Rifle squad composition

[Ken White]

... If that is the case then why are some Marine squad leaders in Iraq are splitting their squads into two teams of 6 Marines each?
. . .

One of my best Marine Platoon Sergeants told me he did it on Okinawa because he had no faith in his youngest Team Leader. I saw people who had done that in Korea, generally for the same reason. I also saw those who refused to do it and either made the weak guy perform or made him a BAR man and put a sharp Private in as the Team Leader.

The latter would seem to me to be the better solution from the standpoint of accountability and leader selection and training. The former will work; the Squad Leader has -- or should have -- the flexibility to organize within reason the way he wishes.

I also saw a guy in Korea who had three fire teams; one with a really good shooter and one BAR; one with two BARs. Those two were his split base of fire. The third Fire Team was the assault element of five Riflemen (including one de jure Team Leader as a Snuffy) under his best Corporal. His rationale was that accurate and automatic fire kept the bad guys down and the BAR Men weren't as mobile and flexible as riflemen. He went where he thought he needed to be at the time.

Wouldn't have done it that way myself but whatever works.

[Cavguy]

The former will work; the Squad Leader has -- or should have -- the flexibility to organize within reason the way he wishes .... His rationale was that accurate and automatic fire kept the bad guys down and the BAR Men weren't as mobile and flexible as riflemen. He went where he thought he needed to be at the time.

Wouldn't have done it that way myself but whatever works.

Amazing how we're having this big debate on proper squad/team tactics.

Seems to me that the NCO SL's and TL's through the wars have pretty quickly adapted "standard" techniques to whatever works best for their particular areas and leadership compentencies - and perhaps there isn't a "right" solution. Hmmmm .... amazing discovery!

Debating how many MG's in a squad can be enlightening, but the real question is whether you're keeping the organization flexible enough to adapt to the enviornment.

[Ken White]

Amazing how we're having this big debate on proper squad/team tactics.

Seems to me that the NCO SL's and TL's through the wars have pretty quickly adapted "standard" techniques to whatever works best for their particular areas and leadership compentencies - and perhaps there isn't a "right" solution. Hmmmm .... amazing discovery!

Debating how many MG's in a squad can be enlightening, but the real question is whether you're keeping the organization flexible enough to adapt to the enviornment.

Or, far more importantly, training the NCOS and the troops as best we can to do their jobs...

[Norfolk]

[QUOTE=Ken White;29680]Or, far more importantly, training the NCOS and the troops as best we can to do their jobs...[/QUOTE

Yes, the single best solution of all.

Unfortunately that would mean the Army having to pull more or less a Vandergriff; how can you get Congress and the top brass to go to a 6-month infantry syllabus, just for an ordinary rifleman, let alone for the NCO's and officers, when you've got people like the unidentified 3-Star spouting off about how firepower completely dispenses with the need for any but the most rudimentary training? As Patton himself said, poor-quality infantry depends on firepower, and the American infantry needs all it can get.

With the Army haemoraging so much of its junior officers and NCO's and recruiting standards falling considerably, any future attempts to improve quality and training are rendered much less effective. And this shows up most clearly at the minor-unit level, where the real fighting is done.

This isn't a deliberate slight to the US Army, which is certainly better now than in any previous war with the possible exception of the Army that fought Desert Storm. And the other English-speaking Armies (never mind others) aren't nearly as well off in that regard as they could be (or even were until recent years) either, but it just goes to show how entrenched the mentality against really comprehensive training and the development of thinking and initiative in all ranks and grades is.

And that of course, was why the German Rifle Squad was so successful. Whether it was the Panzer-Grenadier Squad with a dozen men and two GPMGs, or the Infanterie Squad with ten men and one GPMG, the mental agility and personal initiative of all ranks, from ordinary rifleman to squad leader, gave the German Squad a tactical edge over its opponents that it never really quite lost. The squad leader knew what had to be done, he task-organized his squad to fit the tactical situation using what he had, and just did it. Other than that the Squad Leader controlled the fire of whatever machine guns the squad had, and that the Assistant Squad Leader led whatever assault the squad made, the squad was wonderfully fluid; a sort of tactical chameleon that assumed whatever form that suited the situation best. And it worked.

