number that is guaranteed to work or guaranteed to fail. METT-TC will determine that number for you and there are no reliable shortcuts around that fact.

SFC W

[Darksaga]

It will be interesting to see if they do bring back the M60 as a commonly used crew served weapon.

Two years ago I heard the testing of the new barrel for the M60 while in the field. As many of you know the M60 has a very distinct sound to it that is unmistakable.

Whoever was testing it was going cyclic on the weapon for several minutes. It was very impressive.

I guess the real question will be is if that type of weapon is still applicable in a COIN environment?

[William F. Owen]

Main advantage of GPMGs is RANGE RANGE RANGE. Otherwise a SAW is just as capable. Any support weapon that can reach the range of a GPMG can supplant them in support. I like the 25mm payload rifle myself, but other options abound. Mortars are a possibility if they could be equiped with PGMs.

In terms of weapons and ammunition weight, as well as cost, the SAW is very roughly half what a GPMG is. A SAW weights 7.5kg and 500 rnds 5.56mm link is 6.07kg. An M240 weighs 12.5kg and 500 rounds weighs 13.5kg.

However the SAW is proposed and generally employed as a one man weapon. The GPMG is at the very least a two to three man weapon in terms of effective employment. Individual loads can be far better balance across a dedicated GPMG team, than a lone SAW gunner, especially once TI sights and range finders are scaled. 7.62mm rounds will also destroy and perforate cover, that a 5.56mm weapon cannot.

If you want to leverage that capability in a 7.62mm LAR, then an HK-417 weighs 4.23 kg and 500 rounds is 14.6kg (I think - check my figures)

- So two men with 7.62mm LARs, and 240 rounds carry less weight than carried by one man with an M-249, and 500 rounds. Even if the SAW carries 250 round he is is just carrying 1 kg more. It's not just range. Weight versus capability versus numbers are also critical.

As far as big or small sections, that concept is based upon sections being the smallest unit that can act INDEPENDENTLY. Truth is, they can not, not for the most part. So big sections are still to small to effectivly use fire and movement techniques, becouse they can not sustain casulties or meet the variety of threats on the modern battlefield. A platoon is really the smallest unit you want patroling on it's own. See Mr. Owens article on Patrol-based Infantry for an example.

As the author (very glad you read my work. Thank you) I am not sure this is what I wish to imply. My personal advocacy on this matter is that of the multiple, with is 3-5 x 3-5 man teams. So smallest is 3 x 3 and biggest is 5 x 5. Personally I believe that patrol size is dictated far more by the level of support the patrol can expect than anything else. If you are in rural terrain and have everything I want on the end of a radio, 15 mins out, you can probably live with 6 men. 6 men on a summer afternoon in Gaza, Dundalk or even Fallujah may not be optimal.

...and as far as I can tell the average SOG OP-35 RT Patrol was usually 8 men, 3 x USSF and 5 Indig. My notes are in a suitcase somewhere but I know of only one RT that ran as 3 (and only once), but I am sure several teams ran heavy with 12 or more. Both Plaster's and Greco's books contain detailed numbers.

...and DAMN! Reed is that you Buddy?? Good to know you're out there! Welcome aboard. Dismiss all the condescending mathematics at the start of this post - you know where I'm coming from!

[VMI_Marine]

It will be interesting to see if they do bring back the M60 as a commonly used crew served weapon.

I don't see why they would. The M240B is a good weapon. The Marine Corps is actually converting all of our 240Gs to 240Bs. I just wanted the front rail system and the heat shield, but once they converted my team's gun I saw what a difference the hydraulic buffer makes. It slowed the rate of fire down a good bit, and greatly increased the reliability.

[Fuchs]

I've got a question.
This "patrol" thing as mentioned all the time by U.S. and Commonwealth people doesn't fit into well to what Germany armies did. Patrols of such sizes (squad to platoon) were usually mounted or patrolling along the lines the gaps between Eastern Front strongpoints (usually along otherwise empty trenches or channels).

"We" apply some different patrols for base security around Kunduz, but I don't know the size. Maybe they use squads now. There are certainly not enough men in the base for proper patrolling in more than squad strength. Kundus is unique because the terrain offers no opportunity for stealth unless you move at night and hide at day on high ground. But afaik stealth is not desired in Kunduz anyway because the patrols shall and do deter the Taleban from using 107mm rockets.