Cavguy's right; some of us have been looking at the wrong things when thinking about the rifle squad. I still like the USMC Squad though...

[Rifleman]

I found an article and thought it fit well with this thread. It's about African soldiers from the Tutsi tribe in Rwanda and the way they conduct a double envelopment at the squad level.

The key to Tutsi's (Rwandese Patriotic Army) tactics was the double envelopment; a tactic which embraces the fundamentals of manoeuvre warfare. The double envelopment is seldom used in warfare, but when it has been successfully executed, the enemy force is ultimately annihilated. The use of manoeuvre, speed, surprise and the application and concentration of firepower enables a force to:

- Surround An Opponent

- Attack Simultaneously From All Sides

- Cut Off Any Escape Routes

- Prevent Reinforcement, and

- Demoralize the Enemy

History offers several examples of successful double envelopment attacks like the Carthaginians over the Romans at Cannae, the Zulus over the British at Isandlawana, and the Russians over the Germans at Stalingrad. A key feature of these battles was that in most cases the victor attacked with equal and sometimes with inferior strength or equipment to ultimately destroy the defending enemy forces. The double envelopment, properly executed, can succeed without the benefit of a traditional three to one superiority deemed essential for the more conventional and attritional attack we have adhered to in our doctrine in the recent past.

Article here: http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a397a16354784.htm

[Ken White]

With very strong emphasis on the second 'T' (quality of own troops) and the 'E' (quantity of bad guys) in that order. The first 'T' is also a determinant; Regardless, I wouldn't advise that on plains, desert or anywhere with more than a 30-50m line of fire...

(The subject line converts my all caps to upper and lower??? I hate smart A%$ programs... )

[jcustis]

...and Norfolk and others are hitting it on the head. Regardless of a whether one has a 9-man, 11-man, or 13-man squad, the SL will have more in the way of plays (instead of up the middle) when he has good-caliber training.

Once you couple training with the appropriate number of exercises and scenarios, the SL can recognize the pattern of what he sees before him, or at least what he is about to face, then task organize appropriately before he crosses the line of departure.

This business of C2 over a large squad can be an easily managed tasked considering the current range of comm sets available to a SL and his TLs. I think we've satisfactorily moved out of the experimentation stage with sets like the Marconi Personal Role Radio and it is being employed with great effect on the battlefield. It takes comm discipline, no doubt, but I think on the whole a SL can control a patrol, attack, and defense with greater ease.

In my humble analysis, the A76 radio carried by Rhodesian teams went a long way towards reducing fratricide because the commander in the circling K-Car had contact with the moving parts on the ground below, and those parts could talk between themselves.

The Marine Corps just recently broke out of the hamstringing effect from having only 1 VHF radio at the platoon level around the 2002-2003 timeframe. Anyone remember the piece of #### PRC-68? Now I can watch a scout section leader (running four 3-4 man teams) maneuver from a movement to contact formation and transition into a hasty attack without raising his voice save to control the rate of fire of the SBF's weapons. We were relegated to the use of hand-held ground or aerial pyrotechnic signals, whistles, etc., back in the day, so yes, squad level fire and maneuver was a dangerous proposition.

Perhaps the best way to resolve the winner in this discussion would be to instrument a light infantry squad each from the Army and Marine Corps and run them through a series of experiments. After the first round, shake things up and have the Army squad run through in a 13-man configuration, and the Marine Corps shrinks down to the Army size. Are we going to get any empirical evidence out of it? Most likely not, but I suspect that comparably trained SLs will be able to achieve certain results based on a wide-range of variables that include a little bit training, a bit flexibility to task-organize on the fly, and a bit doctrine.

I need to sit down tonight and finish that second, more lengthy article.

[wm]

I found an article and thought it fit well with this thread. It's about African soldiers from the Tutsi tribe in Rwanda and the way they conduct a double envelopment at the squad level.

The bottom line from where I sit is that a double envelopment works because the losing side commits some major errors in deploying its forces. And that would be the case whether we are talking about squad tactics or operational deployments at the level of an Army Group. Create a salient or leave a flank unguarded and you are just asking to be taken in defilade from the flank or rear.

The better lesson to learn is that to be successful in any level of engagement, quality, timely reconnaissance is a must. As Ken White noted, it is a question of METT-TC (even though Ken left off the C), with everything after Mission (including that pesky Civilian situation) being a very important factor in deciding how to achieve that mission.

I suspect that for every successful double envelopment, there are probably a host of failed attempts, often with disasterous results for the attacker. The Zulus were successsful once against the British and failed noticeably at least two other times in large combat efforts--Ulundi and Rorke's Drift.

Allegedly, the German General Staff was enamored of Cannae from the time it was the Prussian Staff. Attempts to use double envelopments caused more losses than vistories in both World Wars. While the Russians were successful at Stalingrad, in the Battle of Berlin they tried another double envelopment without success. In fact, their casualties were phenomenal. I suspect the oly reason they succeded was because FM Schoerner, the German Army Group Center Commander, failed to commit his reserve in a timely way, which allowed Konev to turn the flank of Heinrici's position on the Seelow Heights.
(Sorry for dragging big battles into a discussion of squad tactics, but the principles are the same IMO)

[Norfolk]

rather than purely the tactical genius of the Cannae'r. Both Ken and wm are right about this. The PLA Rifle Squad (3 "Cells", with 1 AR and 2 RPGs in the Squad) also tends to favour the double-envelopment (as well as some other similar East Asian Squads); the RPA Squad is very similar (minus one RPG, and with the Squad Leader integrated into one of the teams). But this is usually made possible by the close (often very close) terrain that tends to mask heavy automatic weapons fire from more than one element (much of East Asia is rather tight terrain). Otherwise, the double-envelopment is useful on a cut-off, rather incompetent enemy who has no place to go, and no reasonable prospect of relief.

Rifleman, I first read this article about ten years ago in the Infantry Journal, and this is where I first began to comprehend how a 3-team Squad could operate. The original article had nice illustrations, but the Infantry Journal (along with a whole lot else) was removed from public Internet access a few years ago. The author, B.P. Beardsley, went to NDHQ and then NATO HQ not long after this. Tom asked for this article on the "Who Are the Great Generals?" Thread a few weeks ago, given his Africa background. I find this to be, nevertheless, a fascinating article.

Anyone remembering carrying the PRC-25 (I prefer not to, myself)?

The WWII German Rifle Squad never used Fire Teams or Battle Drill; instead it cultivated the independence of mind and ability to learn of its troops (eveyone trained to think and to assume leadership two levels above their own). The Deutchesheer didn't have the minor-unit tactical problems (or controversies) that other Armies have had all along (barring the PLA and USMC and a couple of others). If we're going to look at the Rifle Squad/Section clearly, we have to start with the human factors, then move on to the organization and the shiny kit.

That does not mean that we will be giving up on a 3-team squad for example; just that it means we have to take a long hard look at the kind of man making up that squad, and what he's expected to do and what he's expected to face - then deal with the rest. Thinking about the "German Way" - amongst others - may be a good way to approach this.

[Rank amateur]

The bottom line from where I sit is that a double envelopment works because the losing side commits some major errors in deploying its forces.

Often true, but not necessarily: cavalry, mechanized units, and even the youngest, fastest Zulus, can encircle slow moving "grunts."
Second, all warfare is based upon deception, so the mistake can be forced.
Third, the Zulus were armed primarily with swords and spears, so they deserve major props for their victory. Everyone who says "we can't be defeated because of our superior training and weapons" should be forced to read about Isandlawana.

[Ken White]

...
. . .
As Ken White noted, it is a question of METT-TC (even though Ken left off the C), with everything after Mission (including that pesky Civilian situation) being a very important factor in deciding how to achieve that mission.
. . .
(Sorry for dragging big battles into a discussion of squad tactics, but the principles are the same IMO)

Anyone who thinks a Squad Leader in combat is going to devote much attention to that newly added 'C' is perhaps an optimist...

(Aside from the fact that I thought the populace was a part of the 'terrain' )

Remember I'm a Neanderthal. I am very firmly convinced that a lot of todays terminology and acronyms are short sighted, cheesy and unhelpful; unhelpful to the extent they're going to get people killed unnecessarily in rare cases and are going to send very bad messages in many cases.

I agree with you that the principles used in big battles equate to those at Squad (or Platoon) level but the practice is vastly different and one must be very careful not to try conflating the two. Been my observation that such conflation in discussion can lead some to believe that a minor Cannae is possible with a nine man squad...