The most common battlefield scouting mission in German armies was a stealth-oriented 2-3 men team that infiltrates a short distance (2 km for example) and reports back (or, if it just scouts without infiltration it was often a lieutenant with one or two soldiers).

Platoon-sized dismounted ops were either "Stoßtrupp" actions; strictly offensive, to take out a single position or to take prisoners or they were movement to contact.


I'm a bit confused about this focus on patrolling in U.S. and UK. Maybe it's a consequence of the many LIC in the past two generations?

------

About the M240; it may suffice, but it's much heavier than necessary.
Even the Russian PKM and its decendant Pecheneg is better in some regards.
I would recommend the SS-77 from South Africa for the U.S.Army: http://world.guns.ru/machine/mg13-e.htm
2+ kg saved without a loss of capability and the tactical employment would be the same (unlike with the MG3 which is different because of its high ROF, but also lighter than M240).

[reed11b]

Hey WilF, good to see you are still putting out new thought provoking work, keep it up.
Fuchs, the patrol focus in this discusion is probably my fault since I used it incorrectly to define offensive movements outside the wire (Iraq).
My concept on "squad" size is based on there not being a need for squads and that a fire-team based platoon is more aplicable to modern ops. Arrainging squads for the assault or defense or even patrol like you see in many "perfect squad size/compisition" discusions makes very little sense since the enemy and the conditions you fight in have a say in what is ideal anyway. My ideas differ from WilF's only in minor details, so reading his article is the best way to figure what I am trying to say since I am doing a poor job of it myself.
Reed
Anychance of getting an imbedded spellchecker? that would be grate..errrr great.

[Ken White]

I've got a question.
This "patrol" thing as mentioned all the time by U.S. and Commonwealth people doesn't fit into well to what Germany armies did. Patrols of such sizes (squad to platoon) were usually mounted or patrolling along the lines the gaps between Eastern Front strongpoints (usually along otherwise empty trenches or channels).

Commonwealth and US patrols are used for for that. Commonly called Contact Patrols (sometimes by some Communications Patrols). No sense sending a Platoon or even a Squad if a Team sized patrol is adequate, the size is very much situation dependent...

...afaik stealth is not desired in Kunduz anyway because the patrols shall and do deter the Taleban from using 107mm rockets.

That too. "Presence" patrols. A squad sized patrol is ideal for that, big enough to deter the casual shooter (if said Squad acts like it knows what it's doing) and small enough to be reasonably agile while allowing more time and space coverage than a Platoon sized patrol...

The most common battlefield scouting mission in German armies was a stealth-oriented 2-3 men team that infiltrates a short distance (2 km for example) and reports back (or, if it just scouts without infiltration it was often a lieutenant with one or two soldiers).

A whole lot of that, the bulk of patrols in fact (outside COIN / LIC where the presence patrol does both show the flag and recon work). Reconnaissance (US 'Recon,' Commonwealth 'Recce') patrols -- except it's generally 4 or 5 people and only very rarely is an Officer sent. Four is pretty common for the simple reasons that's the size of a US fire Team (a half squad) and allows two buddy pairs.

Platoon-sized dismounted ops were either "Stoßtrupp" actions; strictly offensive, to take out a single position or to take prisoners or they were movement to contact.

Generically called Combat Patrols in the US. The same except that the minimum number required for the mission is usually sent to reduce exposure; no sense sending a Platoon of 40 plus if ten or twelve people are adequate for the mission.

I'm a bit confused about this focus on patrolling in U.S. and UK. Maybe it's a consequence of the many LIC in the past two generations?

Not really, most of our 'doctrine' was developed in WW I, refined in WW II (both Theaters of Operations) and has really received only minor tweaks since then; aggressive and extensive patrolling was found to avid surprises and to develop a lot of intel. That proved true also in Korea, in Viet Nam and today. It is still with us since, generally, it works. It could be improved in some instances but Armies change slowly...

About the M240; it may suffice, but it's much heavier than necessary. Even the Russian PKM and its decendant Pecheneg is better in some regards. I would recommend the SS-77 from South Africa for the U.S.Army: 2+ kg saved without a loss of capability and the tactical employment would be the same (unlike with the MG3 which is different because of its high ROF, but also lighter than M240).

All true but we have a bad problem with the "it wasn't invented here syndrome." I recall a Bundeswehr LTC pointing out that the US would buy the Karcher Decon device, engineer it for seven years until it no longer worked and then adopt it. He was about right...