[jcustis]

I posted this on another board and didn't get much response. I'm curious to know what people here might think of it.

Well rifleman, if the number of responses here is any measure of success, I guess this proves many of us really miss our younger years.

[Rifleman]

Ken White,

A curiosity question: if you had to pick just one confict, between WWI and today, to study the rifle squad in combat for lessons learned which one would it be?

I was thinking Korea might provide the broadest range of examples.

Your thoughts, please?

[Ken White]

Ken White,

A curiosity question: if you had to pick just one confict, between WWI and today, to study the rifle squad in combat for lessons learned which one would it be?

I was thinking Korea might provide the broadest range of examples.

Your thoughts, please?

Korea had it all. Full bore conventional war engaging in both defense and offense; in both cases with both very rapid long range attacking elements on both sides and with agonizingly slow frontal attack slogging and including night and day attacks by both forces. There were COIN ops, static warfare and extensive patrolling (both combat and reconnaissance, short and long range). It included raids and prisoner snatch missions, combat outposts, economy of force ops, trench clearing, urban warfare, phib landings, heliborne assualts; the full range of missions.

Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Iraq and other operations all have some of those things but not at the extent, length and intensity that prevailed in Korea. There's also more specialization in VN and today, taking units out of some mission sets.

Far more importantly, there is a very significant difference then and now -- then sending a squad on a totally independent mission and trusting the Squad Leader to make decisions was the norm. I know that by the late 60s for a variety of reasons (mostly very flawed personnel policy) such independence was not acceptable to many in senior positions in the Army.

My perception today is that such independence is actively and strongly discouraged if not explicitly forbidden. That IMO is criminal malfeasance. I cannot in good conscience blame the Bn and below commanders, they grew up in a system that discourages that -- I can and do blame their Bosses who inherited that tendency but fail to see the errors in the approach. Before someone flames me for that and points out that Squads are patrolling in both theater (finally... ), ask the question; "Would I agree to sending a Squad on a three day mission in the other guys territory out of artillery range and with possibly spotty communication?" If the answer is 'no,' don't flame.

It is also tacit acknowledgment that our 'doctrine' is flawed and our training is not adequate. That is really criminal...

[wm]

Anyone who thinks a Squad Leader in combat is going to devote much attention to that newly added 'C' is perhaps an optimist...

(Aside from the fact that I thought the populace was a part of the 'terrain' )

Remember I'm a Neanderthal. I am very firmly convinced that a lot of todays terminology and acronyms are short sighted, cheesy and unhelpful; unhelpful to the extent they're going to get people killed unnecessarily in rare cases and are going to send very bad messages in many cases.

I agree with you that the principles used in big battles equate to those at Squad (or Platoon) level but the practice is vastly different and one must be very careful not to try conflating the two. Been my observation that such conflation in discussion can lead some to believe that a minor Cannae is possible with a nine man squad...

In a COIN fight, I suspect that every swingin' Richard out there ought to be thinking about the C in METT-TC a whole lot and their squad leaders,PSGs, and 1SGs better be making sure they do. The NCO chain is about making sure troops do the right things and not get put in jail for letting their "testosterone" do the thinking for them.

I agree that practical application of the principles vary with the size of the organization and the size of the fight, but you can't train folks without some basic set of principles to apply situationally. "Alfa Fire Team lays down a base of fire while Bravo maneuvers right to take the high ground" is just as much an application of mass, maneuver, and economy of force as is "1 ID makes the main effort on the left with 3ACR screening to the right. 2ID and 1AD follow and support to exploit the penetration by 1 ID. 210 FA BDE is DS to 1ID, o/o DS to 1AD."

[Ken White]

In a COIN fight, I suspect that every swingin' Richard out there ought to be thinking about the C in METT-TC a whole lot and their squad leaders,PSGs, and 1SGs better be making sure they do. The NCO chain is about making sure troops do the right things and not get put in jail for letting their "testosterone" do the thinking for them.

I agree that practical application of the principles vary with the size of the organization and the size of the fight, but you can't train folks without some basic set of principles to apply situationally. "Alfa Fire Team lays down a base of fire while Bravo maneuvers right to take the high ground" is just as much an application of mass, maneuver, and economy of force as is "1 ID makes the main effort on the left with 3ACR screening to the right. 2ID and 1AD follow and support to exploit the penetration by 1 ID. 210 FA BDE is DS to 1ID, o/o DS to 1AD."

Huh? Not just restricted to COIN, watching out for civilians applies to all levels of war, I'd think.

They do. Think about civilians, that is. But at Squad level, it's an individual thing -- I mean the civilians in view on one hand and the individual actions of Joe on the other hand. If Joe and his boss are well trained, it will all go well. It's an action thing, not a planning parameter. Wheras at higher echelons it's a group and planning thing, a thinking thing...

If the kids are trained well, they'll do well. If they are not -- or if someone blows it and flips out (and anyone can flip out given the wrong triggers at the right time) then all the harrumphing about the chain of command -- officer and NCO -- "not doing their job" is immaterial and is nothing but, in all too many cases, after the fact CYA.

If they're trained well, they're less likely to err and they'll also spot and the chain will remove the likely weak links. Sadly my son tried to do that to two kids who worked for him in Afghanistan last year, his CO agreed -- Bn overruled and the kids stayed until one got hurt and got some others hurt by failing to react in time while the other wigged out.

That strikes me as a case where the NCOs were doing their job and so were the Company Grades but they ran into a Field Grade let down...

I've seen that too many places and too times over too many years. It is simply not smart.

Moving right along,

Unfortunately, what you find out at Squad level is that those doctrinal principles sound fine and work well on paper -- or even in a MILES engagement. OTOH, when there are a lot of real caps popping, that goes by the wayside. Really. It becomes a rock to rock or tree to tree or room to room effort in disjointed gaggles and Team members get mixed up, the SAW gunner gets hit, Murphy is everywhere. Just isn't as neat and pretty as it is in the book.

Yet, the Company can still say, honestly, that "First Platoon executed fire and maneuver and cleared the objective at 1545Z."

Consider also that if you are a Division OpO, Drowning Creek at Camp McKall you will not even notice in your planning; at Bde level you may or may not notice it, probably not but you almost certainly will not think of it as an obstacle. Nor, likely, will the Bn S3.

As a Company Commander, you'll note that it IS an obstacle and as a Platoon Leader, you will flat know it's an obstacle -- and a significant one.

Echelons matter. Significantly. Your stated tenet is one of the major flaws in our doctrine today; all people of the same rank and specialty are interchangeable (they aren't) and all doctrine is echelon immaterial -- it flat is not.

Ron has asked several times about factors at the Operational level. We don't do it well because we try to stretch tactical doctrine upward and strategic thought (we have no strategic doctrine) down.

As the Actress said to the Bishop, size matters...

[wm]

Unfortunately, what you find out at Squad level is that those doctrinal principles sound fine and work well on paper -- or even in a MILES engagement. OTOH, when there are a lot of real caps popping, that goes by the wayside. Really. It becomes a rock to rock or tree to tree or room to room effort in disjointed gaggles and Team members get mixed up, the SAW gunner gets hit, Murphy is everywhere. Just isn't as neat and pretty as it is in the book.

This is true at all levels. I suspect we would all agree to the old saw that no plan survives first contact. My point was that some things are, or should be, pretty much second nature: things like performing immediate action on a jammed weapon, assaulting directly into an ambush, getting fuel, ammunition resupply, and fire support well forward but still in a position to be coverd and able to una$$ the AO quickly all apply as basic principles that get tailored continuously as the situation unfolds.

Consider also that if you are a Division OpO, Drowning Creek at Camp McKall you will not even notice in your planning; at Bde level you may or may not notice it, probably not but you almost certainly will not think of it as an obstacle. Nor, likely, will the Bn S3.

As a Company Commander, you'll note that it IS an obstacle and as a Platoon Leader, you will flat know it's an obstacle -- and a significant one.

Fact of the matter is that Drowning Creek ought to be significant to all levels of the command. How siginificant varies by echelon, but if the Division is dependent on 1-A/1-509 crossing it to seize an objective that is the lynchpin to the division's plan (and the Div 2/3 planners need to look at that level quite often), it needs to loom much larger at higher echelons. I remember having signifcant discussions with my ADC (M) about the terrain in the North German plain--we actually grappled for hours with 1:50,000 map sheets of most of the area, debating such things as how easy it would be to execute a division level or higher delaying action against the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany. Streams that didn't look like obstacles to a Bde-sized force turned out to be significant issues when we started talking about getting an M-88 across them to recover mobility kills or a HEMMT fueler forward to the tank company task organized to a mech bn Task Force. Failure by senior planners to view the problems that could be caused by using one narrow road and a blown bridge (things a good company plan would have noted as issues) had a lot to do with the Arnhem debacle in WWII.

Echelons matter. Significantly. Your stated tenet is one of the major flaws in our doctrine today; all people of the same rank and specialty are interchangeable (they aren't) and all doctrine is echelon immaterial -- it flat is not.

Agree conmpletely. I think you missed my point. I never argued that all people of a given grade and/or speciality are interchangeable. Rather I urged us to start with some common basis of training that could be expanded and modified--a building block approach. We don't start our kids out reading War and Peace nor do we expect our budding linguists to be able to explain the grammar of Farsi after a week at DLI. We build to those capabilities through a series of steps.

As the Actress said to the Bishop, size matters...

As the poet Andrew Marvell said "To his Coy Mistress"

Had we but world enough, and time,
This coyness, lady, were no crime.
We would sit down and think which way
To walk, and pass our long love's day

But we have not enough of either so we need some shortcuts to get us trained to do what needs to be done a little faster.

[Ken White]

This is true at all levels... all apply as basic principles that get tailored continuously as the situation unfolds.

Agreed.

Fact of the matter is that Drowning Creek ought to be significant to all levels of the command. How siginificant varies by echelon, but if the Division is dependent on 1-A/1-509 crossing it to seize an objective that is the lynchpin to the division's plan (and the Div 2/3 planners need to look at that level quite often), it needs to loom much larger at higher echelons. I remember having signifcant discussions with my ADC (M) about the terrain in the North German plain--we actually grappled for hours with 1:50,000 map sheets of most of the area, debating such things as how easy it would be to execute a division level or higher delaying action against the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany. Streams that didn't look like obstacles to a Bde-sized force turned out to be significant issues when we started talking about getting an M-88 across them to recover mobility kills or a HEMMT fueler forward to the tank company task organized to a mech bn Task Force. Failure by senior planners to view the problems that could be caused by using one narrow road and a blown bridge (things a good company plan would have noted as issues) had a lot to do with the Arnhem debacle in WWII.

Strongly disagree. I'd suggest a Div planning for ops on the north German plain should be using a 1:100K map or even a 1:250K-- we have a bad tendency to over control and over interfere. Why would a Div staff O be worried about an M-88? Three echelons, max. That means the Div should be pondering affairs at no lower than Bn level. We fought WW II failrly successfully that way, did reasonably well in Korea that way and then in Viet Nam learned to over control simply because the Staffs were too big and the Helicopter provided the capability. Capability does not provide a need. We have picked up a lot of bad habits in the last 40 years.

On Arnhem, I'll bet you money that the Guards Armored Brigade surfaced that problem to XXX Corps and was told to press on. That mindset, that the senior Hq planners know best is a killer, pure and simple.

Agree conmpletely. I think you missed my point. I never argued that all people of a given grade and/or speciality are interchangeable...

I know, I was referring to our archaic personnel system and tying that to our equally archaic doctrine and only slightly less archaic training institutions and dogma.

Not least the fallacy that "we cannot afford to train a person for other than their next job." Ludicrous. When I worked at the Armor School, I used to ask the AOAC students how many of them had been either a Bn/Bde Staff principal or a Co/Trp Cdr before they came to the Advanced Course. Seven years, two classes a year and the average was over 80%...

If we're going to send people into combat, we need to train them to two levels above their current job because the probability -- if not certainty -- is that they will rise to that level in combat without benefit of further training. The Army knows this but refuses to decrease hardware emphasis because in our flawed system, hardware means flags and space...

Rather I urged us to start with some common basis of training that could be expanded and modified--a building block approach. We don't start our kids out reading War and Peace nor do we expect our budding linguists to be able to explain the grammar of Farsi after a week at DLI. We build to those capabilities through a series of steps.

Agree -- with the caveat that my contention is that our current doctrine does not do that. It takes Div practices and tries to scale them down and that does not work.

Divisions are not good creatures, they probably should be consigned to history. Consider that we have not truly fought Divisions in all our history other than in the North African and SW Asia deserts -- the terrain lends itself to Divisions. Even in NW Europe in WW II, it was an RCT War, so was the Pacific theater and so was Korea. Viet Nam was a Battalion war and, in good units, a Company war (that should have been a Platoon war but our Platoons were not well enough trained to be allowed to do that...).

Read Charles MacDonald's "A Time for Trumpets" and discover that in the Battle of the Bulge, most all the LTC and below organizations did the best they could with the situation; it was at at the upper echelons that the majority of screwups occurred.

Building blocks are needed, no question -- we just do not do it well.

But we have not enough of either so we need some shortcuts to get us trained to do what needs to be done a little faster.

Strongly disagree. I heard that for 45 years in and around the Army and for that same 45 years I watched a lot of time and effort wasted on sometimes gross stupidity and on over educating senior people and undertraining the folks who get M88s across creeks.

The Armed Forces of the US still manage all too often to cram two hours worth of instruction into eight hours, have grown unwilling in may cases to trust subordinates (because said subordinates are inadequately trained??? ), are massively into micromanagement and are too frequently terrified that something will go wrong. Risk avoidance and combat are mutually incompatible. Risk and 'shortcuts' are not the same thing. Shortcuts get people killed. Risk does not -- it just harms careers.

In reviewing this, it sounds churlish. Isn't meant to be and I'm certainly not attacking you or your thoughts. It's just that this is a long term sore subject with me. We waste a lot of potential and the bureaucratic and sclerotic approach seems to be getting worse instead of better. I've watched micro management and poor training kill too many people to accept either gracefully. Sorry and sincerely, no offense intended.

[wm]

The Armed Forces of the US still manage all too often to cram two hours worth of instruction into eight hours, have grown unwilling in may cases to trust subordinates (because said subordinates are inadequately trained??? ), are massively into micromanagement and are too frequently terrified that something will go wrong. Risk avoidance and combat are mutually incompatible. Risk and 'shortcuts' are not the same thing. Shortcuts get people killed. Risk does not -- it just harms careers.

In reviewing this, it sounds churlish. Isn't meant to be and I'm certainly not attacking you or your thoughts. It's just that this is a long term sore subject with me. We waste a lot of potential and the bureaucratic and sclerotic approach seems to be getting worse instead of better. I've watched micro management and poor training kill too many people to accept either gracefully. Sorry and sincerely, no offense intended.

Ken,
Agree. I did not mean to propose that we cut training short, Because other funding priorities (which we both seem to agree are misplaced) have mandated curtailled training, we need a risk management strategy. This strategy must mitigate as much as possible of the risk that results from cutting training. Rather than sidetrack this thread on squad org, tactics, and tng, I sent you a PM on other issues from your reply to my post.

[Rifleman]

Okay, we seem to be agreed that big squads/sections are the best option, and some good ideas about how to best organize them have been advanced. We know that we would like big squads or three team squads to be TOE but here's the reality: the Army light infantry units can't do that. They're going to be stuck with nine men (on paper) in two balanced fire teams. That won't change anytime soon, so, what to do, what to do.....

I think three options exist for the squad and platoon leader: 1) leave things as is, try to employ two balanced fire teams as much as possible; 2) reorganize the squads by placing both SAWS in one fire team, or removing one SAW if the squad is understrength, leaving a suppression team and a clearing team; 3) break up the fourth (weapons) squad and feed the men into the three rifle squads in an attempt to achieve something close to the three team Marine Corps squad, or, at least the old Army squad with two big fire teams.

I like option three the best. I'd bet that a machine gun team is usually attached directly to the lead squad for most operations now, making it, defacto, a three team squad anyway.

If it really is a "Three block war" in built up areas, then squads are probably the key level. Organizing for the platoon leader to employ a weapons squad of machine gun and rocket teams seems to be planning for a more open style of combat with conventional attacks in a German forest, grazing fire in the defense, etc.

And yes, I just had to be the 100th poster on this thread.